

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS
SWEDEN, 1727-1789

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1689—1789

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PREFACE

THE story of British relations with Sweden during almost the whole of our period is one long tale of struggle for control with France, principally carried on by rival expenditure of money. While Count Horn retained power advantage stayed rather with Great Britain, but after his fall France gained domination so complete, that from 1748 to 1764 Great Britain could not even be represented at Stockholm. After the Seven Years' War the battle was resumed on even terms, though now it was Russia that had chief say in the affairs of the north.

The dispatches grow somewhat wearisome in their iteration of fruitless negotiation for alliance or for the hire of troops or ships, of tirade against France, of money-grants for work with the successive diets. Perhaps the most interesting part of them is what relates to Russia. The ministers of Anne, of Elizabeth and of Catherine II at Stockholm worked alike in close accord with their British colleagues to destroy the power of France. Nothing more in Anne's time, but in that of Elizabeth projects of alliance with Russia as well as with Sweden come to the front, and with Catherine II on the throne we find the gaining of Sweden contemned as valueless, unless in subordination to accord with Russia. After the reversion to autocracy in 1772 the British government ceased to take much interest in Swedish affairs, save in what concerned the American rebellion and trade.

In dating punctuation and orthography the editor has followed the principles adopted in his two previous volumes. His introduction may to some extent be taken as complementary to Nisbet Bain's brilliant contribution to Volume VI. of the *Cambridge Modern History*.

Besides the official correspondence and papers preserved at the Record Office there are at the British Museum letters of the envoys among the Titley and Gunning papers, Egerton MSS. 2684 f., those

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of Thomas Robinson, Add. MSS. 23780 f., and those of Andrew Mitchell, Add. MSS. 6804 f. Further in the Additional Manuscripts may be noted : in 35885 an account of the affair of Porto Novo, a long French account of what passed at the diet of 1738/9, Lieut. Henry Angel's report of Swedish armaments and conditions in 1754, and a Pro Memoria in French, with rough notes in English, prepared for Sir John Goodricke's use, possibly by "Wilkinson," in 1764 ; in 38197 correspondence about Swedish relations with France, 1761 ; in 38333 diplomatic negotiations of the same year ; and in 38346 a report on British trade with Sweden, 1773-1785. Egerton MS. 1754 A has a journal of the proceedings of the diet of 1765/6, in Dutch and French, per the Dutch envoy at Stockholm, Baron Kretschmar.

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PRINCIPAL results of the Swedish diet of 1726/7 were to bring Sweden into alliance with Great Britain France and Holland under the treaty of Hanover and to establish in power the leader of the constitutional party, Count Arvid Horn. He previously, assaulted from one side by the royalist reactionaries and from the other, furiously, by the adherents of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had had to temporise and to prevaricate, playing off the one party against the other. Now the clear voice of the nation had called on him to lead, and soon the death of Catherine I of Russia crippled his Holstein adversaries. He stood for upholding the Constitution of 1719, for maintaining the new alliance with the western powers, and for friendly relations, so far as might be, with all others.

Stephen Poyntz, named in reward for his successful work at Stockholm to represent Great Britain at the projected congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, departed at the end of September 1727. In his place as envoy extraordinary came Isaac Leheup, only to be recalled at once on the ground of offence given to a certain royal personage on his voyage out.¹ He left but two days after Poyntz. From that time, until the coming of Edward Finch as envoy extraordinary in December 1728, conduct of affairs was left to the old minister resident, Robert Jackson, for whom Finch brought letters of recall, to Leheup's secretary, John Snow, or to the Hanoverian envoy, Baron von Diescau.

Finch's first concern was with the Mecklenburg and other German troubles, which had brought Prussia and Hanover to the brink of war. In July 1729 he succeeded in obtaining the accession of King Frederick I, as duke of Pomerania, to the "Treaty of Union" formed by George II with other German princes to resist Prussian

¹ In a humble letter of submission Leheup disclaimed knowledge of his offence, hoping that, whatever it was, it might be imputed to "a phrenzy caused by my want of rest and excess of heat and of wine," and pardoned.

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aggression. Moreover, in response to reiterated appeal from England, Horn agreed to have ready the troops engaged by the treaty of 1727 and to reinforce, against Prussian menace, the garrison of Stralsund. These German troubles, however, ended for the time when in March 1731 George II came to terms with the emperor Charles VI, for behind Frederick William of Prussia, all along, had stood his offended suzerain.

This year 1731 saw Count Horn at the zenith of his power. The diet which met at the end of January elected him marshal almost with unanimity. Yet already in March Finch marked a spirit rising against him, a spirit which moved him, in May, to tender resignation of his offices. This was not allowed; general consent pronounced him indispensable; but his decline was setting in. He was ageing and in ill-health, and death had not long since deprived him of his right-hand man, Joakim von Düben, of whom Finch could not say enough in praise. At court he had to combat the work of the royal mistress, Hedvig Taube—the “cornerstone of the Cabal,” Finch calls her in one place—and he had other grounds of quarrel both with the king, strengthened now by his succession to Hesse-Cassel, and with queen Ulrica Eleonora. Also now, with the breach opening between Great Britain and France, his adversaries were to have the active support of the French ambassador, Count de Casteja.

Nor were relations with Great Britain altogether smooth. There was contention about the subsidies engaged by the treaty of 1727, the Swedes claiming continuance of them for its term, the British government denying the right and withholding payment. The Swedes were laying new imposts on British trade in favour of their own; resented in particular was a tax on British seamen. Finch's protests were ineffectual, and his proposals for a commercial treaty fruitless. He could not expect satisfaction, he declared, while Niklas von Höpken, unalterable in his ill disposition towards England and privately interested besides, remained at the head of the College of Commerce. Moreover the Swedes, active and successful of late years in extending their foreign trade, were making attempt on that to the East Indies and China, so jealously guarded. In 1730 one Colin Campbell, suspected of acting for the shareholders of the suppressed Ostend Company, was found to be engaged in promoting the establishment of an East India Company in Sweden. A charter for this was obtained in June 1731. Objection could not be made to the enterprise itself, but notice was sent from England

that any British subjects engaged in it would be prosecuted according to the law. In March 1732 Campbell himself sailed in command of the first ship, and after a year and a half was back from China with a cargo of teas chinaware and textiles valued at £126,000. A second ship, the *Ulrica Eleonora*, formerly the *Heathcote* of the English East India Company's service, which sailed in February 1733 with one Charles Barrington as supercargo, was not so fortunate. Arrived on the Coromandel coast of India Barrington landed with other Englishmen at Porto Novo, southwards of Pondicherri, and set up a factory there. Informed of this the governors of Fort St. David (English) and Pondicherri (French) joined forces, seized the British subjects (Barrington himself escaping to Danish Tranquebar), and destroyed the settlement. When the *Ulrica Eleonora* returned from her further voyage to Bengal she was chased away by French and English ships and returned to Sweden empty.

For the present the matter was not allowed to raise great stir. Not all in Sweden approved the enterprise; Horn himself looked coldly on it; manufacturers opposed it openly as detrimental to their interests. Finch reported a hostile memorial presented by them, alleging the Company to be promoted by the Ostend shareholders. The friends of France could not yet make it a party issue, since France was implicated. Exchange of protest and justificatory reply proceeded in dilatory fashion until on the triumph of the French party, the "Hats," in 1738, it suited them to exacerbate the quarrel.

Opposition of French to British aims in the north had been in evidence even during the years of alliance of the two powers. The treaties of Vienna of 1731 marked the end of that alliance, and by the time that the War of the Polish Succession broke out they were in open rivalry. The Swedes, naturally, were fervent in the cause of the French candidate, Stanislaus Leszczynski. "Everybody here is for Stanislaus," Finch had written on the news of the death of Augustus II. Casteja, in concert with Count Plélo, his colleague at Copenhagen, worked strenuously for him. Horn, however, stood out firmly against the popular cry, and observation of neutrality was strongly pressed on him from England. Yet it was thought well there to have a call on Swedish and Danish troops, in case of possible developments. At Copenhagen, where the ministry was Anglophilic, success was had; a subsidy treaty was signed on 19/30 September 1734. Not so at Stockholm, proposals to engage 6,000 Swedes at £35,000 a year did not satisfy. On the other side Casteja

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was offering to hire 10,000 for the support of Stanislaus, and a motion to agree with this was carried in the senate. But he was found not to have full powers to conclude, and his government held back. In the circumstances it was deemed necessary to summon a diet. When it met, in February 1734, Horn's credit was found to be seriously impaired. His nominee for the marshalship was indeed elected, but only by a majority of 13 votes out of 649. On the secret committee the opposition had a decisive majority.

It was not only sympathy with Stanislaus that moved the Swedes, opportunity was seen to satisfy, with the help of France, the ever-present longing for revenge on Russia. Swedish volunteers trooped to help in the defence of Dantzig against the forces of the empress Anne. Negotiation for alliance against Russia had been opened also at the Porte, and reports of annihilation of Russian forces by the Turks were coming in. In this state of public feeling, although in July 1734 full powers were sent to Finch to conclude a treaty for troops, and despite declaration to him by Horn "that he neither should nor would ever be for the French proposition, and that he was heartily for the English ones," it was not till the diet had separated in December that he could renew his proposals formally. Without success. When he adduced the example of Denmark as proper to be followed Horn observed, smilingly, that the Danish government had not to reckon with a diet. He was still put off, while Casteja offered large sums in return only for an engagement by Sweden not to give aid to any enemy of France. Not till March 1735 were Commissioners appointed to treat with Finch, and then, although he was now authorised to raise his offers, in the last extremity even to £70,000 for 12,000 men, it was Casteja who prevailed. A convention signed by him on 14/25 June 1735 granted a French subsidy of 450,000 Swedish crowns a year for three years, in return only for engagement by Sweden not to furnish troops for service against France during the present war. This, however, came to nothing; ratification of it was refused at Paris, when Horn had countered by renewing the Russo-Swedish treaty of 1724, a negotiation in which, it is to be noted, Finch was ordered to support the Russian minister, Mikhail Bestuzhev, and the success of which gave much satisfaction in England.¹ On the other hand resentment among the Swedish militants was bitter.

¹ A printed copy of the Russian treaty, in Swedish and German, Record Office, Sweden 72. Differences from that of 1724 were that the Polish troubles

The vehemence with which Casteja proceeded to throw himself into the party strife brought in June 1736 request, and a year later formal demand for his recall. This acceded to, in November 1737 the marquis de Saint-Séverin came as ambassador in his place, instructed to make it his principal object to revive old relations and prevent other nations, and especially England, from gaining ground ; to sound dispositions and await developments ; to continue the pensions paid by Casteja, but not to offer subsidies ; and to interfere in politics only by secret means and without compromising himself.¹ It was an exchange, Finch remarked, "of a blundering hot-headed Gascon for a cool artificial Italian."

Strongest orders were sent to Finch to dissuade the Swedes from entering on war. To no purpose, "a favourable juncture to fall upon Russia," he had lately written, was "longed after with the greatest earnestness." When the States met again, in May 1738, the war-party carried all before them. Horn was censured for the Russian treaty, for the neutrality in the Polish war, and for most else that he had done. In November he was forced to sign a treaty with France, reviving the terms of 1735 ; in December he asked, and this time obtained, permission to resign his offices. Next year in February the secret committee advised immediate alliance, perhaps offensive, with France and Denmark ; in March the senate was purged of its Anglophile members and packed with partisans of France and of war on Russia ; in April, just before the diet broke up, that foremost enemy of England, Count Karl Gyllenborg, replaced Horn as president of the chancery. There followed, to cause anxiety, visits by Count Karl Gustaf Tessin, marshal of the late diet, to Copenhagen and Paris and the appearance of a small French squadron in Swedish waters.

Cardinal Fleury, however, had had enough of war. He was ready enough, the Swedes complained, to get them to serve the ends of France, but not to reciprocate. Indeed, it was largely by French intervention that the war between Russia and Turkey, on Turkish success in which so great hopes were laid at Stockholm, was brought

were specially excepted as a *casus foederis*, and that the secret article in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was dropped, the empress Anne having guaranteed possession of ducal Sleswick to Denmark in 1732.

¹ *Recueil des Instructions*, II, 338 f. The marquis, named in them Saint-Saurin, was an Italian formerly in the service of the duke of Parma at Paris

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to an end. A defensive treaty with the Porte was, indeed, effected in April 1740, but that did not help much.

Finch having requested his recall, on the ground that his services could be of no further value, in September 1739 John Burnaby arrived to replace him, but in view (Lord Harrington stated) of the present situation of affairs with the character of secretary only. A first work laid on him was to counter Swedish pressure upon king Frederick to conclude a subsidy treaty with France as landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. The negotiation was actively pursued at Stockholm and at Paris, but Frederick required terms that Louis XV would not concede, and finally, on 9/20 May 1740, concluded a treaty between Hesse-Cassel and Great Britain¹.

Also Burnaby succeeded in settling the Porto Novo affair. Finch's last work had been to offer on the part of the East India directors, as an ultimatum, the sum of £10,000 in full compensation, on the condition that the Swedish company should employ no British subject, save such as might be already naturalised in Sweden. This had been rejected, and the king advised to take action and institute reprisals. In August 1740 Burnaby was authorised to offer £14,000, or even £15,000, but the Swedish ministers refused to accept less than £19,000. Despairing of success with them, Burnaby made private approach to the chief director of the Swedish company, Admiral Ankercrona, and by a judicious bribe of £1,000 to him succeeded in concluding for £12,000. The agreement was signed on 6/17 October and immediately ratified. Burnaby himself received high compliment and a present of £500.

Despite unpreparedness for war, and rebuff at Paris and at Copenhagen, the general passion for attack on Russia always flamed. It was determined to summon a new diet. In view thereof Burnaby was ordered to co-operate with Bestuzhev in spending money on the elections, and between them they placed in the hands of Count Ture Bielke, the leader of the opposition, sums amounting to 43,000 crowns. The effort was useless. The deaths of the emperor Charles VI and of the empress Anne of Russia, in October 1740, changed the situation. With trouble portending on the question of the Austrian succession it became the interest of France to incite the Swedes to war, in order to keep Russia occupied,² while Erik

¹ Record Office, Treaties 259.

² See the instructions to the new French ambassador, the Marquis de Lanmary, *Recueil des instructions*, II, 352 f.

Matthias von Nolken intimated from Petersburg that Grand Duchess Elizabeth might accept Swedish help towards her projected seizure of the throne. When the diet met, in December 1740, feeling was wild for war. Belief was spread, says Burnaby, that France and Spain would help, that a day was fixed for attack on Russia by the Turks, and that Denmark could be brought in by marriage of the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp to a Danish princess. At present, he wrote (3/14 March 1741), "the whole nation in their hearts are for a war, if they could support one," and only sense of their own weakness could stop it. "We are now playing off our last stake, and M^r. Bestuchef has advanced thirty thousand crowns to strengthen our interest in the next plenum, on which the whole depends." The effort again was useless; the war with Russia, that was to be so disastrous, was formally declared.

In the circumstances Burnaby had not thought it opportune to pursue orders renewed to try for Swedish troops for the service of George II, although urged thereto by Bestuzhev. Now he had notice not to appear at court, and that letters and memorials from him would not be received. The reason alleged was that at an interview with Gyllenborg he had suggested that Sweden could do nothing without consulting France, "*réflexions*," he was told, "*peu ménagées et même offensantes à l'égard de la dignité de sa Majesté et de l'indépendance de son gouvernement.*" He himself, however, believed that Gyllenborg's secretary, Baron Gyllenstierna, lately arrested with others on charges of treason, had divulged his dealings with Bestuzhev to upset the government policy, and indeed at the same time Bestuzhev's house was placed under guard. Consequently, in July, Burnaby was ordered to return home without taking leave.

Nearly a year passed before George II was represented at Stockholm again. The new-comer was Colonel Guy Dickens, of long experience at the trying court of Berlin. Arrived in June 1742, with the character of minister, he found the "Hats" grievously abashed by the disasters of the Russian war. He reported intention to call an extraordinary diet, "contrary to their own, as well as the French inclination," when he expected the principal question to be that of appointing a successor to the throne. He advised the offer of good offices for peace, and wanted money for the purpose of entertaining deputies to the diet freely. He reported most favourable

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relations with Grand Marshal¹ Samuel Åkerhielm, chief of those whom he was specially instructed to approach and "the person in whom our friends place their entire confidence."

When the diet met, at the end of August 1742, Baron Matthias Alexander von Ungern-Sternberg was elected Marshal by a majority of 220 over the "Hats" candidate, Count Tessin, now a senator and vice-president of the chancery. And elections to the secret committee turned strongly in favour of the "Caps." Guy Dickens thereon drew for £1500 for judicious expenditure. Request for British good offices or mediation with Russia was now made to him formally, though coupled with the desire that France should be joined therein. That George II absolutely refused.

Fortunately for the leaders of the "Hats" the main question that was to occupy the diet was not their responsibility for and mismanagement of the war, but that, as Guy Dickens had forecast, of the succession to the throne, Queen Ulrica Eleonora having died in November 1741 without leaving issue. Overwhelming public favour brought about, on 28 October/8 November 1742, election of the legitimate heir, young Charles Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp. Soon, however, it was known that the boy had been chosen by his aunt, the new Russian empress Elizabeth, to succeed her there, and further that she would grant lenient terms of peace only on condition of the election of his cousin, Adolphus Frederick, bishop of Lübeck and Eutin and present administrator of Holstein-Gottorp. Against him stood other candidates; Prince Frederick of Denmark, for whom by assiduous propaganda and free expenditure of Danish money the peasants' order had been wholly gained; Pfalzgraf Christian of Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld, put forward by France; and on the part of Great Britain the present king's brother, Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, as of old, or his son Frederick, the son-in-law of George II. At the last, when it was seen that the Hessian candidature was hopeless, Guy Dickens was ordered to gratify Russia by supporting election of Adolphus Frederick, though covertly, in order not to give offence to Denmark.

The crisis came when in June 1743 some 30,000 Dalecarlian peasants marched in arms on Stockholm, demanding election of Prince Frederick, condign punishment of the authors of the war, and redress of grievances against the nobles. Previously, after the open-

¹ A post "not only the most honourable but the most lucrative and of the greatest influence of any in the kingdom" (Burnaby, 12/23 June 1741).

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ing of the peace conferences at Åbo, there had been agreement to elect that prince, failing liberal concessions by Elizabeth. Now the peasants' revolt compelled decision, a day for the election was fixed. Only at the last moment came word that Elizabeth had granted acceptable terms, and thereon Adolphus Frederick was elected. As soon as this was known feelers were put forth from England for the marriage of Adolphus Frederick to an English princess, so that there should be an English queen in Sweden as well as in Denmark. That, however, was not to be; in August 1744 he married Louise Ulrica, the forceful sister of Frederick the Great, who was to rule him absolutely.

The election determined Christian of Denmark for war. Something like panic ensued at Stockholm; Guy Dickens was called to confer with the leading senators; all possible dissuasion was exercised by the British government at Copenhagen. The outcome was settled by Elizabeth of Russia. She not only sent over to Sweden 12,000 men under General Keith (they arrived at the end of October 1743) but declared at Copenhagen that she would support Sweden with all her forces. Christian VI gave in; a definite agreement between Sweden and Denmark was signed in March 1744. Next year, in June, Sweden concluded a treaty, approved in England, of defensive alliance with Russia. One result was the recall of the Swedish minister, Edvard Carlson, from Constantinople. In the same month George II obtained again the service of 6000 of King Frederick's Hessians.¹

One affair that occupied Guy Dickens' attention at this time was request by the present French ambassador, the marquis de Lannary, for permission to enlist Swedish officers, nominally to fill vacancies in Louis XV's Swedish regiment, really, it was believed, for service in the Jacobite cause. Major Leslie arrived to engage them early in December 1745, and a number proceeded to be ready to embark at Gothenburg. However, difficulties about transport, and the suppression of the Jacobite rebellion, nullified the project.

When in May 1746 a new diet was in prospect the British and Russian governments agreed upon joint action to defeat an outcome in favour of France. Elizabeth transferred from Copenhagen to Stockholm the experienced Baron Korff as ambassador in place of the distrusted General Lubras. Guy Dickens was instructed to act in close accord with him and authorised to draw for £6000 to

¹ See Harrington's dispatch of 18/29 June 1745, page 117.

spend on the elections, given an equal Russian contribution. But though he and Korff did not stint outlay—ultimate expenditure amounted to £5100 of British and some £14,000 of Russian money—it was thrown away. When the diet met on 6/17 September 1746 of the fifty nobles elected to the secret committee, says Guy Dickens, all but seven were partisans of France, and they had with them the majority of the burgher members. In vain Korff attacked Adolphus Frederick on the subject of the countenance shown by him to France; with all respect to the tsaritsa, he was told, the prince did not see how Sweden could be prevented from making arrangements to suit herself. In vain Elizabeth demonstrated in force, demanding the removal of certain evil councillors from about the prince's person, and especially Count Tessin. Her action only roused the ire of the Swedes, and divided the party of the "Caps." Further she would not go, despite repeated insistence from England that it was mainly her affair and that nothing would serve but actual attack. At the end of the year Guy Dickens wrote : " Affairs here are at present in the utmost confusion, the partisans of France driving everything before them." In 1747 formal invitation from Elizabeth and Maria Theresa to follow the example of Great Britain in acceding to their late treaty was declined ; on 18/29 May was signed a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with Prussia, and after a week a renewal for ten years of the convention of 1738 with France. And negotiation with Turkey was resumed.

The diet ended, at once the " Hats," with a good majority now in the senate and the strong support of Adolphus Frederick and his Prussian wife, made onslaught on their political opponents. The chief of them, Åkerhielm, ran in such danger that Guy Dickens twice arranged for his escape on a British ship. However, he got off with the loss of his seat in the senate and his office at court. Guy Dickens himself was subjected to insults, for which he could obtain no redress, and finally, in February 1748, formal request was made in London for his recall. To avoid the indignity of compliance he was ordered to return home with all speed, stating that he was recalled in consequence of the indignities to which he had been subjected. Before going he arranged for a regular correspondence, at £50 a quarter, by young Baron Karl Gedda, son of that Peter Niklas Gedda, who had done such good service to Great Britain both when envoy at Paris and afterwards as secretary of state. Using the name of Wilkinson, Gedda, was to send his letters under cover of the Dutch ministry.

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He continued to write until, after sixteen years, a British minister was received at Stockholm again.

Attempt was made, indeed, to renew diplomatic relations in 1757. Conditions were altered ; the present alliance of Great Britain with Prussia made it probable that Louise Ulrica, queen of Sweden since 1751, might favour the British cause. In August 1757 Lieut.-Colonel Robert Campbell was deputed to investigate. The "Hats," however, were still dominant, and the defeat of its attempt at revolution in the previous year had reduced the court to abject servitude. Moreover, with much misgiving, but unable to resist the lure of subsidies and great promises of gain held out by France,¹ they were on the verge of joining in the Seven Years' War on the side of France and Austria. Campbell found himself unwelcome ; was unable to present the credentials as minister resident, which he carried ; and after three months was recalled. Next year Sir John Goodricke was commissioned, with the same character ; but he, arrived at Copenhagen, found himself forbidden to proceed. In reprisal, when Wynants, the Swedish secretary in London, notified this, he was summarily ordered to depart. Goodricke stayed on at Copenhagen, letter writing and negotiating with the Swedish ministers there, until in September 1763 he was recalled on the ground that "the very neglectful and in all respects improper behaviour of the court of Sweden towards his Majesty, since his accession to the throne," rendered it unbecoming for him to stay, awaiting permission to go on.

The recall, however, did not take effect, for now the confused domestic strife in Sweden of the last three years was resulting in the passing of power to the party of the younger "Caps." Overtures, backed by representations from Petersburg, received, Goodricke was authorised to go forward, on the absolute condition of the prior appointment and actual departure of a Swedish minister for London.² When in April 1764 Baron Gustaf Adam von Nolken had at last been named, and dispatched, Goodricke went to Stockholm with the character of envoy extraordinary, instructed to work in conjunction with the new Russian ambassador, Count Ivan Andreevich Osterman. Very soon he began to press for money, insisting that without it nothing could be done, and in the first place to influence the elections to the approaching diet. He could not set down the sums that

¹ See the instructions to the Marquis d'Havrincourt, French ambassador to Sweden, of 12 May 1757, *Recueil des instructions*, II, 383 f.

² See Sandwich's dispatches of 1763-4, pages 140 f.

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would be required from England and Russia for this purpose at less than £12,000 or £13,000 apiece, including something that must be given to the queen.¹ He believed "no moment since the commencement of the French system so favorable for overturning it as this," and looked to great gains for trade. "The crisis is now come, in which it will be decided whether England or France shall take the lead in Sweden, and our friends will press me more earnestly for his Majesty's resolution."

For the immediate purpose Goodricke was allowed £4000, on condition that Osterman paid out equally and pari passu. About that there was no difficulty; Catherine II was not sparing money. On the other hand the French ambassador, the baron de Breteuil, was also well provided, though handicapped by cessation of the French subsidy payments. He was authorised now to offer a new subsidy of 1,500,000 French livres a year for eight years; an offer accepted by the senate, though by the majority of one voice only, and with statement, according to Goodricke, that the acceptance "consulted more the necessities of France than their own."

When the diet met, in January 1765, the "Caps" had the victory. Their candidate for the marshalship, Count Ture Gustaf Rudbeck, beat his opponent, General Fersen, by a majority of 117. Of the fifty nobles elected to the secret committee Goodricke marked seven only as of the French party, and four for the court. Nevertheless, that without more money all hitherto expended would have been wasted was the constant burden of his dispatches. Thus on July 23: a "great victory" had been gained in the house of the nobles, but only by six votes. "The French gave money, we had none to give. The whole Court party . . . acted openly against us, and numbers of our people were absent. They must be assembled for the grand affair of the senators. . . . This is one of the critical moments . . . when a minister, who has money at his disposal, can do great things for his court without much expense."

The "affair of the senators" was an attempt to unseat seven of

¹ Items of projected expenditure were: for bringing up from the country 300 nobles, who otherwise could not afford the expense, £1050; for maintaining them at the capital for six months, £6300; on elections among the burghers, £1332, and for the secret committee, £1662; for constant maintenance of clubs and societies for the deputies, £3206; for buying the speaker and others of the peasants' order, £2000; for engaging 40 nobles of the French party to leave at the opening of the diet, and obtaining their proxies, £2000; in reserve, and to secure five or six votes of consequence, £2000.

them, partisans of France. The secret committee condemned four, as guilty of malpractice. The nobles negatived the verdict, but the three other orders carried the day against them. The nobles' vote, according to Goodricke, resulted from an outlay of £7000 by Breteuil; the contrary success from bestowal among the burghers of £2000 opportunely received. More money followed.

Next year, on 5 February 1766, at last was signed a treaty with Great Britain, though one of simple friendship only, carrying no subsidy. The terms, considered by Goodricke unexceptionable, did not commend themselves entirely in England, but it was decided to ratify.¹ At the same time was strongly pressed conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Sweden and Russia.

Domestic business, chiefly, prolonged the session of the diet until October 1766. By that time Goodricke, stinted as he was, had expended £17,300, and Osterman, by his computation, some £89,000. Says Goodricke: "France and Russia make their pensions so large, that they spoil the market." On the credit side stood the new treaty, command now of a three-fourths majority in the senate, and occupation of the posts of president and vice-president of the chancery by two foremost "friends," Karl Gustaf Löwenhielm and Fredrik von Friesendorff. Almost all the other administrative posts, however, were retained by the "Hats."

The diet risen, the Swedes renewed proposals for a subsidy treaty with Great Britain. That signed had stopped supplies from France, and they must have money from somewhere. Their want of it, and the ever-deepening depression in trade and industries, furnished the main themes of Goodricke's dispatches during the next two years. He was "persecuted" for supplies from England, he says, whether by subsidy or by loan. Authorised to negotiate, on 28 April 1767 he was able to submit a draft, but for all that he could say his government held firmly to their resolve, no subsidy in time of peace.

Meanwhile the French had changed their policy; no more precarious reliance upon party, but support to the royal aim at subversion of the constitution. In the course of 1765 Breteuil had been able to win the court party, despite dissuasion from Berlin, Frederick II being now in close touch with Russia. In September Goodricke reported a saying of the queen: "my Brother has his way of thinking, and I have mine." In April 1766 Breteuil was instructed that the object was not to give one party the superiority, but to obtain

¹ Record Office, Treaties 537.

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the service of Swedish troops and ships and advantages in trade. For this purpose the king must have chief power to dispose of the forces of the kingdom and to make alliances ; that existing was of no use. Breteuil must not expend a sol beyond the 1,400,000 livres supplied for the purposes of the diet, "dans laquelle nous avons éprouvés plusieurs dégoûts et même des insultes." Subsidies would not be continued.¹

Similar instructions issued to Breteuil's successor, the Count de Modène, under date 28 August 1768.² And now Adolphus Frederick was nerved by his wife and his enterprising son, Gustavus, to strike. In December he appeared in person in the senate to demand the calling of an extraordinary diet. When but one vote, that of Baron Hiarne, was cast in his support, he declared resignation of his office. Prince Gustavus then sent to the Chancery to demand surrender of the stamp used for royal edicts, when the king would not sign them. This refused, he went round with a military escort to the other Colleges formally to declare his father's abdication. Controlled as these were by the "Hats," one and all declared inability to function while the royal office remained vacant. This, and military demonstration, forced the senate to surrender ; a diet was called for April 1769, and thereon Adolphus Frederick consented to continue.

At once the bribery market reopened. Goodricke was furnished with £5000, and then with £7000 more, to influence the elections ; Osterman was liberally provided, as before ; and now that Catherine II held control at Copenhagen Danish money also was forthcoming, while Prussia, under the same influence, supported. De Modène, however, had been beforehand, formally proposing renewal of the French alliance and spending, says Goodricke, "as if he had the mines of Peru at his command." What ruled the issue was the economic stress. Majorities returned against the government were heavy among the burghers and notable among the nobles and clergy. General Fersen had a majority of 232 for the marshalship. As a first step the victors removed from the senate Friesendorff and nine other of their opponents, filling their places, and three others vacant by death, with their own nominees. The Chancery posts (Löwenhielm had died in March 1768) were occupied the one by Count Ekeblad, the other by Ulrik Scheffer, lately ambassador at Paris. It was expected that the first business would be to alter the constitution.

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, II, 408 f.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 416 f.

All that Goodricke and his associates could hope for was schism among their adversaries.

That hope was realised through that old intriguer, Colonel Karl Fredrik Pechlin, commanding a strong following and marked down as purchaseable. Retained in June by a present of £2000 he proceeded to work. At a conference at the end of July with Goodricke, Osterman and the Danish envoy, Baron Juel, he propounded three plans of action. (1) At the cost of upwards of £120,000 "to change both the secret committee and the senate, and destroy the whole French system." (2) At £72,000 "to force the present ruling party to a composition and oblige them to take a part of our friends into the government, by which the actual system of alliance with their neighbours, as well as the constitution, may be preserved." (3) At £30,000, "to form such an opposition as shall preserve the constitution entire, and prevent other violent measures."¹

The envoys preferred the second scheme, as the "most reasonable and practical," but the British government assented only to the third, the cheapest. Goodricke was authorised to match Russian and Danish payments up to the quota of £10,000. Pechlin, provided with the necessary funds, worked with effect, so that on November 17 Goodricke could report the constitution saved, three orders having voted against change. "Col. Pechlin distinguished himself greatly by his activity and address on this occasion." And then on 2 February 1770, when the diet was rising : "We have concluded the Diet in a manner very different from what was to be expected the first three months of it, when there was a majority of 240 against us in the house of nobles, and three to one in the other orders." But expenditure had mounted up ; Goodricke returned his own, from February 1769 to April 1770, at £42,000. Meanwhile De Modène, in view of the results, had been ordered to close his purse.

It remained to provide for the future. On leave in England, in July 1770, Goodricke propounded a scheme for regular expenditure by the three courts interested at the rate of £8000 a year, in equal shares. Nothing came of this, and the sudden death of Adolphus Frederick on 12 February 1771 found Goodricke and Osterman with but little in hand towards the £40,000 estimated by the former to be required for the new obligatory diet. Moreover the revolution in Denmark had cut off supplies thence.

The Swedish government was in sore difficulties. In the senate

¹ Goodricke, 28 July 1769, Record Office, Sweden 115.

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the "Hats" and the court party were in disaccord. Financial and commercial troubles again were pressing, and French support in abeyance; De Modène had been recalled. In January Prince Gustavus had repaired to Paris to negotiate in person. Lightly treated at first, on the news of his accession to the throne his endeavours bore fruit. Subsidies and money to help in the elections to the new diet were promised him, and the count de Vergennes was sent as ambassador to Stockholm, instructed to work for conciliation among the parties in the French interest. This was all in accord with the ideas of Gustavus himself; back at Stockholm he set himself to work to that end, summoning the party leaders to a conference. They came at length to certain terms, though not until after the diet had assembled. When it met, in June 1771, a deadlock was apparent. The "Hats" carried their candidate for the marshalship, Baron Axel Gabriel Leijonhufvud, but the "Caps" controlled the burghers and the peasants, and before long gained a majority among the clergy also.

For nine months two chief questions blocked other business; proper representation of the "Caps" in the senate, and assurances from the king, before his coronation, that he would respect the constitution. In March 1772 he was compelled at last to sign the document demanded; at the end of April seven senators of the "Hats" party were removed. Three previous vacancies, and six of those now created, were occupied by "Caps." Baron Joakim Duben, heir leader, replaced Count Ekeblad, deceased, as president of the chancery. "All I have to say," Goodricke wrote on 21 April, "is that if we maintain our superiority till the conclusion of the diet I latter myself to be able to make any alliance with Sweden, which the King may judge to be a proper foundation for a northern system, to which, it appears, both Russia and other powers would accede, if his Majesty should think it desirable." And a week later; the affair of the senators was ended "in a most triumphant manner for our friends, and in a most mortifying one for the French party"; now was "laid the foundation for any system in foreign affairs, which the two courts of Great Britain and Russia may desire this country to adopt."

Attention in England was now concentrated, as will be seen from the dispatches of the summer of 1772, on forming an alliance with Russia for the control of the north, to which Sweden should be a party. This scheme, however, as also the roseate expectations

founded on the successes obtained at Stockholm, were to be blighted by what was now to occur there. Continuing his efforts for conciliation of the parties, Gustavus had at the same time been extending, by various means, his prestige among the people. Twice he had braved precedent by appearing in person to harangue the diet in the cause of harmony. His interference was resented, and his offer of mediation refused, but his action made profound impression throughout the kingdom. Foiled in his endeavours, and urged on by De Vergennes,¹ on 19 August 1772, his careful preparations completed, he struck. What was toward was no secret ; from as far back as 1766 warning after warning had come from the British government, accurately apprised by its Paris secret service ; and now details of the plot were being sent, with exhortation to the "friends" to take measures of defence. Nevertheless Gustavus caught them insufficiently prepared. In two days the revolution was accomplished ; on 21 August the States were forced to sign the new Form of Government which, in Goodricke's phrase, made the king of Sweden as absolute as him of France.² There was protest and threat of war from Petersburg and Copenhagen, but against Denmark Gustavus showed fight, and Catherine II had enough to do with her Turkish war and with affairs in Poland. The British government, on first (discredited) news of what was done, proposed to furnish £15,000 to help preservation of the constitution, but on confirmation of it resolved, wisely, on abstention from interference. Prospect of alliance with Russia was now fading, and sincere disposition for friendly relations was expressed from Sweden. Louis XV continued to supply his protégé with money, and when in the spring of 1773 threat of war was renewed let it be known that attack on Sweden would mean war with France. Gustavus and his president of the chancery, Count Ulrik Scheffer, were left in peace to set their house in order.

Goodricke in this summer went home on leave and did not return ; in March 1774 came Lewis de Visme from Munich to replace him. He had to deal with difficulties arising from the American war, par-

¹ De Vergennes' successor, Count d'Usson, was reminded in 1774, about the revolution, of "l'intérêt que la France y a pris, et les moyens qu'elle a fourni pour en faciliter le succès" (*Recueil des instructions*, II, 444).

² Translations, Record Office, Sweden 122 and 125 ; the former with Goodricke's remarks, the latter as printed in English at Stockholm. For particulars of how the revolution was accomplished, and on the character of Gustavus III, see the *Cambridge Modern History*, VI, 767 f.

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ticularly use by the rebels of Marstrand and other Swedish ports and the supposed supply to them of munitions of war. His protests were amicably met ; Gustavus and his ministers continued to assert sincere desire for friendly relations. For the rest De Visme had little more to do than to watch, or rather surmise Swedish relations with other powers and to send home valuable reports on trade and industries, the state of the army and navy, and the like, until he succumbed to a sudden illness on 4 September 1776. Conduct of business was then left to his secretary, J L. Doerfeld, until the coming of Thomas Wroughton as envoy, two years later.

Great Britain being then at war with France there came trouble, as of old, about the seizure of Swedish vessels suspected of trading to enemy ports. Gustavus was not the man to bear this quietly ; despite British warnings of what might happen, in 1779 he began to arm convoys to protect the trade and sought to bring about like action on the part of Denmark and Russia. Yet Wroughton received most ample assurance of intention to observe strict neutrality ; the measures taken, he was told, were directed mainly against the Spaniards, who were seizing all neutral ships passing into and out of the Mediterranean ; while on their part the British government alleged all possible leniency in the treatment of the vessels captured. When the result had been, in 1780, the formation of the Armed Neutrality League—attributed in England to machination on the part of France and Prussia—Wroughton supposed that “the principle and the probable consequences of this armament will not be very agreeable to us ;” and the breach with Holland, which ensued, made matters worse. Apprehensions, however, proved unjustified ; Wroughton was assured that the measures taken should never interrupt harmony with England ; and peace in course of time relieved the tension.

The next excitement was intelligence received, in March 1784, of the imminence of a Swedish attack on Denmark. Wroughton in response to anxious inquiry scouted the idea ; warned before, he said, from Copenhagen he had failed to find any foundation whatever for reports “current among the common people about 3 months ago.” He descanted on the madness of such an enterprise, when Denmark would have the full support of Russia. Yet the intelligence was correct, if belated and the danger past. For years Gustavus had had in mind to free Sweden from the Russo-Danish incubus. Rid in March 1783 of the restraining influence of Ulrik

Scheffer he had turned to work ; his plan, to come to terms with Russia and then to fall upon Denmark with all his forces. Paris was in the dark equally with London ; the French ambassador, the marquis de Pons, was informed under date 4 June 1783 that nothing seemed likely to disturb the peace of the north at present, and that never were Swedish relations with Denmark more friendly.¹ Having entrusted to his confidants, Colonel Toll and Admiral Trolle, preparation in utmost secrecy of the army and navy for war Gustavus had travelled at the end of June 1783 to confer personally with Catherine II at Fredrikshamn in Finland. Only partially successful, he had been obliged to defer action, going off himself to Italy, to blind. At Rome interviews with the Russian diplomatist Markov put an end to the negotiation. There was failure at Constantinople to rouse the Turks to war with Russia yet, and at Paris to obtain more than the meagre subsidy of a million livres a year for six years. The affair was ended when in June 1784 Catherine II made formal declaration at Stockholm that she would stand by Denmark, if attacked.

Soon after this Wroughton went for his health to the south of France, leaving his secretary, Charles Keene, in charge of affairs and staying away nearly a year. Little of moment occurred until the calling of a diet in May 1786. Rebellious against the king—rebellion stimulated from Petersburg and Copenhagen—its sittings were closed after six weeks, says Wroughton, “with a very angry speech from the throne,” in his opinion “the most impolitic step” that Gustavus could have taken. Soon afterwards he took another year’s leave, in England. In Holland, on his way back, he died (21 August 1787).

Gustavus was now intent on war again ; this time with Russia, heavily involved now in war with Turkey. In November 1787 Charles Keene, continued in charge of affairs at Stockholm, had the exciting news to send of the king’s surprise visit to Copenhagen, to get Danish help. That refused, he determined to act alone, launching attack from Finland at the end of June 1788. He had prospect of easy success, but mutiny of his officers defeated him, and shortly he was called home to meet an irruption of the Danes from Norway. This was done without declaration of war ; Bernstorff was all for peace and the Danish troops acted only as auxiliaries to Russia under treaty. The less difficulty, therefore, for Great Britain and Prussia,

¹ *Recueil des instructions*, II, 469.

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acting on Gustavus' acceptance of their mediation, to bring about withdrawal of the Danes by threat of force. During the continuance of the Russian war Denmark stayed neutral.

Keene's last concern was with the turbulent diet of 1789, when in a straight fight with his recalcitrant nobility Gustavus, supported by the three lower orders, had the victory. Our period closes with the advent of a new envoy extraordinary, Robert Liston, in August 1789.

ISAAC LEHEUP. BARON VON DIESCAU 1727-8

ISAAC LEHEUP, of Gunthorpe, Norfolk, was a man of some distinction, a brother-in-law of Horatio Walpole and member for Cornish constituencies in the parliaments of 1722, 1727 and 1734. Sent in 1726 to support the cause of the allies of Hanover at Ratisbon he had been expelled from Germany in April 1727 in reprisal for the dismissal of the Austrian minister, Baron Palm, from London. The fate of his present mission has been noticed in the Introduction.

Baron von Diescau was the Hanoverian representative of George II at Stockholm, invested after his arrival at the end of 1727 with "ministerial functions" on behalf of the British government.¹ Failing to give satisfaction in the exercise of his duties he was soon recalled.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ISAAC LEHEUP, Esq^r. AS ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO FREDERICK I OF SWEDEN, 15 July
1727.

(*Record Office, Sweden* 48, *F.O.* 90, 65.)

[Besides the formal clauses, 1 to 3 and 9 to 15]

4. You will take care to make use of all proper opportunities in talking to the king of Sweden to assure his Majesty of the great satisfaction We have in his having enter'd with Us and the Most- Christian King into the treaty of Hanover, and of Our firm resolution to make good, on Our part, all the engagements towards

¹ As in Townshend's dispatch to him of 9/20 January 1727/8, *Record Office, Sweden* 50.

Sweden contained both in that and Our former alliances with that crown.

5. As We have thought it for Our service to employ Our trusty and welbeloved Stephen Poyntz Esq^r in the congress appointed to be held at Aix la Chapelle, you will deliver to him Our letters, herewith put into your hands, recalling him and signifying Our pleasure in that behalf, but before he leaves that court you will get all the lights you can from him concerning the present state of affairs there, particularly with respect to the several ministers to whom you are chiefly to make your applications, with regard to the tempers and inclinations of the senators and principal persons in the government and to the strength and dispositions of the several parties in that kingdome, together with such other informations as may best enable you to manage Our affairs entrusted to your care.

6. You will watch and observe with your utmost diligence all the motions intrigues and negociations of the ministers residing at Stockholm from the czar of Muscovy and the duke of Holstein, and give constant and exact accounts of what you shall discover relating to their views and designs.

7. You shall inform yourself of the said Stephen Poyntz what behaviour the Czar's minister [Mikhail Bestuzhev] has held toward him and Our electoral minister, the Sieur Bassewitz, and you will conduct yourself accordingly in notifying your arrival to the Muscovite minister or not, pursuant to the directions which were given to the said Stephen Poyntz upon that subject ; for tho' We are very willing to live in good correspondence with the czar of Muscovy, and to allow and encourage a friendly intercourse between Our ministers and his, yet We cannot by any means give way to the distinction which was affected to be made between Our ministers as King and as Elector.

8. You shall carefully maintain a good correspondence with the ministers of all other princes and states in amity with Us residing at that court, and particularly you shall cultivate an intimate friendship with the minister from Our good brother, the Most Christian King [Count de Brancas Céreste], with whom you shall act in perfect concert in all things for Our mutual service and advantage.

G. R.

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SAME,
same date.

(*Ibid.*)

1. Upon consulting with Our trusty and welbeloved Stephen Poyntz Esq^r you will learn which are the ministers in Sweden best disposed towards Us and Our affairs and consequently best inclined to strengthen the late alliance and promote the true interest of their country, which We have much at heart. But above all you will apply yourself to cultivate as intimate a friendship as possible with Count Horn, who has the greatest influence in all the affairs of that kingdom

2. When you are first introduced to the said count, and upon all other proper occasions, you must assure him of Our particular regard for his person and merit, and that as We have seen the good effects of his prudent conduct in surmounting all the opposition that was made to the accession of Sweden to the Hanover alliance, so his council and advice in all matters for the mutual interest of both kingdoms will always be of the greatest weight to Us; and therefore you have Our especial orders to act in perfect confidence with him and take his opinion in your proceedings at that court, which We make no question but he will give you, as a true patriot and a friend to both nations.

3. You will pay all the deference and respect to the king of Sweden, which is due to his crown and dignity, and you will promote his interest and authority in that country; yet so as not to give any jealousy to Count Horn and his party, as if We intended to countenance the royalists and their designs, preferably to any others. You will rather make it your chief care to entertain the best understanding you can between the king and Count Horn, and between their parties; whereon the quiet of Sweden, the preservation of their liberties, and the success of Our affairs in that country will extremely depend.

4. We hope that by the late measures taken in Sweden the great strength and influence of the Muscovite and Holstein factions are very much broke, however, as their views and designs have been all along opposite to Our's you will endeavour to weaken and discountenance them as much as you can.

5. You will assure both the king and Count Horn that We are resolutely determined to fulfill all the engagements entered into

by their accession to the Hanover alliance, and We should be glad the season were come to give them a proof of it, in conjunction with France, by aiding them towards recovering the provinces lost to Muscovy. But that upon mature reflection upon the present situation of affairs We cannot but be of opinion that this time is not a proper one to begin such a work, or even to betray an intention that way. Dissensions and confusions in Muscovy may happen soon to ripen things for such an enterprize, and then We shall not be wanting, in concert with France, to contribute Our utmost towards their assistance and success.

G. R.

GEORGE TILSON, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, TO BARON
VON DIESCAU.

(*Record Office, Sweden 50*)

Whitehall, 9 Feb. 1727/8.

I have already acknowledged the favour of yours of the 17 January, and speaking to my Lord [Townshend] since upon the subject of it his Lordship bid me tell you that no one could wish better to his Swedish Majesty's affairs than the King, nor desire more to see those provinces reunited to Sweden, which have been taken from that crown by Muscovy, but his Majesty thinks it would be very impolitick and unseasonable to be giving the Russ any alarms of that nature at this juncture. Nothing would more effectually put an end to all their divisions, and make them think of strengthening themselves more particularly towards the frontiers of Sweden, than the apprehensions of a rupture on that side, whereas if the Swedes continue quiet and avoid giving untimely jealousies in all likelihood factions may soon grow to a great height, or they may turn their arms towards Persia to defend their conquests there, where since the late peace made with the Turks the Persians will probably soon give them disturbance. And it is the interest of Sweden that the Muscovites should be engaged in a warr on that side, which may employ their forces and consume their wealth against a distant enemy, but if Sweden should too eagerly shew their intention on this side, before a warr is entered into with Persia, in all likelihood the Emperor and those who are friends to Muscovy, and enemys to Sweden, would perswade the Russian court to abandon their Persian conquests and to turn their forces towards defending those in the north, as being of more consequence to affairs in Europe.

EDWARD FINCH 1728-1739

EDWARD FINCH was the fifth and youngest son of that redoubtable statesman Daniel Finch, Earl of Winchilsea and Nottingham. His elder brother, William, had also served as envoy to Sweden in the years 1720 to 1724. Edward, after a brief stay at Ratisbon, had been sent at the beginning of 1725 to Dresden to remonstrate with Augustus II upon the persecution of his protestant subjects in Poland. He had used there such strong language that when it fell to him to follow Augustus to Warsaw the Poles almost forcibly resisted his coming, and arrived he was not admitted to court. When in April 1727 Augustus returned to Saxony Finch made his way back to England.¹ After the termination of his Swedish mission he went as minister plenipotentiary to Russia.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EDWARD FINCH Esqr, AS ENVOY EXTRA-
ORDINARY TO FREDERICK I OF SWEDEN, 30 September 1728.

(*Record Office, Sweden 51, F O. 90, 66.*)

[Formal.]

PRIVATE AND ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME,
same date.

(*Ibid.*)

Though you will endeavour to live well with the senators in general and with the other ministers in Sweden, yet you will apply your self particularly to cultivate an intimate correspondence with Count Horn, whom you will assure on all occasions of Our esteem

¹ See fully on this subject the editor's *The Alliance of Hanover*, index.

for his person and of Our singular regard for his great merit, and you will let him know that you are ordered to take his opinion as to persons and things in Sweden, and conduct yourself chiefly by his advice, as one whom We look upon to be a true friend to the alliance.

You will likewise carefully seek the good will and intimacy of the Sieur Duben, whom Count Horn, as being long and often absent himself from Stockholm, makes his chief confident. You will also take opportunity of improving a good acquaintance with the Sieur Torne, who is private secretary to the king of Sweden, and whom We take to be well intentioned towards Us and Our affairs. But as he is not at present on very good terms with Count Horn, by reason of some difference with respect to one Bononschiöld, you must be cautious in managing that acquaintance, so as not to give offence to the count. And as you may happen to grow familiar with the Sieur Törne you may insinuate to him how agreeable it would be to Us to see all the true friends of the king and kingdom of Sweden perfectly united together, and how much it is for their common interest to lay aside all private disputes as much as possible, which will otherwise give great advantage to their adversarys, and consequently do much prejudice to Our alliance with that crown.

As to those of the Holstein party you must not cultivate any intimacy or confidence with them; however you should behave yourself towards them on all occasions in a polite and well bred manner, so that they may not have any ground to complain of ill treatment or incivility, and the well intentioned at the same time may not conceive any jealousy, as seeing that your conduct toward the Holsteiners is pure civility and such only as a gentleman in good manners ought to use.

The Emperor having⁷ approved and published a decree of the Aulick Council concerning the affairs of Mecklenbourg, by which that duke [Karl Leopold] is to be deprived of the regency, his subjects to be absolved from their oaths, and his brother [Christian Ludwig] to have the administration of the dutchy conferred upon him, entirely under the direction of his Imperial Majesty and dependant on his sole power and authority, you have herewith put into your hands several papers relating to that affair, by which you will see the nature and pernicious tendency of this enormous attempt upon the liberties and privileges of the Empire, together with some thoughts which We judge proper and seasonable to put

a stop to so arbitrary and dangerous a proceeding. And as the Swedes are very nearly concerned, and in particular with respect to Pomerania, in the effects of this decree, especially if the king of Prussia should get footing in Mecklenburg, as he is empowered to do by being admitted into a share of executing the Emperor's orders in that behalf, you will talk seriously to the ministers in Sweden upon this head and animate them as much as possible to joyn in taking the necessary measures for defeating the design of the very extraordinary and unjustifiable decree and for putting a stop to such despotic enterprizes of the Imperial court, which subverts the very foundations of the rights and immunities of the Germanic Body.

G. R.

CHARLES TOWNSHEND, VISCOUNT TOWNSHEND, SECRETARY
OF STATE, TO EDWARD FINCH.

(*Record Office, Sweden 51 to 54.*)

Whitehall, 10 Dec. 1728.

Very private.

[After several paragraphs about the private doings of Prince George of Hesse in Sweden]

. . . . I send you herewith by his Majesty's command a copy of a treaty of union entered into by the dukes of Wolfenbuttle and Wirtemberg, to which the King as Elector, the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, the duke of Saxe Gotha and others have acceded, and to which his Majesty would be glad to have the king of Sweden's accession, as duke of Pomerania. The engagements, you will see, are very loose and general, and therefore can create no difficultys, but they are a foundation for cementing an union among the princes concerned in it, and consequently may be of great use in the affairs of the Empire. Before you propose this to the king of Sueden you will acquaint Count Horn and Mons^r Duben with the treaty and the orders you have received upon it, letting them know that his Majesty would not let you take any step without consulting them. His Majesty is of opinion that this treaty will be of advantage to the kingdom of Sueden by giving them weight and influence in Germany and in the affairs of the Empire in general, and his Majesty believes Count Horn and Mo^r Duben will agree that it will always be not only for the honour but also for the interest of the crown of Sueden, and for the good and safety of the protestant religion,

that they should enter into such treatys as will give them opportunities of concerning themselves in those matters and of bearing a figure among the princes and states of the Empire. And as his Majesty makes no question but Count Horn and Mr^r Duben will encourage your proposing this accession to the king of Sweden, his Majesty would have you conform yourself to their sentiments in conducting this whole matter.

The King has been informed, and as he thinks from pretty sure hands, that Mr^r Chauvelin is trying by Mons^r Castejas, the French minister at Stockholm, to get Count Horn to move his Majesty to contribute a proportion of money towards placing King Stanislaus on the throne of Poland. The count will have seen from the copy of Mr^r Woodward's instructions, which you were directed to communicate to him, how heartily disposed his Majesty is to assist King Stanislaus in that affair; and as the same instructions have been communicated in France they cannot be ignorant of the King's good intentions that way, and therefore his Majesty cannot think why the Garde des Sceaux [Chauvelin] should take so indirect a method to move that matter, unless that he is apprehensive that England may propose to France in lieu thereof some favours and benefits for the protestants in Poland or the Empire, or some other equivalent in favour of the liberties of the Empire, which France would willingly avoid being obliged to give. And therefore as they know how closely the interests of England and Sueden are united, and that we have nothing to ask of one another, the Garde des Sceaux thinks he can't do better than to make Sweden the mover of the proposal and save France, who is chiefly interested in supporting King Stanislaus, from being engaged to do anything in lieu of such a demand. Count Horn will easily perceive the evasive turn Mr^r Chauvelin is aiming to give to this business, and will be of opinion that France should rather directly herself make her own proposal in a matter of this nature than engage Sueden to do it, and thereby deprive us of turning this demand to the advantage of the libertys of the Empire and of the protestant religion. Count Horn and Mr^r Duben will know best how well founded this intelligence is; and if it is true they will know at the same time of how great importance it is that Mons^r Chauvelin should never be apprized either of our having discovered this piece of cunning, or of the King's sentiments upon it. And therefore his Majesty persuades himself that as he acts with the utmost

openness and confidence towards those two ministers they will honourably keep his secrets, and not expose him to any ill will from the French in letting them know this discovery.

You see that this whole letter is of a very secret nature, and ought to be managed with very great caution ; and thô you will, with that confidence you are directed, communicate the contents to Count Horn and Mr Duben, and not proceed or act upon any of the particular points but by their direction and advice, yet you will decline giving them any part of it in writing.

These are points, as you may observe, which are not to be communicated or concerted with the French ambassador [Count de Casteja], and therefore you will not open your self to him upon them, thô in all other respects the King would have you live perfectly well with him, and in great freedom and mutual confidence.

Whitehall, 2nd May 1729.

The King having been informed by a very sure hand that the Emperor is resolved to bring the business of Meclenburg before the dyet at Ratisbon, in order to get the proceedings of the Aulick Council with respect to the provisional administration of that country approved and confirmed by that assembly, his Majesty, who looks upon that step as a most dangerous one to the rights and libertys of the Empire, ordered me to write the inclosed letter last night to Mr Skutenhielm and to the ministers of Denmark [Baron Sohlenthal] and Hesse Cassel [General Diemar] here, that they might inform their respective courts of this design and press them to send effectual orders to Ratisbon to prevent such a great blow being given to the constitutions of the Empire. And it is his Majesty's pleasure at the same time that you do exert your utmost application at the court where you are in this affair, and for that purpose you will represent to the king of Sweden and to Count Horn the extreme importance of their being vigilant and active in this business, and will endeavour to procure the strongest orders and instructions thereupon to the Swedish minister at Ratisbon [Von Stade.]

Hanover, June 10/21 1729.

. . . . I am sorry to find by the inclosed memorial, which I received from the German Chancery here, that notwithstanding the good dispositions which the ministers in Sweden profess with regard to the affairs of Meclenburg yet there is some reason to fear

that his Swedish Majesty's zeal begins to slacken, and that he may possibly be prevailed upon to acquiesce intirely in the decree of the Aulick Council. It is therefore of the utmost importance that you should endeavour to remove the wrong impressions which the king of Sweden and his ministers may have received as to this affair, and his Majesty has commanded me to send you for that purpose the inclosed copys of letters which passed sometime ago between the court of Berlin and me, and by which his Swedish Majesty and Count Horn will perceive the views the king of Prussia entertains in relation to the dutchy of Meclenburg, and to what a degree he flatters the Emperor in that affair. The King hopes that upon the perusal of these papers the court where you are will be convinced that it highly imports them to join with the rest of the allys in a strenuous opposition to the decree of the Aulick Council, and that his Swedish Majesty will not only send orders to his minister at Ratisbon to act in a strict concert with those, who are instructed to oppose this decree, but that he will also give directions to Mr Crassau [Krassow] to undeceive the court of Vicenna as to any hopes they may have conceived of Sweden's acquiescing under so notorious a violation of the constitutions of the Empire. I need not tell you that his Majesty would have the inclosed letters communicated to nobody but the king Count Horn and Mons^r Duben.

Hanover, 31 Aug^t/11 Sept^r 1729.

I received by Randal the messenger, while I was at the Ghörde, your dispatches of the 4/15 of August, and I have since had by the post here those of the 13/24 and 20/31 of the same month, all which have been laid before the King.

His Majesty observed by yours of the 4/15 that Count Horn, who gave little credit to the advices I sent you formerly concerning the views of the Hessian family towards the succession in Sweden, was now beginning to suspect that such a design was really carrying on. Upon which I must inform you that when I sent you notice at first, by his Majesty's command, of the designs in agitation upon Prince George's going into Sweden I had that intelligence from very good hands, though it did not then meet with much credit from Count Horn. And now his suspicions are awakened I must desire you to assure the count, with my compliments, that these intrigues must arise from another quarter and not all from the Hessian

court. For since I have been in Germany I have had good opportunities of sounding Prince William thoroughly, and others of the court of Cassel, as to their sentiments with respect to the Swedish succession ; and I am convinced that, whatever thoughts they might have flattered themselves with formerly that way, they are now quite in another way of reasoning and look upon the being only landgrave of Hesse Cassel in Germany in good circumstances, as they are at present by the help of the subsidies from England, to be much better than to have the accession of the crown of Sweden, and I have all the reason in the world to think they are at present sincerely in these sentiments ; and as to Prince William's son [Prince Frederick], I think there is much less probability of any intrigue that way. He is indeed a very pretty young prince, and saluted the King very handsomely at the head of his regiment, and his Majesty spoke very kind things both to him and of him , and as his Majesty has several daughters he may be a proper match in time for a younger daughter of England, but that is a thing as yet at a great distance. However his Majesty himself would rather chuse him as presumptive landgrave than as having any prospect of the crown of Sweden ; besides the uncertainty, as well as emptiness of such a view his Majesty has several reasons not to see the kingdom of Sweden and the landgraviate of Hesse joyned together, and in powerful or active hands. Upon the whole his Majesty thinks you may very well quiet Count Horn's apprehensions as to the Hessian family, and turn his enquiry towards some other source of the workings of the present intrigues in Sweden. And in order to convince the count that his Majesty is sincere you may let him know that you are instructed to follow such directions as he shall think proper to give you, and to be assisting to him in disappointing and putting an end to these pernicious designs, which cannot be attended with any other consequences but those of embroiling the kingdom of Sweden and ruining his present Majesty's affairs.

If you can find that a congratulation is expected from the King upon the peace with Saxony, and you have not yet done it, you may make a compliment upon that subject in such manner as you shall think proper.

I send you inclosed a copy of the convention signed with the king of Prussia, which I hope will put a stop to the confusion which was apprehended with reason in these parts.

EDWARD FINCH, 1730

Whitehall, 9th Jan^{ry} 1729/30.

I am now to acknowledge your letters of the 3^d 10th and 17th of last month, which have been laid before the King

You did extremely right according to your orders to convince Count Horn of the purity of his Majesty's intentions with respect to what is spread about by designing people concerning Prince William of Hesse and his son, but as you apprehend in your's of the 17th Dec^r that while your assurances continue secret between Count Horn and you the publick will not be disabused, and such false reports may take root to the prejudice of his Majesty's affairs, the King thinks fit that you should communicate your apprehensions to Count Horn and take his advice how you should conduct your self in discrediting such groundless suggestions.

I believe you may depend upon it that what Count Horn let drop to you about the continuance of the subsidys to Sweden was done in concert with Mons^r Casteja, and you will not at all hazard your credit in appearing ignorant and uninformed of the resolutions which may be taken here upon that subject, for it is always best to keep people in suspence as long as possible upon matters that may prove disagreeable to them, which, you yourself must see from the present situation of our affairs, would be the case, should Sweden at this juncture demand the continuance of the subsidies

Whitehall, 20th January 1729/30.

I have received your letter of the 31th of last month and laid it before the King, but have no particular commands from his Majesty at present upon the contents of it.

But the King has ordered me to acquaint you that he has received secret advices concerning the warlike preparations of the king of Prussia, and his dangerous designs of disturbing the peace of that part of Germany These advices have been confirmed from several quarters, and we also learn from Holland that the king of Prussia reinforces his garrisons on those frontiers and appears inclinable to do all the mischief he is able, as soon as he can have a proper occasion. His scheme seems to be, if the Emperor does not agree with the allys of the treaty of Seville, to begin hostilities by attacking the King's German dominions and thereby kindling a warr in Lower Saxony. These advices you will impart to Count Horn, and to such others as he shall judge proper, and let them know

that thô his Majesty believes they may have the same advices from Mons^r Klinkowströhm, yet he would not omit communicating them to his friends in Sweden, as being of the utmost importance in this juncture. You will shew to the count that it is the interest of Sweden to make preparations on their side by giving orders for a body of troops to hold themselves in a readiness, as soon as the season will permit, to reinforce the garrison they have in Stralsund, in order, if the king of Prussia should come to a rupture, to be in a condition not only to prevent any ill design he may have upon them, but likewise to take advantage of the opportunity that might offer itself of recovering most part, if not all, that they have lost on that side, and thereby curb and disappoint the restless and ambitious views of a dangerous and most troublesome neighbour.

Whitehall, 27th Jan^{ry} 1729/30.

His Majesty has commanded me to send you by express the inclosed letter, which I received by last post from Mr Du Bourgay. You will see by it that the advices I lately transmitted to you, relating to the king of Prussia's designs upon the electorate of Hanover, are sufficiently confirmed, and that there is the greatest reason to apprehend that by the intervention of Seckendorff a concert is actually formed between their Polish and Prussian Majestys for attacking the King and disturbing the peace of Lower Saxony, and that the Emperor will, in all probability, join in it. The King has but too much reason to be convinced of the truth of what Mor Du Bourgay mentions concerning the plan for invading the mines of the Hartz and driving the troops of the commission out of Mecklenburg, and his Majesty is persuaded that Mons^r Manteuffle was dispatched from Grodno to Berlin with no other view than to concert measures with that court. But as the convention for the arbitration was signed before his arrival, and it was consequently then too late for him to prevent that agreement, his Majesty believes that he employed himself there in laying the foundation of a new rupture, and in forming a plan of operations to be executed at a proper opportunity. The delays and the difficulties which have been started by the court of Berlin, in order to retard the decision of the arbitrators at Brunswick, seem to be a sufficient proof that these were the views and intentions of Seckendorff Manteuffle Gromkow and that whole party, into which they have at last brought the king of Prussia.

As to the former part of the plan above mentioned, vizt the invading of the Hartz, his Majesty will do all in his power to be in a condition to repel any attacks in that quarter; but as to the other, relating to Mecklenbourg, it will be certainly much more feasible, since the few troops which the King and the duke of Wolfenbuttle have in that dutchy, if it should not be necessary to recal them for the support of their own dominions, would yet be very insufficient for the defence of that country. I sent you lately a plan of accommodation relating to the affair of Mecklenbourg, together with some remarks upon it, and I find by one of your letters since that you have received it. His Majesty would have you now make use of this with the king of Sweden and Count Horn to convince them of the purity of his intentions in the affair of Mecklenbourg, and of the great regard he had shewn to his Suedish Majesty in the share he had designed him in the execution of that plan, if what his Majesty proposed had taken effect. At the same time you will endeavour to convince them how much it is for the interest of Sueden to prevent the king of Prussia's making himself master of Mecklenbourg, how dangerous that must prove to their possessions in Pomerania, and how much probability there is at present (for the reason abovementioned) of his succeeding in that part of his plan, if he be suffered to attempt it.

The King has already communicated the advices, which I now send you, to France and Holland and required their assistance in pursuance of their engagements, and his Majesty does not in the least doubt of being vigorously seconded by those powers. What remains is, in the King's opinion, that those princes, who are by their situation more immediately concerned to preserve the tranquillity of the Lower Saxony, should heartily concurr in the same good design and should each of them give the king of Prussia to understand, in the most friendly manner, that having reason to apprehend that he may have taken measures to attack the electorate of Hanover, or in some manner or other to disturb the peace of the Lower Saxony, they hope his Majesty will be pleased to declare himself upon this head in such a manner as may intirely remove the uneasiness they are under upon that account, and that they have so much the greater reason to desire this favour of his Majesty as they find themselves by their engagements under a necessity of declaring to him that they will be obliged to oppose any enterprize he may make in violation of the publick tran-

quillity. This is what his Majesty would have you use your utmost endeavours to bring the king of Sueden to agree to, and to prevail upon him to send orders to Mons^r Klinkowström to make the said declaration in his name to the court of Berlin, which the King is convinced will be the only method of preventing the effect of their present unwarrantable and pernicious views.

I shall only add that his Majesty would have you communicate the inclosed letter from Mr Du Bourgay to the king and Count Horn only, and that in the utmost confidence. The name, which is omitted in the inclosed letter, is that of Mons^r Cnyphausen ; the part which that minister bears in this affair makes, as you will yourself observe, the utmost caution and secrecy absolutely necessary.

Having thus explained to you his Majesty's intentions I think it needless to give you any particular directions as to the manner of executing these orders, the prudence and dexterity you have hitherto shewn in managing the several commissions, with which you have been intrusted, leaving me no room to doubt but that you will do it in the properest method, and will be particularly careful of making these representations to the king of Sweden and Count Horn in the way that may be most agreeable to them, and most likely to be attended with success.

Whitehall, 3^d Feby 1729/30.

I have now in my hands your letters of the 7th and 14th of last month, and have laid them before the King. His Majesty doubts not by the contents of Mor Klinkoströhm's letters, which Count Horn read to you, but that the court where you are will be well apprized from their own minister of the dangerous designs of the king of Prussia, which will make it more easy to you to execute his Majesty's orders upon that head, which you will have received in my letters of the 20th and 27th of January.

As to the business of the subsidys, concerning which you and the French minister [De Casteja] have had a formal insinuation that the senate desires that they may be continued, the King of himself is always inclined to do all the good he can for his friends and allies the Swedes, and knows not what may happen between this and the meeting of the dyet in that kingdom to put it in his power to shew his good dispositions towards Sweden ; but as circumstances are at present here it is impossible to think of moving

such a question in parliament with the least probability of success. You may therefore let Count Horn know his Majesty's good wishes and inclinations, and how ready he should be upon any proper opportunity to do anything [that] depended on him to help Sweden in their affairs, but you must give him to understand at the same time that the asking of the parliament at this juncture a continuance of the subsidys would certainly produce a flat refusal, which would not only be very disagreeable both to his Majesty and to Sweden but might also be of ill consequence, and Count Horn cannot be ignorant how cautiously and tenderly such assemblies are to be managed in affairs of this nature.

The King was not a little surprised at the notion you say is suggested in Sweden, as if the treaty [of Hanover] and the subsidys were to determine together, which is a principle not only without the least foundation from the treaty itself but would be look'd upon here as such a breach of faith, that nothing could do more hurt to the interest of Sweden in this country and might prove an effectual barr to his Majesty's good intentions in their favour upon a proper occasion.

You may assure Count Horn that thô it would not be possible for his Majesty to continue the Swedish subsidys, yet he will be always ready to concurr in every thing that may be for their security or advantage, and in case they should think it proper at this time to send any additional forces to Stralsund, the present weak condition of which place may probably be a temptation to the king of Prussia to make some attempt upon it, in that case his Majesty, to shew how much he interests himself in the safety of Sweden, will be contented to let the forces they should send thither be looked on as part of the quota of succours they are obliged to furnish at their own expence by the accession and former treatys. And you may likewise assure Count Horn that in case of a rupture his Majesty would take part of their ten thousand men into his pay, preferably to the troops of any other nation.

I am concerned that I hear no more from you about the paper in cypher, which I sent you in mine of the 5th of December last. It contained matters very well worth their attention in Sweden, and shewed in so particular a manner the King's regard for them, that his Majesty is surprized that he has not yet had either Count Horn's or Mons^r Duben's thoughts upon it, which he would be glad to see as soon as you could know them.

Whitehall, 14 April 1730.

Upon sending back your servant I shall more particularly acknowledge the dispatch of the 26th of February, which he brought, as likewise that of the 19th of March last, which you sent by Over the messenger.

Those dispatches were laid before the King as they came to my hands, and I can assure you in general that his Majesty very much approved of your conduct both in procuring the declaration from Sweden with respect to the king of Prussia and in animating that court to name troops for that service, in case they should be wanted, and also in managing the matter of the subsidies in such a way that Count Horn and the senator Duben appeared satisfied with the orders you had received from his Majesty upon that head. The King was particularly pleased with the readiness and vigour which the king of Sweden showed on that occasion, and with the offer he made of having more troops at his Majesty's service, if they were needful. Mr Klinkowströhm executed his orders very well, and his Majesty makes no question but that the zeal of Sweden and of his other allies contributed very much to make the king of Prussia come to that temper he did, particularly with regard to the disputes at Brunswick.

His Majesty saw with satisfaction likewise by Count Horn's letters, and by the behaviour of senator Duben and others, that his good friends the Swedes were very hearty in preparing to give their assistance in case of any disturbances happening in Lower Saxony.

WILLIAM STANHOPE, BARON HARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF
STATE, TO EDWARD FINCH.

(*Record Office, Sweden 55 to 73.*)

Windsor Castle, 28th July 1730.

I have now in my hands your letter of the 8th inst., which I have laid before the King, whom I find very well pleased with the readiness shewn in Sweden to alter the first instructions given to Monsr Von Stade. His Majesty makes no question but that minister will act a right part at Ratisbon, whenever there shall be occasion, and he has no other view in this matter but to have a perfect union and harmony appear in all places betwixt such strict and steady allies as his Majesty and the crown of Sweden.

I shall inform my self more particularly of what you write a project for an East India Company. I hope it is not intended to favour indirectly that of Ostend, against which his Majesty and his allys have so justly declared themselves. The King can see upon what foundation we can openly oppose such an establishment in Sweden, but if you can understand give any discolourment to it you will not do amiss, tho' it seems very unlikely such a trade should ever thrive in that country.

Whitehall, 20 Oct. 1730

I have received your letter of the 30th of last month and laid before the King, who has no particular commands to send upon the contents of it; for since Mons^r de Casteja is to take to him the character of ambassador there appears to be an end to the dispute, which was apprehended before, of his pretended to take place even as plenipotentiary.

The King thinks it might contribute to keep the duke of Mecklenburg from running into extravagancies if the Swedes would strengthen their garrison at Wismar, and therefore wishes for the good of that country that a battalion were sent from Stralsund to Wismar. I have spoke to Mons^r Sparre about it, who is apprehended that some difficulties might be made in Sweden. However his Majesty would have you sound Count Horn senator Duben and know their sentiments upon this matter, if you find they have no objection to it you will endeavour to get orders for the sending a battalion to Wismar as desired; if you see that the affair will be attended with many difficulties and objections his Majesty would not have you press it but form yourself to the opinion of the count and the senator especially in requesting that compliance or in letting it drop.

Whitehall, 18 Decr 1730

. . . . I have been informed that one Colin Campbell is at Stockholm, and very busy in forming schemes for a trade with the East Indies. He was employed in the service of the Dutch Company, and according to the advices I have had acts now under direction from them and has given in the inclosed memoria to the President of the College of Commerce. You will inform the minister from the States General [W. H. Rumpf] of this and your attention to know how this Campbell proceeds in his intrigues.

DISTRUST OF FRANCE

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For as this whole project seems to take it's rise from the directeurs of the Ostend East India Company the Swedes with specious pretences may be drawn in to engage in an undertaking which will be attended with great risks and uncertainties for them ; and if any profits arise they will be chiefly run away with by the Flemings and other strangers.

Whitehall, 29th Decr 1730.

. Mr Titley writes to me the same as Count Plelo did to Mons^r Casteja, that the dispositions in Denmark are extremely good towards Sweden and that they intended, as soon as they could pitch upon a proper person, to send a minister of character to Stockholm. And his Majesty was glad to observe by your's of the 2^d that they had equally good dispositions in Sweden towards curing all old animositys and coming to a perfect good understanding between the two nations, and you will take care on all proper occasions to increase those good inclinations, where you are, and to promote a strict amity between two protestant powers, who are his Majesty's good friends and allys.

Whitehall, 5 March 1730/1.

. The King has had intelligence that France is carrying on separate measures with the northern crowns and that the French ministers have orders to be outwardly civil to those of his Majesty but not to trust them with any of their transactions nor open themselves with confidence, as heretofore. Whereupon his Majesty thinks it necessary that you should be watchful and upon your guard on your side and conduct yourself in the same manner towards the French minister at Stockholm, and at the same time use your utmost endeavours to penetrate into his secret negotiations. And as the French are disposed to spread malicious insinuations, in order to blacken his Majesty, with respect to what is transacting at Vienna, as if our measures were destructive of former treaties and dangerous or prejudicial to the interests of the northern crowns, the King has commanded me to acquaint you in confidence that he was ready and zealous to execute the engagements of the treaty of Seville, even by force, in conjunction with his allys, but finding it impossible to fix and agree upon proper plans for that purpose his Majesty thought fit to hearken to some overtures from the court of Vienna, which tended to effect the same in an amicable way. This is the whole of our present transactions at Vienna, to get

the treaty of Seville executed peaceably and quietly, and you may assure the Swedish ministers in confidence that there is nothing doing contrary to our former treatys, and that all surmises of that nature are utterly false and groundless.

Whitehall, 1 June 1731.

. . . . The King finds by unquestionable advices that France is at work in several courts, particularly in the north, to secure them to their own views and to alienate them from his Majesty's interest, and no doubt you will have observed by Mo^r Casteja's conduct that his endeavours tend that way and that the design of the treaty of Vienna is painted in the worst colours possible, though nothing can be more harmless and inoffensive than it is, as I hope you have been able to convince the ministers in Sweden by the communication you have made of that treaty and by shewing them how particularly careful his Majesty was that all his engagements with his old friends, of which Sweden is in the first rank, should subsist and that nothing in the least detrimental to them should be admitted. These things you will inculcate as sedulously as possible in order to counterwork the false and invidious insinuations of the partisans of France, and you will endeavour to be extremely well with Count Horn, not only by assuring him of the King's personal regard for him but also of his Majesty's steddy resolution to cultivate the friendship of Sweden and to promote the interests of that crown on all occasions.

You will remember what I hinted to you in my former dispatch concerning Count Bonde, and we have still greater reason to be entirely confirmed in the same opinion, that he is a partisan of France and wholly gained to promote their measures, and accordingly you will be watchful of his conduct; and though you may not be able to inspire other notions into him yet you may find means to prevent his influence taking place with other people. And on this head I must acquaint you that we are persuaded that Mo^r Von Kochen is at present well inclined to his Majesty and his affairs, but that no artifices nor suggestions will be wanting to ruin his credit in Sweden, as being too much addicted to us; wherefore you will have your eyes towards keeping him in those good sentiments he has at present by giving him assurancy of the particular consideration we have for him here and by using your interest to support his credit with Count Horn and others and to destroy any

impressions to his disadvantage ; and in all things, as far as lies in your power, you will apply yourself to hinder our friends in Sweden from being put out of humour with us or alienated from us by the malicious insinuations the French and their creatures are so industrious to spread amongst them.

[Harrington continues at length in this dispatch on the innocence of the Vienna treaties and the specially friendly sentiments of Great Britain towards Sweden.]

Hampton Court, 22^d June 1731.

I have lately received your letters of the 26 May and 2^d and 9th inst., which have been all laid before the King as they came to my hands.

As his Majesty was much concerned to see by the first Count Horn's resolution to quit his employment in the Chancery and to retire from publick business, so it was a particular pleasure to his Majesty to find by your's of the 2^d inst. that the count had at last yielded to the pressing instances of the four Estates of the kingdom and would still continue to do his country that service he is most able to perform. You will take an opportunity to let the count know the King's sense of this transaction and how extremely satisfied his Majesty is that a person of his uprightness and abilitys remains at the head of the Chancery by the unanimous voice of the whole Swedish nation. I desire you please to make my compliments to the count on the same occasion. I congratulate him on the just opinion his countrymen have shewn for his superior merit in the most solemn and glorious manner imaginable, and I should have looked upon it as an irreparable loss for us, as well as for Sweden, if he had quitted the care of publick affairs, as he seemed determined to do.

Hampton Court, 6 July 1731.

I have received and laid before the King your letter of the 16 of last month. His Majesty was glad to see that you had hopes given you that something might be proposed or done to the advantage of the British trade with Sweden. Our commerce is so beneficial to that country, and our treatys already made settle such privileges on the British merchants, that it would be but reasonable to expect some better encouragement than we have met with of late on that head. And therefore if you have any communication made to you of proposals of that nature, that tend to the

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reciprocal advantage of both nations, they will be received here with pleasure and the proper instructions sent you thereupon, the King being perswaded that nothing will more contribute to cement the friendship and union between the two crowns than the putting the mutual interests of their trading subjects on a right foot.

Hampton Court, 13 August 1731.

I have now in my hands your letters of the 21th and 28th of last month, which have been laid before the King.

His Majesty approved of your talking as you did to the ministers concerning the new East India Company, which undoubtedly has been underhand encouraged and supported by the agents of the Ostend Company and other foreigners, and consequently, if the project should go on, it will be found that Sweden had only lent its name for the benefit of strangers and to enable them to hurt the English and Dutch Companys, with little or no real advantage to themselves.

The King was glad to see the assurances you had with respect to the negociation on foot with Denmark, and would freely communicate any thing that passes between us and Muscovy. But hitherto there is not the least thing done, nor any advance or proposal made on either side, and we cannot imagine what should give rise to the report that has prevailed in several courts of our being in treaty with Muscovy. We are indeed not at present upon ill terms with that court, and are desirous our merchants should live and trade there not only unmolested but also with favour and advantage; but as to any particular engagement or negociation you may be assured there is none at present depending there.

Mr Stanyan shall be acquainted with the endeavours you are using to procure the Turkish debt Luca Chirico applys for.

Hampton Court, 1 Oct^r 1731.

I am now to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 1st and 8th of September, which have been laid before the King.

It will be well if the impressions concerning our negociations with Muscovy are removed, which have been propagated with great industry in several courts without any real foundation for such reports, and no doubt they will be revived again when Mr Rondeau shall happen to take upon him the character of resident at Moscow, which has been sent him upon the earnest solicitations

of the Russia Company but which he is not to produce till such time as the Czarina shall name a minister to come hither on her part, though his Majesty is likewise desirous to live in amity with the Czarina, both for the sake of peace and the ancient good understanding between the two nations, and also for the benefit of his subjects who carry on a very considerable trade to those parts.

The King approved of the reasonings you used with Count Horn and the other Swedish ministers concerning the friendly inclusion of Sweden in the treaty of Vienna of the 16th of March. His Majesty only made a kind offer, in case the Emperor should explain himself in such manner, as to the powers he proposed to include, that there might be no difficulty in agreeing to it. But as the Imperial court have said no more since of that matter his Majesty forbears naming any one on his part and will not, if the case should happen, mention the inclusion of Sweden, unless such a mark of friendship and good will is agreeable there, which undoubtedly carrys no burthen or engagement with it in the way it was done by the late Queen after the treaty of Utrecht.

You will have seen by mine of the 3^d of Sept^r what I writ concerning the French ambassador's intention to make advances to Count Gyllenborg. The King has reason to believe that this intrigue is actually begun, and it will be very easy, now Count Horn is informed of this, to find out how and by whom it is carried on. It is likewise certain that France aims at hurting Count Horn by making him conceive bad impressions of his friends, and particularly of Mo^r Von Kocken, whom they represent as partial to England and false to the count's interests. These hints you will make the best use you can of to shew his Majesty's attention to do all the good he is able to Count Horn, and the secret intrigues of France to overthrow him.

Whitehall, 2^d Nov^r 1731.

I have the King's commands to inform you that upon the repeated advices, which his Majesty has for some time past received of the negotiations carrying on by the court of France at that of Copenhagen, in order to bring the latter into an alliance in opposition to his Majesty, and upon certain intelligence that they had not only already prevailed upon the king of Denmark to renew the former convention for six months after its expiration but were most earnestly

endeavouring by the offer of great subsidies to fix and secure that prince entirely to their interest ; and there being reason to believe that notwithstanding the said intrigues and proposals of France the court of Denmark was really disposed to prefer the friendship of England and to join in a new alliance with the King upon any reasonable terms, that should be proposed to them ; his Majesty was therefore pleased to command me to prepare such a project of a treaty as might answer the mutual view of friendship and good understanding between the two courts, might prevent that of Denmark from throwing itself into the arms of France, and be a means of securing the future tranquillity of the north. This I have accordingly done, and transmitted the plan I had drawn last week by a courier to M^r Titley, to be proposed to the Danish ministers. I have likewise by the King's orders already informed Baron Sparre of what has passed in this affair and communicated to him the project itself And his Majesty would have you, upon the receipt of this, take an opportunity of acquainting the king of Sweden and Count Horn with what is above, and let them know that as his Majesty's motives for proposing this new alliance are the most disinterested, it being calculated chiefly to countermine the dangerous intrigues of France and to establish the general peace of Europe upon a firmer and more extensive foundation, so the alliance itself, as proposed by his Majesty, is the most innocent and justifiable, containing only the usual articles of union mutual defence and general guaranty, together with the renewal of former treaties and engagements between the contracting parties. And you will farther inform them that as his Majesty sets the highest value upon the concurrence of Sweden in the measures he engages in for the publick good, and as a disposition has been observed in that court to be upon a good foot with that of Denmark, the King thought fit to order that in the project sent from hence the king and crown of Sweden should be expressly named to be invited to accede to the said treaty as soon as concluded ; and upon this head you will sound them, though not in such a manner as that it should be taken for a formal requisition on the part of his Majesty, as to their dispositions to join with us in such an alliance. Upon the whole you will take care to make them sensible of the necessity of observing the strictest secrecy with regard to this affair, since it cannot be doubted but that if it should come to the knowledge of France they would immediately redouble their attacks at Copen-

hagen and increase those temptations, by which they have been so long aiming to draw that court into their measures.

I received yesterday your letter of the 20th past and sent it to his Majesty at Richmond.

Whitehall, 16 November 1731

I have received yours of the vith of October, and have laid it before the King.

His Majesty was very well pleased to see the good sentiments you find, upon all occasions, as well in Count Bonde and Mons^r Von Kocken as in Count Horn, and you will continue to be very carefull to cultivate them in the best manner you can, by letting them know the King's kind acceptance of their good intentions towards him. People in Sweden certainly do nothing but justice to his Majesty when they acknowledge the uprightness of his views and the peacefull tendency of his measures, which he hopes will be always agreeable to Sweden, as being likewise well disposed to promote the general good of Europe.

M^r Robinson has, at the request of the Imperial court, lately desired the King's good offices at Stockholm for the vote of Sweden at the dyet, as duke of Pomerania, for the guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction. I see by your last that Mons^r Antivari, the Imperial secretary, had presented a memorial upon that subject, which you hoped would be favourably answered. You know the King's sentiments in general already as to that guaranty, which he is engaged by treaty to support; however his Majesty has thought fit to give you order in particular as to this point, that you may give all the assistance you can to the Imperial secretary for procuring the Swedish vote of duke of Pomerania at the dyet as the Emperor desires.

You do very right in being watchfull of the proceedings of the new East India Company, and his Majesty is pleased with the assurances you receive from the ministers that it shall not be made a cloak for encouraging an indirect trade of the Ostenders.

Whitehall, 30th Nov^r 1731.

I have received your letter of the 10th inst. and laid it before the King, who continues to be very well pleased with the confidence Count Horn and the Swedish ministers shew you and with their dependance on the friendship of England. You did well

to assure them of it ; they will have seen a late mark of it by naming that crown in the project of our defensive alliance with Denmark ; and if that treaty succeeds the confederacy will be too strong to fear any resentment from France. However you may let the count know that if the French court thinks fit to lay aside their inveteracy, and to be reconciled to the King, his Majesty will not be forgetful of his good allys the Swedes.

As we find by your last that the Swedish ship was ready to sail on her voyage to the East Indies, I must acquaint you that it is hoped here that they have been careful not to employ his Majesty's subjects on board, for there is a very strong Act of Parliament strictly forbidding all British subjects to engage in such like foreign service. And if such persons are found by the East India Company's ships or others they will endeavour to put the laws of England in execution upon their countrymen, and seize them in order to answer their disobedience.

Whitehall, 7th Decr 1731.

. The King was pleased to find that the French ambassador's way of talking and acting has grown so disagreeable to Count Horn and the Swedish ministers. You do very right in improving those disgusts, and you will continue as dextrously as you can to perswade them of the usefullness as well as disinterestedness of the friendship of England, and to point out to them the dangerous views of France, as well as their haughty manner of treating Sweden.

Whitehall, 29 Feb. 1731/2.

I have now in my hands and have laid before the King your letters of the 2^d and 9th inst., by which his Majesty has an account of what has come to your knowledge of the negotiation carrying on by the Danish minister at Stockholm [Major-General Schmettau] and of the conversations you have had with the Swedish ministers upon that affair. The King was very well pleased with the assurances that were given you that nothing should be concluded without previously acquainting him with it, which is a complaisance his Majesty is certainly intitled to from them, after having given them so early a communication of his own negotiation with Denmark. His Majesty might indeed have expected that after having shew'd so great regard to Sweden as to insist that they should be expressly named in his project of a treaty with the king of

Denmark they should have waited to see the event of that transaction before they listen'd to any proposals for a separate treaty with that prince ; but however as you have been positively assured that this affair was not carrying on with the intervention of the French ambassador, and have been solemnly promised that nothing shall be done in it displeasing to his Majesty, there does not seem to be any reason to apprehend any ill consequences from such a negotiation, especially as it has been declared to you that in case it should end in a treaty, and Denmark should propose the inclusion of France, they would on their part insist on the same for England. You will in the meantime be pleased to continue observing all that passes in this business with the utmost attention, and especially as to any part the French ambassador may be taking in it.

Whitehall, 21st March 1731/2.

I have received your letter of the first instant and laid it before the King, who was glad to see the detail you had from Count Bonde of what has passed in their negociation with Denmark. I have already informed you in mine of the 29th past of his Majesty's sentiments as to such a transaction, for the success of which we shall wait with some impatience for your next letters, as they will probably bring an account of the answer that will have been received from the Danish court upon the affair of the guaranty expected by the king of Denmark.

As to what Count Bonde and Mr^r Von Kocken desired to be informed of by his Majesty, vizt whether any thing had come to his knowledge of a negotiation between Denmark and Muscovy for indemnifying the duke of Holstein at the expence of Sweden, you may assure them from the King that his Majesty has not the least information of any such things having been thought of by those two courts ; and if he should hereafter find, which however is by no means credible, that such a design was really on foot they may depend upon his not concealing it from his good friends in Sweden.

Whitehall, 2 May 1732.

. I have not as yet receiv'd any thing from Sparre upon the affairs of commerce ; you will have seen by what I writ to you the 25th past that we should be in expectation of knowing what answer you would obtain from the instances you were directed to make by mine of the 28 March in pursuance of the representa-

tions of the Board of Trade. In the mean while his Majesty is very sorry to see so little appearance of your obtaining, by your strongest instances, the redress which is so justly desired, or even preventing future incroachments, whilst his Majesty's friendly dispositions towards Sweden continue to make so little impression upon the persons who have the direction of those affairs. You must however lose no opportunity of talking in the strongest and most serious manner, as well to the king of Sweden as the several ministers, upon the necessity of their conforming their practice to their treatys and thereby putting a stop to any further complaints of this kind.

The King was pleas'd to see that the difficulty which you apprehended you should be under with relation to Mons^r Bestuchef no longer subsisted, and would have you behave to that gentleman as to the minister of a princess with whom his Majestv lives upon a foot of friendship and good understanding.

Whitehall, 9 May 1732.

I have now before me your two letters of the 19 and 26 past, by the former of which I was glad to see you had received the representations of the Board of Trade, which, as they sufficiently shew how ill founded those recriminations are, which are made upon us by Sweden, will have enabled you to give the proper reply to such arguments as they pretend to draw from our practice here in justification of their own. As to the making a new treaty of commerce his Majesty does not at present see that we shall be like to procure the redress of the grievances complain'd of by that expedient, all that we desire being a most faithfull execution of our present treaty on their part, which as we are not able to obtain there does not seem to be any good reason to hope for a greater regard being shewn to any new stipulations. The King will, however, be willing to hear and take into consideration any particulars they may have to propose on that head. You did very well in speaking to the ministers in the manner you did upon the subject of the new tax laid upon mariners, and I hope we shall soon see the good effect of your representations. In the mean time, however, I shall referr that matter to the examination of the Commissioners for Trade, that you may be furnished with their opinion thereupon.

The French ambassador's declaration was visibly calculated

to intimidate Sweden and prevent their uniting themselves more closely with us, which, as it appears by the representations he lately made to the Swedish ministers upon the report of a treaty of commerce being on foot, he had very great apprehensions of their doing. I can assure you, however, that whatever strain the Garde des Sceaux [Chauvelin] may write in to M^r Casteja they have talked with much more moderation to the Imperial secretary at Paris upon the same subject.

The King was very glad to see that the assurances you were directed to give by mine of the 4th April were so agreeable to the Swedish court; they may rely upon his Majesty's resolution to give them on every occasion the strongest proofs of his friendship, if they do not themselves, by their conduct with regard to his subjects, make it impossible for him to exert himself so much as he might otherwise do in their favour.

I shall be extremely pleased with having an account of your notions as to what you touch upon in your letter concerning any method of procuring a vente for our manufactures in Sweden, and thereby saving so much specie to the kingdom and employing a greater number of poor.

Hanover, 23 June/4 July 1732.

I have already acknowledged the receipt of your letters to the 7th of June, and am now to acquaint you that the King approved very well the discourses and reasonings you had with the Swedish ministers upon the business of trade; and his Majesty thinks that it would be in vain to set about making a treaty of commerce before we can settle the principles on which it is to be founded and agree upon the true meaning of the several clauses in the 12 article of the treaty of 1720, which we took to be the last established rule of our commerce, and which the Suedes seem to explain away so as to be of little or no significance; for if *interdicuntur and cohibentur* is to be taken in the present tense, not as to the time the treaty was made but as to the time of making the complaint, Sweden may make as many new laws as they please to load our trade and justify them upon so loose a principle. But as you desire the King's pleasure upon several points in dispute I have sent extracts of your late letters to the Board of Trade, that they may examine further into the matter and make those enquiries you desire and give their opinion upon the whole, which I shall

transmit to you as soon as I receive it with his Majesty's commands. In the mean while it appears to the King that the present method you have put this discussion into is extremely proper to come at the bottom of the grievances and to strike out suitable means of redress, and you will continue to proceed as you propose, and his Majesty will be glad to see the upshot of the several conferences you are to have upon this subject, of which you seem to have made yourself entirely master.

Zelle, 18th/29th August 1732.

I have received your letter of the 2/13 inst. and laid it before the King.

As Baron Sparre is now here in his way to Stockholm I have taken an opportunity of talking to him very strongly upon the subject of our grievances in affairs of commerce, and represented to him the ill consequences which are so much to be apprehended from their continuing in Sweden to put such hardships upon our trade; and he has promised me to do all in his power for putting those affairs upon a better foot and to support the instances you make upon that subject as much as possible.

The King is very sorry for the ill appearance of things at your court with relation to Count Horn's influence there, and commends your diligence very much in transmitting every particular that comes to your knowledge.

Whitehall, Oct^r 10th 1732.

I have received and laid before the King your letter of the 20th past, and as you mention therein the queen of Sweden's dissatisfaction with Prince William, upon account of his being supposed to have the succession to^t the crown of Sweden in view, and as it appears from thence that her Swedish Majesty does not approve of the continuation of that monarchy in the Hessian family, the King would be glad to be acquainted, as far as any thing of that nature may have come to your knowledge, what are her Majesty's real sentiments upon that affair and what prince she may herself have cast her eyes on as a more proper successor to that kingdom, since it can hardly be supposed that she can be inclined to favour the pretensions of the Holstein family, the advancement whereof to the crown of Sweden must be attended with the inevitable ruin of all those who have been most zealous in her own and the king

her husband's service. You will not, however, make use of his Majesty's name in any inquiries you may make upon this subject.

. . .

Whitehall, 21st Nov^r 1732.

I have now in my hands your letters of the 25th of October and 1st November, which have been laid before the King.

His Majesty was glad to see by the former that Baron Sparre, when he spoke in the senate, had mentioned the English grievances in their trade with Sweden, and makes no question but that, as he cannot but be rightly informed of the great advantage the British commerce is to his country, he will, in composing his memorial, set that matter in a true light and remove the prejudices of those who seem to act as if all trade with us were detrimental to the Swedes. We are very sensible of the contrary, and find to our great cost how much the ballance runs against us; so that if his Majesty's subjects cannot obtain relief in their just complaints we must turn our thoughts here to put our iron trade in another channel, according to the opinion and advice of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations.

Whitehall, 28th Nov^r 1732.

. You will find inclosed an account from Mr Titley relating to a ship now lying at Gottenburg and going to the East Indies upon account chiefly, as is supposed, of the late Ostend Company. I send you this by his Majesty's command that you may compare it with such observations as you may have opportunitys of making where you are, and may endeavour to dissuade your court from giving any encouragement to people who are carrying on an unfair and collusive trade under the express prohibition of treatys.

Whitehall, 29 Dec^r 1732.

Your last letter is of the 6th inst. It has been already acknowledged by my order, and having now laid it before the King I may acquaint you that his Majesty approved very well of the step you had taken in agreeing to confer with the three Colleges for the redress of our grievances in trade, as likewise of the manner in which you addressed yourself to the deputies upon your first meeting with them. We shall be impatient to be acquainted with the success of your endeavors in a point of so much importance, though I must not conceal from you that by our last letters from France

we see that great alarm has been taken there upon the apprehension of our being like to obtain some new advantages in commerce, and that there is great reason to fear you will meet with considerable opposition from that quarter, by their insisting upon having every thing granted to them which you may be able to obtain for our merchants. I see that you were your self apprehensive of some difficultys of this kind, and therefore need not advise you to keep a strict eye upon the French ambassador upon this occasion.

By Mr Titley's last letters we are informed that there are great hopes conceived at the court of Denmark, now the difficulty of Sleswick is removed, of bringing Sweden to accede to their late treaty with the Emperor and the Czarina, and that your court is far from being disgusted at the guaranty which is therein given to Muscovy, tho' we cannot easily believe that your court will come into these measures, as indeed it does not appear to be their interest so to do. However you will inform yourself if there is any foundation for these advices and send us the informations you shall be able to get relating to this matter.

Whitehall, 9th Jan^{ry} 1732/3.

I have now laid before the King your letters of the 13th and 20th past, and his Majesty approves very well your reasonings upon the affairs of trade and your indefatigable endeavours to get the several abuses, which we justly complain of, rectified. I shall referr the account you have sent me of your conferences with the deputies of the Colleges to the Commissioners of Trade, that they may report their opinion to his Majesty of what steps may be farther proper to be taken.

The assurances you received from Count Horn of his determination to exert himself in keeping the new party, that is formed against him, from the management of foreign affairs, and the improbability of that cabal's being able to support their credit for any time, were very agreeable to his Majesty.

* The representations you were directed in mine of the 28th of Nov^r to make against what was passing at Gottenburg were meant upon a supposition of the Ostenders being the persons principally concerned in the ship going from thence to the East Indies, and consequently of the king of Sweden's name and protection being lent to people, whose collusive practices have made them so

obnoxious to his Majesty ; and if the account which I transmitted to you upon that subject might be relied on, I think there was very just reason for England and Holland to be offended at such a proceeding ; however, as you and the Dutch minister [W. H. Rumpf] had reason to believe it would not be in the power of the Chancery to give any redress therein, you did right in following Count Horn's opinion and in not making any formal complaint against it.

Whitehall, 30 March, 1733.

I have now in my hands your letters of the 7th and 15th inst., by which the King is informed of what pass'd between you and the Suedish ministers upon the arrival of the two French couriers, which were dispatched to Mons^r Casteja upon the subject of the Polish election, and I can assure you that his Majesty very graciously approved your attention to discover the sentiments of your court upon that occasion, and the manner in which you expressed yourself in your discourses upon it. The King took particular notice of the great change in the language of Count Horn upon the arrival of the second messenger, and his Majesty cannot but suspect that he must have brought an offer of subsidys from France, and would therefore have you employ your utmost dexterity to come at the truth of that particular and be extremely vigilant in observing the conduct and motions of Sueden upon an occasion of so much importance.

Whitehall, 4th May 1733.

The King saw with a great deal of pleasure, by the account you sent of your conference with Count Horn in yours of the 18th past, the explanation that minister gave you with regard to his own sentiments upon the point of their being offered subsidies by France at this juncture. The count most certainly judges right that their accepting that offer and proceeding to act offensively, if the case should exist, in conjunction with France alone and in opposition to all their neighbours would be a very dangerous step on the part of Sweden, and you will therefore endeavour to confirm him as much as possible in that notion and to inspire the same into others. And as he likewise declared to you that they should never take a step of that consequence without the advice and concurrence of England, you need not scruple telling him plainly that the King has too much regard for the interest of Sweden to advise their throwing themselves into those difficulties,

which the taking any violent measures for seconding the present views of France with relation to Poland must inevitably be attended with, and which the count himself so clearly foresaw.

You have already acquainted the Swedish ministers with his Majesty's general intentions with respect to the election in that kingdom, and you may now, in your conversations with them upon the same subject, take occasion to insinuate that tho' the King is far from the thoughts of giving an exclusion to any candidate, who shall be fairly and constitutionally elected, yet, as the Emperour and his other allies are unanimous in the elector of Saxony's interest, and that upon the foot of his concurring in the guaranty of his Imperial Majesty's succession, his Majesty cannot for that reason, as well as others, but think that prince the most proper in all respects of any that have hitherto been talked of for the crown of Poland. It would be indeed in all appearances to no purpose, after what has already passed between France and Sweden, to press them to come into the same views; but you may, however, let drop in your discourses with them, and especially to Count Horn, who shews so much regard to the sentiments of England, that it would be the highest satisfaction to the King to be able to act in conjunction with Sweden upon this, as well as every other occasion; or if their notion of the point of honour has already irrevocably fixed their inclinations in favour of any other candidate, that his Majesty's sincere good wishes for their prosperity and welfare would necessarily lead him to wish that they may content themselves with such declarations, as they have already made, and not give ear to any propositions tending to draw them into more precipitate and dangerous measures.

Hampton Court, 2^d Oct^r 1733.

When I wrote to you by last post to acquaint you with the notification which had been made to the King by the Sardinian minister here [Chevalier d'Ossorio] of the treaty lately concluded at Turin, I made no mention of your letter of the 12th past, as it had been before acknowledged from my office and I had not then time to tell you that his Majesty approved very much the endeavors, which you appear as well by this as all your preceding dispatches to make use of upon every occasion to dissuade the Swedish ministers from joyning in the present Polish dispute. The King would have you still continue the same conduct, which seems every day more

and more necessary, and particularly since you apprehend the Swedes in general may be animated by the appearance of the French squadron, and since one of those ministers themselves appeared to be so far elevated thereby as to have let drop in your hearing some hint of their making use of this opportunity for the recovery of their lost provinces. The Imperial court has pressed his Majesty very strongly to employ his utmost interest in Sweden for preventing their being drawn by the insinuations of France into such measures as must be the cause of kindling a general war in the north, and his Majesty would be extremely glad to see his own constant care and concern for the tranquillity of those parts so far seconded by his good allies in Sweden, as that they would not throw themselves headlong into resolutions that must inevitably be attended with such fatal consequences. You will therefore lose no opportunity of reasoning in this way with the Swedish ministers and representing to them the danger of their depending so far upon the precarious assistance of a French fleet as to be led thereby into committing hostilities against any other power; but in doing this you will continue to observe the conduct you have hitherto done, and not make any formal application in writing or otherwise in his Majesty's name.

As there is great reason to apprehend, as well from the present situation of affairs in Europe in general as in particular from the conclusion of the treaty, which you have had an account of between France and Sardinia at this juncture, that a war is now inevitable; and as it is absolutely necessary for his Majesty, though otherwise entirely unengaged in the present disputes relating to the Polish election, yet upon such a prospect (wherein all the powers of Europe may come to be obliged more or less to concern themselves) to be making an early provision against such accidents as may be the consequences of a war once kindled in Europe, it is therefore the King's pleasure that you should take an opportunity of sounding Count Horn and Mo^r Von Kocken in the utmost confidence, whether his Majesty might depend upon having a body of Swedish troops at his disposal, in case he should be willing to enter into a convention with the crown of Sweden for that purpose.

Hampton Court, 9th Oct^r 1733.

. . . . You will understand by my last letter that what I herein mentioned concerning a body of Swedish troops to be taken

into the King's pay was to be touched upon to no other person but Count Horn and M. Von Koken only, and you will press those ministers for a speedy answer upon the said proposal and let me have it as soon as possible for his Majesty's information. And in case you find a disposition in those ministers to come into this proposal, you will then desire to know what number of troops they are willing to furnish and upon what terms. But whether they think it practicable, or no, you will recommend in the strongest manner to them to observe the most strict secrecy in this affair, and especially insist upon it's being concealed entirely from France.

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Whitehall, 20th Nov^r 1733.

I have laid before the King your two letters of the 31st past, by which his Majesty is informed of what past between you and Count Horn upon the affair of the troops and approves your endeavours to bring that minister to a more clear and full explanation of his sentiments therein.

I am now to acquaint you that the King thinks it convenient that you should take an opportunity of speaking to the king of Sweden likewise, with the same engagement of secrecy, upon this subject and to give him an account of his Majesty's desire, for the reasons which you were before directed to represent, of taking a body of Swedish troops into his pay. If his Swedish Majesty should require the same eclaircissement as to the number and destination of those troops, as was expected by the ministers, you will acquaint him that as to the former the King would be glad to have a body of six thousand men, but with regard to the destination, that as his Majesty has not hitherto taken any part in the present disputes, but is only making a proper provision against cases of necessity, it is impossible at this distance to say any thing positive upon that head.

You will please to take notice that your executing this commission with the king of Sweden, or not executing it, is to depend upon the opinion you may yourself have, at the time of your receiving this letter, of the probability of your succeeding in it, or not; for if by the discourses you will have had, since writing your last, with the ministers upon this subject you should have just reason to think that any farther application would be fruitless, and that the troops will not be obtained, you will in that case neither address

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yourself to the king of Sweden nor make any farther mention of the affair to any body whatsoever.

The King was very much pleased with the declarations made to you by Count Horn of their being entirely unengaged in Sweden and intending to act with temper and moderation, and approves at the same time your continuing to represent the expediency and advantages of such a conduct.

Whitehall, 1st Jan^{ry} 1733/4.

I have now in my hands yours of the 12th of last month, which has been laid before the King.

As you observed the present temper of the Swedish court to be so little inclinable to furnish troops to his Majesty, you did very right in not carrying the matter farther than you have done by sounding how they were disposed as to such a negociation ; whenever the turn of affairs shall give you a better prospect you will have this business in your eye, the King being desirous to be closer engaged with Sweden upon that foot, when they shall have an inclination to hearken to proposals of that nature.

We hear of couriers going so frequently through Copenhagen to Stockholm, that it raises a desire to be informed what may be the subject of them. Count Plelo is very close at the Danish court, and gets private audiences of the king without letting the ministers know his business. We don't hear that Mon^r Casteja is so active with you, and we do hope that the Swedes will not easily be drawn away from the prudent measures they have hitherto pursued with so general an approbation

Whitehall, 15th Jan. 1733/4.

. . . . In one of my late letters I acquainted you with the King's approbation of your having deferred any farther mention of the affair of the Swedish troops to be taken into his Majesty's pay till a more favourable opportunity, but as such an one seems, in the King's opinion, now to present itself, by the good disposition which the king of Sweden has himself shewn towards the Emperor's cause in concluding the treaty of Smalkaden with that prince, and by the strong assurances which are given you every day by Count Horn of their not being yet engaged with France, nor in

any haste to throw themselves into such violent measures as would be the consequence of such an engagement, his Majesty thinks it not improbable that in their present situation, and especially as the success of King Stanislaus's affairs in Poland seems to be every day less and less to be depended on, they may be tempted by the offer of English subsidies, and therefore would have you move this affair again to Count Horn and speak of it in confidence to the king of Sweden likewise, insisting with them both upon the strictest secrecy, and particularly with regard to Mons^r de Casteja and all such as might carry it to him. These orders the King would have you immediately execute, in case upon the arrival of them affairs continue in the same situation as when you wrote your last dispatch, though at the same time his Majesty leaves you a discretionary power to deferr the doing of it, if any thing should have happened from which you have very strong reasons to be convinced that your making any proposition of that kind would be useless and ineffectual.

Whitehall, 19th February 1733/4.

The King has commanded me to write this letter to you to let you know that he has had intimations, as well by the advices he has received from France as by what has come to his Majesty's knowledge of the discourses of the French minister here [De Chavigny] and of those in some other courts, that a negociation for engaging Sweden on their side in the present disturbances is carrying on very vigorously at Stockholm; as also that a treaty is actually transacting, thro' the mediation of France, for securing the neutrality of Denmark, while Sweden should endeavour to recover her conquered provinces from Muscovy; which transactions are supposed to be so near being brought to perfection that the French ministers have in several places been heard to boast of their courts being sure of the two crowns of Sweden and Denmark. This intelligence appears to the King to be of so great importance that he thinks it absolutely necessary that you should endeavour to procure some farther explanation than has already been given you with relation to the real designs of your court; and therefore you will immediately apply yourself to Count Horn and any other of the ministers, whom you may think proper, and let them know how unhandsomely the King must think himself treated by Sweden, and how great and just cause his Majesty would

have to complain of their behaviour towards him, in case the advices above mentioned prove to be founded ; that the King has indeed hitherto suspended his belief of them, in reliance upon the repeated assurances that have been given you of their inoffensive and peaceable dispositions ; that his Majesty's friendly and unreserved conduct towards Sweden, in communicating so freely to them the negotiation which was sometime since on foot between himself and Denmark, as likewise in explaining to them the whole purport of his present transactions with Muscovy, does not seem by any means to deserve so much mystery and concealment on their part with regard to the proposals of France, if there are any such, and their own intentions in the present conjuncture ; and that the King therefore thinks he may very reasonably expect, as one of their nearest and most affectionate allies, to be consulted upon any new measures which may be recommended to them by other powers, before they engage themselves absolutely therein. And to Count Horn in particular you will represent how great a disappointment it must be to the King to find himself deceived in the idea, which he (Count Horn) himself had given to his Majesty of the pacifick views of Sweden, which you have already acquainted him that the King entirely depended on, as coming from a person in whom his Majesty has always reposed so perfect a confidence ; that the King still continues in the same dependance upon the frequent declarations which he has made you to that effect, and will not, as the count himself desired, be prevailed on by any idle reports to alter his opinion till he shall inform his Majesty of their having changed their conduct ; that the King took very kindly the count's having promised you that information, which he hopes, however, there may not be any occasion for his giving ; but if that should be the case you will represent to him that his Majesty cannot look upon any declaration, that they might make to him after their party was taken, as a completion of that promise, but must naturally expect in consequence as well of the friendship constantly professed towards him by Sweden as of his (Count Horn's) particular assurances, a more early and more usefull information.

I hope you will have received in due time my letter of the 15th past relating to the Swedish troops and that your answer is upon the road ; by which if we find any signs of a disposition in your court to comply with our proposals I shall immediately take the King's orders for giving you the necessary informations as to the terms

upon which his Majesty will authorise you to conclude that affair.

Whitehall, 26 March 1734.

In my last of the 20th inst. I acknowledged the receipt of yours of the 6th, which I have since laid before the King. His Majesty observed with pleasure what Count Horn said to you of the States having constantly recommended the preserving their friendship with the maritime powers, which maxim it is hoped this next dyet will not depart from, but that the sober people in Sweden would still remember their true interest and be strong eno' to maintain it against the efforts of such as would engage that kingdom in bold and hazardous measures. As the count has advised you to be quite easy, the King hopes that he will endeavour in fact to make you so by frankly opening to you his views in the ensuing dyet, and what methods he intends to use to prevent Sweden's running precipitately into schemes that may overturn the whole system of the tranquillity of the north. You did well to remind the count of the personal regard his Majesty has for him, which still continues, and as the King flatters himself that he shall find the same good designs in the count he has hitherto experienced, so he will readily cooperate with him in promoting the solid interest and advantage of that country.

I have already acquainted you with his Majesty's principal views in applying to Sweden for troops, which may suffice for the information of Count Horn and his friends, but the King, as you will have observed by my former letters, is not inclined to have his thoughts upon those matters set forth in an authentick signed memorial. Your last promemoria, as you take notice, is no secret, which his Majesty is sorry for ; and would not willingly give fresh occasion to comments in the world and to debates in a dyet, under the great uncertaintrys things are in at present in Sweden.

The warmth the Swedish ministers always express about Dantzig makes the King fear lest they may be drawn into the warr upon that account. His Majesty has a great concern for that town, both in regard to the publick trade and to the good of his own subjects, but as the circumstances of affairs are now so perplexed in Poland his Majesty, who has constantly avoided intermeddling in the least in that quarrel, does not see how he can concern himself or be of use to the Dantzicks without giving offense to one side or other.

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Whitehall, 28th June 1734.

I have now in my hands yours of the 5th inst. which has been laid before the King.

His Majesty observes that it is Count Horn's opinion that you should still defer giving in any memorial upon the proposal of having a body of Swedish troops in readiness for his service, and therefore hopes that there will be no hindrance in that matter, tho' you have not by you a full-power in form for that purpose. That seems only to be necessary when you come to conclude a convention for those troops, for as to your proceeding in the negotiation the King's orders, which you have received from time to time, may be a sufficient authority for that end. However, a full-power shall be prepared, to lye in your hands and be ready to be exhibited, if it shall be necessary in the course of your transacting this affair.

His Majesty thinks the offer he has made very reasonable, and till he knows how high the expectations of the Swedes run, and what proposals and conditions they make on their part, he cannot send you positive instructions for your farther guidance in this affair, and therefore I have nothing in command at present upon what you suggest of offering 50^m pounds per annum for 8,000 men, which is a point the King takes time to consider of, and would gladly see first how the proposal you are already empowered to make is relished by the diet, and what is said upon the memorial you are to present on that occasion.

Whitehall, 27 August 1734.

. As you observe that matters are in a great agitation at Stockholm and upon coming to a crisis, that the Danish negotiation is resolved upon and that the French proposals are pushed on with warmth, you will easily imagine that his Majesty expects with some earnestness your next letters, hoping to see that among these various intrigues Count Horn has been able to make his dispositions in so just a manner that the King's offers will not fail of having their due weight and efficacy at the dyet; his Majesty puts his greatest confidence in the count's care and management and hopes for success from his superior talents in the conduct of affairs.

The business of Porto Novo, with the representations of Mons^r Sparre and what the East India Company have to alledge in their behalf, has been referred to our chief lawyers here, both civilians and those of our common law, and I expect their report every day

to lay it before his Majesty for his further commands upon this incident.

Whitehall, 30th August 1734.

. . . . His Majesty was very well pleased to find that Mons^r Casteja's offers for promoting the Danish negociation were not accepted by Mo^r Sehested, and that Count Horn intended to make use of that treaty to bring on the King's proposals His Majesty is very desirous of contributing towards settling a good understanding between Sweden and Denmark, and would readily by his good offices forward the present transactions for making a treaty between them and join in the same, if it shall appear necessary, as the count thinks, to complete what they are doing. You will open these his Majesty's sentiments in confidence to that minister and consult him in the steps you are to take to advance both the Danish negociation and the propositions you are entrusted with from the King.

His Majesty received very kindly the assurances the king of Sweden gave of his having so much at heart the ofters made from hence. You will take as frequent opportunity as you judge convenient to fix those thoughts in that prince, and to hinder him from hearkening too much to the insinuations of those who oppose our scheme.

Whitehall, 13 Sept^r 1734.

. . . . His Majesty has nothing new to say to you upon what passes in Sweden, where the ferment continues to run pretty high between the adverse parties, but as Count Horn is so hearty in the interest of England the King perswades himself that no opportunity will be lost, nor any means left unattempted, to make his proposals succeed in the dyet; and as you soon expected intimations to move your self in that matter, the King hopes in a post or two to hear that matters have been so prepared that your memorial will have met with that reception which we wish, and think we have reason to expect here from the nature of our offers and from the apparent interest of Sweden to cultivate in the best and strictest manner his Majesty's friendship.

Whitehall, 8th October 1734.

As your letter of the 18th of September came in last Friday upon my dispatching my post I had then only time to acknowledge it, but I have since laid it before the King.

His Majesty was very glad to observe that the French proposals, upon examination, did not seem to make much impression in their favour upon the Swedes. And as Mr Titley tells us that Mr Sehested had orders to sign his treaty, which we hope is now finished, the time appears to be come, which Count Horn thought proper to bring on the King's proposals with success, and therefore his Majesty will now be expecting every post to hear the good effects of our patience in waiting till Mr Casteja's schemes were exploded, and the Danish treaty concluded.

We hear from Copenhagen that Mr Sehested has been privately directed to be usefull to you, and that when the alliance is made he will have formal instructions to assist you as farr as lyes in his power; and you will on your part do all the good offices you can for that gentleman, where he shall have need of them, since it is his Majesty's view to create a strict union between himself and the two northern crowns.

Whitehall, 11th October 1734.

The King having had intelligence that the French court is endeavouring to promote the conclusion of a treaty between Sweden and the Porte for making war upon Muscovy, and would give the strongest assurances of their assisting the crown of Sweden, when the war was once begun, as much as possible in the recovery of her lost provinces, and of guarantying all such acquisitions as she might make upon the Czarina; and as the King does not think it impossible that the Swedes [Karl Fredrik von Höpken and Edvard Carlson], who appear'd this summer at Constantinople and were in great intimacy with the French ambassador there [de Villeneuve], may have been at work at some such plan as this; his Majesty has therefore order'd me to send you this information that you may be upon your guard to discover what foundation there may be for supposing such a negociation to have been actually carrying on by both or either of the persons above mentioned, and whether any insinuations of that kind may have been made by Mr Casteja; and the King would likewise have you sound such of the Swedish ministers, as you may think proper, upon it, and by representing the great hazard and uncertainty that must attend their embarking themselves in such an undertaking, in which they would run a very evident risk of being at last abandoned in the same manner as those of Dantzick have so lately been, you will

endeavour to deterr them from coming into a project which in the present distracted situation of affairs between Christian princes may facilitate the ambitious views of the Ottoman Porte, and give a fatal assistance towards the subversion of the libertys of Europe.

Whitehall, 19th November 1734.

. . . . It was with a particular satisfaction that the King found by your last dispatch that Count Horn was still likely to continue in his post as president of the chancery; the concurrent desires of the king of Sweden, of the senate, of the nobility, and no doubt of all true and unbiassed patriots do him both honour and justice, and must be a lasting testimony of the value of that minister's service and of the irreparable loss his retreat would be.

His Majesty has considered what you represent as to the necessity there is of having a sum of mony in your hands to distribute for the services mentioned in your letter, which his Majesty makes no doubt but you will do with all the prudence and good management you can, and therefore is pleased for the present to allow you to draw for two thousand pounds, and if you will find it necessary to carry the point the King has in view you may give hopes of being empowered soon to furnish a larger sum for that use. I think you may draw upon M^r Thomas Lowther at the Treasury, if haste is required; otherwise I will settle this matter with S^r Robert Walpole more particularly when he returns to town, which I believe will be next week.

Whitehall, 3rd December, 1734.

. . . . His Majesty is sorry to see that strong efforts are made from time to time to bring the French proposals to bear, but as the king of Sweden Count Horn and our other friends continue steady in preferring a negociation with England it is hoped that their interest will prevail at last. And since you have to do with such a venal people, as you represent them, the power the King has lately put into your hands of distributing some mony, where you shall judge it to be of service, will probably have the effect you propose and turn the scale in our favour.

Whitehall, 15th Jan^{ry} 1734/5.

Yours of the 25th of last month is come to my hands and has been laid before the King.

I can say nothing more to you upon the point of the augmentation of our offers, which you apprehend the Swedish ministers aim at, than I did in my last, of the 7th inst. You will continue to manage that matter very cautiously when they shall open themselves to you, which I perceive they had not yet done.

The King has defensive treatys with Sweden by which his Majesty is engaged to assist them, when the cases therein expressed do exist, but his Majesty does not see how he can go any farther to give assurances of an offensive nature, which can never, as we apprehend, be so worded to mean anything of what Sweden desires without giving umbrage to other powers and engaging his Majesty in measures contrary to the amity and good correspondence he holds with them.

Whitehall, 11th Feby 1734/5.

I have now in my hands your two dispatches of the 15th and 22th past, by which his Majesty saw, and was very well pleased with, the pains you took in recommending and justifying to Count Horn the English proposals upon the foot you were at first authorized to offer them to Sweden, and in shewing the advantages to that crown in accepting them preferably to those of France

The King likewise took particular notice of the two methods suggested by his Excellency of promoting the success of our negociation by increasing our offer of subsidys. The first of which, vizt, that of really giving the whole, and in appearance only the half, will not at any time be practicable according to the forms of our government, since every bargain that is made of this kind must come to be laid before the parliament.

The second, vizt, that our taking 12,000 men instead of six, may possibly in the course of future events come to be taken into more particular consideration, and especially if it should be expressly and in form proposed by Sueden.

But I must desire upon this occasion that you will recollect the hint which I gave you in one of my former letters concerning the probability of a pacification; you will have seen since by the King's Speech that a plan was preparing by his Majesty and the States for that purpose, and I may acquaint you that it will be in a very few days actually delivered on the part of the maritime powers to the ministers of the respective partys engaged in the present war, so that Count Horn will easily conceive that whilst

his Majesty is pursuing a scheme, which, if accepted by the partys, may prevent all farther hostilities and remove those dangers that were apprehended, it cannot be a proper time for an augmentation of his offers of doubling the number of troops to be asked of Sueden, and especially as those already made have not as yet been negotiated upon either in the diet or senate, nor any direct and formal representations for augmenting them made on the part of that crown to his Majesty.

As the King is, however, extremely sensible of the value of the friendship of Sueden and desirous of enabling our friends there to pursue and support the mutual interest of the two kingdoms, those considerations, as well as the present unscttled state of the affairs of Europe and the uncertainty of an immediate accommodation, will prevent his Majesty from retracting the orders he has already given you for offering subsidies, which he would have you on the contrary still pursue and endeavour to advance that negotiation in all events as much as possible. His Majesty hopes you will be able to conclude it upon the foot of his former instructions, but if that should be impracticable we must be determined by the greater or less prospect of success in our endeavors towards a general pacification in admitting or declining the demand of taking twelve thousand instead of six thousand Swedes, which you will in the meantime talk of in such a manner to Count Horn as not to let him despair of the King's being induced to come into it, in case the plan which is now upon the point of being proposed to the respective powers should not be received by them in the manner which his Majesty and the States General think they have just reason to expect.

You will remember to put Count Horn in mind of the communication which he promised to give you of the particular proposals that should be made by Mo^r Casteja, that you may be able to transmit an account of them to his Majesty, in order to receive his instructions before they are agreed to.

Whitehall, 25th Feby 1734/5.

The King read with particular attention the account you have transmitted in your's of the 5th inst. of the offers made to Sueden by Mons^r Casteja, and of the conferences you had had thereupon with his Suedish Majesty Count Horn and the other ministers. The result of all which appearing to the King to be, first, that if

his Majesty would entirely defeat the French negotiation he must offer an equal subsidy on his part to what is proposed by France, in which case the English terms, thô clogged with the demand of troops, would be preferred ; 2^{dly}, that in failure of that method the influence to accrue to France by the acceptation of her proposals might be still checked and moderated by concluding at the same time with England upon the foot of our first propositions ; and 3^{dly}, that if neither of these things be done our friends in Sueden must be entirely ruined and that kingdom fall into a French management. I am therefore ordered to send you his Majesty's commands upon this state of the affair in question.

As to the first proposition, that of our giving the same sum as is offered by France by way of subsidy for the troops we demand, I am to acquaint you that it would so far exceed any thing that has been granted upon bargains of the like nature between this crown and foreign princes, and would lay a burthen upon the nation so disproportionate to any immediate and visible benefit to result from it, that it will be absolutely impossible, and especially while we are not engaged in any war, to comply with such a demand.

The 2^d proposition which the Suedish ministers seemed to apprehend, vizt, the concluding both with Casteja and you, is what the King cannot at present authorize you to concurr in, since it will be necessary that his Majesty should first see more distinctly than he hitherto does what will be insisted on by France as the conditions of her giving so large a subsidy to Sueden, and how far, after that first convention shall have been concluded, we may expect to find Sueden at liberty to be of use to us. For otherwise we might possibly have agreed to give a large subsidy for troops which might be restrained from doing us any service in the only emergencys wherein we could have any occasion for them, and it might not be in our power to tye up Sueden from following all such measures as his Majesty might disapprove, nor even from giving actual assistance to the party who might perhaps be at war with us. All therefore that can be for the present said to you upon this head is that in case the ministers there should, as you seem to apprehend, be forced into the convention with France, you should endeavour to give his Majesty the earliest account of the particular conditions that will have been stipulated between those two crowns, upon which you will have his immediate orders for your farther proceedings

In the mean while, however, you will go on, as you have hitherto done, in thwarting as much as possible in private the success of the French negotiation and in confirming the good dispositions of our friends there by giving them the strongest assurances of the King's inclination to do everything that may be in his power as well for their particular support as for assisting to keep that kingdom steady to the pursuit of it's real interests. And you will by no means suffer an imagination to prevail as if his Majesty would, in consequence of what is mentioned above, abandon and give them up entirely, the King being on the contrary most sincerely desirous of cultivating and improving the present good understanding with Sueden and being determined to take all such measures for that purpose as may be compatible with the circumstances of our affairs and those of the rest of Europe, and justifiable according to the particular constitution of our domestick governments.

In this view his Majesty is still ready to conclude with them upon the foot of his first propositions, provided he may be thereby secured from the apprehension of their taking any such engagements whilst that shall be in force, either with France or other powers, as might destroy or lessen the benefit of it to England; so that you will not understand by any thing that goes before that it is designed to retract the orders you already have for concluding upon the former foot, if possible; what I have said in some of the pages above being only upon the supposition of the contrary. You will therefore declare yourself ready to sign with the Swedish ministers immediately, if it can be done exclusively of Monsieur Casteja's propositions and upon those already made by his Majesty, which is, as I informed you in mine of the 11th, the greatest length we can go in the present uncertain state as to peace or war, though in case of the continuance of the latter the King might very probably find it for his convenience to hearken to the proposal made by Count Horn of an augmentation both of troops and subsidies.

Whitehall, 18 March 1734/5.

In mine of the 4th inst. I promised by the King's order to dispatch a messenger to you in a few days; since which, as by the letters that I have received from you affairs at your court appeared to be drawing on very fast to a decision, his Majesty has been engaged to deferr sending that express for a very short time, in order to be

enabled to form a more certain judgement upon the negotiations at Stockholm before he should give you his final instructions upon them.

The dispatch which I have now received from you of the 26th past has represented the state of Mons^r Casteja's transactions in such a light, as has determined his Majesty to lose no time in sending you those orders which both you and our friends in Sueden will be in expectation of receiving, in consequence of what I wrote to you on the 4th instant, and which will fully explain to you the King's intentions and the conduct you are to hold in either of the cases which may now arise, vizt, that of the actual conclusion of the treaty with Mons^r Casteja, that of his refusing to conclude it upon the conditions and restrictions demanded by Sueden, or lastly that of his waiting for new instructions from his court there-upon.

Upon the first of these cases having nothing new in command from his Majesty, I must content myself with referring you to my letter of the 25th past, wherein I acquainted you that if anything were actually concluded between France and Sweden it would be absolutely necessary that the King should have a full and exact account of the particular stipulations, that might have been entered into on either side, before he could give you any farther directions as to your proceedings in his own negotiation.

If remains therefore to acquaint you with his Majesty's pleasure upon the two other cases extracted from your letter of the 26th, in both which your conduct is to be the same. You are to endeavour to conclude upon the foot of our first proposals, but if you find that impracticable you may inform our friends there that his Majesty will be willing to take the separate and secret articles of the Suedish accession to the treaty of Hanover, whereof I send you a copy inclosed, as the rule of his proceeding. You will see that the subsidy we then gave was 50,000^{lbs} sterling for 3500 foot and 1500 horse for three years. The only alterations the King desires may be made are, 1st, that the term may be two years instead of three, and 2^{dly}, that instead of the 1500 horse he may have 4500 foot, which will make the whole number 8000 foot and is in exact proportion; the value of horse being always reckoned in calculations of this kind to that of foot as three to one. You are therefore hereby authorised to offer a subsidy of 50,000^{lbs} sterling for two years for 8000 Suedish foot to be kept in readiness

to be employed either in the defence of his Majesty's own dominions or upon any other exigency wherein he may think fit to require their service, the pay of the said troops, and the subsidy in case of their being taken into his Majesty's service, to be regulated according to the practice during the late war, conformably to what I wrote to you in the answer to the quaeres of your court, which I sent you in mine of the 3^d of May last past.

If you shall find that even these offers will not be sufficient to prevent their agreement with France the King gives you power, thô not to be made use of but in the last extremity, to contract for 12,000 foot in the proportion of his former proposals, that is to say upon the foot of 70,000^{lbs} per annum for two years.

But in either of these cases you are to take it as an invariable instruction that Sueden be absolutely restrained and tied up from taking any such engagements with other powers as might frustrate his Majesty's views in making the large offers above mentioned, and for this purpose the King will expect to have an article to the effect of the sixth separate one of the Suedish accession inserted in any convention which you may be able to conclude in consequence of these or your former orders; which article you will take care to have worded in such a manner that his Majesty may have a sufficient security by it for their not entering into engagements with France after having concluded with us, since the same reason which the King has for forbidding you to sign the convention with Sueden, even upon the foot of your first instructions, in case of their having first accepted Mons^r Casteja's proposals, is equally strong against our concluding at all with them, unless we have an absolute certainty of their not contracting afterwards with France without his Majesty's approbation.

Whitehall, 1st April 1735.

I have now laid before the King your dispatch of the 12th past, and found his Majesty very well pleased to see by it that Mons^r Casteja had demurred upon the project given him by the chancery, by which you would in all probability gain time for receiving the King's last instructions in relation to our negotiation, which were transmitted to you in mine of the 18th past by Carrington and of the 25th by the post.

Those letters will have so fully explained to you his Majesty's intentions in relation to this important affair that I should have

nothing now to trouble you with upon the subject if his Majesty had not taken notice, in the account you give of what you proposed to demand of Sueden in the first day's conference, that you had determined to ask the six thousand men for no other use than for the King's own defence in case of his being actually attacked. This you will have found by the letters abovementioned, wherein what was said to you upon that subject in your first instructions was enlarged upon and confirmed, to have been very far from the King's design, who expects to have the troops entirely at his discretion, excepting only in such cases as were reserved by the accession of the Hanover treaty, and wherein, as I informed you by my last, his Majesty would be still willing to dispense with their service, if desired. The King therefore hopes that upon the receipt of my said dispatches of the 18th and 25th past you will have found means to rectify the omission above mentioned and will not have proceeded any farther in the negotiation upon the foot of a bare defensive stipulation.

As the convention, which you are now transacting, is proposed to last only for two years, and as the treaty of 1720 expires in the year 1738, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should use your endeavors to obtain a renewal of the defensive engagement therein contained, by which the two kingdoms were reciprocally to assist each other with 6000 men in case of attack, either for perpetuity, if possible, or in failure of that for as long a term as can be procured. And this the King hopes you will be able to get settled at the same time that you conclude the present transaction, as it seems a very favourable opportunity for proposing it, and as the thing itself is so evidently for the interest of both parties.

Whitehall, 1st April 1735.

Your two letters of the 12th of March were acknowledged last post by my order, but the mail came in so late that I could not take the King's commands upon them. I am now to acquaint you that his Majesty was very much surprized to see by your short letter, out of cypher, that instead of any relief in the burthens already laid upon our trade a new order was fixed up at the Custome House imposing an additional duty of ten per cent. on all coarse woollen manufactures, which would entirely ruin the trade of our Yorkshire clothes in that country. This notorious neglect of all stipulations in favour of our commerce, this most unfriendly

treatment of their allys, who have been always scrupulous of doing any thing in prejudice of Sweden, will, I fear, raise a spirit of resentment in the nation when such usage shall be publickly known, and then it will be impossible to hinder the parliament from making a severe retaliation upon Swedish goods and manufactures, of which there are several that may be loaded with high dutys, which would tend much to the advantage of the produce of our own country. You will therefore make an exact enquiry concerning this new tax, and send the best account you can of it hither to be laid before the King, and you will make the strongest representation against this new infringement of our treaty in that behalf and let the Swedish ministers know that as we meet with repeated hardships laid upon the remains of our trade to that kingdom we shall find ourselves necessitated at last to act towards them in the same manner, and make ample reprisals, which we can easily do, particularly in the article of iron.

Whitehall, 8 April 1735.

Your letter of the 19th past was acknowledged last post from my office, as was likewise the copy which you sent of your harangue upon the opening of the conferences.

The King read over your said dispatches with attention, but did not find any one point arising from the former of them, upon which you will not have been fully informed of his intentions by the instructions contained in my several late letters to you.

As to the latter, I mean your speech to the Swedish commissioners, his Majesty could have wished that you had not confined the service of the troops purely to his own defence, since, as you were informed by your principal instructions contained in my letter of the 3^d May last past, the King intended the 6000 Swedes "in the first place for the security of his own dominions, and to have them in readiness to be employed upon any exigency that should require it," and since the furnishing such a succour for his Majesty's defence only is what the King can already claim from Sueden, and is not therefore at all disposed to give a subsidy for it. And his Majesty likewise hoped the expressions at the end of that piece, which would seem to disclaim any design of tying up the hands of Sueden, would not be taken too strictly, since the King cannot consent to conclude this treaty with them without an absolute exclusion of any other such engagements being taken during the continuation of it

by that crown as might be prejudicial to his Majesty. I only touch now upon these heads, that by referring you so often to the full and particular instructions you will have received from me upon each of them in my late dispatches you may see how great a stress is laid upon them by his Majesty and may regulate your conduct in the progress of the negotiation accordingly.

Hanover, 6/17 June 1735.

I have already acknowledged your letters as far as the 13th of May. I have since received those of the 16th and 23^d of the same month, and have laid them likewise before the King.

His Majesty took particular notice of Count Horn's concern that England would not help them in the way they hoped, that is, in giving subsidys without any troops really at the King's disposal, and as to the arriving at our point by degrees. His Majesty has all the consideration for the count possible, and would willingly rely on his word for the execution of what he should promise, but as he cannot but know a good deal of our constitution, and that parliaments in England, as well as dyets in Sweden, must have satisfactory accounts laid before them in order to provide the necessary funds, he will easily comprehend how little we can be able to justify the consenting to give subsidys for a body of troops, to which we are already entitled by treaty without any expence, when those motives, which weigh extremely with the King of assisting the count in carrying on his system of affairs there and thereby bringing about little by little, and with certainty, what we desire, cannot be produced; besides that, as he says the dyet had absolutely precluded the point the King had in view, it is plain that till a new dyet be convened our subsidys must go on without the least hopes of any benefit from them as to troops, tho' the count were ever so desirous, even in an exigency, to make good what he promises by degrees on that head. These considerations will, as the King hopes, satisfy the count as to the particular confidence his Majesty would readily place in his word and honour and shew him at the same time the impossibility there is likewise on our side of granting subsidys, without any apparent advantage that we can be at liberty to prove to the publick, how much soever his Majesty is convinced of the counts reasons on that head.

I can say nothing to you from hence concerning the 10 per cent. and the new prohibitions, the matter is before the Council of Trade

and I shall transmit to them what observations you shall make from time to time upon that extraordinary and unwarrantable proceeding.

Hanover, 27 June/8 July 1735.

I have no letters from you since that of the 6/17th June, but by the accounts from Stockholm, which Prince William has communicated to the King, his Majesty has seen that Mons^r Casteja's negotiation was in so great forwardness that the treaty between France and Sueden was look'd upon to be as good as concluded.

The King is satisfied that you have done all in your power to prevent the success of this transaction, and that you will still use your utmost address and credit with the ministers for the same purpose, or at least for obtaining some farther delay in case the treaty should not have been actually signed, which would be extremely agreeable to his Majesty. But if, as we have most reason to apprehend, that affair should be over before the arrival of this letter, you will then take the first opportunity of expressing to the king of Sueden Count Horn and the rest of our friends there the great concern which his Majesty has been under at seeing them driven into a measure so contrary to their own personal inclinations by the necessity of complying with the instructions left by the States, and at finding himself at the same time entirely disabled from giving them the assistance he wished, in that important conjuncture, by the nature and constitution of his own government, which would by no means allow of his giving the subsidys upon the foot desired by Sueden, according to what I have very fully explained to you in my former dispatches. That the King is perfectly satisfied and convinced of their particular good dispositions towards him, and does not in the least impute to them the blame of what has happened, but is, on the contrary, firmly persuaded that they will contribute all in their power towards preventing the ill consequences that might arise from it, and which are without doubt intended by the promoters of this new union between France and Sueden; and in particular, as the King is informed that their present convention extends no farther than a bare neutrality, his Majesty flatters himself that they will not suffer any more dangerous engagements with that crown to be engrafted upon it, to the disturbance of the tranquillity of the north and to the prejudice of his Majesty's particular interests.

You will likewise represent to them that as the King has been acquainted that the Muscovite minister there [Mikhail Bestuzhev] has, in this crisis, presented a very strong memorial desiring the renewal of their treaty with the Czarina, to which it was hoped that a favourable answer might be returned, and as his Majesty thought it not improbable that, supposing that to be the case, the French ministers might either refuse to ratify the new convention or, if it should have been notified before the returning such an answer, might take a pretence from thence for withholding the subsidies therein stipulated, that in either of those cases they will find his Majesty ready to treat and conclude with them upon the same terms which he has already offered, provided the affairs of Europe remain in such a situation as may authorize his doing it; the King being sincerely desirous to take every opportunity of testifying his friendship and affection to his Swedish Majesty and his particular esteem for Count Horn and those other ministers, who have shew'd themselves so zealously disposed towards promoting the real interests of the two crowns.

Hanover, 12/23 August 1735.

. . . . His Majesty was glad to find that the affair of the renewal of the treaty with Muscovy was happily brought so near it's conclusion, by Mon^r Bestuchef and the commissarys being entirely agreed upon the several articles of it, that nothing but the usual forms of engrossing, communicating to the king and senate, and signing the same were wanting to compleat the whole; and his Majesty, according to what you mention, expects to hear by your next of the 5/16 inst. that the instruments were that day signed by the respective partys, notwithstanding the opposition that was stirred up to traverse and delay the finishing of the business. You may be sure, as I have already told you, that the King was extremely well pleased with the share you had in promoting the success of this negociation and not a little delighted to observe that true Swedish spirit of Count Horn, who appeared so easy and indifferent whether the French ratification were exchanged, or the subsidys paid or not.

Hanover, 5/16 September 1735.

I receiv'd this morning your letters of the 2^d and 6th inst. N.S. both together, and immediately laid them before the King.

His Majesty was very well pleased to observe the confidence Count Horn had made you of the orders Mor^r de Casteja had received from his court to endeavour to get Sweden to consent to the admission of the king of Prussia as a party to the treaty lately concluded at Stockholm. The sentiments Count Horn expressed with regard to that negotiation were very agreeable to the King, and his Majesty would have you let that minister know with what satisfaction his imparting that affair, and his opening his thoughts upon it to you, were receiv'd here. The King was glad to find that you judg'd that this proposal would scarce take effect, however, as the exchange of the ratifications and the payment of the subsidys might be made to depend on the Swedes entring into the project as suggested by Mor^r de Casteja, you will do extremely right to be very watchful of the steps that ambassador shall take, and apply yourself to counterwork his intrigues.

Hanover, 16/27th Septem^r 1735.

. . . If the king of Sweden should renew his questions as to your orders about resuming your negotiation you may answer, as you have hitherto very rightly done, that you cannot expect any precise instructions till his Majesty knows the fate of their late convention with France, but that you make no question but that the King will continue to treat upon the foot he formerly proposed, and has no design to recede from any thing you have already offered in his name, whilst the publick affairs remain in the same situation they are at present.

I have received from England report from the Lords Commissioners of Trade upon the contents of the several letters and papers from you, which by his Majesty's command I had referr'd to their examination, relating to the difficultys and discouragements our trade labours under in Sweden. Those Commissioners are of opinion that the new dutys and prohibitions are all manifest infractions of the 12th article of the treaty with Sweden of 1720 and apprehend that, if the Swedes will not abide by the stipulations of that article, there is little reason to imagine that they will be more punctual in the observances of any new treaty that shall be made, as they lately proposed.

They concurr intirely with you in opinion that the best method England can take under the hardships that are laid on the British trade in Sweden is to give all possible encouragement to the making

and bringing iron from our own plantations, which they judge to be as serviceable as Swedish iron, and will make large amends to the nation by saving the great sums which are yearly expended for that commodity.

Whitehall, 9th Decr 1735.

. . . . His Majesty took notice of what the senator hinted to you about a conjunction between Great Britain Sweden and Denmark, which is an idea the King likes very well and is persuaded that it will not be unacceptable to Denmark, and therefore, as such insinuations may be thrown out to you, you will encourage the matter, especially if any ministers of consideration should talk to you upon that subject, as it seemed to be Count Horn's notion while the late treaty between Sueden and Denmark was in agitation.

The King was glad to hear that there was not the least disposition towards uniting with Berlin, since that project, as it was at first set on foot, was undoubtedly intended to make a triple union with France, particularly with respect to Poland, but as the face of affairs on that side will be wholly changed by the present preliminaries that whole system must likewise drop.

Whitehall, 19 December 1735.

Since my last to you of the 16th inst. I have received and laid before the King yours to me of the 2^d. His Majesty observed upon what passed between Mo^r Casteja and Count Bonde, which you took notice was in order to justify the cabal, that the plan of France for that minister's conduct there is to decry the present ministry in Sweden by throwing all the blame of the loss of the subsidys on their behaviour towards the French court. And the King would have you let Count Horn know that his Majesty has very great reason to believe that Mons^r Casteja is instructed to distinguish always between the Swedish nation and the ministers, and to address himself so as to make it believed among the people that France would have ratified the late treaty and have paid the subsidys, and have shewed all other marks of their affection to the nation, if at the same time they should not have strengthened the hands of a ministry, whom they supposed to have acted so contrary to the interests of their country as well as those of France. These hints his Majesty thought fit you should give Count Horn in confidence, that he may observe the management of the French ambassador in affecting that sort of popularity and in heaping as much odium as

he can upon the ministers for depriving Sweden of the advantages they pretend they might otherwise have had from France, tho' at the same time you let the count know that by all his Majesty has learnt he is persuaded that the French have no intention either to ratify the treaty, or to pay the subsidy, but order their ambassador to make use of this pretence to colour their inexecution of their engagements.

Whitehall, 6th February 1735/6.

Since my last to you of the 27th of Jan^{ry} I have received your's of the 16th and 20th of the same month and have laid them before the King.

His Majesty took particular notice in the latter of the conversation you had with Count Bonde upon the subject of the business of Porto Novo, where the count hinted at the King's abandoning the East India Company here to the revenge of that of Sweden. You did very right in discouraging as much as possible such a strange insinuation ; it is an affair that his Majesty thinks ought to be discussed in a legal and regular way, since this East India Company has so many strong arguments and proofs to alledge in support of their proceeding as they did against undoubted subjects of England, acting in open breach of the laws of their country ; but the draught of an answer is made to Mr Sparre's representations in that subject, which I was in hopes to have sent you by this time, but you easily conceive what hindrances occur in parliament time. However I hope soon to have the draught considered by the Lords of the Council, and when it has had his Majesty's approbation it will be given to Mr Sparre and a copy of it shall then be sent to you. In the meanwhile I am glad you publish as authentically as you can the proclamation relating to the laws in favour of our East India Company, that his Majesty's subjects may be apprized thereof and avoid incurring the penaltyes inflicted thereby.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EDWARD FINCH ESQ^r, ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO FREDERICK I OF SWEDEN.¹

Hanover, 21 October O.S. 1736.

(Record Office, Sweden 75 and F.O. 90, 66.)

When you shall have received these Our instructions to you, with such other papers as shall be put into your hands at the same

¹ Returning to Stockholm after a visit to Hanover.

time, you shall repair to your post at Stockholm with all convenient speed.

You shall in your way thither go to Copenhagen, where you will find Our trusty and welbeloved Walter Titley Esqr, Our minister resident at that court, to whom We have given instructions upon the same subject as We do to you, and whereof you have herewith an extract for your information and guidance in the negociation entrusted to your care and management.

You will likewise communicate to Our said minister these Our instructions to you, and let him take a copy or extract thereof, as may be most convenient for his use, or necessary to promote the work he is charged with for Our service at that court, and you will conferr freely and confidentially together; and as he will let you know what steps he has taken, and what dispositions he observes in the place where he resides towards the alliance We have a mind to set on foot between Us and the northern crowns, so you will communicate to him what lights you can relating to the court of Sweden, as may be proper and usefull to inform and assist him in carrying on the business We have thought fit to direct him to conduct in the best manner he can at the court of Denmark.

When you have conferred together and informed each other as fully as possible and settled your methods of proceeding and of holding correspondence, you will lose no time in hastning your journey to Stockholm, where being arrived you will take an audience of Our good brother the king of Sweden, and on delivering to him Our letter herewith put into your hands you will in Our name give him the strongest assurances of Our friendship and esteem for him, and of Our constant desire to cultivate and improve the same upon all occasions. And you will add such other expressions of Our brotherly affection towards him as you shall judge most apt to perswade him of the sincerity thereof.

You shall in like manner at an audience of Our good sister the queen of Sweden assure her in the most expressive terms of Our affectionate value for her person and of Our earnest desire to give her the most convincing proofs thereof, as often as opportunitys shall offer.

As you will perceive by the extract of Our instructions to Our minister resident at Copenhagen what Our view is with respect to a defensive alliance between Us and the northern crowns, so for your more particular information you will receive herewith a

copy of a project of a treaty, which We ordered to be drawn up for that purpose, and also of a separate article belonging thereto. And as the settlement of the business of commerce with Sweden is a matter of great concern to Our kingdoms you have likewise herewith the project of a separate article with that crown upon the subject of mutual trade and commerce.

These projects are only put into your hands at present as draughts to explain to you the nature of Our scheme for the said alliance. But you are to take care not to speak of them, nor to shew or produce them to anyone; it being Our intention that you should proceed in this affair with the utmost caution and circumspection.

As Count Horn at several times, and particularly while their treaty with Denmark was in agitation, hinted to you that that convention might be usefully extended to the advantage of the three crowns, you will at your return to Sweden sound that minister at a distance, and with the best address you can, to find out whether he entertains any thoughts of that kind at present, and if you discover that he is still for maintaining a strict friendship between Us and Sweden, and for strengthening the same not only by the renewal of the treaty, which will expire in the beginning of the year 1738, but by a more general defensive treaty with other powers, you may open yourself more freely to him and follow the lights he shall give you to conduct yourself with respect to the other Swedish ministers.

But as We have observed by the last reply of France that the said crown has hinted a willingness to form a plan of negociation with Sweden, and as the last convention is not yet ratified, wherein France promised a large subsidy, it appears to Us that the French court by this situation of things has such a hold of Sweden, that if they cannot or will not make a new alliance with Sweden, or fullfill the last, they may be able at least, by their partisans, to hinder the Swedes from making any treaty with others, which they shall not like.

We have besides had advices that the party which acts in opposition to the present ministry in Sweden have taken great pains to indispose the nation towards Us and Our friends, and that by their intrigues and insinuations they have spread ill impressions for that purpose. Wherefore upon your return to Stockholm you will make diligent enquiry how the minds of people are inclined towards Us and Our kingdoms, and what false suggestions are diffused amongst them to Our prejudice; and you will therefore proceed with great caution in giving the least hint of this your commission,

'till you are well apprized that the obstacles abovementioned may be surmounted.

Reports have already been handed about in Sweden, as well as in other parts of Europe, of a negociation being begun upon the foot of what is specified in these instructions ; and therefore, no doubt, upon your arrival there you will find people jealous and inquisitive, and particularly the ambassadour of France, and perhaps the minister from the Czarina ; but you will conduct yourself as carefully and as dextrously as you can to avoid giving umbrage ; and especially, if you find the Russ minister inclined to diffidence and suspicion, you will endeavour to quiet his scruples by giving him assurances of Our perfect friendship for Our good sister the Czarina, and of Our earnest desire to cultivate the same by all means possible ; and consequently of Our being farr from entring or being any ways disposed to enter into engagements prejudicial to the interests of Our said good sister

G. R.

WILLIAM STANHOPE, BARON HARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO EDWARD FINCH.

(*Record Office, Sweden 76 to 86.*)

Whitehall, 4th March 1736/7

The King would have you inform Count Horn in the utmost confidence, and under a promise of not mentioning from what quarter the intelligence came, that his Majesty has very good grounds to believe that it is the intention of the court of France to send Mr Chavigny, after his having spent some little time at Copenhagen, upon a commission to Stockholm, as a person more proper to manage the French intrigues at that court than Mr Casteja. The experience we have had of Mr Chavigny's conduct has sufficiently convinced us of his ill intentions, and we cannot but conclude that in case of his being employed at your court his chief view will be to cool and diminish the good understanding which at present so happily subsists between the King and the crown of Sweden, and to thwart and oppose every design that may be formed in concert with our friends there for extending and confirming that important union, in order to which it cannot be doubted, from what is already so well known of the intentions of France, but that his first and principal endeavours will be employed for ruining the

power and credit of Count Horn and his friends at the ensuing diet, by joyning with and supporting the cabal in all their designs and wicked schemes for that purpose. As his Majesty is therefore most desirous of continuing in the strictest friendship with his Swedish Majesty, and is persuaded that Count Horn does constantly act upon the same principle, he would have you represent to his Excellency the great danger that may arise from suffering a person of Mo^r Chavigny's character to be employed there, and leave him to judge whether it might not be possible to take such steps as should prevent his mission thither. But if that be not thought practicable, it will be however of the greatest consequence that you should be as early as possible in putting the count, and thro' him the rest of our friends, upon their guard against the mischievous abilities and dangerous maxims of the minister that is designed for them.

Whitehall, 5th July 1737.

. . . . I shall soon talk with the directors of the East India Company here upon the protocol you sent me, and when they have consider'd the contents of it, and have return'd me their answer, I shall take his Majesty's commands upon the whole and send them to you. And as to the warm memorial, which in yours of the 21st of June you mention to have been presented to the king of Sweden by the East India Company there, it is not unlikely that those merchants may be furious and violent in their expressions and designs, but it is hoped that the government and the ministers will be more prudent and cautious than to give ear to such inconsiderate instances, which if pushed to extremitys cannot fail to be attended with very ill consequences.

Hampton Court, 2^d Aug^t 1737.

. . . . You have been already acquainted that I had put a copy of the protocol into the hands of our East India directors. Those gentlemen lately came to me, having consider'd the contents of that paper, and expressed them selves to be highly oblig'd to you for what you did, and extremely pleas'd with the force and clearness of those arguments you had used in support of the affair of Porto Novo. And as the justice of their cause has been put in so strong a light by you to the Swedish ministers they are in hopes that the weight of your reasonings will have a good effect to remove the prejudices of impartial people. And as they observed that the

Swedes in their discourse seem'd to look upon themselves to have been worse treated than any others had ever been in the like case, they put into my hands a paper, of which the inclos'd is a copy, to shew that their conduct in that respect has been alike to all who have infring'd their rights and privileges. This I send you that you may be acquainted with what they have to say on that head, if you should have any occasion to mention that matter in your conversation with the Swedish ministers. . . .

[Enclosure.]

Anno 1730. Two ships under Polish colours, one called the Neptune, the other the Sea Horse, were blockd up in Bengal river by the English and Dutch.

The Sea Horse was taken and the Neptune retir'd and lay there till she was quite decayed.

The ship Apollo, anno 1731, with Prussian colours, was waylaid by the Dutch in all the passages in her return from China and was attackt by them, although she escaped.

The ship Mermaid, bound to Bengall with the Emperor's pass from Trieste, was pursued by the English and Dutch and chaced out of the Indies, and a Dutch ship watch'd her in a hostile manner in the road of Tranquebar (a port belonging to the Danes), from whence with much difficulty she escaped.

The Dutch stopt the first Swede ship that went to China and carried her into Batavia and examined her there.

In the case of the ship Flandria, the Emperor's subjects concerned in her submitted to the determination of the courts in Westminster Hall.

Hampton Court, 30th Augt 1737.

. . . . The King would have you acquaint Count Horn and Mo^r Von Köchen in the utmost confidence and secrecy that his Majesty has received undoubted intelligence that thô Mo^r Casteja is recalled upon pretence of his having acted contrary to the intention of his court in his conduct towards our friends at Stockholm, yet that his successor Mo^r St. Severin is instructed to tread in the same steps, to keep up an appearance of making court to the king of Sweden Count Horn and their friends, but underhand to assist and support the opposite party and to endeavour to keep it up as much as possible for the ensuing dyet, for which purpose he has directions to continue all the same pensions, as Mo^r Casteja

gave, on the part of France, and particularly those to the two persons in the Chancery, whose names have been formerly mentioned to you upon an occasion of the same nature, and whose friendship he is ordered to cultivate for the support of the French faction and in opposition to his Suedish Majesty and his friends.

You will therefore let the ministers abovementioned know that as this information is entirely to be depended on and appeared of the highest consequence, as it might serve to put them upon their guard in time against the specious pretences, but really dangerous views, under which the new French minister will be directed to act, his Majesty would by no means conceal it from them, not doubting but that this confidence on the King's part will be received, as it is intended, as the most convincing proof of his Majesty's sincere friendship to the king of Sweden, and his desire of contributing to the protection of those who are in his Suedish Majesty's true interest; as also that the secret with regard to a discovery of so great delicacy and importance will be inviolably observed on their part.

Hampton Court, 13th Sept^r 1737.

Your two last despatches of the 26th and 30th past having been laid before the King, I am to acquaint you that his Majesty was particularly attentive to the new turn of discourse, which seems to have arisen very suddenly amongst the Swedish ministry, concerning their entring into a war with Muscovy for the recovery of their lost provinces. You did very well in throwing in every thing that might tend to discourage those thoughts, and his Majesty would have you continue the same conduct, making it your business to discover whether there be really any scheme of that kind on foot, or with what views such conversations have been held to you, as also whether there may be some connexion between that way of talking and their sudden dispatching away the two officers you mentioned in your former.

The only circumstance that seems capable of animating the Swedes to attack the Czarina must be the notion of her having suffered very much and being reduced by the Turkish war; but as it is hardly to be conceived that Sweden will engage that power without the support and even actual assistance of France, and as what would make it worth while to that crown to give such an expensive assistance to Sweden seems to be the increase of the

Czarina's power by her success in the present war, which should deter the Swedes from attacking her, it appears at first sight very difficult to reconcile such different motives of proceeding, so as to imagine that a concert for the purpose abovementioned can be formed between the two crowns.

Hampton Court, 18th Oct^r 1737.

I am now to return you thanks for the curious particulars you sent me in your's of the 30th past of the disposition of people where you are to lay hold of the first plausible occasion that shall offer for attacking Muscovy; and at the same time to acquaint you that his Majesty very much approved your caution, in conversing with the senator Creutz, to discourage any expectation of their having the King's assistance or countenance in such a rash attempt. You do likewise extremely well in endeavouring upon every opportunity to convince those, whom you talk with, of the great folly and danger of embarking themselves in schemes of that nature, and it was a particular pleasure to his Majesty to see that Count Horn Mo^r Von Kocken and Count Bonde were so strongly averse to them. The situation of Europe at present, and of the Emperor's affairs in particular, is such that a declaration of Sweden against the Czarina might be attended with the most terrible consequences, and the King therefore hopes that effectual pains will be taken to keep the king of Sweden steady at this juncture, and to prevent the influence of those insinuations that are made to him of the necessity or expedience of his calling an extraordinary diet for such pernicious purposes. . . .

Whitehall, 6th Dec^r 1737.

I had only time by last post to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 11th and 15th of Nov^r, since which that of the 18th is likewise come to my hands, and they have been all laid before the King.

The discourse you had with Mons^r Gedda, as mentioned in yours of the 15th, concerning the business of Porto Novo was certainly right on your part in maintaining the point of the injury first done to us in employing English subjects and effects in a trade contrary to the most express laws of the kingdom, which is a very just foundation for our complaints and which ought to be remedied effectually, in order to remove with satisfaction on both sides the

ill impressions which that incident is made use of by the malice of our enemys to create in Sweden, who seem to think of nothing but a kind of unconditional restitution, of which you know extremely well the inseparable difficulties; for althô the King's ministers were and still are of opinion of it's being a desirable thing, even at the expence of the said restitution, to have a strong and sufficient security that an absolute and certain stop be put to the Swedes employing for the future either English subjects or effects, for the carrying on their trade to the Indies, yet as it does not depend upon them to make such an agreement but upon a Company, for whose resolutions and ways of thinking it is impossible to answer, all that can be said to you upon that head is that in case you find a real disposition where you are to come to such an adjustment of this troublesome affair you should encourage them in the making such a proposal, which you may be assured will be, when made, strongly supported and recommended to the said Company by all those, who have the honour to be employed in his Majesty's affairs here in England.

The King observed with pleasure the good dispositions that appeared in Mo^r Gedda towards England in your conversations with him, and you will lose no opportunity of cultivating an intimate and cordial friendship with a person, who has abilitys as well as inclinations to fix and improve a solid harmony between the two kingdoms. What he mentioned of the project of a treaty between the three crowns of Great Britain Sweden and Denmark you know would be very acceptable here, if it can be brought about, and as Mo^r Gedda seems to be of opinion that such a scheme might be made to bear, if proper methods were effectually employed for that purpose, you will talk to him confidentially and try to find out more at large and precisely his ideas upon that subject, and what means of acting he judges to be most likely to attain so desirable an end.

Whitehall, 21st Febr^y 1737/8.

. . . . I am now ordered to inform you that the King is every day more and more confirmed by fresh intelligences of the truth of what I wrote to you on the 30th of August last past concerning the conduct that would be held by the new French ambassador at Stockholm. Whatever pretences he may make to the contrary, and whatever appearances he may put on, our friends

may be convinced that they are only to cover his game, his true point being to follow the steps of his predecessor and to overturn the credit of the present Swedish ministry, in particular of Count Horn and Mr^r Von Köchen; for which purpose, as partisans to that design will be chiefly wanted in the ensuing diet, upon which great hopes are formed, Mr^r St. Severin will have very soon, if he has not already receiv'd it, a sum of five or six thousand pounds sterling at his disposal, to employ for the use abovementioned. As the King's friendship for the king of Sweden, and his good opinion and regard for the persons at present in his service, makes his Majesty desirous of putting them upon their guard against all such dangerous machinations, his Majesty gives you leave to open this intelligence, under the strongest tye of secrecy, to the two gentlemen before mentioned, which the King cannot doubt will be religiously observed, as nothing but his Majesty's sollicitude for their preservation could have induced him to have made them a confidence of this nature. And you may let them know that the King wishes them to be well prepared, and in time, against those intrigues, for that event will certainly verify the informations that you are now ordered to impart to them.

Whitehall, 10th March 1737/8.

I have laid before the King your dispatches of the 17th 21st and 24th past, and his Majesty having considered their contents, and the use and service that may be justly hoped for from your being intrusted with the distribution of a sum of money towards securing the important objects therein at large set forth, I have now his orders to acquaint you that his Majesty has determined for the present to empower you to employ the sum of two thousand pounds sterling for those purposes, the King being fully satisfied that you will conduct yourself with the utmost discretion in so nice an affair and take effectual precautions in placing his Majesty's bounty to the greatest advantage; and you may accordingly draw upon England for the sum abovementioned.

You shall have by the next post a copy of our treaty with Muscovy, to be communicated where you may think proper.

Whitehall, 17th March 1737/8.

You will have seen in my former letters what intelligences the King had received concerning the views and intentions of France

with regard to the court where you reside, and I have now his Majesty's orders to acquaint you that all I had before told you in relation to the conduct that was prescribed to Mr St. Severin has been fully confirmed to his Majesty by fresh informations, and the King would therefore have you take the first opportunity of apprizing Count Horn Monsieur Von Köcken and Mons^r Gedda, in order to keep them constantly upon their guard and prevent their being deluded by deceitful appearances, that the behaviour and proceedings of the present French ambassador will most certainly be directed, thô in a more cautious and covert way, to the same end with those of his predecessor, and that that end is no other than the ruin of the present Swedish ministry, and in particular of Mr Von Köcken and Mr Neris [Nérés], which two gentlemen are more particularly aimed at as being thought the most disinclined of any to the French interests ; and you may add, in the same confidence, that the King has reason to be assured that this intrigue has already gone so far, that very sanguine hopes have been conceived of the removal of the two ministers above-mentioned by the States of the kingdom when next assembled.

And as by your former letters it appears that Mr Gedda, in particular, seems to have entertained an imagination that he is still well at the French court, and that he has a great credit and influence with Mr St. Severin ; that he may not any longer deceive himself therein to his prejudice you will let him know, in the utmost confidence, that he is looked upon both by the ministers at Paris and their ambassador at Stockholm in exactly the same light, and with the same disapprobation and ill will, as either of the two others, whom I just named to you, and that all his suggestions and overtures are considered as coming from a determin'd enemy to the French interests ; which circumstances you will likewise communicate to Count Horn and Mr Von Köcken as what his Majesty is sure of, beyond a possibility of misinformation.

It is also the King's pleasure that you should inform the same ministers, in the utmost secrecy, that a discovery has been made to his Majesty of a negociation now on foot between Mr Chavigny and Mr Schulin at Copenhagen for drawing Sweden into a new union with France and Denmark, in order to which it is designed by France that the first propositions should be made by Denmark to Sweden, in order to cover the real intention of those overtures,

which is no other than that of bringing the two northern crowns entirely under the dependance and direction of the French. If this transaction succeeds at Copenhagen some insinuations will soon be made to the Swedish ministry for that purpose, which will probably be at first no more than general professions of the friendship of Denmark towards Sweden and as general invitations to a concert with that crown for the preservation of the peace of the north. But our friends may be assured that the design is deeper laid, and that in whatever shape it may make its appearance at Stockholm the original plan has been concerted with France, who intends no less, by encouraging such an alliance, than to be herself at the head of it and to obtain thereby what she has so long aspired at, the entire management and disposition of those two powers. The King therefore judges it to be of the utmost importance that those of the Swedish ministry, who prefer an alliance with England, should be prepared in time by this friendly communication against the danger of such insidious proposals, lest by too hastily embracing them they should chance to throw themselves unwarily into that very situation, which they have so long appeared to think, both by their conduct and professions, the most prejudicial to the interests of their own country.

Whitehall, 9th May 1738.

I informed you in a late letter that I had referred to the consideration of the East India directors the proposals that were made to you by Messrs Gedda and Ankerkrona for the accommodation of our dispute with Sweden concerning the business of Porto Novo, and I am now to send you inclosed a copy of the answer that I have receiv'd thereupon; which referring, as you will observe, to papers that have been formerly transmitted to you I don't think it necessary to trouble you with fresh transcripts of them.

At the same time I am to acquaint you in confidence that tho' this answer seems to insist upon retaining the whole seizure, which could not be avoided in making a report in form by the whole Court of Directors under their present powers, yet, as I have since talk'd with some of the leading members of that body, I find they are persuaded they should be able to procure an authority from a general meeting of the proprietors to adjust the matter, in case it were proposed to them from Sweden in the following shape.

To restore and give up whatsoever should belong to natural born Swedes, being demanded as belonging to them, with interest and allowance for profits that might have been made ; and in this they would not confine themselves to the quantum you stated in one of your former letters, but would be willing to compound for a round sum, without looking too scrupulously into particulars. But then it must be observed that whatever is asked must be so as being the property of real subjects of Sweden, for the Company can never submit to pay a farthing of what should be claimed as belonging to Englishmen naturalized there, since thereby they would not only put themselves entirely in the wrong, and renounce the benefit of the several laws that have been made in their favour and under which they have hitherto justified their proceedings, but would likewise thereby in a manner publish an impunity and license to all future transgressors of those laws, and so give them the greatest encouragement that is possible to persevere in such illicit practices.

The condition which they require on the part of Sweden in exchange is, that all British subjects, naturalized or not naturalized in Sweden, together with their effects, should be absolutely and effectually forbidden to be employed for the future in the Swedish East India trade, and that without any exception for such persons as have been hitherto concerned therein, but that the prohibition should be general and unlimited. They do not, however, mean that the trafficking with goods of the produce of his Majesty's dominions should be understood to be comprehended under this restriction. . . .

Whitehall, 19th May 1738.

I have received your letter of the 5th inst., which is decyphering, so that I can for the present only acknowledge it's arrival, and must deferr till the next post acquainting you with any commands which his Majesty may have for you upon the contents.

In the mean time the King has ordered me to let you know that his Majesty has received the strongest confirmation of all the advices I have, in my former letters, sent you concerning the design of the French court to procure the destruction of the present Swedish ministry at the dyet.

This is the great point to be laboured by Mo^r St. Severin, preferably to all others, and as the hopes of French subsidies is what they

think most capable of making impression upon the minds of the generality of people there he will inforce his exhortations to the purpose above-mentioned by letting them plainly perceive that without that absolute condition nothing is to be expected from France, but will give the strongest expectations of his court's complying readily with their desires, in case of their proceeding at the dyet to set aside the present ministry.

This is what our friends may absolutely rely upon the truth of, and they will most certainly, if they keep a strict eye upon Mons^r St. Severin, see it fully confirmed, for thô he may hitherto have been obliged, out of prudence, to act in a more dark and covert manner, yet as things are now drawing to a crisis it will be impossible that he should not give the Swedish ministers several opportunitys of seeing plainly what is the real drift and tendency of his proceedings.

Thô this intelligence may be absolutely depended on, yet as the King cannot so well judge at this distance, as you may do upon the spot, of the effect such a communication might have upon the persons that are threatned, his Majesty must leave it to your discretion whether to impart the whole, or what part of it, and at what time to our friends, since there may possibly be room for an apprehension that those gentlemen might be driven by such strong representations of the danger of their situation to think of embracing very contrary measures, to what we should wish them to pursue, for their support.

Whitehall, 26th May 1738.

In answer to your letter of the 9th inst. I am now to acquaint you that the King approved your design as to Mo^r Gedda, as also that relating to Mo^r Von Köcken, if he could be brought to allow of it; and upon account of such and other extraordinary disbursements, as well as in consideration of the insinuations made to you by our three friends, and more particularly by Count Horn, his Majesty has ordered me to let you know that you may draw immediately upon the receipt of this for another thousand pounds, the disposal of which the King leaves to your own discretion, with the advice of our three friends, being only desirous that it should be employed towards their support and that of the true Swedish interest in the dyet. This is what his Majesty at present allows you to expend, but the King likewise is pleased

to give you a liberty of drawing for still one other thousand pounds, making in the whole four thousand, but that you are not to do but in case of great necessity. And you are to take care, when you acquaint our friends there with these fresh instances of his Majesty's regard to them and the cause which they are engaged in, to let them perceive, in a gentle manner, that the King does not think of going into any farther expence, than what I have just mentioned, upon occasion of the present dyet.

Whitehall, 21st July 1738.

I have already thanked you for your dispatch of the 3^d inst., and may now acquaint you with the King's approbation of the language you held to the king of Sweden.

Besides the information I sent you in my last, to be imparted in confidence to Count Horn, I have the King's orders to let you know, that you may acquaint the same minister with it in the utmost secrecy, that Baron [Karl] Sparre is the man who has Mo^r de St. Severin's entire confidence, who is intrusted with the secret of France upon all occasions, and who, being looked upon as an implacable enemy to the Swedish ministry, is the engine made use of for disposing the members of the dyet towards carrying on the views of the French court.

The King having ordered me, at the beginning of this dyet, to instruct Mo^r Rondeau to represent to the Russian ministers the necessity of their exerting themselves towards the support of the well-intentioned party in Sweden, and that you had orders to assist Mo^r Bestuchef therein, I am now informed by him that he is positively assured both by the duke of Courland [Biren] and Count Osterman that no endeavours have been wanted on the part of the Czarina for so good a purpose, and particularly that Mo^r Bestuchef had already been trusted with above fifty thousand crowns for that use, which you are to keep entirely for your own instruction.

The King has been informed in great secrecy by Prince William of Hesse that he had certain intelligence from Sweden that the ambassador of France is taking great pains, in this time of the dyet, for getting the succession of that crown regulated in favour of the eldest prince of Deux Ponts or Birkenfeldt. As this intelligence is very particular and extraordinary his Majesty would have you use your utmost attention and skill to discover whether

any thing of that kind be really in agitation amongst the French ambassador and his friends, and if you find that such an intrigue is actually on foot you will endeavour to procure constant information of the reception and progress of it, and particularly as to the queen's inclinations for or against it ; but you are sensible of the great delicacy and nicety of any steps that you can take in an affair of that nature, and will, I doubt not, conduct your enquiries with the utmost caution. . . .

Whitehall, 8th Sept^r 1738.

. The King was very sorry to see by your late letters that things seem'd to be taking a very dangerous turn in the dyet, contrary to the hope which we had conceived from our former accounts, and his Majesty was the more struck with this ill news, as the courage of our friends in the senate seems to be entirely cast down upon these first appearances of danger. His Majesty in the present circumstances sees no better remedy than that which you mention, of getting a sudden end put to the dyet, which seems to be the point now most especially to be laboured. But I must acquaint you in confidence that the French party are now very sanguine and confident of succeeding in their endeavours to parry that blow. The nobles house they have always thought themselves sure of, and have lately found means to gain two of the most wealthy merchants of Stockholm [Tomas Plomgren and Gustaf Kierman], by whose means they flatter themselves they shall secure the whole body of the burghers to their interest. The said two merchants are both members of the secret committee. As to the peasants, they intimate that you had at first gained the orator of that assembly, which is a circumstance the King would be glad to know the truth of ; but be it as it will you may look upon him for the future as a person who will act entirely under the direction of the French ambassador and will do his utmost to carry the house, in which he presides, into the same views, having sold himself and his brethren to that party, for which he is to receive 3000 crowns, that money being deposited for him till the end of the diet and not even then to be paid, unless his body conforms itself in every thing to that of the nobility.

These are intelligences which may be absolutely depended on, but they must be managed with the utmost caution and secrecy, and the King leaves entirely to your discretion the use that may

be made of them and the measures that may be taken in consequence of such important informations, rememb'ring that in any hint you shall think necessary to give our three friends, in relation to these advices or any part of them, his Majesty would by no means have you let them perceive that they were transmitted to you from hence.

Whitehall, 6th October 1738.

I am to acquaint you now, by the King's order, that by the advices his Majesty has lately received he has undoubted reasons to believe that Mo^r St. Severin is at present fully authoriz'd to conclude a treaty with Sweden upon the foot of the subsidies granted by the unratified convention of 1735, and that he will immediately propose the same and endeavour to proceed to the signature with the utmost expedition. You will therefore communicate this intelligence to our three friends, who, his Majesty doubts not, will do their utmost to prevent the success of a design so evidently calculated as well to the prejudice of their country as to their own private overthrow and destruction. And as there can be no question of their being in such dispositions, and the King is desirous to assist them therein by furnishing them with all such advices as may be of use, his Majesty would therefore farther have you let them know that one of the articles which will be insisted on by France is to tye up the hands of Sweden from contracting any new engagements whatsoever, during the continuance of the new convention, without a previous communication and concert. This article would be so dishonourable, if consented to, and so dangerous in its consequences, at a time when the situation of Europe is so critical and lyable to the apprehension of such sudden disturbances and alterations, that his Majesty cannot but think that the knowledge you will hereby be enabled to give the Swedish ministers of the French intention of demanding so shameful a condition will put it in their power to clog, at least, and embarrass this fatal transaction, which, without their exerting their utmost vigour to oppose it, will be most certainly hurried to it's conclusion by the cabal with the greatest blindness and precipitation.

Whitehall, 10th Oct^r 1738.

. . . . We shall be impatient to see what resolution will be taken by our friends upon the great point of proposing to proceed

to the nomination of persons for the vacancies in the senate, as also to learn the success and consequences of that step, if they should determine to take it, since you seem to look upon it of so great importance. In the mean while his Majesty was pleased to observe by your letter that affairs appear'd to be rather mending in the dyet, and his Majesty hopes that the declaration to be made by Mo^r Bestuchef, with the return of the Muscovite troops to a country nearer home, may give some check to the sanguine proceedings of those who would precipitate their country, contrary to its true interest, into a French alliance and a war with Russia.

Whitehall, 31st Oct^r 1738.

I have now received and laid before the King your dispatches of the 13th and 17th inst.

His Majesty was very glad to find that our friends had been able to give such repeated checks to the violent and dangerous schemes of the majority in the nobles' house, by the opposition of the other States, so that there seemed a fair appearance of our seeing a much more favourable conclusion of this diet than could be reasonably expected from it's beginning; and I may let you know in confidence that his Majesty has reason to think that the French themselves begin now to talk but despondingly as to their hopes of overturning the Swedish ministry, and seem willing to content themselves with the dyet's leaving such instructions as may absolutely tye up the hands of his Swedish Majesty and his servants and fix them to a French plan of proceeding; upon which condition Mo^r de St. Severin will, as the King is undoubtedly informed, be allowed to go on with his convention.

We hear from Petersburg that the duke of Courland had talked very strongly to Mo^r Nolken about the design of Sweden to fall upon the Czarina at the instigation of France, letting him perceive that her Majesty, designing to stand next campaign upon the defensive only with regard to the Turks, she would be sufficiently provided with forces at home to defend her dominions against any attack from Sweden. And that, as to the dependance the Swedes might have upon France, the duke had given him full proof of that crown's having offered to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive with the Czarina in the year 1735, and at the very instant that France was negociating the subsidiary treaty with Sweden. This conversation will no doubt have been written

home by the Swedish minister at Petersburg [Erik Matthias von Nolken], and we hope may be of good use in the present circumstances.

What you wrote to Mr Rondeau concerning the communication expected from that court had his Majesty's approbation.

As to the disposal of the remaining one thousand pounds, which you are authoriz'd to draw for, the King is so well satisfied with your prudence discretion and judgement in the application of it that you may depend upon your bills for that sum being answer'd with the same punctuality as the former were.

Whitehall, 21st November 1738.

. . . . I need not tell you with how much concern the King has seen the unhappy and dangerous turn which affairs have taken in Sweden by the sudden conclusion of the French treaty, nor with what surprise his Majesty took notice of the new language which even our three friends had begun to hold to you upon that occasion. You will, I doubt not, continue to exert your usual zeal and diligence in laying before his Majesty every thing that shall pass in consequence of that transaction, and you may be fully assured that, whatever just dissatisfaction the King may have conceived at the manner in which things have been conducted there, his Majesty imputes no blame to you but is on the contrary entirely satisfied with the pains you have taken to prevent this evil and with your whole behaviour during the late most important and delicate conjuncture of affairs.

Whitehall, 23^d Feby. 1738/9.

The King having now taken into consideration the paper that was delivered to you the 6th instant by Count Bonde, being a reply on the part of Sweden to the answer you gave in there, by his Majesty's order, upon their late declaration concerning the affair of Porto Novo; as it appears by the contents of that piece that the way of reprisals is no longer thought of by the Swedish court, but that they are on the contrary desirous of going on with the negociation that was begun for the settling of that business; and as the King sees at the same time that you had received the new instructions and documents from the East India Company, which I sent you in my dispatch of the 19th past, by which you are fully apprized of the terms upon which his Majesty is willing to come to an immediate accommodation of the said dispute; it is therefore the King's pleasure that you should now forthwith proceed in the

negociation of that business with the persons who may be appointed to confer with you thereupon, to whom you will make such proposals as you are authorized to make on the part of the directors, and which are so reasonable and fair that we cannot question their being readily acquiesced in by Sweden.

Whitehall, 18th May 1739.

The circumstances mention'd in your dispatch of the 1st inst. as to their secret proceedings in Sweden, which seem to carry the appearance of some hostile design, being very particular, the King will be very desirous of seeing whatever other intelligence of the same nature you may be able to come at, and his Majesty would have you more especially exact in your informations as to their real strength, both by sea and land, and what forces they might be able to act with this summer, if they should come to a rupture.

The view which you mention of Count Tessin's and Mr Palmstierna's mission to Spain is likewise very curious, and deserves your most particular attention to discover what foundation there may be for it.

The pressing Mr Rudenschiold's departure for Berlin so earnestly, just in this juncture, seems to confirm the surmises that some have entertained, as if, to supply the loss of Denmark, France and Sweden were now endeavouring to draw the king of Prussia into their new measures. It will therefore be of importance that you should use your best endeavours to find out wherein Mr Rudenschiold's instructions may consist, and whether any negociation be either already on foot with the court of Prussia, or may be commenced upon that minister's arrival there.

Whitehall, 17th July 1739.

I have receiv'd your letters of the 29th past and 3^d instant and laid them before the King, who is pleased with the continuance of your exactitude in relating every thing that passes of any consequence in the parts where you reside

I am now to send you his Majesty's final orders in relation to the business of Porto Novo. You have waited some time for them, but you will easily be able to make the Swedish ministry sensible that in a Company, where the interests of such numbers are concerned, it is impossible to proceed with that expedition which might be desired.

The King was surprized and concerned to see so equitable a proposal, as that you were before authorized to make on the part of the Company, whereby they offered to relinquish to Sweden all that they could not themselves prove to have belonged to British subjects, entirely set aside and rejected by the commissioners appointed to treat with you. His Majesty thinks we should be fully justified, in the eyes of all impartial people, in abiding absolutely by such a fair and reasonable offer. But as the King is still desirous that nothing should be omitted on our part that can be, with honour and justice, comply'd with towards facilitating an accommodation between the Companys, and as it appears by the protocol, which you transmitted, that the way they wish'd we should proceed in was by the offer of a round sum once for all, without making any distinction of British or Swedish property, as to the effects seized, his Majesty ordered the directors to be consulted thereupon, and I am now authorized by them, and commanded by the King, to let you know that they are willing to give any sum not exceeding ten thousand pounds sterling for a final accommodation of this dispute, provided they may be at the same time absolutely secured of the condition, which has been already offer'd by Sweden, vizt that for the future no British subjects, except those already naturaliz'd in Sweden, nor British effects, be ever employed in the Swedish East India trade. It must be left to your judgment, who are so perfectly acquainted both with the persons concerned and the affairs in dispute, to make the best bargain possible for the Company upon this occasion, by making your first offer in such proportion as you think proper, and endeavouring to bring the whole payment as much below the total sum, to which you are limitted, as may be in your power, but I must at the same time apprise you that this offer on the part of the Company is an absolute ultimatum, so that if the Swedes will neither be contented with that, nor upon farther consideration accept the proposal before made of restoring to them all we could not prove to be the property of British subjects, which they are still at liberty to do, if they preferr it to this new one, the King sees no remedy but that the negociation must be broken off; and in that case his Majesty cannot refuse his protection to his subjects against any violences or vexations that may be offer'd to them, in resentment of what has passed in this affair.

JOHN BURNABY
1739-1741

JOHN BURNABY was the eldest son of John Burnaby, of Kensington, and brother of Admiral Sir William Burnaby, first baronet. He had been secretary to Earl Waldegrave at Paris and Vienna, and after his recall from Stockholm in 1741 was sent to Switzerland.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOHN BURNABY AS SECRETARY OF EMBASSY
AT STOCKHOLM, 20 July 1739.

(*Record Office, F.O. 90, 66.*)

[Formal.]

WILLIAM STANHOPE, BARON HARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO JOHN BURNABY.

(*Record Office, Sweden 87 to 90.*)

Whitehall, 16th October 1739.

. The King was very well pleased with the strong declarations that were made you by Count Gylleberg, and which you give an account of in your letter of the 2^d to Mor Munchausen, of there being no intention at present in that court to give his Majesty any disturbance in Germany. You did very well to receive what the count said to you upon that occasion with the utmost civility, but his Majesty was at the same time glad to see your resolution of not being led by any such professions into a false security, and depends upon your exerting your attention to observe the actions of that court, from which their real designs

may be best judged of ; and in this juncture particularly it will be necessary to redouble your vigilance, as the Czarina's peace with the Porte may very probably make an alteration in the schemes of the Swedish ministers and oblige them to lay aside that of falling upon the Russian conquests in Finland and Livonia ; though at the same time they may find it absolutely requisite, for the sake of gratifying the present martial humour of the publick, and keeping up their own credit with the nation, to substitute some other enterprize in the room of it ; and you will easily conceive that it must be of the highest importance to his Majesty to be early informed of any such change of their plan, and the particulars of it.

Whitehall, 20th Nov^r 1739.

I acquainted you in my last that I was in daily expectation of receiving a report from the directors of the East India Company upon the result of the late conferences at Stockholm upon the business of Porto Novo, and the same having accordingly been since sent to me I now transmit you a copy thereto by the King's order. You will see by it that they still adhere to their former offer of £10,000, together with the reasons they allege for so doing and their answer to those which were advanced by the Swedish Company. The King would have you communicate this paper to the commissioners appointed for settling the said dispute, and as you have copies in your hand of all that has pass'd in it from the beginning, and so are fully master of the whole, you will support the proceedings and offer of the East India directors with all such other arguments as shall occur to you, and give me an immediate account of your success, which his Majesty cannot but still hope will be favourable and that when the whole affair shall be recon sider'd in Sweden, and it shall appear how much their Company has been misinformed as to the real value of the effects seized, so handsome a proposal as that of giving them £10,000 sterling, upon condition of the exclusion of British subjects and their effects for the future, agreeably in general to the offer made to M^r Finch in the last conferences, will be readily accepted ; or else that either of the two other methods before offer'd for accommodating this dispute, and which our Company are still willing to recur to, will be acquiesced in by the Swedish commissioners. M^r Finch is not yet arrived, and I have no letters from you since my last

Whitehall, 15th February 1739/40.

Prince Scherbatoff, the Russian minister here, having acquainted me by order from his court that the Czarina his mistress was now fully convinced of the intentions of the Swedes to begin hostilities against Muscovy, for which purpose an extraordinary diet was design'd to be summoned, and that her Czarish Majesty being at the same time equally assured that those designs were intirely to be attributed to the ill dispositions of those who are now in power at the Swedish court, and that nothing could be more for her interest, in the present conjuncture, than the reestablishment of the former ministry, whom she looks on as persons averse to disturbing the publick tranquillity and consequently well disposed towards preserving the friendship between the crown of Sweden and those of Great Britain and Muscovy; in order to attaining so desirable an end her Czarish Majesty had resolved to instruct her minister in Sweden to pursue that point with the utmost application at the ensuing diet, and would put him in condition to employ all the necessary means for that purpose, wherein she hoped that the King would be pleased to give you orders to co-operate with Mo^r Bestuchef and would likewise furnish you, on his Majesty's part, with whatever the King might be willing to contribute to the success of those endeavours. I am therefore to let you know that his Majesty, having had former experience of the good intentions of the said late ministry, and being persuaded as well of their inclinations to preserve the antient system of friendship with this crown, as that nothing will in all probability so effectually contribute towards the maintenance of the tranquillity of the north, a point so essential in the present dangerous circumstances of Europe, as their being restored to that credit and authority which they before employed to so good purposes, I have by the King's order acquainted Prince Scherbatoff with his Majesty's intention to comply with the Czarina's desire in the particulars abovementioned, and you are accordingly to inform Mo^r Bestuchef that you have received the King's commands to join with your utmost skill and ability in the endeavours he shall use for bringing that design to perfection, and that as soon as the point of the diet shall be resolved, and the time of its meeting known, you shall expect to have more particular instructions for your conduct and to be enabled by his Majesty to assist him in the manner desired by the Czarina.

Whitehall, 4th April 1740.

Having received together since last post your dispatches of the 7th 14th and 18th past and laid them before the King, his Majesty was particularly pleased with your diligence, in collecting so many curious particulars in relation to the progress of M^r Asseburg's negociation at Paris,¹ and the motions that it has occasioned amongst the new ministry at Stockholm, which the King would have you continue to attend to with the same vigilance, and especially after M^r de St Severin's arrival there, who left Paris some time since upon his journey to your court, and is very probably instructed to endeavour to settle the affair directly with the king of Sweden, since it has not succeeded in M^r Asseburg's hands.

The King took notice of what had passed between you and M^r Bestuchef upon your having executed the orders you were charged with to him, and you may renew your assurances to that minister of his Majesty's intention to enable you, as soon as matters shall appear ripe for doing it, to concurr with him in advancing by the necessary means the salutary views of the two courts, with regard to the next dyet that shall be called in that kingdom.

Hanover, 6/17 June 1740.

I acknowledg'd from the Hague the receipt of your most secret letter of the 9th past, and found upon my arrival here on Tuesday night your dispatches of the 20th and 23^d. All which having laid before the King I am now to acquaint you that in pursuance of what I some time since inform'd you was his Majesty's intention, and upon due consideration of the pressing instances made to you by several of our friends in Sweden, and by M^r Bestuchef and General Diemar, representing the necessity of employing immediately, without waiting for the actual convocation of the dyet, part of the sums his Majesty proposed to advance towards securing the election of proper members and other purposes of equal importance, the King has been pleas'd to send orders to England to remit immediately to you, or send you a credit for, four thousand pounds, or if so much could not without inconvenience be spared at once one half of that sum now and the remainder as soon as possible afterwards. You will therefore be soon enabled to give the assistance desir'd by our friends there,

¹ Concerning a treaty between France and Hesse-Cassel, cf. the Introduction, page xii.

and will accordingly acquaint them with his Majesty's having comply'd with their request, and when you receive the mony you are to distribute it according to their advice, and to that of Mr Assebourg and Dankleman, if they arrive in Sweden time enough to be consulted therein, and in concert with Mr Bestuchef, who you will take care may go hand in hand with you in the disbursements to be made, pursuant to the assurances that have been given to his Majesty on the part of the Czarina.

But if it should be judg'd absolutely necessary by the well intention'd there, either by reason of a sudden resolution being taken to summon the diet, or for other essential causes, that the mony should be furnish'd before such time as you can possibly receive it in virtue of the orders abovementioned, which were sent two days since by a messenger to England ; in that case, if you can yourself find means of drawing upon the Treasury, without danger of exposing the secret, the King allows you to do it for any sum not exceeding that of four thousand pounds, to which his Majesty is pleas'd to limit his present contribution.

When the King receives some further lights, which he is in expectation of, I may send you more particular instructions for your guidance in this nice and important commission. In the mean time I must recommend it to you to be well assured of a good prospect of advantage from the methods that shall be proposed to you for the application of the sums intrusted to your care before you proceed to any actual advances ; and you will let me have an account to be laid before the King, when any safe conveyance shall offer, of the steps that you shall have taken and every thing that may relate to your execution of his Majesty's commands in this particular

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Hanover, 17/28 June 1740.

Secret.

I am now to acquaint you that as the King is informed by his servants in England that there will be great difficulty in finding remittances to Stockholm from thence, his Majesty would have you, without waiting for any farther advices, draw yourself upon Mr Thomas Lowther of the Treasury for four thousand pounds, by bills of two thousand pounds each, payable at two different times, at one uzance, and this you will take care to manage with so much care and circumspection that your having drawn for such large sums may not be known in Sweden.

Hanover, 15/26 July 1740.

. . . I must now acquaint you in confidence that a hint has been given from a certain quarter, as if the Muscovites were dissatisfied with your conduct and complain'd of your living in intimacy with some of the new ministry and neglecting to cultivate the friendship of the well-intentioned party. I desire you will not imagine that this intelligence makes any impression to your disadvantage, for the King is satisfied that you have too much regard to what you know to be his Majesty's intentions to give any real foundation for such a jealousy, but I only mention it that you may consider what appearances on your part may possibly have misled people into such a mistaken opinion of you and may prevent, as much as lies in your power, their falling into such an error for the future, because the King is desirous that the court of Muscovy should have no doubt of his concurring and co-operating entirely towards bringing about the same good ends at the ensuing diet, as both you and the Czarina's minister are instructed and enabled to contribute to. . . .

Lintzburg, 18/29 September 1740.

. . . As the behaviour of France towards the King, in relation to our war with Spain, will probably make it soon necessary for his Majesty to take a body of foreign troops into his service, you will in the utmost confidence hint the same to our friends and desire to know their opinion what success might be hoped for, in case a proposition were made for troops for that purpose to be furnish'd to his Majesty by Sweden, and what effect it might have towards the advancement of that interest which we are endeavouring to support in that kingdom. . . .

Whitehall, 2nd December 1740.

I have already acquainted you both with his Majesty's approbation, and that of the court of directors of the East India Company, of the convention you signed the sixth day of October last with Mo^r Ankercrona for a final accommodation of the affair of Porto Novo, and I now send you by the bearer, your servant, the King's ratifications of the same, to be exchanged against those of his Swedish Majesty, with the copy of a letter of the court of directors to me, declaring their entire satisfaction in the said agreement and humbly desiring that his Majesty would be pleased to ratify it.

You will likewise find inclosed the power of attorney which you desired from the court of directors, with their instructions to you for your proceeding, and a letter from them to you expressing their full approbation of what you have done.

You will see by the contents of some of the papers abovementioned that you are to draw upon the court of directors for eleven thousand nine hundred and three pounds seventeen shillings and seven pence of the mony to be advanced upon this occasion, and I am to acquaint you that for the remainder that will be wanted to make that sum up [to] twelve thousand pounds, and for the thousand pounds promised to Mr Ankercrona and the five hundred pounds designed as a present to yourself from the Company, you are to draw upon Sir Robert Walpole in the same manner as you do for the first mentioned sum upon the directors, his Majesty having been pleased to agree that those sums should be paid out of the forfeiture to the Exchequer upon the effects seized at Porto Novo.

Since this affair is therefore thus happily finished I may now wish you joy, as I do very sincerely, of the part you have had in bringing it, by your prudent and dexterous management, to a conclusion; and as the king of Sueden was pleased to desire you to send his compliments to the King, upon the signing of the convention, you will now return a suitable one to that prince in his Majesty's name.

Whitehall, 6th January 1740[1].

I received yesterday your letters of the 9th and 12th past, and having laid them immediately before the King am to acquaint you that considering the pressing instances that were made to you, and the reasons given for inducing your concurrence, his Majesty approved the step you had taken of advancing the 5,000 crowns you mention, and would have you draw for that sum in the way you have been before directed to follow upon like occasions.

I some time since sent you directions for your sounding our friends as to his Majesty's offering to take a body of Swedish troops into his service, which they did not at that time think would be of such use as to judge the risking such a proposition adviseable. But as the appearances of affairs in the dyet seem at present more promising than was then expected the King would have you consult with them again on the subject, and if they are of opinion that your taking any step towards setting on foot a negociation of that

kind would have a good effect towards the success of the cause we wish well to, and be favourably received, you may let them know that you are authorised to declare his Majesty's willingness to take a body of 6,000 of their troops upon the foot of our convention with Denmark and for the same term, and that you will be ready to enter upon the transaction immediately, for concluding which you should have full powers as soon as it should appear that the proposition was likely to succeed, and in case they approve the thought, and find it a proper time to bring it, with a prospect of being accepted, before the diet, you will consult and settle with them the best method of your proceeding to insinuate it, where it may be convenient.

Whitehall, 3rd Febr^y 1740/1.

. The King sees by your accounts which you have given of the transactions in the diet that the judgment you had formed of the weakness of the friends of the old ministry, and the little success to be expected from that quarter, has been fully confirmed, and therefore approved extremely the firmness with which you withstood the pressing attacks made upon you for advancing still more money for keeping up a party that could not be supported by such means; and altho' his Majesty was well pleased with your complying, as far as you have already done, he would have you for the future absolutely stop your hand unless, conformable to instructions, you shall see a greater certainty than I am afraid is to be hoped for by any further advances of money on the part of the King to bring about such a thorough change in the affairs of Sweden, as was first promised in order to induce his Majesty to disburse the sums he has already done, and therefore you took a very proper resolution to refuse the paying the further sum of one thousand pounds that was desir'd of you.

Whitehall, 13th March 1740/1.

I have received, since my last, several letters from you, the freshest of which is of the 20th of Febr^y, and have laid them all before the King; and I am to report to you his Majesty's approbation of your continuing to transmit such full and particular accounts of what passes in the Swedish diet.

By the great warmth and earnestness with which the point of

assembling a body of 12,000 men and a proportionable train of artillery, under pretence of opposing an attack which was apprehended on the side of Muscovy, was debated there, it looks as if some plan was forming in Sweden in order to come to a rupture with the Russ; and as his Majesty is of opinion that the Swedish ministry could never think of taking such a step without being prompted thereto and promised to be supported in it by France, the King would have you very attentive to get the earliest and best informations you can as to any reinforcement the Swedes may send to their army in Finland, and what encouragement may have been given for it by the French court, since from the conduct of that court in coming, or not, into such a design his Majesty will be able to judge better of their views and intentions in other respects. The King is likewise desirous to know how the king of Sweden stands affected with relation to the present differences between the queen of Hungary and the king of Prussia, and whether he proposes, as duke of Pomerania, to furnish his quota of troops to that princess, in support of the succession of the House of Austria according to the Pragmatick Sanction. You will also endeavour to find out whether any application, or proposals, have been made to Sweden for coming into an alliance with his Prussian Majesty, and in that case what disposition they shew towards it; there have been reports of such application having been made to your court, and we have been likewise inform'd that the Prussian ministers give out that the king of Sweden had assured the king their master that he would not suffer his Hessian troops to be employ'd against him; and tho' his Majesty can hardly give any credit to such insinuations you will, however, try to discover whether there has been any foundation for them.

The King observed that what his Swedish Majesty had to say to you in private was the thing we imagined, the taking a body of his troops into his Majesty's pay, and the King approved the answer you made that prince, when he open'd himself to you upon that subject; and as he thought it would be better to wait till their affairs were come to a consistency, before any further notice was taken of this matter, you will conform yourself thereto, and when that proposal shall be made to you in form you will return the answer prescribed to you by my letter of the 20th of last month, by encouraging such an idea and promising to send an immediate account of it to the King, which you will accordingly do.

Hanover, 19/30 June 1741.

The King having now fully weighed and considered as well what has been urged against you by the court of Sweden, to authorize their late treatment of you in excluding you from the discharge of your function as his Majesty's minister, as the circumstances you have alleged in your defence, I may have the pleasure to acquaint you that his Majesty has been pleased to receive your justification of your own conduct in a very favourable manner, but you will not be surprized that the King should not think it by any means expedient, after what has passed, that you should continue to reside at Stockholm.

I am therefore to acquaint you that it is his Majesty's pleasure that upon receipt of the King's answer to the king of Sweden's letter concerning you, which you will find herewith inclosed, together with a copy for your information, as also of his Majesty's letter of revocation, you should, without staying to take leave of that court, depart from thence and come hither directly, having first lodged in the hands of Mr Gedda, or such other minister as may be proper, his Majesty's said letter to the king of Sweden and given the same person notice of the orders you have received from the King. I return you thanks for the several letters I have received from you lately, which have been all duly acknowledged, tho' as it was to no purpose to send you any instructions in the situation you have been in I have not troubled you with particular answers.

Before you come away the King would have you endeavour, if you can do it by any of the English residing there, or by any of the foreign ministers of your acquaintance, in whom you can confide, or otherwise you shall judge proper, to establish a correspondence, that his Majesty may be informed from time to time of what passes in those parts.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MELCHIOR GUY DICKENS 1742-1748

THIS minister always signed and was addressed in his double surname, never as "Dickens" simply. This fact, and his Christian name, suggest a Low German or Dutch original, such as "Guidekens." However this may be, it was as "Guy Dickens" that he entered the British army in 1716, to be gazetted the next year captain in the 32nd regiment of foot. When his colonel, Charles Du Bourgay, went as envoy to Berlin in 1724 he accompanied him as secretary, remaining there after his chief's return in 1730, first as secretary in charge of affairs and afterwards as minister, until the arrival of the Earl of Hyndford in 1741. Before his appointment to Stockholm the next year, with the latter character, he obtained his long solicited promotion to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. After leaving Stockholm he was sent, in 1749, as envoy extraordinary to Russia.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUT.-COLONEL MELCHIOR GUY DICKENS AS
MINISTER AT STOCKHOLM, March 1741/2 (endorsed 6 April 1742).

(*Record Office, Sweden 91 and F.O. 90, 66.*)

[Formal.]

JOHN CARTERET, BARON CARTERET, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
COLONEL GUY DICKENS.

(*Record Office, Sweden 91 to 97.*)

Whitehall, 11th June 1742.

I have his Majesty's commands to send you the names of the three following senators, Lagerberg, Cronstedt and Akerhielm.

They are all considerable persons, by their knowledge weight and favourable dispositions towards us. The last particularly is a man of great abilities, and well acquainted with the state of the court and of the affairs of Sweden. His Majesty directs you to do all in your power to establish and cultivate a confidence between you and them, which may greatly promote the success of such matters as you may receive his Majesty's commands to transact at the court of Sweden. You will not be wanting, as opportunities may offer, to make mention to each of them apart of the regard you know his Majesty has for them, and in a particular manner for senator Akerhielm ; to whom I desire you will make my compliments.

Whitehall, 16th July 1742.

I have laid before the King the several letters I have received from you, the last of which was of the 22^d past, and order'd the receipt of them to be regularly acknowledged to you, having not had till now, since I wrote to you on the 11th June, any particular commands from his Majesty to transmit to you. But a diet in Sweden being soon to meet his Majesty has directed me to acquaint you that in your applications to those that are out of employment you may represent how much the preservation of their country will depend on the turn of affairs in the ensuing diet, and give them assurances that his Majesty, far from resenting the late behaviour of Sweden, which is imputed to France only, has an inclination to assist them. They may observe the different and great turn, which the affairs of Europe have taken ; the vigorous measures which Great Britain is resolved to pursue ; and how much she has at heart to prevent the schemes of France ; which power has indeed employed Sweden, but not served the Swedish interest ; and if a way can't be found to remedy the present evils they must tend to the manifest destruction of Sweden. That they themselves are the best judges what methods will be the properst to pursue, and how far they may think it expedient for the service of their country, and usefull for their own in particular, to open themselves to you upon the assurances you will give them that the King is extremely desirous to concur in those measures which may appear proper prudent and practicable.

The principal of those out of employment, with whom it will be proper for you to endeavour to connect and to hold this language

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to, are the Counts Bielk Bark and Bonde and Mess^{rs} Von Kocken Neres and Bahr, and in case you should find some difficulty therein, young Joachim Duben may be the fittest person to assist you to that purpose.

Among those that are in employment I have already mentioned to you the senators Åkerhielm Lagerberg and Cronsted, and in particular the former, as persons well-intentioned and to be cultivated. I may also add Mess^{rs} Boneauschold and Scutenthielm, who, tho' of an inferior rank, being in the Chancery may give you assistance. From Duben you may find out whether Thörner [Torne], of the College of Commerce, may be trusted. General Spence [Spens] and the stadholder Fucks you will endeavour to bring into our interest. As to the diet, Count Tessin and Mon^r Palmstierna are the most in the French interest of any that can pretend to be marshalls. His Majesty very much relies on your zeal and prudent conduct. You will transmit the best intelligence you can concerning the views the king of Sweden may have, as to settling the succession, and whether there is any possibility to procure it for the family of Hesse, in the person of Prince William, the father. If that could be his Majesty would prefer that scheme to any other, of which I have acquainted Prince William, but that his Majesty could not meddle in it 'till the king of Sweden should ask his assistance in it and shew what grounds and probability he may have of success. But in case his Majesty's views concerning the family of Hesse are not like to succeed, his Majesty would then be inclined to support the duke of Deux-Ponts. We know that France is against the house of Hesse, and thinks the scheme in their favour impracticable, and will do every thing possible to get Count Tessin chosen marshall, upon which they say that the French interest depends.

Whitehall, 30th July 1742.

I received by the last post and laid before the King your three letters of the 9th and 13th inst. His Majesty took notice of what had passed between you and Count Gyllenbourg and would have you acquaint that minister that he judges very right in supposing that the King was far from being unconcerned for the preservation of the balance of the north; that his Majesty is and has always been in very favourable dispositions towards Sweden, and wishes very sincerely their prosperity; but that if the King has not the

opportunitys he might have desired of being serviceable to them it is not to be imputed to him but to themselves, who by throwing themselves so entirely into the hands of France had left no room for the operation of his Majesty's friendly intentions towards them, and that it therefore now lyes upon them to point out in what particular way the King may be able to contribute to the amendment of their situation.

You will have received in my letter by Carrington of the 16th inst. very particular instructions for your conduct preparatory to the diet. His Majesty was glad to find by your present dispatches that applications were beginning to be made to you by the old friends of the English system, and that they were in so good hopes of recovering their credit in that country. You may give them assurance of the King's readiness to contribute thereto, and as they have declared that they do not expect any thing should be hazarded upon an uncertainty, nor unless in case of necessity, and even not then unless they are sure of success, his Majesty is pleased to allow you to expend as far as the sum of £6,000 sterling in the manner you shall agree with the gentlemen abovementioned for the support of that interest, upon the conditions which I have just repeated from your letter; and you will draw for any sums not exceeding the said total, at one usance, upon Mr Lowther of the Treasury, giving me timely notice of your doing it, that the Lords of the Treasury may be prepared to order the payment.

As to the succession, his Majesty has intelligence that the French are extremely desirous of keeping off that question in the present circumstances. The King, on the contrary, would be desirous of bringing it on, as, till that is settled, every thing remains in such uncertainty that it is impossible to build on any sure foundation in treating with Sweden. My dispatch of the 16th will have informed you that the King's view was in the first place for the House of Hesse, and if that could not succeed for the duke de Deux Ponts. You will therefore direct your endeavours, and employ all your credit and dexterity, for procuring the success of the former, if possible, and, if not, of the latter.

The election of a marshal is a point of the highest importance. By his Majesty's informations three persons are talked of for that post; Count Tessin Mo. Palmfeldt and Mo. Ungern. The French are using their utmost endeavours for the first, tho' they doubt of being able to prevail on him to accept of it. They are at the

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same time most zealously bent against Mo. Ungern, as a firm friend to the old ministry. He has, however, according to our secret advices, a very great party, and he is the candidate whom his Majesty would have you assist, in concert with our friends, to the utmost of your power.

The next great point will be the choice of a secret committee, upon which the French partisans are already working with the utmost diligence. All I can say upon that head is that you must countermine them all that is possible, taking this for your rule, that those candidates whom they shall pitch upon will be the persons you are to oppose, and his Majesty cannot doubt but that the opposite party, when they see the King ready to contribute so largely to their interest, will open themselves freely to you and give you all possible lights for promoting the success of our common views.

You will understand that the money, which the King authorizes you to employ, is meant for the success of these several points, as well as others that may arise, but principally for securing the succession in the manner above prescribed to you.

P.S. The two persons in Sweden that I love the most are Count Turo Bielke and Count Bonde. They are now of the opposing party. I desire you will assure Count Bielke that I shall never forget what passed between him and me in Gottenburg, and Count Bonde the pleasure and satisfaction I had with him at Stasleby, his country seat, when we went to the Orlyck. If they are now in our interest I would have you do them all possible service. When you mention me to them they will remember the particulars hinted at, if they are still English. I am afraid neither of these are for the House of Hesse, but as they are good patriots nothing can be so advantageous to Sweden as that choice, if they mean to be English. You are not confined to £6,000 strictly; if you can carry that point in favour of Prince William you may promise 2 or £3,000 more, which will be made good. You will take up the money of the English merchants, as I did in the year 1719, and pay those that you give it to in specie, as the surest and most secret method. You may tell Count Turo Bielke from me that I have good reason to believe that he is the most obnoxious person in Sweden to the French court, and has been represented to the Swedish court by the French as the fomenter of all the opposition in Sweden to their measures, as an incendiary in the late affair

of the Dalecarlians, and that he will not be safe if the French party prevail in the diet.

Whitehall, 13th Aug^t 1742.

I receiv'd to day and laid before the King your letter of the 30th past, when his Majesty took notice of what had been recommended to you by our friends in relation to the paper given you by Count Gyllenborg, upon which subject I can only now add to you, having already sent you his Majesty's orders thereupon that you should let our friends know that the King is sincerely desirous of being useful to Sweden, considering that kingdom as one that may be of the greatest service to the protestant cause, and that in their present distress'd circumstances he would most willingly use his mediation in their favour, provided it were asked of his Majesty in a proper manner. But there are many reasons why his Majesty cannot himself offer it, and indeed, considering the confusion and unsettled state of the government there at this time, we should be at a loss to know to whom to address such an offer. This is the substance of the answer I have given to Monsieur Wassenbourg [Wasenberg]'s insinuations upon the same head and is all I have at present in command from his Majesty.

Whitehall, 17th September 1742.

As it seems probable by your late letters that the mediation of his Majesty for procuring a peace with Russia may be soon desired in form by Sweden, the King has ordered me, for the sake of saving time, to let you know that if such an offer is made you should immediately accept the same in his name, without waiting for farther instructions; and you will also give notice then of your having done so to Sir Cyril Wich, to whom I have sent like orders for declaring his Majesty's acceptance there, and you will endeavour to have a regular correspondence with him, if possible.

Whitehall, 12th October 1742.

I receiv'd, whilst I lay at Helvoetsluys, your dispatch of the 19th past by Carrington, and laid it before the King as soon as possible after my return hither. In the mean while Mr Wasenberg had receiv'd and executed his orders for demanding his Majesty's good offices. You have already had information of what passed upon that occasion, and of the declaration made afterwards to him by the duke of Newcastle, importing that tho'

the term of good offices only was used by that minister in his audience, and in the paper deliver'd by him, his Majesty understandt it to be his mediation which was asked by Sweden, and upon that foot had agreed to the demand, as well as upon the supposition that it was not intended to join other powers with him afterwards in the mediation. I am now to repeat to you that these are his Majesty's sentiments, that you may hold the same language at Stockholm. If it be thought necessary to shew civilities to France, and to live upon an outward foot of friendship with that crown, we shall not object to it, but as to all real union and confidence it is not possible for Sweden to preserve them at the same time with both. They must, therefore, make their option. If they will prefer the French system to our's they may still have our good wishes, but they must expect no essential services from us We should but deceive them if we held a different language from this, and they may therefore judge of our sincerity by this plain declaration

The King was very well pleased to see the resolution taken by the secret committee to treat immediately with Russia, and approv'd particularly the nomination of Mes^{rs} Gedda and Ditmar [Dittmer] to be the Swedish plenipotentiaries. They may depend upon his Majesty's exerting his influence with the Czarina to procure them the most reasonable terms, provided they will put their interests into his hands only, and you may let our friends know that we have good reason to believe that the demands of Russia will not be so extravagant, as to prevent our obtaining a favourable accommodation for Sweden.

It was certainly a right thought of our friends to include Muscovy in their general system of alliance with the maritime powers, after their peace shall be made. You may acquaint them with his Majesty's approving it and let them know, farther, that we have ourselves a defensive treaty now ready to be signed with the Czarina, to which, when concluded, his Majesty may, very probably, think of inviting Sweden, if he finds such measures taken there as shall be a security to us for their resolution of returning to a hearty and sincere friendship with England.

I come now to give you his Majesty's farther instructions concerning that great point of the succession, upon which the King was very glad to see that our friends agreed in his way of thinking, by which his Majesty understands that you mean Prince William

the father, that being his Majesty's scheme and view. As to their way of conducting that affair the King entirely approves it, and since they had so great hopes of prevailing upon a great number of the Holstein party to join in favour of the House of Hesse, provided they were disappointed of the duke of Holstein, you will acquaint our friends that the time is now come for putting that plan in execution, for you may positively assure them that the King knows, with certainty, that the Czarina will not part with the duke of Holstein, tho' he should be appointed successor in Sweden, nor come into that design at all; her intention being to declare him, in a very short time, her own successor; for which purpose she has actually put one of the most eminent Russian divines about him to instruct him in the principles of the Greek religion. That circumstance I imagine, will very little recommend him to the Swedes, if it were in their power to have him, when so instructed and converted, but since even that is not in their power they must surely think it the most disgraceful circumstance that could happen to their country, to have their crown offer'd and refused, tho' they ought at the same time to consider it as a particular happiness to be prevented, by having early notice of the certainty of such a refusal, from engaging themselves in a step which is, in many respects, the most contrary to their true interests, and which must necessarily intail upon them a perpetual source of disagreement and, most probably, even of wars with Denmark.

Upon this head I can't help observing to you that his Majesty saw with surprize and dissatisfaction the unaccountable coldness of the king of Sweden himself, in an affair so essential to the interest and glory of his own family. You will therefore take an opportunity of talking strongly to his Swedish Majesty upon this head, of shewing him all the probability of his success, and of representing to him, openly and fully, all the superior tyes of conscience and honour, those which result from his affection to his native country and his own family, with all the most encouraging motives of interest and personal reputation, which oblige him to promote and support this important design, the opportunity of which he may lose by a weak and timorous conduct and repent, when too late, of his scrupulous adherence to the views of a set of counsellors, who have already reduced him to be a mere instrument of carrying on their dark and dangerous intrigues with France and are, at this time, ready to enter into measures with that crown for depriving

him of the poor remains of his former splendor, and even driving him from that share they have hitherto left him in their administration, in order to establish a total dependency upon France in Sweden by giving that court the merit of providing a successor to their crown.

Upon this view of the question, and the information above contain'd, his Majesty hopes that the king of Sweden will join with our friends, and act with vigour and steadiness in the pursuit of the great object abovemention'd. If that succeeds, if a ministry be established whom we can depend on, and if Sweden will stand by the King in the conjunctures that may arise, his Majesty will be ready to make a defensive alliance with that crown and will take them by the hand and make a common cause with them, by which the honour of that nation will be retrieved, when they shall again find themselves upon the old foot of friendship and confidence with the maritime powers, who being clear of all views of ambition, and meaning nothing but the defence of their own religion and libertys and the support of the general balance of power of Europe, without any thought of attacking France or any other power at any time, till they are obliged to do it for their own preservation, there can be no apprehension entertained, by any true patriots in Sweden, that a perfect union with us, upon such principles, can lead them into any exceptionable or dangerous measures.

Such a defensive alliance, as I have just mentioned, may naturally produce the payment of subsidies, upon necessary occasions, from England to Sweden. But you will be easily able to shew that the giving them now (in the manner you mention as proposed to be ask'd) is a thing impracticable and inconsistent even with the interest of Sweden itself. For if any good is expected from the mediation so lately ask'd of his Majesty it is evident that, by our taking such a step, it would be entirely destroyed, since the only foundation upon which we can be supposed to do Sweden any service with the Czarina is that of her persuasion of our entire impartiality; and we should, by giving such subsidies, fall into exactly the same situation as France is now at the court of Moscow, where all Mo^r Chetardie's art and eloquence could never prevail upon the Czarina to admit that crown for a mediator, whose mony was known to have kindled and supported the war against her. This reasoning is so unanswerable that it cannot but give full satis-

faction, and must convince all impartial people that as his Majesty cannot, whilst the mediation is depending and before the peace shall be concluded, come into a demand of subsidies, so his declining it is a proof of his true regard to the welfare and interest of Sweden.

As to the distribution of the money you are entrusted with you cannot certainly better employ it than by securing, in what shape soever, a majority in the Plenum. The King has no objection to your giving the sum you mention to Mo^r Arkenholtz, and you may even double it afterwards, if you find it advisable. But his Majesty leaves the detail of those matters to your own prudence, with the advice of our friends, and as you are fully apprized of our general view you need not write for fresh orders upon every particular.

12th November 1742.

. We hear from Moscow that there is a scheme in agitation there for sending Mo^r Buchwaldt first to England and then to Stockholm, to propose the duke administrator of Holstein to be married to an English princess and elected king of Sweden.

In Denmark they are still fond of their project of uniting the two crowns by getting the Swedish election to fall either upon his Danish Majesty himself, or the Prince Royal [Frederick] and they have instructed Mo^r Grüner accordingly.

We shall expect with impatience, and the King relies upon the performance of the Marshall's promise for securing the crown to Prince William, in case of the duke of Holstein's refusal, which by all our accounts from Moscow may be depended on.

Whitehall, 26th Nov^r 1742.

I have now laid before the King your letter of the 5th instant and found his Majesty perfectly pleased with the representation you had made to the king of Sweden, with the new spirit and resolution you had thereby inspired into that prince, and with what passed afterwards between you and Mo^r Åkerhielm.

I received your said letter on Tuesday morning last, and the same evening arrived here a Russian courier dispatched from that court to Mo^r Nariskin. He brought likewise a letter from Sir Cyril Wich to me, of which the inclosed is a copy.

The next day Mo^r Nariskin came to me to inform me of the particulars of the orders he had received.

They were to direct him to let his Majesty know, thrô me, that the Czarina had determined to declare the duke of Holstein her successor in Russia, and consequently to decline any offer that might be made of the crown of Sweden to that prince, which resolution she would however not directly make known but keep things for a while in suspence, in order to gain time for promoting her other views. Those views were to get the Swedish succession settled in favour of the duke administrator of Holstein, bishop of Lubeck and Eutin. That the first step she proposed taking in order thereto was to send Mr^r Buchwald hither, to concert the affair with his Majesty. That he was to follow the courier immediately, so that we might expect to see him in a very short time. That his instructions would be to demand a princess of England for the duke administrator, to desire the King's concurrence in the Czarina's scheme of procuring him the crown of Sweden after the death of the present king, to declare that, in case of his Majesty's compliance, she would immediately accept his mediation and give a total exclusion to France, as well in that as in all other points, and that if the election were determined in favour of the Administrator the terms of peace should be made much easier to Sweden than upon their giving their crown to any other prince. That the Czarina likewise desired that the King would join with her in procuring the removal of the present Swedish ministry and the reestablishment of the old one, as friends to England and Russia. That whatever expence should be occasioned by bringing these great points to bear, she would take one half of it upon herself, and that there was a sum of 40,000 roubles now actually lodged at Amsterdam, which I might dispose of and have it remitted to you immediately for those purposes, if the King thought proper; desiring that orders might be sent you forthwith for your proceeding upon this plan and coöoperating with Mr^r Buchwald, when he should arrive at Stockholm, and requiring an absolute secrecy upon the whole.¹

I lost no time in acquainting his Majesty with all the particulars above, and was ordered by him to return the following answer.

That he was extremely sensible of so great a mark of the Czarina's confidence, and should be always ready to give her equal proofs of his towards her. That the propositions now made to his Majesty

¹ It does not appear that Buchwald came to England. He was at Stockholm in February 1743.

were of the greatest weight and consequence, so far especially as related to the election of the Administrator, and required the maturest deliberation ; and that the King would therefore reserve to the arrival of Mr^r Buchwald, who might be charged with farther explanations, to open himself more fully upon that subject. That what appeared for the present to his Majesty was that the direct interfering of foreign powers in the domestick concerns of any other government, and principally in so essential a one, as that of appointing a successor, might prove of very dangerous consequence to the interests of those who should follow such measures. That the King had hitherto acted upon that principle, and kept himself clear of all reproach upon that head. That in the present case his Majesty could not but apprehend that the steps proposed to be taken in favour of the Administrator might be very prejudicial to the views of the Czarina herself, for that if it were suspected in Sweden that we had a design of putting a successor upon them it would hardly fail to unite them in favour of the French system and secure the crown to the duke of Deux Ponts, who would have all the obligation of his election to France and must consequently be the least desirable successor for the Czarina ; not to mention that the undertaking itself appeared at first sight to be subject to very great difficultys, as the Administrator would be a new candidate, introduced after so long a canvas for other competitors and without that advantage of blood on his side which, by the veneration retained in Sweden for the memory of Charles the 12th, had thrown so great a majority, with so much affection, into the interests of the duke of Holstein. That it would at least be necessary, since otherwise we should work only for France, before a thing of such importance was settled between us to have our party in Sweden better formed, and persons in power there, who might be more confided in ; and that therefore his Majesty came very readily into the design proposed by the Czarina of procuring the expulsion of the present ministry, thô he did not think it necessary as yet to take any step in relation to the money offered on her part to be remitted to you. That you had already full instructions for pursuing that necessary measure, wherein the King would heartily concurr with her Czarish Majesty, as an indispensable preliminary to whatever should be undertaken for the mutual interest of England and Russia and for the real advantage of Sweden. That as to the secret I thought it necessary to acquaint him, for his

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own justification as well as for mine, that though we had indeed never before now had any communication of this plan relating to the Administrator from the court of Russia, yet that it was no news either here or at Berlin or Copenhagen, and that we had had a very particular account of it, as a thing intended by the Czarina, and of Mr^r Buchwald's being to be sent both hither and to Stockholm for promoting it, a considerable time since from France.

The King has thought the incident of this direct application to him from the Czarina in favour of the Administrator of so great consequence that he has ordered me to send a messenger to you immediately with the account which goes before of Mr^r Nariskin's proposals, and the answer returned to them ; and I am to acquaint you that his Majesty would have you communicate the whole in the utmost confidence to the king of Sweden and to such of our friends, whom you can absolutely depend on.

They will observe that the answer to the Czarina's overtures is calculated entirely for gaining time to know their sentiments, as to what they shall be able to do there themselves in relation to the succession, and as to what, in failure of their first designs, they would wish to have done. And it cannot but appear most evident to them that if his Majesty, instead of proceeding in the way he has done, had given the Czarina a direct refusal, it must have driven her immediately into the arms of France, in order to the pushing this favourite view with the assistance of that crown, who would hardly scruple, after what they have done for the duke himself, purchasing her Czarish Majesty's friendship by procuring the crown of Sweden for a prince of the same family, and our friends there can have no doubt but that a successor so introduced must be their absolute ruin.

We on our part suppose them to wish for the House of Hesse, at least they have acted with you from the beginning upon that principle, and neither the king of Sweden himself nor the warmest well wishers to his family can have the least doubt of his Majesty's zeal for securing that succession to it. But upon this occasion, where they may possibly fall into apprehensions of our being influenced in some degree by the new overtures and proposals from Moscow, it will be very proper for you to set before them in a strong and true light the steps his Majesty has taken towards securing the Hessian succession, as looking upon it to be the real interest of Sweden. This you can do very plainly from the orders

you have constantly received, and from the informations that have been as constantly given you of every thing that tended to obstruct it, and you may give them a new and full proof of his Majesty's steady attachment to this view from what has passed lately with Denmark, where the King had not only before very earnestly recommended the Hessian succession, but Mr Söhlenthal having now lately acquainted his Majesty with the great consternation his court was under upon the news of the duke of Holstein's election, who, having a pretension to part of the king of Denmark's dominions, would probably soon make use of his new power and alliances to fall upon that prince, so that his Danish Majesty was ordering his land and sea forces to be held in such a readiness as to secure him from those dangers, a body of 10 or 12^m men being ordered in Zealand, and as many in Norway, with a squadron of 10 or 12 men of war, desiring to know the King's sentiments and offering to concurr in his views. His Majesty's answer was an entire approbation of those necessary precautions, a new recommendation of the Hessian succession, and a promise to stand by and support the court of Denmark, whilst they should adhere to the system, which they then seemed disposed to return to.

The king of Sweden and our friends will see by this account how firmly and how uniformly his Majesty has acted in this affair, and you may assure them that the King continues in the same sentiments and will adhere to them invariably to the last.

But that it is absolutely necessary for him to know in time, in order to enable him to do them the service he desires, what their real plan is in all events, what hopes they have of succeeding for Prince William of Hesse, now that they are thus authentically informed of the Czarina's resolution not to part with the duke of Holstein, and lastly, in case they find it impossible to carry the point for the House of Hesse, what conduct they propose to hold and what measures they would recommend to his Majesty; whether they would, in case of the impossibility above-mentioned, rather chuse to have a successor imposed on them by France, and the present French administration thereby irretrievably confirmed and established in Sweden, or might not rather be willing to forward the Czarina's present proposal, by which the king of Sweden might hope to be secured for the future, by the joint influence of his Majesty and the Czarina, from the disagreeable and unworthy

treatment he has been of late years exposed to from the reigning faction ; and they, our friends, would have all that merit and advantage to themselves, which must otherwise be acquired by the French party, whether they should carry the point for the duke of Deux Ponts by their own strength or should, upon his Majesty's refusal, be resorted to by the Czarina for securing the succession to the Administrator.

I have communicated all that is above to Mo^r Alt, that he may give a full account of it to the Stadholder [Prince William of Hesse], in order to convince him, as well as the king his brother, of his Majesty's fair and honourable proceeding.

His Majesty will expect your answer to this, that we may know the sentiments and determination of our friends at Stockholm as soon as possible, and there will in all probability be time sufficient for our receiving it, as the Czarina will hardly be induced to make known her resolution in relation to the offer made to the duke of Holstein till such time as she shall have his Majesty's final answer upon her present proposals.

I have just received your dispatch of the 9th instant O S.

P.S. The great object will be to know their plan, in case of the duke of Holstein's refusal. We are for the family of Hesse, either father or son, but if not we would rather wish to concurred with the Czarina. We must not appear to meddle too much in the affair of succession. You have the most important points imaginable under your care. If Russia, disgusted with us, applys to France, you know the consequences of it ; and if Denmark should find we are for the House of Gottorp, you must likewise know those consequences. It is a great matter for the King to be apply'd to by such powers under such various circumstances. We may certainly get advantages every way, but can't please all partys ; therefore look to the greatest, which is Russia, provided we give the House of Hesse no reason to complain. We are against the duke of Deux Ponts, as the French candidate, but for no other reasons, as you will have found by your former instructions. I expect by the return of the courier full éclaircissements as to these points and as to the money that may be wanted. I shall tell Mo^r Nariskin that I have sent you orders to do every thing to turn out the French faction, and bring in our friends, but as for all the rest I wait for Buchwald's arrival, and Mo^r Nariskin is to send back his courier to the same effect. If France can support the faction in Sweden our

friends are undone. France can do it no way so effectually as getting Russia, therefore we shall keep that court in suspense till we hear from you. You will do all you can for the support of Count Bielke. Possibly the secrets out of the Hessian chancery may come from Madam Taube, who is sold to France. Finch is so well established at home, that he will be no more employed abroad. Gyllenberg and Tessin are slaves to Lanmary, yet he distrusts the former, and so does his court. Palmstierna in Denmark is an enemy to England and has done mischief, and is entirely in the French system; he is a man of parts, and a dangerous enemy to our friends.

Whitehall, 11th Jan^{ry} 1742[3].

I have received your letters of the 17th and 21st and am now impatiently expecting your courier, in order to be fully informed of the measures you have taken and the probability there is of succeeding for the Bishop [the Administrator]; for the French party still give out that he has no chance, and they are at this time expecting at Paris to have all the news, immediately after the reassembly of the diet, of a sudden and tumultuary election of the duke of Deux Ponts. If the French party are deceived in that expectation, and see any hopes of carrying the point for the prince royal of Denmark, they will act in concert with Mo^r Berkentin for setting him upon the throne. In the mean while they give good words to the Holstein minister and court of Russia, but are at work underhand in opposition to the Administrator.

Whitehall, 18th Jan^{ry} 1742/3.

. The Hessians continue as strongly bent as ever upon pushing the affair of the succession in favour of Prince William, or his son; they have great suspicions of your acting for the Administrator, and will watch every step that you take most narrowly.

The French affirm that the king of Sweden is himself for Deux Ponts, but dares not declare it. That prince, they say, has two thirds of the nation for him, yet they apprehend he will lose it, if the Czarina should propose Lubeck [the Administrator] to the Swedes, and do it in a moderate handsome way without pretending to dictate or impose a successor on them, and if her proposal comes attended with an offer to restore Finland.

Their plan at present is to flatter both Pechlin and Berkentin with hopes of their assistance, and so to play one upon the other and keep both partys thereby in dependance upon them, and not declare for either candidate 'till they see he is sure. In the mean while they underhand favour Deux Ponts, thô with a resolution not to throw their whole weight into his scale, unless Denmark will concurr with them in it, so that his election may be attended with a triple alliance between France Denmark and Sweden, and that they may at the same time procure a Danish princess for him.

In case they see it must go for the Bishop they will exert themselves to the utmost to get the limitation in point of religion extended to the princess he shall marry, being very apprehensive of his marrying a princess of Great Britain.

If you find yourself obliged to act for the Administrator I must recommend to you to do it in the most covert manner, that no just offence may be given to Denmark.

Whitehall, 25th Jan^{ry} 1742/3.

I send you this letter and another upon the same subject by a courier, upon account of the extreme importance of their contents.

The King orders me to recommend most particularly to you to act in the affair of the succession with the utmost care and caution, and to be attentive above all things not to give any cause of jealousy to Mr^r Berkentin. And if the business should at last turn out in a manner that must be disagreeable to Denmark you are sufficiently authorized from the intelligence I have sent you, in relation to Monsieur Lanmary's intrigues, to remove all blame therein from yourself and to throw the whole upon France, whose endeavors to oppose the Danish candidate and to favour a Russian one the court of Denmark can have no doubt of, after having seen the French exert themselves to the utmost for the duke of Holstein and ascribe the whole merit of his election to themselves, as they have done openly at the court of Muscovy.

Whitehall, 25 February 1742/3.

You will have received from Mr^r Titley a letter wrote to him by Mr^r Schulin desiring that you would openly contradict a report spread in Sweden, as if we had here declared ourselves so averse to the Danish views in regard to the succession in Sweden, that rather than they should succeed we would abandon all the other

affairs of Europe and join a squadron of 25 men of war to the Russian forces, in order to oppose them.

You know very well that you have never had any instructions of that nature from hence, but on the contrary are restrained from giving any opposition to the said Danish scheme, and indeed from meddling at all in the internal affairs of the court, where you reside; and I can assure you that the report of any such language as that mentioned above, having been held here is entirely false and groundless.

You will therefore take all opportunitys of vindicating our conduct in that particular and declaring, as desired by the Danish court, that the said insinuation, as if his Majesty's ministers here had express'd themselves in so unfriendly a manner towards Denmark, is a malicious invention and absolutely void of all foundation of truth.

I have sent a copy of this letter to M^r Titley to be communicated to the Danish ministers.

Whitehall, 11th March 1742/3.

Your letters by Over of the 15th and subsequent ones by post of the 18th and 22^d past have already been acknowledged.

The King took immediately into consideration the contents of the declaration made on the part of his Swedish Majesty, wherein it is desired that his Majesty's resolution as to assisting Sweden may be forthwith made known; and his Majesty having commanded me to explain his sentiments thereupon to Mons^r Wasenbergs, who had copies sent him both of the said declaration and of what had passed in your conference with the Swedish commissioners thereupon, I have had two meetings with that minister, where we enter'd into and discussed the whole affair in a very free and friendly manner, and I gave him a full account, to be reported to his court, of his Majesty's dispositions and intentions.

The inclosed paper is the protocol of our conferences upon that occasion, which is the best instruction I can send you as to the language you should yourself hold to Sweden in this conjuncture, and you will therefore conform yourself to the sense of it in all respects. Mo^r Wasenbergs sends a copy of the same to his court.

The King approves of your conduct entirely in relation to Mo^r Buchwold, and particularly of what you mention to have written to Sir C. Wich concerning his want of proper instructions both

for acting in concert with you and with regard to the terms of peace. I have written myself likewise, in the strongest manner, upon the same subject and to the same effect.

Whitehall, 15th April 1743.

I have received your dispatch of the 1st inst. and laid it before the King, from whom I have no new commands at present upon its contents, his Majesty waiting for your farther relations to see what turn the great affair now depending before the States of Sweden is like to take.

In the mean while, however, I have the King's express orders to acquaint you that whoever may be the successor chosen his Majesty would have you be preparing matters (tho' without taking any publick step till farther orders) in such manner that when that prince shall come to the crown of Sweden the King may have it in his power to obtain, if he should then think it necessary to be applied for, a confirmation of the cession made to him by the former treatys of the dutchys of Bremen and Verden.

Hanover, 11/22th July 1743.

I have received your several letters to the 28th June O.S., and have his Majesty's commands to acquaint you that he is well pleased that the peace is concluded between Sweden and Russia; and his Majesty has never ceased to exhort the court of Russia, during this whole transaction, to come to such resolutions as should not make Sweden desperate, but to moderate their demands, notwithstanding the unfortunate situation that Sweden was in, before the peace was concluded.

Your conduct has been entirely approved by his Majesty, and in the violent situation that affairs had been in for these two months at Stockholm it was impossible to send you any particular directions. But as you knew his Majesty's sense and ultimate view in that affair I trusted to your prudence, and I congratulate you for it's having answered it's end

Mor' Narischkin, who is at Franckfort, and often comes hither, knew nothing of the peace 'till I acquainted him of it, but he says he expects a courier every day with orders to thank his Majesty, and to carry into execution those matters which were proposed by the Czarina, supposing the duke administrator should be chosen. I can say nothing to you upon that particular at present, but

his Majesty would have you entertain in good humour that certain person, who spoke to you and desired you to write to me, as a true Swede, that he hopes to see an English princess, and that declared soon, in order to stop some restless peoples mouths. As soon as I know what will be the event of that matter, which will be no ways disagreeable to his Majesty, if it can be brought about with dignity and a proper subsistance during the time of his remaining eventual successor, I shall not fail to acquaint you, and in the mean time I desire that you will find out, as from yourself, what Sweden proposes to settle upon their successor for his present maintenance, and likewise, as from yourself, to find out whether Sweden would like, or could be brought to desire his Majesty to guarantee the peace that they have made, not doubting but that Russia will make that demand of us.

Worms, 7/18th September 1743.

I received on the 26 Aug^t/6 Sept^r, by Brettle, the favour of yours of the 12th Aug^t O S., with the protocoll of the conference inclosed, which I immediately laid before his Majesty. His Majesty approves entirely the discourses that you held at that conference, and particularly your assuring the Swedish ministers that the King will be as ready to employ his good offices in order to make up the differences with Denmark, as he was with regard to those of Russia.

I shall now proceed to acquaint you with the steps his Majesty has already taken to endeavour to quiet the court of Denmark, since Baron Söhlenthal's arrival here with the character of ambassador extraordinary. His Excellency spoke to me much in the same way as the Danish ministers spoke to Count Tessin, of which he shew'd me the protocoll. I then told him, by his Majesty's command, that the King was very sorry to see that a new flame was like to break out in the north, which might prove of very ill consequence to the court of Denmark; that since the peace had been made between Sweden and Russia both those courts had applied to his Majesty to interpose with the king of Denmark to endeavour to penetrate into his real design as to peace or war, making at the same time the most pressing instances to desire his Majesty to use his good offices towards maintaining the tranquillity of the north, by perswading the court of Denmark into pacifick measures, and that these courts have supported their

request with very strong and solid arguments ; that the court of Russia had insisted that though there was no treaty subsisting between us and Sweden yet there was a defensive alliance lately concluded between Great Britain and Russia, by which, thô the *casus foederis* was not to exist during the late war between Russia and Sweden, no more than during the present war between Great Britain and Spain, that however if any new power should attack Russia or Great Britain, the *casus foederis* should then take place, which the court of Russia had declared to France, in case France should declare war against us ; which fact the French partisans had denied every where, 'till the Czarina declared it to Mo^r D'Alion at St Petersburg, and at Paris by Prince Cantemir. That his Majesty had answered to the court of Russia that he would make use of his best offices for the common interest of all the parties concerned, knowing of what consequence it is to preserve peace in the north. That his Majesty, having considered the protocol of what passed between the ministers of the king of Denmark and Count Tessin at Copenhagen, was very glad to find that the Swedish ambassador had explained himself with relation to the dutchy of Sleswick in the following words : *Pour ce qui regarde le duché de Slesvic, il y a des traités des conventions et des garanties là-dessus, et la Suède ne se départira jamais de ses engagements à cet égard.* That Sweden by the treaty of peace of 1720 at Copenhagen had stipulated that they will not oppose either directly or indirectly any measures that should be taken relating to the dutchy of Slesvic, and since that time Sweden, by another defensive treaty, had given her guaranty of the said dutchy. That his Britannick Majesty had also given his guaranty in the year 1720, as well as his Most Christian Majesty and other great powers, as being absolutely necessary to preserve the tranquillity of the north in those perilous times ; so that the king of Denmark is entirely founded to reclaim all these guaranties, in order to remain in the quiet possession of that acquisition, though a formal cession of it has not been made as yet by the House of Holstein ; and there is nothing more for the interest of those powers, who have given their guaranty, than to have this cession performed, since otherwise they are obliged to defend the king of Denmark, in case he should be attacked on account of the said dutchy of Slesvic. That the difficulty was how to procure the cession ; that it did not appear to us that it was in the power of Sweden to procure it at present ; that his

Majesty thought that moderation and cultivating peace were the only likely methods of producing so good an end ; and that his Majesty was far from being of opinion that Denmark's making war upon Sweden, which would infallibly occasion a general war in the north, could in the present conjuncture produce so good an end, but rather the contrary.

That with relation to the dutchy of Holstein the court of Denmark cannot be ignorant of the great difference, and essential distinction, which is between the two cases of Sleswic and of Holstein ; Sleswic making no part of the Empire but being absolutely independent of it, whereas Holstein is one of the ancient States of the Empire. That it does not appear how any foreign power can have any right to meddle in the alienation of a State of the Empire ; that it cannot be done but by the consent of the actual possessor, who can answer only for himself and who, by the known laws of the Empire in all ages, cannot bind his *Agnati* by any act of alienation. That his Majesty is of opinion that what Count Tessin said is not only possible, but even probable, that there is no disposition in the Swedish nation to desire the uniting of this dutchy to their crown ; that it is evidently out of the power of Sweden, or any other power, except the Czarina, to persuade the Great Duke to make a cession of Holstein , and that there is not the least likelihood that either the Czarina or the Great Duke will be induced to make such a cession in the present circumstances of affairs. That it seemed to me to be of very dangerous consequence for Denmark to begin a war against those two nations without any other support than it's own revenues and forces ; and therefore his Majesty, with the utmost sincerity and friendship, advises the king of Denmark not to begin a war, in the course of which he may meet with more opposition than can at present be foreseen. That the alliance of blood between the two royal families,¹ which is agreed upon, is a further argument that induces the King to make this friendly representation to the king of Denmark.

That as to the other point, relating to the election of a successor to the crown of Sweden, his Majesty thinks it too delicate a point to be touched upon, it being a matter purely domestick and the business of the States only, in which no foreign power can have any right to interfere or to make any interpretation contrary to the declared act of the States.

¹ Of Great Britain and Denmark.

This was the substance of what I said to M^r Sohlenthal, and which I likewise gave him in writing by his Majesty's command.

I hope you will be able by the communication of this letter to convince his Swedish Majesty and the plenipotentiarys with whom you held the conference of the sincerity of the King's intentions towards the king of Sweden and the Swedish nation ; they will see that he has already employed his good offices, which he will continue. But as there is no treaty subsisting between Great Britain and Sweden at present, which circumstance was not occasioned by the court of Great Britain, as is very well known, the crown of Sweden has no right to demand any succours of the crown of Great Britain, any more than the crown of Denmark has to demand any succours of the King, no treaty subsisting between the crown of Great Britain and the crown of Denmark ; and therefore your answer was very just and prudent, when you spoke to the plenipotentiarys in these words, *Le Roy mon maître ne laissera pas d'employer d'abord à votre réquisition des bons offices, par où il faudra bien commencer, vous répétant que les sentiments de ma cour sont assurément très sincères.* And you will see by what I have said to Monsieur Söhlenthal that your assurances have already been made good.

Speir, 23^d Septbr/4th Octbr 1743.

. . . . I am very sorry at what you mention concerning the equivocal conduct of the marshal [Baron Ungern-Sternberg] in the diet, in whom you say the well-intentioned Swedes have no more confidence, as they believe he has been corrupted. Whatever has been the cause of his conduct we know of a certainty that he has not been corrupted by France, for at this very hour he is represented by all the partisans of France as one of the greatest enemys to their system and the most attached to us, for which they are very liberal in assigning causes of corruption against many others, and the marshal in particular, and boldly assert that we have disposed of millions, though they say we have failed in all our points. They accuse us of stirring up Denmark, the contrary of which you know to be true, and they say we are desirous of having a new war break out in the north, tho' nothing can be more contrary to our interest and views than disturbances in the north. They labour by all the lies and villainies imaginable to

destroy our friends in Russia, which we still hope they will not be able to do. We are apt to think that the irresolute and weak proceedings of our friends in general cannot be so easily justified, as the marshal can from the charge of corruption, and I write this to you, that our friends may not be too hasty in withdrawing their confidence from him.

Whitehall, Dec^r 13 1743.

. His Majesty saw with great satisfaction the overtures which had been made to you by General Keith, and approves entirely your intention of entering into all proper and possible measures with him, and our Swedish friends, towards the removal of the partizans of France from the ministry and destroying the influence of that crown there; and his Majesty doubts not your making the best use of the opportunity, which seems to offer in consequence of the present favourable dispositions of the Russian court, for effecting that great point, wherein it is necessary to leave the particular steps to be taken to your own experienced prudence and discretion.

The French party seem hitherto to have no manner of suspicion of Keith, but I believe rather look upon him as their friend, so that he must have acted his part with great dexterity.

I mentioned to you in my last that the King would have you do all in your power to keep the prince successor in a right way of thinking, and to prevent his being misled by French artifices. This grows now every day more necessary, as the French leave no stone unturned, and will, to be sure, spare no expence, to gain him and his confident Mor^r Plesse, or to corrupt any favourite servants, by whom they may hope to convey their impressions to his Highness. And I may tell you in confidence that they even already seem at the court of France to think they have made a good progress in that work, and have great hopes both of the prince and his minister. There is no doubt but that they will use all kinds of false insinuations to blacken our conduct towards him, and will endeavor to persuade him that he owes his election entirely to the French party. But this you are very well able to confute; and if it should be insinuated to him that we have had any share, more or less, in encouraging the king of Denmark's demand of the prince's renunciation of his right to Holstein, as the French have lately given that out, as also that we were plotting to bring

together an extraordinary diet in Sweden, in order to force him to it, these things you may likewise absolutely deny ; for his Majesty has taken no other part in all that dispute but what you are already acquainted with, I mean the successful endeavors which he employed to dissuade the Danish court from beginning hostilities against Sweden, in order to extort such a renunciation on the part of the successor. And the prince may depend upon his Majesty's inclination to do him service, as long as he continues to act a right part and to be advised by our friends in the share that is fallen to him of the administration of affairs in Stockholm.

Whitehall, 20th April 1744.

I have in my late letters acquainted you that the great view which France is at present pushing in the north, in concert with the senators in the French interest in Sweden and with Brummer and Lestock¹ at Moscow, is to bring about an alliance between Russia Prussia Sweden and France. That the object proposed by the latter herein is involving the northern princes in new disturbances, in order to which they would prevail on the Empress to fall upon the king of Denmark and so to oblige him to restore Sleswick to the duke of Holstein, thô guarantied by the most considerable powers of Europe, and by France and Sweden themselves, to his Danish Majesty ; and as a temptation to the Swedish nation to take a part in this faithless enterprize it is proposed that the dutchies of Bremen and Vehrden should be conquered and restored to that crown. You know that those dutchies were yielded in the most solemn manner by Denmark and Sweden to the late King, and the paper which I send you herewith will shew you at what times, and by what treaties, they were guarantied to his Majesty by those crowns as well as by France and Prussia.

His Majesty therefore hopes that the king and crown of Sweden will not give ear to any proposals, which tend to making them parties in so great and crying an injustice as the attacking his Majesty in a possession so justly acquired, and so solemnly assured to him, must necessarily appear to be in the eyes of the whole world.

You will therefore be attentive to what may pass therein and endeavour to prevent any resolution being taken prejudicial to his

¹ Leaders in the attack on Alexis Bestuzhev.

Majesty's interest. But I must recommend to you to act with great caution, as the intelligence is of a secret nature.

Whitehall, 14th September 1744.

I received to day your letters of the 28th and 31st past, which I immediately laid before the King, but have no commands from his Majesty upon them, unless it be that you should continue to oppose to the utmost of your power, by your representations to our friends in the senate, the project of an alliance between Sweden and Prussia, giving constant intelligence to Lord Tyrawly of all that passes in that affair.

Whitehall, 9th October 1744.

I am to acquaint you in the utmost confidence that the King has intelligence from good hands that France is now forming the design of invading his Majesty's electoral dominions with a powerfull army, either during the winter or at farthest upon the approach of the spring, and that in order to bring your court to concur in the scheme she holds forth to those in her interest (tho' without any design of accomplishing it) hopes of acquiring to Sweden the dutchies of Bremen and Vehrden, and at the same time, as a bait to the House of Holstein and for the sake of captivating the inclinations of the Czarina, she insinuates to them that those dutchies shall be given at the peace to Denmark, as an equivalent for the restitution of Sleswick to the Great Duke and his family; which is equally fallacious, since they must very well know that it would be impossible to find an equivalent, which would be thought by Denmark a sufficient indemnification for the loss of Sleswick. As this affair, therefore, which I have had at other times occasion to mention to you as a thing talked of, seems now to be growing towards it's maturity, I must recommend to you very particularly to put our friends upon their guard, though with great prudence and caution, against the dangerous and deceitful views of France and the ill consequences that might attend the crown of Sweden's being drawn into measures so contrary to her known engagements and so unlikely to be attended with any real advantage to her, and which must infallibly light up a new flame of war in the north.

WILLIAM STANHOPE, BARON HARRINGTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO COLONEL GUY DICKENS.

(*Record Office, Sweden 97 to 99.*)

Whitehall, 4th Decr 1744.

The King was pleased to see by your letter of the 13th that our friends had given you so strong assurances of the present favourable dispositions of Sweden towards furnishing his Majesty with a body of troops, if he should have occasion to desire them. I cannot however as yet send you any more positive instructions upon that head, than that you should keep up that inclination by general assurances of his Majesty's friendship towards Sweden, without engaging the King in any thing; the difficulty of giving an answer upon this being the greater, by reason of the method in which our friends have insisted that it should be put, I mean that the proposition should be conveyed to Sweden thrô the Czarina, since we can't as yet form a certain judgment either as to the practicability or expediency of that way of proceeding. But I am expecting every day a courier from Lord Tyrawly, whose dispatches I hope will enable me to write more clearly to you upon this matter; and in the mean while I have written to Lord Tyrawly to sound the inclinations of the Czarina with regard to the thing itself, and the manner propos'd by our friends of conducting it.

I am to acquaint you in the utmost confidence that notwithstanding all General Lubras's professions the King has very sufficient reason to be persuaded that he acts a double part and is in reality in league with the French party to support that interest in Sweden, and at his own court, and to displace and ruin our best friend in the Russian ministry [Alexis Bestuzhev]. You may depend upon the truth of this, and his Majesty would therefore have you impart the same in the greatest secrecy to Mo^r Ackerhielm, that he and our other friends may be upon their guard against so dangerous a person; and you will exhort them to keep a watchful eye upon his proceedings, which you will do likewise for your own part, and not fail to give immediate notice to Lord Tyrawly, or in his absence to the Earl of Hyndford, of whatever discoverys you may make with regard to his conduct.

Whitehall, 21 Dec^r 1744.

The King was pleased to see by your letters of the 20, 23, and 27 past that you had so good hopes of defeating the French intrigues for procuring the accession of Sweden to the league of Franckfort, and the new projected alliance between your court and that of Berlin. You will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to Lord Tyrawly in what manner they are now at work to gain both the Czarina and Sweden to their interest. I must leave it to your prudence to give such hints of this in a proper manner to Mr Akerhielm, as may enable him to countermine the projects of the French party, only recommending to you the utmost discretion and management, that it may never be known from what quarter you receive informations of this nature I beleive I may venture to acquaint you at the same time that General Lubras gives all the assistance in his power to the views of that faction.

Whitehall, 29th January 1744/5.

I have received your letters of the 28th past and of the 8th and 11th instant, and I have laid them before the King, who observed with great satisfaction that the affair of the accession of Sweden to the treaty of Francfort, notwithstanding the endeavours of the partisans of France to carry that point by surprize, has been so seasonably defeated by the boldness and vigour of our friend [Akerhielm], to whom you may express how agreeable his conduct upon this occasion has been to the King, as well as his openness and confidential lights to you upon all others.

His Majesty approves of the conduct you and the rest of our friends intend to observe with regard to General Lubras, towards whom it is necessary both you and they should continue upon your guard.

With respect to the intrigue carrying on by the lady you mention to obtain your recall thro' the interest of the prince successor and the court of Russia, you need be under no alarm, it not being his Majesty's intention, who is well satisfied with your zeal and diligence in his service, that an attempt of that nature should take place to your prejudice.

Whitehall, 19 April 1745.

The King was very well pleased to observe by your late letters the zeal which our friends expressed for seconding the view, which

his Majesty once had, if it could have been brought to bear in a reasonable time, of taking a body of Swedish troops into his service. You may make them proper compliments thereupon, but you must prevent their taking any steps towards engaging that affair farther, since the season is so far advanced that those troops could be of no use to his Majesty for the present campaign.

The consent, however, which the Czarina gave so readily to that proposal must have convinced your court of the good dispositions of that princess towards his Majesty, and I doubt not but Lord Hyndford's late letters, in answer to what you have written to him, will have enabled you to confirm the truth still more fully.

Hanover, 18/29 June 1745.

. I am now to acquaint you by the King's order in the utmost confidence that a treaty was signed here the 6/17 inst. between me and Mo^r Assebourg from Cassel, by which the 6,000 Hessians formerly yielded to England are again taken into his Majesty's service and pay. As it is necessary and agreed that this treaty should be ratified by the king of Sweden, it is not to be doubted but the French ambassador will exert himself to the utmost to prevent his Swedish Majesty's taking that step; and it is therefore the King's pleasure that you should, by the means of our friends and by personal application to that prince, if you find it necessary, endeavor to prevail on him to dispatch the ratification immediately, and as his Swedish Majesty is known to be particularly jealous of his honour and reputation you may use it as the strongest argument to determine him, if he should hesitate about it, that the King having upon the faith of the signature only, and of Mo^r d'Assebourg's assurances that the ratification might be absolutely depended on, sent immediate orders the very next day to Sir Thomas Robinson for procuring the release of all the Hessian officers and soldiers, as well those who were made prisoners of war upon several occasions in Bavaria, as those since stop'd and detained at Ingoldstadt, which we have all the reason in the world to believe that the queen [of Hungary, Maria Theresa] will have immediately comply'd with upon his Majesty's request. It could not but carry a great reflection upon the king of Sweden, if by withholding the ratification in such circumstances he should suffer his Majesty's dependance upon the good faith of his Hessian government to be so far overreached

and abused, whilst he should himself enjoy the benefit of such a deception by the immediate free release of his troops.

Whitehall, 9th May 1746.

I had no letters from you last mail, but now have the King's orders to acquaint you that as the empress of Russia, according to Lord Hyndford's last letters, is determin'd to give all the assistance in her power to our friends in Sweden, in order to the disappointment of the mischievous views of France and her partisans in that kingdom, and is desirous that you should act in concert with her minister Baron Korff for that purpose; it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should accordingly confer with the said Russian minister upon the business above-mentioned and join with him in every thing that may tend to defeating the French plans and lessening the influence of that crown in Sweden, though I must at the same time caution you to proceed with such discretion in every thing that relates to the king of Prussia, that he may have no cause for complaint or umbrage from your conduct.

Whitehall, 20th June 1746.

The Czarina having assured the King by my Lord Hyndford of her intention to give all the assistance in her power at the ensuing diet to our friends at your court, and to employ all her credit in conjunction with his Majesty to obtain the removal of the partisans of France and the restoration of the well intentioned ministers, and having at the same time offered to employ such sums of money as might be necessary for effectuating our common views in Sweden, upon his Majesty's undertaking to do the like on his part; the King has ordered his Lordship to acquaint Mr Bestuchef that he will contribute the same sum as he did the last diet, which amounted to six thousand pounds sterling. And I am therefore to acquaint you that you are at liberty to draw for that sum, in such proportions as shall be wanted, upon Mr Davis of the Treasury, giving previous notice of every draught you make to Mr Pelham, and that you are to act in concert with our friends in the distribution of that money and, so far as they shall advise it, with the Russian minister likewise, insisting upon equal advances at least being made on his part. For the rest his Majesty leaves the conduct of those affairs to your discretion and experience and gives you leave to apply a proper proportion of the

money thus intrusted to you to the expenses of your own table during the diet, hoping that as the above credit is given you so early you will be able to make a good use of it with regard to the election of a marshal and other articles of importance, that may be preparatory to a happy success of affairs during that assembly.

PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE, EARL OF CHESTERFIELD,
SECRETARY OF STATE, TO COLONEL GUY DICKENS.

(*Record Office, Sweden 99 to 101.*)

Whitehall, 7 November 1746.

I send you herewith an extract of the letter which his Majesty commanded me to write to my Lord Hyndford by the last post. You will see that it contains the King's instructions to his Excellency to use the strongest instances with the empress of Russia in his Majesty's name in order to prevail with her to send immediate orders to her ambassador at Stockholm to propose to the court of Sweden to accede to the alliance lately concluded between the courts of Vienna and Petersburg; and as his Majesty cannot doubt, for the reasons therein contained, of the ready concurrence of her Imperial Majesty in a measure so necessary to retard the conclusion of any treaty between France Prussia and your court, and if possible to defeat it, it is the King's pleasure that you should be endeavouring to prepare matters so, as far as you may be able thro' the means of our principal friends, that the said invitation may meet with a favourable acceptance, whenever it shall come to be formally proposed by M^o Korff at Stockholm.

As the French party have been able to carry a majority in their interest in the secret committee, notwithstanding the sums of money you have already been directed to employ to counterwork their prevalency at this critical conjuncture, the King would not have you give the least encouragement of any further advance on his Majesty's part, since there is no probable appearance, from what is past, of it's proving of the least utility.

Whitehall, 9 December 1746

I had only time by the last post to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 14th and 18th past.

I am now to acquaint you that the King received with great satisfaction the account, contained in the paper which had been

communicated to you by the Russian ambassador at your court, of the strong representations with which that minister had accompanied the delivery of the Czarina's letter to the prince successor, against Count Tessin and the rest of the French party in Sweden ; and his Majesty was particularly pleased with the seasonable and proper method taking at the same time by the court of Russia to give weight thereto, in sending so considerable a force, as what they intended to do, to Frederickshall.¹ The King cannot but entertain the best hopes that this way of proceeding, if steadily adhered to and pursued on the part of the Empress, must have the best effect upon the future operations of the Swedish dyet, and that the same will effectually defeat the conclusion of the alliance now actually forming between France Prussia and Sweden. You will therefore do well to recommend this strongly to Monsieur Korff, making him at the same time a compliment in his Majesty's name for his open and friendly communication to you of the views of his court, and you will likewise let him know that I signified to my Lord Hyndford by the last post the King's commands directing him to press both to the Empress and her ministers, in the most serious manner, the necessity of a steady and firm perseverance in these vigorous measures.

As you mention in your letter of the 18th that you were to have a conference the next day with the Russian ambassador and our principal friends, in order to deliberate upon the proper steps to be taken in consequence of the representations abovementioned, the King will be expecting to hear by your next what the result of that meeting has been ; and as his Majesty is desirous to contribute all his weight to effectuate the immediate removal of these avowed enemies to the good system it is the King's pleasure that you should exert yourself to the utmost in cooperating in every thing with Mon^r Korff, in order to bring about this desirable end.

The money, which you have already been directed to employ preparatory to the diet, having been hitherto of so little utility, and the French court, as you are already acquainted, being come to a determination to grant a subsidy to Sweden, in consideration of their engaging forthwith in the alliance abovementioned, it is not reasonably to be expected that the King should embark in any further expence, under the present uncertainty whether any success may be hoped to follow from it, but if you shall think that

¹ Fredrikshamn, on the Finland frontier.

FURTHER SUPPLY OF MONEY

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the overturning Count Tessin and his party, so as that they may not recover again their credit and influence, can at this critical juncture be accomplished and absolutely carried by means of a farther advance on the part of his Majesty, and that you will at the same time answer for the event of it, I am authorized to tell you that the King will make what efforts of that kind he can afford (considering the very great expence his Majesty is already at) in conjunction with Russia to secure the success of this capital point, but his Majesty will not be at the charge of more than the farther sum of £4,000 for that purpose

I am further to let you know, in the utmost confidence, that Mons^r Lanmary has found means to corrupt a person employed by Mons^r Korff in Russian translations, and that he hopes thro' that canal to be regularly informed of the steps and negotiations of that minister. As this, therefore, is a discovery of the greatest importance you will lose no time in communicating the same to the Russian ambassador in the same confidence, recommending to him to be upon his guard to this person for the future and telling him besides that tho' you cannot yet inform him as to the particular matters, which the French minister may by this means have got to the knowledge of, he may however depend upon it that the fact is undoubted, and you will take particular care at the same time never to mention from whence you received this most material intelligence.

Whitehall, 23^d Decr 1746.

. . . . You will have seen by that letter [of 9 December] with what particular satisfaction the King received the account of the representations made by Mons^r Korff to the prince successor of Sweden, and that tho' his Majesty had little encouragement, from what had happened, to make any farther pecuniary efforts in the present situation of the dyet, he had still determin'd, if you could ascertain and answer for the removal of Count Tessin and the rest of the French faction in Sweden, to go a farther length in the expence his Majesty had already made, namely, in advancing the additional sum of £4,000 for the purposes abovementioned and for them only.

The King is waiting to see what effect those representations will have had, when they shall come properly enforced by the vigorous measures then taking by the empress of Russia in sending to Fredericks-haven a body of troops to give weight to them,

and I am to acquaint you that this is in reality the only method left to effectuate what the Czarina desires, and therefore you will recommend to Mons^r Korff, as I have already done and am repeating by this post to Lord Hyndford, to press his court not to slacken in the pursuit of those vigorous and necessary measures from any consideration of irritating the Swedes, since from the step already taken those, who have a disposition to be offended with it, must have taken their party, and the Russian ambassador cannot but be sensible that nothing could be a greater matter of triumph to Count Tessin and his faction, nor tend more to increase the despondency of the well-intentioned party in Sweden, than to see his court not prosecute a measure so properly calculated to bring matters back to the antient and good system, with that spirit and resolution which is so absolutely necessary, and upon which the event of the diet so entirely depends. You cannot therefore inculcate too often to the Russian ambassador this important principle of a steady perseverance on the part of Russia in supporting with vigour what they have begun with so great an appearance, and indeed with the only one, of success.

Whitehall, 2^d January 1746/7.

I have now laid before the King your letters, which I received by the two last mails, of the 5th 9th and 12th past O.S.

The late disappointment which the Russian ambassador has experienced from the order of the burghers, notwithstanding the great advance which he made upon that occasion, gives the King but very little hopes of that minister succeeding any better upon his present plan with that of the nobles, or indeed of any good effect likely to follow in the course of the diet, from past experience, by meer pecuniary efforts, let them be never so great, unless they are supported by the most vigorous measures at the same time on the part of Russia.

You will therefore continue to recommend the necessity thereof to Mons^r Korff as indeed of the only method left now to effectuate what the Empress has in view, and you will further observe to that minister that the King agrees entirely in opinion with our friends in Sweden that if her Imperial Majesty is not determined to support with the same activity and vigour her own measure, with which she undertook it, it had been infinitely better that the step lately taken had not been taken at all, since it must be the

greatest matter of triumph, not to say of ridicule to the French party to see it miscarry merely for want of being properly and duly supported.

As to what you mention in your letter of the 9th past with regard to the invitation to be made as well on the part of the Empress Queen as on that of the Czarina, which the well-intentioned Swedes think may be of use in order to engage Sweden to accede to the treaty lately concluded between those two powers, I can now acquaint you that I have sent his Majesty's orders to Sir Thomas Robinson to suggest this, as an adviseable step, to the Austrian ministers

Whitehall, 20th Jan^r 1746/7.

I laid before the King your letters to me of the 16th 19th and 23^d past O.S., the receipt of which was notified to you two posts ago.

You acquaint me by your's of the 19th past that the Austrian minister [Antivari] had received orders from his court to join with the Russian ambassador in pressing Sweden to accede to the treaty between the two Empresses, on which occasion you want no other instructions than what you have already received, by his Majesty's command, in my letter of the 25th of Nov^r for your conduct in that matter.

I acquainted you by my letter of the 2^d inst. with his Majesty's opinion that the views of Russia in Sweden could not be effectuated unless vigorous measures should be taken by the Empress. His Majesty is further of opinion that those measures should be taken forthwith by marching a body of troops into Finland, where the Swedish forces are so few, and in so very bad a condition, that little or no opposition could be made.

The one vigorous step taken by M^r Korff, by order of his court, stunned at first the French party, but not having been properly supported hath only animated that party the more, as appears by the election of the new senators; and unless Russia should without delay exert itself effectually in this manner the Swedes, prompted by their allies and encouraged by the remissness of Russia, will certainly, when they have concluded their treaty with France and Prussia, begin first and have the advantage of striking the first blow; their enemies too would in that case the more easily succeed in their attempts to draw the arms of the Turks upon Russia, whereas should the Empress begin forthwith

in Finland Sweden would be obliged to be quiet, not being in any condition now to oppose on that side, the schemes of France would be defeated, and Russia be secure against future disturbance not only from the Swedes but likewise on the side of Turkey.

These are the King's sentiments, which his Majesty would have you recommend to Mr Korff to inculcate into the court of Russia, that they may be induced to take these only effectual measures for carrying on their views in Sweden and securing themselves, and the tranquillity of the north, against the dangerous schemes and designs of their enemies.

I laid before the King your letters of the 26th and 30th past, to which the directions of this letter are a sufficient answer.

P.S. I must earnestly recommend you to not draw his Majesty into any difficulties. Russia is principally, the King more remotely concerned in the conduct of Sweden, wherefore it is reasonable that the Russian minister should be the principal and the publick actor, and that you should rather advise and encourage him, than appear; which if however you should be obliged in any degree to do you will do it with the utmost decency and discretion, and in any representations which you may make you will principally dwell upon the number of the Swedish officers engaged in the cause of the Pretender. Upon the whole you will rather act than appear.

Whitehall, 27th Jan^{ry} 1746/7.

I received and laid before the King your letters of the 2^d 6th and 9th instant, which have been in effect answered by my former letters, but as Mr Korff still seems to expect that his Majesty should bear an equal part of the expence on occasion of the diet in Sweden I am directed by his Majesty to repeat it to you that as his Majesty never entered into any engagements of that sort, and you never gave any room to expect any such thing, his Majesty will not advance any further sum and is of opinion that the only measure left for Russia to take is to march a body of troops into Finland and act with vigour on that side, and that all other attempts to bring the Swedes into their views will be fruitless and ineffectual.

Whitehall, 3^d March 1746/7.

Your dispatches of the 6th and 10th past, which I received by the mail of the 27th, having been already acknowledged from my office I am now to let you know that having laid them before the

King, together with the extract of the plan, which the Russian ambassador at your court had communicated to you, and which he had likewise transmitted to Petersburg, his Majesty considered the premises laid down in that plan as extremely right, containing as they do a very true and exact description of the present defenceless state of Sweden, as well with regard to the small number of troops in that kingdom to make any resistance as with respect to the low condition of their revenue and the distress which any vigorous measures there must necessarily operate.

From these premises the King naturally concluded that the view of this plan was of course to recommend to the court of Russia the taking immediate and effectual steps to bring back Sweden to a right way of thinking ; and his Majesty was extremely disappointed, when he found that the conclusion from these principles went no farther than the project of only getting together a body of Russian troops, with a train of artillery, upon the frontiers of Sweden, with a view to intimidate, and not with any design to act effectually.

Mr Korff has already experienced the fruitless effects of weak and languid exhortations, and therefore it is surprising that he should choose to recur again to the same ineffectual method, after what had happened to him upon the memorial which he delivered to the prince successor. Unsupported as that measure was, which had been a good one had it been followed in the manner recommended then by the King, it only threw a little immediate consternation amongst the partisans of France ; but they soon recovered it and ridiculed the step then taken, because they soon saw that it was not intended that the same should be supported in the manner in which they apprehended at first it would be.

You therefore did very right, upon Mr Korff's communication of his plan to you, to represent to him the inefficiency of it. If Russia means any thing by their present negociation with Sweden during the dyet it can only be effected, as I have told you before, by taking advantage of their present defenceless state and marching a body of troops immediately into Finland. If that measure is neglected the King has good reason to believe that, as soon as the triple alliance now forming between France Prussia and Sweden shall be concluded, Prussia will march a body of troops to the assistance of Sweden against Russia ; in which case Russia will have the joint forces of Prussia and Sweden, supported by French subsidies, to deal with ; whereas, should the Empress begin now

with Sweden she will have only that single weak power to contend with and might soon oblige her to enter into such measures as may be agreeable to Russia.

I may farther acquaint you in great confidence that the king of Prussia has been for some time, and is still, intriguing at the Porte, in conjunction with France, in order to engage the Turks to take the first opportunity to invade the dominions of the empress of Russia.

This therefore being the state of things you will immediately represent to the Russian ambassador the absolute necessity of his recommending forthwith to his court that there is but one effectual method left for them to bring Sweden back to the good system and to prevent that kingdom from falling upon Russia; which is to march instantly a body of troops (whether great or small is immaterial, as Sweden is not in a condition to resist) into Finland, to take possession of that province, and to insist with the prince successor to displace Count Tessin and the rest of the French faction, in order to make room for the well-intentioned party in Sweden to resume their former activity and to pursue such measures as may be of advantage as well to Russia as Sweden.

I send to my Lord Hyndford an extract of this letter and have signified to him his Majesty's pleasure that he should make at Petersburg the strongest representations according to the purport of what is above.

I have received your letter of the 13th past, the contents of which, with regard to the persons taken up at Stockholm, should serve as a farther lesson of vigour to Mo^r Korff in the present conjuncture and shew him that the now predominant party in Sweden has not the least remains of regard for the court of Russia.

Whitehall, 13 March 1746/7.

I laid before the King your letter to me of the 17th past, containing an account of the communication made to you by Baron Korff of the protocol of conferences held at Petersburgh, by which it seems to have been apprehended that Lord Hyndford promised that his Majesty would be at an equal expence with the court of Russia on account of the diet in Sueden. As your instructions at first were to acquaint M. Korff that the King did not propose to be at an equal expence with the Czarina on that occasion, and you did act agreeably thereto, I have nothing to add from his

Majesty thereupon farther than to acquaint you that by a letter from Lord Hyndford of the 7th past I find that matter hath been spoken of at Petersburgh in such a manner, that there is reason to believe no more mention will be made of it.

Whitehall, 24 March 1746/7.

By the mail which came in last Friday I received your letters of the 27th past and of the 3^d and 6th instant, and laid them before the King.

His Majesty took notice by that of the 6th instant that the accession of Sweden to the treaty between the two Empresses appeared to be in some forwardness, it having received the approbation of the chancery, as likewise of the king and senate of Sweden, but as his Majesty cannot tell how to reconcile this affair of the accession, if it should be finally agreed to, with the other measures which Count Tessin and his adherents are at the same time pursuing in direct opposition thereto, and especially the alliances now upon the point of being concluded with France and Prussia, the King would have you recommend to Baron Korff and our friends in Sweden not to suffer themselves by any false appearances to be betrayed into a state of dangerous security, since this seeming disposition to accept the invitation of the two Empresses will probably be found a meer collusion calculated to prevent Russia at this time, which is what the French faction in Sweden chiefly apprehend, from acting offensively. And therefore, as the invitation is made to Sweden to accede, which that crown may now, or may not accept at their own option, his Majesty suggests it to the Russian and Hungarian ministers, in order to prevent the accession of Sweden, if it is intended to be made upon an insidious foot, as there is at present the greatest reason to believe it will be, if it takes place at all, whether it might not be advisable not to press the conclusion of this affair, which might tie up the hands of Russia from acting with vigour and give the Swedes, by becoming in this manner a pretended ally to the treaty of Petersburg, an opportunity of concluding their other alliances with greater security.

I laid before the King your several accounts referred to in your letter of the 3^d, by which there appears to be a balance still remaining in your hands of upwards of 10,000 copper dollars, and his Majesty approves of your paying, as you propose, that balance to Monsieur Gedda in part of the arrears of his pension.

As to his pension being put for the future upon some establishment in England, I am to acquaint you that it is not practicable, nor would it be proper if it were, for reasons that must naturally occur to you.

Whitehall, 7th July 1747.

I had not time to take the King's orders by the last post upon the contents of your dispatch of the 16th past.

I am now to acquaint you that his Majesty approved the answer you had given to Monsieur Korff upon his late proposition to you to join with him in the representations, which he is now directed to make at Stockholm by order of his court. The King cannot entertain an opinion of the least good effects to be expected from any verbal remonstrances on the part of Russia, if the same are left unsupported and not seconded, as experience has shewn that they have hitherto not been, by vigorous measures. Nothing was so evident as that the court of Petersburgh had it absolutely in their power to frustrate and prevent the triple alliance concluded at Stockholm, provided they had shewn the least proper appearance of vigour, even without exerting it, and yet we have the mortification to see, notwithstanding Monsieur Korff's repeated representations, that that measure is now finally compleated.

As to the present idea of Russia to engage his Majesty in a previous offensive system against Sweden, you will see, by the extract which I send you inclosed of my letter to the Earl of Hyndford, what his Majesty's sentiments are upon that measure, and I have only to recommend to you to conform your language to the Russian ambassador upon that head to the tenour of that extract.

Whitehall, 11 August 1747.

. The King approved entirely the steps which you had taken in order to facilitate the escape of our principal friend [Åkerhielm] which we are in hopes he will accordingly have been able to effectuate ; and you may, upon the receipt of this letter, draw upon M^r Davis of the Treasury for the reimbursement of any expence which you may have incurred upon this occasion. His Majesty was, as you will naturally imagine, much concerned to hear that the persecution of this worthy patriot had been pushed on with so much rancour and inveteracy by the French party, and you will take an opportunity of letting him know that he will always meet with, from the King, all the regard and consideration in his power.

Whitehall, 5th February 1747[8].

The King being informed that the Swedish secretary here [Wynants] has received orders from his court to present a memorial, the purport of which is to desire your immediate recall, and as a compliance therewith upon such a representation would not be consistent with his Majesty's dignity, I have his Majesty's commands to direct you, upon the receipt of this letter, to leave Stockholm as soon as possible and to return into his Majesty's presence, acquainting however the ministers of his Swedish Majesty, before your departure, that the frequent indignities which have been of late offered to the character which you bear from the King, and for which you have not found any inclination in the court of Stockholm to make you redress, notwithstanding the many memorials presented by you in pursuance of your orders from time to time, have determined the King to recall you from your present residence.

At the same time I have the pleasure of acquainting you that the King is entirely satisfied with your conduct and with your zealous and diligent endeavours during the whole course of your ministry at Stockholm.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROBERT CAMPBELL 1757

CREDENTIALS AS MINISTER RESIDENT, dated 12 August 1727.
(*Record Office, F.O. 90, 66.*)

ROBERT D'ARCY, EARL OF HOLDERNESSE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO LIEUT.-COLONEL ROBERT CAMPBELL.

(*Record Office, Sweden 103.*)

Whitehall, Aug^t 16th 1757.

(*Unsigned.*)

The King having been pleased to appoint you to go over to Sweden with a private commission, in which his Majesty's service is particularly concerned, has commanded me to furnish you with proper instructions, in order to your being fully apprised of the intent of the commission you are charged with and for your direction in the execution thereof.

First. You are therefore, in the first place, to proceed forthwith to Stockholm and upon your arrival there shall use your utmost endeavours to inform yourself with precision of the state and situation of the several parties in the kingdom of Sweden and the names of the chief persons who are supposed to have weight with either, and the degree thereof, as likewise what you can discover of the particular characters of such persons and of the means by which they might be induced to oppose, by themselves and their friends, the violent measures pursuing by the courts of Versailles and Vienna against his Majesty and his allies.

Secondly. Upon your arrival at Stockholm you shall acquaint the Prussian minister with the nature of your commission and consult with him the proper means of carrying it into execution.

Thirdly. You shall more particularly enquire into the characters and inclinations of the senators and whether any, or which of them, may, probably, be induced to support his Majesty's interests in that assembly in opposition to the prevailing party, and what means must be used to render such an opposition effectual.

Fourthly. You shall insinuate to all such well-intentioned Swedes as you may have occasion to converse with the danger to which the liberties of Europe and the protestant religion are exposed by a union between the houses of Bourbon and Austria, to which the court of Russia has likewise acceded, and the danger that the liberties even of Sweden would be in, supposing they should accede to the utmost extent in the views they are entering into with that of France.

Fifthly. That on the contrary, should they not succeed, they would be exposed to the utmost resentment of the king of Prussia. That the event of the death of the present Czarina, an event not unlikely to happen in a short time, would give a new face to the affairs of Europe and leave the Swedes in a most dangerous situation. Or, should the Ottoman Porte grow jealous of the increasing power of the two Empresses and determine to form a diversion in favor of the king of Prussia, which would, in all probability, draw the greatest part of the forces of the Austrians and Russians to another part of the world, Sweden would in that case likewise be left to the mercy of the king of Prussia. That at all events the commercial interests of Sweden ought to make them favour the cause of England, or at least make them cautious of taking measures that might affect that harmony and good understanding which his Majesty has always been desirous of maintaining with the crown of Sweden.

Sixthly. Whereas his Majesty has received certain intelligence that the court of France is actually pressing that of Sweden to employ the forces they are now sending into Pomerania in hostilities of a dangerous nature against the king of Prussia, by invading part of his territories under the pretence of the Imperial *Conclusum* against the king of Prussia and of the declaration made by the Swedish minister at the diet of Ratisbonne [Greiffenheim],¹ you will use your utmost endeavours to engage the well-intentioned Swedes to oppose so dangerous and unjust a design, as likewise to

¹ Declarations (printed) by him and by the French minister, Baron de Mackau, Record Office, Germany, States, 106.

prevent the renewal of any fresh declarations on the part of Sweden at the diet of the Empire, which would tend to involve them more and more in the measures of France.

You will not fail to send me from time to time for the King's information distinct accounts of the progress you shall make in the execution of this commission, in order to your receiving there-upon such further instructions as his Majesty shall be pleased to direct.

Whitehall, Novem^r 11th 1757.

You will easily imagine how much I have been surprized to have heard nothing from you since your departure from England, since which time various circumstances have made it improper for you to continue any longer at Stockholm. I am therefore to acquaint you with his Majesty's pleasure that you should return to England as soon as possible.

SIR JOHN GOODRICKE, BARONET 1758-1773

SIR JOHN GOODRICKE, of Ribston, Yorkshire, fifth baronet, was sent to Sweden as minister resident in March 1758, but not being permitted to enter the country was forced to stay at Copenhagen until April 1764, when the passing of power to the 'Caps' had enabled diplomatic relations to be restored. Given the character of envoy extraordinary he remained at Stockholm till July 1773. He was not the first diplomatist of his family; the second baronet, Sir Henry Goodricke, had been envoy extraordinary to Madrid in the time of Charles II.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIR JOHN GOODRICKE, BARONET, AS
MINISTER RESIDENT AT STOCKHOLM. 14 March 1758.

(*Record Office, Denmark 104, F.O. 90, 66.*)

[Formal.]

ADDITIONAL AND PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SAME,
SAME DATE.

(*Ibid.*)

Whereas We have not for some time past employed any minister at the court of Sweden you are upon your arrival at Stockholm to apply to Mons^r Marteville, minister of the States General, and endeavour to obtain from him all such lights as may be usefull to you in the execution of the commission with which you are charged; and if a person should be presented to you by him, under the name of Wilkinson [Baron Karl Gedda], you will look upon that person

as one well inclined to Our interests and able to inform you both as to persons and things ; but if this person should not voluntarily make himself known to you it is Our express will and pleasure that you should not make any enquiries concerning him.

2. You will as soon as possible after your arrival exert your utmost diligence to find out the state and strength of the several parties now in Sweden, the names and characters of the principal leaders of them, and endeavour to penetrate, as far as possible, into their several views and designs, giving Us the best and earliest information you can upon that head.

3. You will endeavour to get the best information possible concerning the naval and military force of Sweden, as also of the state of their finances and of the resources by which they may be enabled to carry on the war in which they are at present engaged with the king of Prussia, and will endeavour to find out whether there is any inclination on the part of Sweden to come to an accommodation with his Prussian Majesty, in which case you may assure the senators, with whom you may have an opportunity of conversing, that his Majesty would most willingly contribute by his good offices to a reasonable accommodation. And if at any time you shall have reason to think a negotiation of that kind is on foot you will use your best endeavours to support the king of Prussia's interests therein.

4. And whereas We are firmly resolved, by the blessing of God, vigorously to maintain in conjunction with Our allies the present necessary war, in which We are engaged ; and whereas We are determined efficaciously to support, as far as in Us lies, the interests of Our good brother and ally the king of Prussia, and as it is principally with that view that We have been induced to send you to reside at Stockholm, you will have this object constantly in your view and upon all occasions support and maintain to the best of your power the measures which you may have reason to think his Prussian Majesty is pursuing at the court of Sweden ; and you will endeavour for that purpose to keep up a correspondence with such person or persons, in whom you shall have reason to think the queen of Sweden cheefly confides, taking the utmost precautions, however, not to give umbrage on that account to the senators.

G. R.

ROBERT D'ARCY, EARL OF HOLDERNESSE, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO SIR JOHN GOODRICK.

(*Record Office, Denmark 104, 107-8, 110*)

Whitehall, May 30th 1758.

I took the first opportunity of laying before his Majesty your letter of the 16th instant, giving an account of the unexpected and offensive resolution taken by the court of Stockholm to refuse admitting his Majesty's minister there, which was communicated to you at Copenhagen by Monsr Ungern. But before I proceed to make any remarks upon this very extraordinary event it will be proper for me to acquaint you that as you could not, upon Mr Ungern's authority only, take upon you to suspend the orders his Majesty had given you, the King approves your resolution of going to Stockholm and the precautions you had taken to pursue your journey in a manner the least hazardous and the least liable to an affront; tho' at the same time it might have been wished that under some pretence or other you had delayed your departure from Copenhagen, till you could have received instructions from hence. And as various accidents may have detained you, I dispatch this messenger to Mr Titley with directions how to forward the dispatches address'd to you, if you have left Denmark.

Two days before I received your letters, which I am now answering, Mr Weynantz [Wynants] delivered a memorial to me, of which the inclosed is a copy, in which a reason is attempted to be given for so unusual a step. But the reason given is as extraordinary and offensive as the thing itself.

In the answer which is returned to this memorial, of which I likewise send you a copy, his Majesty has consider'd what is due to his own dignity and to the strict alliance with the king of Prussia, but at the same time, as his Majesty is sensible this measure is forc'd by a party against the opinion of the cooler and wiser people in Sweden, care has been taken to avoid any harsh or irritating expressions that might widen the breach, and render an accommodation hereafter more difficult; however, after so publick an insult his Majesty could not suffer a Swedish secretary to remain here, and I am directed to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that immediately upon the receipt of this dispatch you should return to Copenhagen and wait there for such farther orders as his Majesty may think proper to send you.

It would now be quite unnecessary for me to say any thing upon the subject of your letters of March 27th and April 13th and 28th, all which have been regularly laid before the King.

Whitehall, October 9th 1759.

I received on Friday last the favour of your letter of the 25th September, and yesterday in the evening that of the 29th, both of which were immediately laid before the King.

As to the representation that has been made to you by the Swedish minister, Mr d'Ungern, of the irregularity supposed to have been committed by a privateer who, tho' under English colours, acted by virtue of a commission from the king of Prussia, I can only acquaint you at present that his Majesty will order a strict enquiry to be made into the affair, and you may depend upon receiving his Majesty's orders as soon as the particulars mentioned in your letter can be ascertained with any degree of certainty. This answer, however, general as it is, will give you an opportunity of continuing without suspicion your confidential intercourse with the Swedish minister, which it is his Majesty's pleasure you should cultivate and encourage, as his Majesty is of opinion that a division between the two heads of the governing parties, and the uniting one of them with the court, would be of great consequence in the present conjuncture, particularly if a reconciliation with Sweden might be the means of detaching Russia from her present alliance with the King's enemies. You may, therefore, acquaint the Swedish minister that Mr Hopken [Anders Johan] may, in the first place, depend upon the strictest secrecy upon the overture which has been made through your channel, and likewise upon his Majesty's support and assistance, if he will engage himself, sincerely and heartily, in a new system.¹ You may farther acquaint the Swedish minister that his Majesty knows, with certainty, that the court of Versailles is determined to support Mr Scheffer [Karl Fredrik]'s interest, in opposition to Mr Hópken; and it is very likely that the court of Denmark, whose councils seem of late to be entirely governed by a French influence, will act the same part, particularly if Russia should incline to favour Mr Hópken.

The courts of the north have such different interests, that it

¹ In the margin : I should be glad to know what assistance Hopken expects from hence.

appears impossible they should finally continue in the same system ; and if we are rightly informed of the state of the French finances the golden chain, that has for some time united them, will speedily be broke. Russia, from various circumstances, is a natural ally to England, and his Majesty will be ready to cultivate that friendship, whenever it can be done consistently with his engagements to the king of Prussia, from which his Majesty is determined not to depart. His Majesty would be no less desirous of an alliance with Sweden, whenever they shall quit their present dependance upon France. The instructions the Swedish minister [Ungern-Sternberg] had received to talk with Mo^r Korff upon what related to Russia, without the interposition of the French ambassador [President Ogier], seems to be an indication of Mo^r Höpkens sincerity.

What is mentioned in your last letter of the endeavours used by the court of France to engage Sweden to join in the project of invading these kingdoms was no secret to his Majesty. However you will take a proper opportunity of thanking the Swedish minister for this communication.

You mention at the close of your letter of the 25th Sept^r that you had communicated to the Prussian minister [Viereck] part of your conversation with Mo^r Ungern ; you will please to let me know, with precision, what it was that you have communicated, and what you have omitted. And you will for the future be cautious how far you open yourself to the Prussian minister upon the secret and nice part of this transaction, for tho' it is not his Majesty's intention to conceal it from the king of Prussia himself, as it is not known how far the minister that prince employs at Copenhagen may be in his confidence, it will be adviseable that such communications should be conveyed to Berlin directly from hence ; particularly as it is essentially necessary that no part of this affair should transpire in Denmark.

Whitehall, Jan^{ry} 23^d 1761.

Your most secret letter by estafette of the 2^d inst. has been the object of his Majesty's most serious attention. The King has determined to comply with the proposal contained in it of remitting ten thousand pound sterling to be at the queen of Sweden's disposition, hoping that it may be a means of preventing any farther hostile operations against the king of Prussia. The Lords of the

Treasury have given you credit upon Me^{srs} Hanbury and Halsey at Hamburgh, and you may accordingly draw for the above mentioned sum of ten thousand pounds sterling, which you will convey, in the secretest manner, to her Swedish Majesty.

It is necessary to shorten this letter for fear of giving umbrage; I shall therefore only acquaint you that in case you are talked to by the Danish ministers upon the present embroiled state of affairs in Sweden you should content yourself with answering that you do not apprehend it to be the King's intention to intermeddle in the interior affairs of that kingdom.

Whitehall, Jan^{ry} 27th 1761.

. . . You mention in your letter of the 2^d inst. that the well arctected in Sweden desire your presence there. As you cannot but remember the indignity offered to the crown of England in your person, you must be sensible it would be impossible for his Majesty to consent to your going to Stockholm untill suitable reparation is made. There seems a natural opportunity for the court of Sweden to make the necessary advances, by sending a proper person to compliment his Majesty upon his accession to the throne. You have the King's leave to insinuate this to your correspondents, and you may add that the person so sent may depend upon a cordial and gracious reception from his Majesty. The natural consequence of such a step will be the appearance of an English minister at Stockholm.

JOHN STEWART, EARL OF BUTE, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(Record Office, Denmark 113.)

St. James's, Jan^{ry} 5th 1762.

The King having reason to imagine, as well from the accounts which you have transmitted of what has passed lately in Sweden as from other intelligence which we have received, that there is now a very considerable alteration for the better in the dispositions of the people there, in consequence of which it is probable that a minister on the part of his Majesty would be welcome at this juncature to that court; as the King would not be wanting in any thing that might tend to the support of our friends and to a renewal of the antient harmony and good understanding with the crown

of Sweden, it is his pleasure that you should immediately apply by a private letter to the queen of Sweden to know whether, in case his Majesty should take the resolution of sending you thither as his resident, he may depend upon your meeting with a suitable reception, and whether, upon the King's condescending to make that first step towards a reconciliation, they will immediately, as we have been assured they would, appoint a minister to his Majesty.

It is absolutely necessary that the King should have a previous satisfactory assurance upon these points, but that no time may be lost his Majesty does not propose to wait for your sending hither the queen's answer, but has ordered me to send you at all events his credential letters, leaving it to your discretion either to set out immediately for Stockholm, in case the answer you receive should in your judgement authorize your doing it, or to postpone it until you can have his further orders. But though you should find therein a sufficient encouragement for your repairing to that court, yet you will understand that you are not to legitimate yourself there as the King's minister by the presentment of your credentiall till such time as the reciprocal step of appointing one on the part of the king of Sweden to his Majesty shall be actually taken.

Whilst your journey into Sweden remains dubious the King has thought it to no purpose to send you more particular instructions for your conduct there. If you go, and are properly received, no time shall be lost in furnishing you with his Majesty's directions. In the mean time you will confine yourself to general assurances of the friendly dispositions of your court, in conformity to the language of your credential letter, and to hearing and reporting to me, for his Majesty's information, whatever may be said to you on the part of the court of Stockholm.

St. James's, Feby 9th 1762.

The King saw by your last dispatches that you had written to the queen of Sweden, in pursuance of his orders, upon the subject of your mission to that court, and that judging it necessary that the president of the chancery at Stockholm [Count Ekeblad] and the Swedish minister at Copenhagen [Johan Wilhelm Sprengtporten], from whom you will want a pass in case of your journey, as also the Danish minister, Mr^r Bernsdorff, should have an intimation of it, you wished to receive instructions for your conduct therein.

In answer to which I have the King's commands to acquaint you that as so much will depend upon the more or less encouragement which the answer expected from her Swedish Majesty may give to the execution of that design, and as a good deal of time may be lost by your waiting to know his Majesty's sentiments, he is pleased to leave to your own judgment and discretion the steps to be taken with the persons abovementioned towards facilitating the success of the measure intended. And the King is perswaded that in the resolutions you shall take you will precipitate nothing, but be careful to act upon sure grounds, and with such caution as not to commit his Majesty's honour and dignity.

St. James's, Feby 23^d 1762.

I have received and laid before the King your dispatches of the 30th past and 2^d and 6th instant.

You acquaint me therein with the contents of the letter written to you by order of the queen of Sweden, in which the King observed with some surprize that after so much pressing on her part for the mission of a British minister to Stockholm her Majesty now entirely discourages the intention of your journey thither, and gives no hopes either of your being admitted, or of a reciprocal nomination; which being the case his Majesty cannot think it at all proper that you should make any further application upon that subject, thro' either of the canals proposed in these or in your former dispatches.

JOHN MONTAGU, EARL OF SANDWICH, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(Record Office, Denmark 115, Sweden 104 to 106.)

Whitehall, 28th Oct^r 1763.

I immediately laid before the King your letters of the 1st and 11th instant, in the last of which you give an account of the overture made to you by Mor Faxel for the reciprocal mission of ministers to London and Stockholm, and transmit a minute you took of what that gentleman had said, which he acknowledged to be exact.

His Majesty having taken this matter into consideration has commanded me to acquaint you that after the very indecent returns made by the Swedish ministry to repeated advances on the part of Great Britain, to renew the former correspondence with their court, the King does not think it consistent with the

dignity of his crown to pay any attention to a loose verbal declaration, made with so much precaution of not giving anything in writing as carries strong appearances of being calculated to leave a door open to disavow whatever may pass on the subject. His Majesty therefore sees no ground as yet to make any alteration in the orders already sent you in the earl of Halifax's letter of the 9th past, and repeated in mine of the 7th instant; and you will accordingly acquaint Mr^r Faxel that you are still directed to adhere to those orders and that nothing can induce his Majesty to change this resolution but some authentick overture, in writing, on the part of Sweden, and the immediate nomination of such a minister to reside at this court as shall be acceptable to the King, and not the proposing persons whom there may be reason to suppose beforehand his Majesty must object to, as was the case of those three Mr^r Faxel alludes to, as having been formerly nominated.

In case, on your making this declaration, Mr^r Faxel shall give you sufficient reason to hope that the court of Sweden will comply with this just and moderate expectation of the King, his Majesty is pleased to allow you to remain where you are till an answer can be received from Stockholm; but if that answer shall prove unsatisfactory, or be delayed beyond a necessary time, you will instantly leave Copenhagen without applying for fresh instructions, or transmitting any proposal short of what the King is determined to insist upon, vizt, the actual and immediate nomination of a proper minister to his court. When such a person shall be so appointed, and shall be set out for London, his Majesty will then authorise you to repair to Stockholm in the same character that shall be given to the Swedish minister.

The period of time which the court of Sweden has, at last, chosen to insinuate this overture is very remarkable, and has much the air of proceeding more from a view of amusing the King, for their own purposes, than from any sincere intention of reconciliation. The distress the finances in Sweden labour under from the non-payment of the subsidies due from France; the difficulties the senate have brought themselves into from the unjustifiable means they have employed to supply this deficiency; and the little encouragement they have yet had to expect that relief from France, which their urgent necessities absolutely demand, are circumstances so well known that it is not unnatural to suppose that the Swedish

ministers may flatter themselves that the appearance of renewing an intercourse with Great Britain may raise such a jealousy and alarm, as possibly to induce the court of Versailles to make an effort to preserve their influence in Sweden, which they might, not improbably, lose entirely, was a British minister to be really admitted at Stockholm in this juncture. It may, therefore, be very important for the French party in that country to prevent, if possible, your leaving Copenhagen just now, the reason of your having so long resided there being too notorious not to afford that faction ample room to make any ungrateful use of the King's longer patience. His Majesty is, however, determined not to be trifled with any more, and therefore expects that you do punctually obey the orders now transmitted to you.

Whitehall, 20th Decem^r 1763.

I have received and laid before the King your dispatches of the 12th 26th and 29th past, the last containing the Swedish secretary [Faxel]'s declaration on the part of his court that they were ready to appoint an envoy to set out immediately for London if the King approved of sending them a minister in the same character. In answer to which I am ordered to acquaint you that the King thinks that you have been rather too hasty, and given them an advantage in point of ceremony, which with a court that had behaved so improperly should have been carefully avoided yet, as they seem to be sincere in their expressions of friendship and reconciliation, his Majesty chuses to sacrifice his just resentment to a measure which, if properly cultivated on their part, may tend to their own as well as the public utility.

You will receive herewith credentials of envoy extraordinary but will on no account put yourself in motion for Stockholm, nor make any use whatever of your credential letters. 'till you shall have authentick information that one of the persons mentioned in your last dispatches is named envoy extraordinary to this court and a time fixed for his setting out. You will then lose no time in repairing to your place of residence, regulating yourself by the instructions which you are at present in possession of, as you will be furnished with fresh orders according as the circumstances of affairs may require.

I must observe to you upon the subject of the beginning of your last that notwithstanding you write in cypher you should be extremely

careful how you commit any person's name, especially where the discovery would be attended with such very bad consequences.

Whitehall, 30th March 1764.

As the departure of the Swedish envoy for London seemed to be fixed, at latest for the end of this month, I hope this letter will find you at the place of your residence, where there are many concurrent causes, which would render your presence at this time very seasonable.

The distrest state of the finances in that kingdom, their total want of resources, and the inability of France, in the present junc-ture, to supply those defects, throw so many difficulties in the way of the leading senators among the French party that there could hardly be a more favorable opportunity for a British minister to resume his functions at the court of Sweden, after so many years interruption.

You will therefore, if still in Denmark, lose no time in repairing to Stockholm, as soon as you shall receive authentick information that the day of Mr Nolken's departure for this court is finally determined ; and tho' you must upon all occasions, particularly in your first steps towards a power, which has failed in its attention to this crown, be extremely careful not to commit his Majesty's dignity, yet you will, in the present crisis, be likewise cautious not to give the ill-intentioned members of the state any handle to retard the journey of their envoy to this capital, which they will be very apt to do, in order to protract the arrival of a minister at their court, whose principal aim they will consider as directed to traverse the designs of France.

The great influence that crown has obtained in the interior of Sweden must indeed make this a continual object of your attention ; and it being likewise the interest of Russia to weaken a connection so opposite to their views you will not fail to keep up the most amicable intercourse with their minister [I. A. Osterman], both from the advantage you may derive from thence for his Majesty's service as well as to correspond with the friendly advances made by the court of Petersbourg, who have given general instructions to their ministers, residing in foreign states, to communicate with those of his Majesty in a free and confidential manner.

The length of time which has elapsed since your first destination to the court of Sweden, and your place of residence, in consequence

of it, having furnished you with the opportunity of gaining a knowledge of many particulars relating to the present situation of that kingdom, you will be enabled to send me an early account of the combination and strength of the leading parties, and the immediate views of the principal courts who take the most active part in their different contests.

The King does not doubt, from your zeal and abilities, of receiving such clear and satisfactory informations upon this subject that his Majesty may form a perfect judgment of the measures he may think proper to take for the advantage of his own kingdoms and those of his allies, as well for the general tranquillity of Europe.

In the meantime you will regulate yourself by your original instructions, except on those points which may have varied by subsequent orders, or such as will be naturally pointed out to you by the alteration of circumstances and times.

Whitehall, 22^d May 1764.

. It is certain, that according to the nature of the Swedish government, and it's connections with France, that nothing material can be effected but by a proper application of money, but it is equally true that this kind of assistance will be frequently demanded under the pretence of bringing measures to bear, which have little or no foundation in themselves.

You will therefore, Sir, be particularly attentive not to encourage any proposals which have not the appearance of weight and consistency, at the same time that you shew the intention of this court to concur in whatever may effectually establish such a system as may preserve a true balance of power in the north and from thence extend itself to the rest of Europe.

The readiness with which his Majesty complied with the scheme of supplying her Swedish Majesty with the sum of ten thousand pounds, mention'd in your letter, when the intent of it was to take off the force of that kingdom, which weigh'd heavy upon the king of Prussia, is a strong proof of his Majesty's disposition to support his friends in the most effectual manner, when the cause is real and adequate; it will therefore be your care to transmit to me from time to time such lights for his Majesty's information, that the King may not be amus'd by specious appearances on the one side, nor, on the other, permit any substantial occasion to be lost, which

may promote the interest of his Majesty's affairs and those of his friends and allies.

Whitehall, June 22^d 1764.

As it will be some time before you can be furnished with an answer to the several points mentioned in your letter of the 1st instant, and transmitted from hence to the earl of Buckingham, you will do well to employ this interval in procuring the clearest intelligence possible of what are the immediate views of the French party, and whether it is true (as we find it insinuated in some secret advices) that they have engaged to carry through the next diet a treaty for delivering the marine of Sweden to the disposal of France.

There is no doubt but that their stipulation of succours from Sweden will be chiefly, if not wholly confined to that element, as most advantageous to the French ; and the opposite party will not fail secretly to encourage it's going into that channel, as more calculated to alarm Great Britain and consequently to procure higher terms for themselves, when they shall promise to oppose it.

It must be remembered, and I daresay you will always have that reflection before you, that whenever the French party in Sweden had any points of their own to carry they made use of Great Britain as an object of jealousy, by which they brought France into their own measures ; and though, by this method, both these great powers became their dupes, yet France had the advantage, as she finally gained what she aimed at, tho' perhaps at too great an expence.

I need not therefore observe to you how necessary it is to examine and understand thoroughly the plan which the French ministry may have formed with respect to their negotiations in Sweden, and particularly in the article of their marine, much less need I caution you to be circumspect in weighing well the engagements, which may be required of us and promised by them.

Whitehall, 6th July 1764.

As it has been a general maxim in the politicks of Sweden to avail themselves of the rival spirit between Great Britain and France, so as to draw assistance from each in the course of their negotiations, which always ended in their obtaining considerable subsidies, the King is desirous of being thoroughly informed not only of the present state of the parties, which divide that kingdom, their objects

and connections, but likewise how far they will probably carry their expectations, and what degree of succour they may propose to themselves from this crown, in case that the system which has for so many years directed their councils should be effectually overthrown.

His Majesty is of opinion that it would be inconsistent with his dignity, as well as prejudicial to the interests of this country, to take a large share in bringing about such a change, as may subject him afterwards either to throw away the advantages, which a new system might produce, or else to purchase them at a price far beyond their real value.

You will therefore send me, for his Majesty's information, the clearest accounts you can procure of the probable designs of those who will take the lead, in case the connections of France should be dissolved, and from what source they hope to indemnify Sweden for the loss of those supplies which the court of Versailles will immediately stop, upon their quitting an alliance from whence they have hitherto derived their principal support.

There is no doubt but that Great Britain, as usual, will be looked upon as the power which is to be charged with the whole of that burthen, and it is equally certain that they will, upon all accounts, endeavour to render it as weighty as possible ; it will therefore be necessary for you to exert all your prudence and proceed cautiously, even in your previous steps, so as to engage in nothing whatever without farther instructions from hence, as the entering into any pecuniary engagements at your court, or elsewhere, is a matter that will require very full and serious consideration before it receives his Majesty's final sanction ; and you are to consider these enquiries, which you are ordered to make, in no other light than that his Majesty's servants may be fully informed of the real state of things in your department, before they undertake to give the King their opinion as to the measures that it may be advisable to adopt in the end.

But you are not, on this account, to quit the field without trying your whole strength and judgment in defeating the intentions of the enemy. If a thorough change of system in the Swedish councils (which you must always endeavour to procure) cannot be obtained without engaging this country in expences which she can by no means undertake, consistent with her interests, you must throw every difficulty in the way which may perplex the designs of the

opposite party and make the purchase of the Swedish alliance as burthensome to France as possible; for next to overturning the French system it is the interest of Great Britain that France should continue her subsidies to Sweden, provided they exceed (as frequently has been the case) the utility and value of such an alliance.

Whitehall, Augt 3^d 1764.

I have receiv'd your letter of the 13th past, and wish that the contents of it were so explicit as might enable me to return you such an answer as would satisfy the impatience of those persons who wish, by the first of next month, to know his Majesty's resolutions, not only in relation to the support they ask but also whether we would have them enter into a treaty with us, or what method we propose for the establishing a new system in foreign affairs.

As to the first of these points it is highly necessary to know both the nature and extent of the support they expect from us, and how far they have strength enough to carry into effect the engagements they will enter into in consequence of it. This is the more proper to be insisted on, from the reflection upon what is past with respect to the manner in which our mony has been thrown away in that country, and the advantage which France has always had over us in that particular.

As to the second, you must inform yourself upon what ground they would propose to build the treaty betwixt us, supposing a readiness on their part, whether any, and what subsidies they would demand from us, and how far they would expect any indemnification both for the loss of their arrears, which France keeps back for many prudent reasons, as well as of the future favors they will be promised from that crown.

The well-intentioned in Sweden are just in their remark that we should probably be able to defeat the project of France at one half of the expence, which it would cost that country to establish it, but how should even that half be ascertained, when Great Britain, by a punctual compliance with her engagements, would treble the value of any offer from France, whom they know themselves to be liberal only in promises, and who is, by that means, at this very time bribing them with their own money.

It is not, therefore, from what France holds out to them that they are to estimate the value of what they are to expect from us, but from the real advantage they will have of joining with

an ally whose engagements, whatever they are, are sure of being punctually complied with; and as this is the invariable plan upon which his Majesty forms his treaties it is incumbent upon the King's servants to inform themselves minutely of the conditions expected by Sweden, as far as the great out-lines can be at present ascertained, that they may not, by degrees, be drawn into measures which it might be extremely inconvenient for this country to carry into execution.

I have only to add that as the marine of Sweden is the point which makes our connexions with that crown a principal object to Great Britain, you will send me by the earliest opportunity what I dare say you made a great part of your earliest enquiries, the strength and condition of their navy, and what particular advantages, either in seamen or ships, France might derive from it in its present condition, as well as the probable means by which they could encrease its future strength, and how those means are to be effected.

(Most secret.)

Whitehall, Aug^t 17th 1764.

You have been already apprized by my letter of the 22^d June of some advices the King had received that the court of Versailles were engaging their party in Sweden to carry thro' the next diet a treaty for delivering the marine of Sweden to the disposal of France. I am now to inform you that his Majesty has authentick intelligence that the French ambassador at Stockholm [De Breteuil] has actually orders from his court to be preparing the way for such a treaty, and to procure in the approaching diet the necessary authority for the Swedish ministry to conclude an alliance, by which Sweden, in consideration of the subsidies paid by France, shall be obliged to furnish that crown with a number of ships.

The prejudices that may arise to Great Britain from stipulations of this nature are too self evident to need my adding any particular instructions to excite your utmost zeal and vigilance to trace the extent and progress of every negotiation set on foot by the French ambassador; for as the court of France are sensible how much it behoves Great Britain to counteract and frustrate these measures, you may be assured they will endeavour to keep the transaction as secret as possible, especially from you; and they may, very

probably, attempt to carry their point by means of some general powers to be given by the diet to the Swedish ministers for treating and concluding with France, in which there shall be no mention of the specifick alteration intended to be made from the former subsidiary treaties between the two powers. You will, therefore, never cease to exhort our friends, in the strongest terms, not to become the dupes of such artifices but to take care that no powers be delegated to the ministers, the utmost extent and force whereof are not clearly and explicitly understood and limited ; and you will let those, who profess themselves enemies to the French system, perceive plainly that if, after this warning, they suffer themselves to be over-reached, there will be just grounds to suspect that all their declarations have been calculated solely to draw money from England, without any sincere intention to oppose the pernicious views of France in Sweden.

Whitehall, Sept^r 11th 1764.

I have delayed entring into the particulars of your several important dispatches, in hopes of hearing from the earl of Buckingham what plan the court of Russia meant to pursue in relation to Sweden, and what measures they wished we should co-operate in, as the most likely to extricate that government from it's present dependency on France ; but having as yet received no such information from his Excellency, but on the contrary being told by him in one of his late letters that he thinks the Russian court is grown more cool with regard to the affairs of Sweden, it seems plain that their intention is that the whole burthen of this business, and particularly the pecuniary part of it, should be born by his Majesty.

It is proper, therefore, to prevent your remaining any longer in suspence on this point, to inform you that the sum of £40,000, which is suggested as necessary to procure a majority in the diet, far exceeds what his Majesty thinks advisable (considering the present state of the finances of this country) to be employed in such a pursuit, particularly as it is far from being clear that when the first point was gained the distressful condition of Sweden would not make it absolutely necessary for that country to expect a subsidy ; when all we could hope for, in return for our generosity, would be a preference to any other power that might be willing to treat with them ; and this we should certainly decline, as sub-

sidiary engagements on the continent (under however plausible a light they may at first appear) are very inconsistent with the disposition and real interest of this island.

This being the case I am ordered to inform you that you should not give any hopes that such terms, as are demanded, can be advanced from hence, and you will therefore confine yourself to the endeavouring, by measures of a different kind, to embarrass the French in their machinations and to make them pay as dearly as possible for any imaginary advantages they may wish to obtain. If you can suggest any thing that may contribute to that end all due attention will be paid to your representations, but it would be deceiving our friends in Sweden to give them grounds to hope that it is in the power of this country to distribute such immense sums among them, or that it is our intention to engage them in our system by an annual subsidy.

If any new matter should arise in this affair in consequence of any information we shall receive from Russia, and if it shall appear that they mean to take upon themselves the half of the expence, you may depend upon immediate information, and fresh instructions; but in the mean time it is thought proper to apprise you of the reasoning of this court, and of our resolution not to charge the nation with a load of expence in support of continental measures suggested to us by another nation, who, tho' their interest is much more nearly concerned, seems as yet no way inclined to take a forward part either in the trouble or charge of this undertaking.

Whitehall, 18th Sept^r 1764.

Your letter of the 31st past, together with the French paper inclosed, has been received and laid before the King, who expressed his great approbation of the clear and explicit detail which you there give of the several sums necessary for carrying on your negotiations with the leading men among our friends in Sweden.

You may expect a full answer to the many material points contained in this dispatch as soon as I shall receive his Majesty's orders upon the subject; in the mean time you will defer the putting into execution the instructions you received in my last letter, as Lord Buckingham will have directions, sent him by this post, to demand an answer from the Russian ministry upon the question, whether they will or will not take upon themselves the half

of the eight thousand pounds necessary to be risked as a previous expence.

You will do well to suggest to me what advantages in trade you can secure to this country, in case we should overturn the present system of politics in Sweden and establish our own, as the state of the finances in this kingdom will not justify our embarking in expences, which are not attended with real and essential utility to the public.

It may not be amiss for you to insinuate to the Russian minister at Stockholm [Osterman] how much we are surprized here that after the King had complied with the empress of Russia's request in sending a minister to Sweden, with orders to second her Majesty's views in whatever would tend to establish a good system in that country, we have never been able to obtain any answer from his court relative to that matter, but that on the contrary they seem as indifferent as if no proposal of this kind had ever been made on their part.

Whitehall, 21st Sept^r 1764.

Since my last dispatch by Butson, the messenger, I have taken an opportunity of speaking to Baron Gross upon the Swedish affairs, and asked him whether his court was disposed to bear an equal share in the expences which must necessarily attend any attempts to overturn the present system of affairs in that country, and detach them from their dependance upon France.

He answerd that he had no doubt of their readiness in that particular, and that he even supposed that their minister at Stockholm had orders to draw for a sum, in case of exigency of affairs required it.

When I told him that we were not averse to advance the half of a previous expence, which was thought necessary to be riskd, and which, at the best calculation, amounted in the whole to about eight thousand pounds, he seem'd to speak of their concurrence as absolutely certain and attributed the late backwardness of his court with respect to the Swedish affairs as owing singly to their being so intent upon their great object in Poland, which being now probably drawn to a conclusion we should find them equally alert in what related to their system in Sweden.

I then further inform'd this minister that his Majesty seemed

disposed to try what might be produced from the eight thousand pounds already mentioned, provided Russia would risk the half of it ; but I could assure him that as it was at their repeated solicitation that the King sacrific'd his just resentment towards the Swedish government, and renewed a correspondence with them, which they little deserv'd, no pecuniary engagements of any kind would be entered into, unless the court of Russia took her full share of the expence and advanced *pari passu* with us in every determination of that kind.

His answer was still the same, that he thoroughly understood the intention of his court was to join with us in an equal share, and co-operate together exactly upon the same footing.

You will, therefore, now address yourself immediately to the Russian minister at Stockholm and inform yourself perfectly whether his instructions coincide with the language held by Mons^r Gross, whether he has any authority to take an equal share in this previous expence of eight thousand pounds, a commission to draw for it immediately, and a power to dispose of it, jointly with you, for the purposes intended. If you find that these particulars are answered in the affirmative you may then draw for four thousand pounds, the share which falls to this crown ; and his Majesty will afterwards concert with the empress of Russia how far it will be prudent and advantageous to the common cause to embark in the further expences mentioned in your plan as necessary to destroy the French system and to erect our own, amounting to no more than £25,000, in the whole, between the two crowns, including the £8,000 abovementioned. But if you find any hesitation in the court of Russia to pay their share of this first sum of £8,000 you are on no account to make use of your credit, or engage his Majesty in any expence upon this occasion.

I must now repeat to you what has been the constant tenour of your instructions, and must be the great object of your researches, to find out, and apply in your negociations, every point which can be of utility to the commerce of Great Britain, in which Sweden has at present the advantage ; and with regard to her marine, your constant endeavours must be employ'd to render it of as little effect as possible, or, if they are intent upon supporting it, to direct it in such a channel as may render it the most useful to this country, and as much as may be at the disposal of this crown.

Whitehall, 12th Oct^r 1764.

I have received and laid before the King your letters of the 21st past, and have it in command to allow your draught for the 250£, as the exigence seemed to be pressing, and the time would not admit of your writing for instructions. I would, however, recommend great caution to you in advancing any sum at your own risk, especially in a country whose system of politicks is so extremely fluctuating and uncertain.

The earl of Buckingham having transmitted to you the account of what passed between him and Mons^r Pannin upon the subject of Swedish affairs, I may hope by the next post to receive your sentiments upon the several points, which were therein agitated. His Lordship acted perfectly agreeable to the instructions which he received, and which you will never lose sight of, in discouraging all ideas of a subsidy, which is a plan totally inconsistent with the system of this country and scarce ever answers the intention for which it is formed.

The King expects soon to hear of the resolutions which are taken in consequence of the instructions you received by Butson, the messenger. The court of Russia, as well as our friends in Sweden, will have great reason to be satisfied with his Majesty's generous efforts to free that country from it's dependance upon France, and the King depends upon the assurances which they have given you, as well upon the declarations made upon the part of the Czarina, that they will both effectually co-operate in supporting a cause, wherein their own interests are so closely connected.

If Russia agrees to the proposal you are authorized to make (of which their taking an equal share in the calculated expence is always to be considered by you as the *sine quâ non*) the leading men amongst our friends will be without excuse, if they fail in their part after their own demands shall have been so generously complied with.

This is an argument that you will not fail of improving in your discourse to the queen upon what makes the subject of your last dispatch, and you will endeavour to expose the weakness and fallacy of those counsels, by which they are endeavouring to mislead her in that important point, the choice of a marshall to the diet.

His Majesty approves entirely of your reasoning upon that subject, as well as of the steps you propose to take in consequence of

it, and has no doubt, from your great zeal and abilities, but that you will succeed in defeating the artifices of those, who by flattering the queen's supposed weight and authority would in effect destroy her real influence. I shall not fail to send you very regularly his Majesty's commands upon every material point, and for that purpose must desire a continuance of that punctuality in your correspondence, as well as of that very instructive information, which render your dispatches at this period particularly interesting.

Whitehall, 9th Nov^r 1764.

I send you herewith inclosed by Slaughter, the messenger, an order for the sum which has been allotted you for carrying into execution the purposes upon which you have received ample instructions, and I have it in command from his Majesty to recommend to you the greatest care and attention in the use of it.

The King exprest a great deal of surprize at the conversation which past between you and the Russian minister, wherein he affected to give a very extraordinary turn to the calculation you had made and transmitted to me, which was too clear and explicit to admit of any discussion, or stand in need of any explanation. I must therefore remind you upon every occasion not to give in to reasonings of that nature, which are incompatible with the true intent and meaning of your own proposals, and contrary to the spirit and letter of your instructions.

The sum of four thousand pounds intrusted to your management (of which his Majesty does not doubt but he shall receive a very just and punctual accompt) is far from inconsiderable, when added to that of equal value from Russia, and when the purposes, for which it is design'd, are duly weighed.

What more extensive projects that crown may have in view are not at present a subject of enquiry and can only be considered by you when they are regularly proposed by that court and when their utility to the good cause in general, as well as the interest of this country in particular, shall be carefully examined and approved of here.

In the meantime the King expects that you should make the most discreet and advantageous use possible of the powers, which are put into your hands, and that you should be particularly attentive that there be no fraud or collusion in the management of the other half, which Russia is to advance for this joint service.

The language which the Russian minister held upon this occasion may very fairly put you upon your guard, as his manner of reasoning carries with it a much stronger appearance of a wilful mistake on his side, than the fixing any charge of inaccuracy on your calculation.

Whitehall, 20th Nov^r 1764.

. As I find by Lord Buckingham's last letter, of the 17th past, that Count Osterman has received thirty thousand roubles from his court, and that his instructions are not to be backward on his part in the necessary expences, you will act in concert with such effectual influence as perfectly to answer the great confidence which his Majesty places in your zeal and ability.

The court of Petersbourg does not seem to have adopted any particular plan, and to judge by Mons^r Pannin's conversation with Lord Buckingham they do not appear to have any thing particular in view, and tho' they blame economy and limited expence upon the occasion, yet by the apprehensions they express of being drawn into the half of a subsidy, and by the sum they have transmitted to Mons^r Osterman, I question if they mean to engage in any measures which will carry them beyond the sum which we have proposed, and to which you are carefully limited by your present instructions.

You have already seen by the earl of Buckingham's letter that Mons^r Pannin would not agree to engage in the moiety of the sum proposed, but yet, upon considering the whole of that conversation, as well as the sum already transmitted to their minister at Stockholm, I should rather believe that their intention is to concurr with you in the article of expence.

I must however remind you to follow your instructions strictly and literally in that particular, and never advance a shilling without obliging Count Osterman to bear his proportion, nor to exceed the sum of four thousand pounds, without express orders.

Whitehall, 30th Nov^r 1764.

Having received the King's commands upon the remaining particulars of your late dispatches I am to acquaint you that with respect to the project of a defensive alliance, before you receive any instructions upon that point it will be necessary to know the sentiments of the court of Russia and whether they intend to order

their minister at Stockholm to accept of such a proposition, if it should be made to them at the same time that it is offer'd to his Majesty.

Lord Buckingham is directed to sound the Russian ministers upon this subject and will send you the result of his conversation with them, which you will receive as a matter of information, but will take no steps in consequence, 'till you shall be further instructed from hence. . . .

Secret.

Whitehall, 30th Nov^r 1764.

I find that the French ambassador at Stockholm has orders to propose the payment of the Swedish arrears (fixed at twelve millions) by the yearly sum of a million and a half 'till the whole is cleared, which will have been formally proposed long before this letter can reach your hands. This is the usual method by which France corrupts those governments, over whom she has gained an ascendant, by bribing them with their own money. I have the pleasure to acquaint you, from the same source of intelligence, that the French minister in Sweden [De Breteuil] does the greatest justice to your merit by expressing to his court the apprehensions he is under from your activity and abilities.

He endeavours, however, to make himself, as well as his principals, easy by being convinced that he has entirely gained the queen and the Swedish ministry, whom he represents resolved to concur in the measures proposed by his court.

I must inform you with respect to her Swedish Majesty that many months ago she was advised by the king her brother to close in with the proposals of France, whenever they were fairly offered, as she might possibly get something from them but never would from us, and indeed without this clue you, who are upon the spot, can trace out the turn and dispositions of that person, to know how well such advice would be relished.

The court of Denmark pretends great apprehensions from the supposed concert of Great Britain and Russia, in aiming to overturn the present constitution of Sweden. She asserts that the court of Petersbourg made formal overtures to her for that purpose, which she immediately communicated to France, after having rejected them with disdain.

The system, however, of that court is so trifling and inconsequent

that I send you this account more as a mark of their weakness and despicable dependance upon France than as any usefull intelligence to assist your transactions in Sweden.

I regret exceedingly to find by the mail of this morning that Slaughter, who was dispatched from hence the 9th instant, did not reach the other side of the water till the 22^d. I hope you have hit upon an expedient to remedy this inconvenience.

Whitehall, 4th Jany 1765.

Having received and laid before the King your several letters of the 7th and 11th past I am commanded by his Majesty to repeat to you what has been the regular and constant tenor both of your instructions, and of those which have been sent to the earl of Buckingham, upon the subject of Swedish affairs.

It was from a friendly attention to the solicitations of Russia that his Majesty resolved to risque a certain expence, in concurrence with that power, to traverse the projects of France in Sweden and to rescue that kingdom, in some degree at least, from her dependance upon the court of Versailles. For this purpose a sum was fixed upon, which added to that of Russia was judged sufficiently adequate to the purposes intended, at the same time the court at Petersbourg was given clearly to understand, both by his Majesty's ambassador and by their own minister at this court [Baron Gross], that if any thing further was expected the motion should come from them, and that any plan which they should refer to his Majesty would be examined with all that candor and friendly attention, which were due to an ancient and natural ally.

You will find in the course of my correspondence with you that this has been the constant language which I have been ordered to hold, and the court of Russia has always been particularly told that Great Britain will not take the lead in the affairs of Sweden; but their silence upon these propositions is either a proof that they are not serious in their designs, or that they wait to have them brought about at the expence of this crown.

The consequence in either case will be the same, for his Majesty, ever steady to his purpose and strict in his engagements, has faithfully fulfilled the one and will invariably pursue the other.

The only instructions, therefore, I have now to send you are to recommend the most careful and judicious use of the powers which are already given you, and as to any further views, they must

depend upon the part which Russia shall think proper to take, and the propositions which they shall in consequence submit to his Majesty's consideration.

Whitehall, Jan^{ry} 15th 1765

Baron Gross having lately receiv'd a courier from his court immediately communicated to me the contents of his dispatches, and particularly the plan of instructions which have been sent to Count Osterman, in order to regulate his conduct in the Swedish affairs.

With respect to the interior of that kingdom he is ordered to aim at re-establishing that balance of power between the king the senate and the states, which has been destroyed by a variety of abuses ; that the power of making laws declaring war and levying taxes should rest solely in the states, and that the senate should not have it in their power to break in upon that privilege in the open manner they did during the late war.

That in order to bridle more effectually the ambition of the senate endeavors should be made to restore all the king's just rights and prerogatives, but that this should be done independent of the queen by the assistance of good patriots, who neither wish to see an encrease, or diminution, of the royal authority, that the court party may not exceed the bounds prescribed by the constitution.

That these points, immediately affecting the interests of Russia, naturally engage all their attention, and that for this reason proper measures have been taken by them to attain the end proposed ; but that the overturning the French interest in Sweden, and gaining them over to our alliance, must be the work of Great Britain singly, who should endeavour to keep Sweden in a state of inaction whilst Russia, by entring into a close alliance with Denmark, which she has actually begun and which, by agreeing to a provisional stipulation upon the affairs of Holstein, she hopes to effect, will give that strength and activity to Denmark, which France has hitherto deprived her of, by making Sweden the active power.

For this purpose it will be necessary for the British minister at Stockholm to be furnished with full instructions, and to be provided with sufficient sums to overturn the French system, in which he must engage alone, the court of Russia, for various reasons, not thinking it convenient to make a common purse, but chusing that

each minister should act from his separate fund and move no otherwise, in concert together, than by communicating without reserve their respective measures and acting with an entire confidence to each other in whatever steps they may pursue.

It is unnecessary for me to make any remarks upon this plan, which Russia has actually adopted, and which they have deferr'd communicating to this court 'till it is too late to make any reply. It is indeed apparent that they never meant to receive an answer, as they know perfectly well how much these instructions deviate from every principle upon which (entirely at the request of Russia) his Majesty consented to send a minister to Sweden, and how contrary to the stipulation by which he was furnish'd with money, in order to employ it jointly and in an equal proportion with Russia, for the more effectually promoting the united interests of the two crowns.

You will therefore make the best use you can of the powers which you have already received, and endeavour to weaken as much as possible the effects of the French system, especially where the interests of this country may be concerned, if you find that you have not strength enough to overturn it.

Whitehall, 19th February 1765.

You will have seen by my letter of the 15th inst. how readily and graciously his Majesty listened to the application made by the Russian minister at this court, and gave you fresh powers to act in concert with Count Osterman, upon the assurances that he would proceed with you *pari passu* in those measures which would promote the mutual interest of the two crowns.

You cannot have a stronger proof both of the steadiness and uniformity of his Majesty's councils, and of the inconclusive spirit which has attended those of Russia, than by tracing the whole of this negociation to its source; wherein it will appear how that court has deviated from the original plan, and either by the natural instability of their government, or by motives which cannot easily be comprehended, they begun by building one system and suddenly adopted another, which they communicated so late to this court that there was no time left to form any other alternative than that of rejecting their proposals entirely, or else of embarking in so deep an expence that neither the state of this country, nor the principles of sound policy, could justify.

It was in compliance with the request of the Czarina, who seemed eager to renew the ancient alliance with this crown, that his Majesty consented to the overtures of Sweden in sending a minister to the court of Stockholm; it was at her solicitations that the King resolved to second her views in that kingdom for destroying the influence of France, at a joint and equal expence, and by measures which should be mutually concerted. They were constantly told that Great Britain would not take the lead, they were repeatedly invited to communicate their plan, and in the mean time his Majesty generously risqu'd a previous and certain expence upon their advancing an equal sum on their part, and upon the assurances given that it should be jointly employed, and by a perfect union of measures for supporting the common cause, of which the ruin of the French system in Sweden was always to be considered as the base.

In consequence of these arrangements, and by the effect of their influence, such springs were set in motion as have since produced that success in changing the general disposition of Sweden, and it was not 'till these great points were secured that the court of Petersbourg communicated their plan, which, by separating the views of the two crowns and by dissolving at once the principles upon which Great Britain embarked with Russia, not only destroys the project of the 31st August, which was absolutely formed upon their supposed concurrence both of measure and expence, but lays the crown under the necessity either of seeing the whole of their expence and negociation entirely thrown away, or else of entering into such engagements, and undertaking such burthens, as have been utterly disclaimed from the beginning.

It is from seeing the affair in this true and natural light that the Russian minister here has made such effectual representations, and given such strong assurances of a reciprocal expence and union of measures on the part of his court, as have induced his Majesty to give you further powers, to be employed only as you shall find Count Osterman authorized to concur absolutely with you, and as you shall find that concurrence will tend to the immediate destruction of the French influence; but you must not dispose of the additional supply unless you are satisfied it may be employed with effect, and to answer the purposes on which the whole tenor of your instructions have been founded.

Whitehall, 29th March 1765.

Tho' your letters of the 5th and 8th instant were detained so long by contrary winds on the other side of the water that I have not time to answer them fully by this post, yet I must not omit to inform you upon the subject of the full powers that his Majesty approves of your being furnished with them immediately, though perhaps it will be some time before you can make use of them, and I shall send them to you by the first messenger which shall be dispatched to Stockholm. In the mean time you will transmit to me such a project of a defensive treaty with Sweden as without entering into any subsidiary engagements may be consistent with the views and interests of this crown and be likely to take effect in the country where you are. In executing this plan you will endeavour to be as explicit as possible, that your instructions in consequence may be full and decisive, it being extremely necessary in a project of this kind, and in so critical a situation of parties and circumstances, that no time should be lost in bringing it to a conclusion.

Whitehall, 9th April 1765.

In consequence of your letters by Cleverly the messenger I received his Majesty's commands to send you, without loss of time, your full powers and such general instructions for forming the treaty in question as the nature of it can admit, or the shortness of the time will allow.

The treaties of 1700 and of 1719/20 seem to afford the proper base for that which you have now in agitation, allowing for those natural alterations which the different circumstances of time and situation of affairs render necessary.

His Majesty does not disapprove of making this treaty, which is in itself purely defensive, as simple and unembarrassed as possible, yet there are two points which you must always keep in your eye, in order to render this negotiation of general utility to Great Britain, either with respect to her own immediate interests or to her future views and connections in the north.

The first of these may be effected by having some general article inserted, similar to the 12th of the treaty of 1720, wherein, without entering into any particular discussions, such mutual advantages in trade may be stipulated as may put the contracting powers upon the footing of the most favoured nations, agreeable to the tenor of

the article abovementioned. The second object is of greater extent, and a more complicated nature, which it will be no otherwise necessary to explain than by telling you that our treaty with Russia is far from being in that forwardness which the King has a right to expect from the readiness and facility which his Majesty has shewn in the course of that negotiation.

That they have never been open and explicit, either in their own affairs or those which relate to Sweden, except by declaring that they wished to reverse the policy of France by making Denmark the active power, with whom they were then carrying on an alliance, which is since, I believe, concluded, and throwing Sweden into a state of inactivity. This, which would be good policy with respect to the interests of Great Britain, if our former connections with Russia were renewed and strengthened, would be of dangerous tendency whilst things continue on their present uncertain footing. How much more critical would it be if by a change of system, not difficult to be foreseen, the Houses of Austria and Bourbon should separate their unnatural coalition, and the Czarina's aversion to the court of Vienna and predilection for the king of Prussia should engage her to join that prince in the part which he would gladly take, that of uniting himself intimately with France.

The activity of Denmark would then be as troublesome to the interests of this country as the inability of Sweden would be a charge, and it will therefore be a necessary part of this defensive alliance to form it upon such principles that at all events his Majesty may not find himself encumbered by an useless ally, nor Russia have that additional reason for suspending her alliance with this crown, by availing herself of a disadvantage which she would have brought upon us.

Sir George Macartney has instructions by this night's post to inform the court of Petersburg of the King's resolutions upon this point and to make the proper use of it in promoting his Majesty's service.

Whitehall, 23^d April 1765.

. The King has taken particular notice of the plan you mention in one of your late letters for removing Mr Nolken from hence and replacing him by some person, in whom our friends in Sweden can confide. His Majesty entirely approves this idea, and would have you encourage it by all proper means, as it must cer-

tainly prove of great utility to have such a person at this court. I must at the same time do Mr Nolken the justice to say that his whole conduct here has been most perfectly inoffensive and not liable to the least exception, were not his connections and principles represented to be such as must prevent my ever opening to him on any point of business transacting with his court, which cannot but be a very disagreeable as well as inconvenient circumstance.

Whitehall, 14th June 1765

I send you by Pollock, the messenger, his Majesty's final commands for concluding the treaty between Great Britain and Sweden, and enclose for your clearer information the report of the Board of Trade upon the only point which has prevented your receiving these instructions sooner. In reading over the treaties, which have at different times and upon various occasions been concluded between the two kingdoms, I find that all those, which were not expressly meant to be temporary, are and ought to be still in force, and that therefore the idea of the British subjects being treated upon the footing of the most favoured nations should always be kept in view. However, as the Board of Trade, after consulting the principal merchants concerned in the commerce of Sweden, is clearly of opinion that the obtaining such general declarations in favor of the British traders in Sweden, as are set forth in your project, will be of such advantage to the commerce of the King's subjects as to make it a proper and beneficial article to admit in a treaty with Sweden, his Majesty is pleased to direct that you should sign the treaty as it stands in your project, except that in the 2^d article after the words "*Nations les plus favorisées*" you should insert, instead of what finished that article in the projected plan, the following words, *excepté dans le cas contenu dans le 3^{me} Article du Traité Préliminaire de Commerce et de Navigation conclu entre les Couronnes de Suède et de France 14/25 Avril 1741 concernant les droits à payer dans le Port de Wismar.*

As you will not fail to make a proper use of his Majesty's condescension upon this occasion, in not insisting too rigorously upon the letter of former treaties, which still subsist between the two crowns, so you will remember that the alteration mentioned above must be insisted on as a *sine qua non* of your signing the treaty, the report of the Board of Trade being very strongly and very properly decisive upon that point.

I am charged with no other instructions for you upon th^r subject of the treaty, except that in the preamble you must obviate any expressions which may seem to convey the supposition that all former treaties between Great Britain and Sweden are expired; the words *les Traités défensifs &c^a étant expirés* may for that reason admit of too much latitude, for tho' it is very true that our treaties with Sweden, which are particularly defensive, have a term of duration assigned them, yet others which are permanent may upon any future dispute be entitled ~~tr~~ties of alliance and defence, and their existence under such an interpretation be contested. It is extremely easy (by artfully throwing in a word) to remove this difficulty, without letting it appear that you have any jealousy of their entertaining such a design.

His Majesty has no doubt, from your usual zeal and ability, but that you will bring this treaty to an immediate conclusion, and the return of the messenger will be expected with some degree of impatience.

I send you enclosed a précis of the treaties between Great Britain and Sweden from the year 1654, which I believe includes them all; I find that you have had copies of most of them sent you from this office, but you will find them here given you in one view.

LIEUT.-GENERAL HENRY SEYMOUR CONWAY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(Record Office, Sweden 107.)

Whitehall, August 10th 1765.

Your letters of the 23^d of last month were received this day, and the matter of them appearing extremely important I immediately laid them before his Majesty, and in the duke of Grafton's absence, who is gone out of town on some private business, I took his Majesty's commands thereon, and particularly on that part of them where you speak of the great effect to be drawn from a proper distribution of some money, in the present critical situation of affairs in Sweden, and of your want of instructions and power to furnish yourself with the sums necessary for maintaining our influence in the diet, and improving the advantages already gained by the friends to his Majesty's cause and party there.

His Majesty is sensible of the great importance of these objects, and being satisfied from your clear account of the state of affairs

there that a single hour should not be lost in giving you the assistance you want at this critical moment, has ordered me to dispatch the bearer immediately and to acquaint you that you may draw for any sum, not exceeding two thousand pounds, which you shall have occasion for, not doubting of your care and discretion to employ it in the most effectual manner for attaining the several important ends mentioned in your last, maintaining the interest of his Majesty and his friends at that court and counteracting the artfull and active means used by the French ministers to subvert it.

The disadvantage you mention yourself to have laboured under, not having any money at your disposal while your adversaries were furnished liberally by their courts, was certainly great; but as the court of Petersbourg, whose interest in these transactions is more immediate, will, it is to be hoped, have done her part, by giving the expected credit to Count Osterman, and as the zeal and prudence of your united endeavours have already gained the victory you speak of in the late assembly of the nobles, his Majesty cannot but flatter himself that a continuation of the same zeal and ability on your part, with the farther assistance now given you, will soon bring that great work to a happy conclusion.

AUGUSTUS HENRY FITZROY, DUKE OF GRAFTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 107 to 109.*)

Whitehall, Augt 16th 1765.

. . . . When I laid before the King your dispatch of July 16th, containing a copy of the declaration you intended to give to the president of the chancery [Count Ekeblad], in order to bring on the consideration of the treaty of alliance between the two crowns, his Majesty was pleased to express his entire approbation of it, being conceived in terms the most unexceptionable and best calculated not to give any alarm or handle to the adverse party, and his Majesty, confiding in your known zeal and ability, doubts not that you will speedily bring that work to a conclusion the most advantageous to the interests of his kingdom, more especially since you will have received, by Claverley, those means

of support which you have hitherto represented as all that was now wanted for the obtaining the very important objects of your present negociations.

Sir George Amyand has undertaken to transmit to you himself the letter of credit, which was promised in Mr Conway's dispatch.

Whitehall, Sept^r 10th 1765.

The success of the French party in Sweden, related in your different dispatches of the 19th 20th and 23^d of August, was received with the more concern, as your preceding letter of the 16th had given reason to expect a very different account. Pollock the messenger, who was to be dispatched by you on the 25th, is not yet arrived, and by whom you was to send to me your reasons more at large for the absolute necessity of a power being given to you of drawing for a sum, when some urgent moment required it.

Without waiting for this messenger I have it in command to acquaint you that his Majesty is graciously pleased to allow you that power, to be made use of on such an occasion, as far as to the sum of 3,000£.

This farther mark of his Majesty's good intentions to the cause you are supporting in Sweden will be received by you, I trust, with all that gratitude which so peculiar a proof of confidence deserves. I am likewise to say that this power given to you is not to be made use of except on the most evident necessity, nor is it necessary that the whole of the sum should be drawn for at once. It is meant by his Majesty as a resource to which you are to have recourse only on those occasions, when the interests of his Majesty manifestly require it. I must repeat again this injunction, as the terms on which this power is granted to you, who are to make use of it with discretion and at a time when it can be efficacious. You will draw for the whole, or any part, in the same manner as you did for the last.

Whitehall, October 4th 1765.

I have been commanded to write to Sir George Macartney to acquaint you directly from Petersbourg, as soon as he has obtained the explanatory declaration on one of the articles of the treaty of commerce. When he sends you word of his success you are to give assurances to Monsieur d'Osterman of a still more hearty concurrence with his court in the affairs of Sweden. Sir George

Macartney's intelligence to you on this head is to guide in some measure your behaviour towards that Russian minister. In the mean time there should be no alteration in your conduct towards him, and even, if you are forced to speak to him on the treaty of commerce, you may say that you hear this court only requires an authentick declaration of that which Monsieur Panin has already made by authority from the Czarina. It would be, in fact, doubting their fair intentions to suppose it could suffer any difficulty.

I am confident that it is not necessary to give a caution of this sort to a minister who has conducted himself with the prudence and perspicuity that you have ever done, but to fulfill his Majesty's commands I am to say that it is expected to receive here the terms on which you conclude the treaty, in the manner most beneficial to this country, in order that the King's pleasure may be taken upon them before you proceed signing it.

Whitehall, Oct^r 25th 1765.

As the diet draws nearer to a conclusion it is more incumbent upon us not to lose sight of those motives, which first induced his Majesty to allow so considerable a sum to be risked in Sweden, with the hopes that it might be employed to such effect as to be very beneficial to this country. It will also be necessary to take a view of those which are fulfilled, and make use of the time which remains to bring about such as have not yet been touched upon.

The zeal and ability, of both of which you have given such evident proofs since you have been at Stockholm, make me confident that you are only waiting the opportunity, that may be the most suitable, to obtain advantages essential to the commerce of this country.

If I was not to remind you on this head, and of the King's expectations from your endeavours, I should not do justice to that readiness which his Majesty has always shewn, on the recommendation of his ministers, to furnish you with the means to carry them into execution.

The first great end, and of the greatest consequence to Great Britain, appears indeed to be compleatly answered; at least for a time you have prevented the navy of Sweden falling into the power of France. This one point alone his Majesty considers as a compensation for what has been disbursed, especially as the King

was informed, by the secret intelligence, that our rival nation had formed a plan of so dangerous a nature. I am commanded to say that this service to this crown has been brought about by your activity, and will never fail to recommend you to his Majesty's favor. Having succeeded thus far by the prevention of an evil, it is hoped that you will not reckon your work compleat till you have obtained some point by which the trade of Great Britain might be freed from many difficulties imposed upon it by the Swedish government. The expectations here on a point so desirable for this kingdom do not exceed the ground of hope which you gave in your most secret dispatch of August 31st, and in that of October 20th of last year; and on which you founded the consequences that might encourage his Majesty to interfere in the affairs of that country.

Private.

Whitehall, Nov^r 16th 1765.

His Majesty very much approved of the language held by you to M. Osterman on the subject of the farther credit which M. Gross's letters to him had given him reason to expect would be sent you. I am now authorized to acquaint you that his Majesty has most graciously been pleased to allow you to draw for two thousand pounds, which is the sum wanting to compleat the thirteen thousand promised by this court to that of Petersbourg to be furnish'd for promoting the common interests of both. I have only to recommend to you to make such judicious and discreet use of it as will most effectually tend to the advantage of the common cause, and more particularly to the success of your present negotiation.

Whitehall, 3^d Jan^r 1766.

I cannot help expressing my surprize that as the King advances in his bounty to support in Sweden that party, which has professed a desire of abandoning France and connecting itself with Great Britain, so in proportion does that system stop in its progress. Nor did I imagine that a dispatch of yours, dated but seven days after the arrival of Walker the messenger, should so soon apply for a fresh credit. I cannot help desiring you on this occasion once more to turn back to your former dispatches; in them you will see by what assurances of your's his Majesty was first encouraged to embark in this affair. You will reflect on what was asked for, and you will then naturally consider the effect it has produced,

and how far the easy success you have met with in the diet has, as yet, turned to the interests of this country or to the advantage of it's commerce. I must also remind you that Walker, who carried you final instructions upon the treaty of alliance, was also the bearer of a fresh supply, to be employed, if necessary, to get that treaty through, which you yourself in repeated dispatches looked upon as unobjectionable in every respect, and indeed little could be expected from the solidity of an ally, who should hesitate on so innocent an act, particularly at an instant when those, who profess themselves the friends of our system, are at the head of affairs. This argument will be sufficient to make his Majesty wait for the issue of that negotiation, before greater lengths are gone; and as soon as I hear from you that the treaty is concluded I shall instantly acquaint you with his Majesty's farther commands. I must not conceal from you that any hesitation upon it will very little encourage the King's servants to advise the support of a system, which then would bear so unpromising an appearance.

In answer to one part of your secret letter of December 10th I cannot avoid expressing again my surprize that you should argue, from my silence, that Mr Gross's account to Mr Osterman was founded. You may be assured, Sir, that whenever I receive my Sovereign's commands upon any point they shall never be transmitted to a minister of the King's but thro' my own channel. This consideration alone ought to have proved to you that Mr Gross must have mistaken my meaning, or have misrepresented it. I mention this for your own information as to what is passed, not having yet heard his Majesty's pleasure on any future plan, farther than what has been already communicated to you.

The conduct of Russia towards us will probably have great weight in the decision of that point. You judge right of the earnest desire his Majesty has of preserving the good understanding which subsists between this court and that of Petersbourg, and as you represent Mr Osterman's assistance to be so necessary in passing the treaty there can be no objection to your acquainting him that any failure or backwardness in it must necessarily damp any resolution that may be formed here of proceeding further.

The declaration transmitted here, and of which Sir George Macartney sent you a copy, was neither so explicit as we could have wished it, nor was it signed by ministers under a full power authorized for that purpose.

Whitehall, Janry 24th 1766.

As I had acquainted you, in a former letter, that the fixed system here was to give no subsidy to any power whatever during peace, and as I had represented to you that I thought there could be but one inducement which could be of weight enough to determine his Majesty to depart from so wise a plan, I was in hopes that it would not have been necessary for me to have repeated any thing more on that subject. You will find in the dispatch I allude to, and which I believe you had not received when you wrote yours of the 24th December, that I there give it as my opinion that the case alone of adding such a fleet, as joined to that of Great Britain may preserve to this country it's superiority at sea, can be a sufficient motive to encourage his Majesty to depart from so just a resolution. The fluctuating state of the government of Sweden would alone render it unadvisable to depend on her for such a naval assistance, if she was, in other considerations, in a situation to give it. You must have immediately felt, as I am confident you did from what I then said, that Sweden does not stand in such a light as to prove the propriety of granting her a subsidy. If I have been led to repeat this to you it is on the appearance in your dispatch of the 24th December that the marshall and the four senators at your conference with them are not without hopes of obtaining a subsidy from Great Britain, and that, if you have not encouraged such expectation, you have at least admitted the plausibility of their reasoning.

This is so different from their professions, and your assurances, at the beginning, when his Majesty was first induced to support their cause, that I could have wished you had fairly represented this to the leaders of the party, who must all along have known, if they went any lengths to break with France, that the court of Versailles was not likely to pay them the arrears, nor to continue the subsidy.

Besides, Sir, if it becomes necessary for the credit our friends must keep up in the country that some means must be found to answer for the loss Sweden will sustain by changing it's political system and quitting the alliance of France, it seems on every account to be the moment to make proof of the real intention of Mons^r Panin, and whether he is sincere in that system which he has communicated to Sir George Macartney, and thro' Mons^r Osterman to you.

The moment appears critical to decide this, and I am commanded to say that you should on the receipt of this represent to Mons^r Osterman the impossibility there will ever be of forming that system, and fulfilling that plan, if Russia does not at this time give the friends of the party assurances that from the Czarina may be expected a treaty of subsidy, that may make amends for that which they are likely to lose. On conversing with that minister you will be careful not to engage yourself so as to answer for any part that his Majesty will take in forming the general plan. It will be easy for you to avoid it by different means, among others by saying that you conclude that his Majesty's ministers at Petersburgh [Sir George Macartney] and Copenhagen [Walter Titley and Robert Gunning] will have received orders on that head, that the present state of his Danish Majesty's health must necessarily stop all negociation of that nature at present; but I would recommend to you above all things to shew to Mons^r Osterman that so great a plan risks to be crushed in its birth, if the Empress does not avail herself of the present moment.

As far as I can venture to answer for future plans, it must be from Russia that they are to expect a subsidy, nor can I foresee any circumstance that can induce his Majesty to grant such a one to Sweden in time of peace.

You are not to understand by this that his Majesty has come to any resolution not to support farther the prevailing party in Sweden. It relates only to the inexpediency of the measure of a subsidiary treaty, which would be as little satisfactory to the King and to his ministers as to the people of Great Britain. I must moreover add that what his Majesty has already granted for the support of their cause has come purely from himself, and which the King will probably discontinue, or go on with, guided in that, as his Majesty is on every instance, by the prospect there may be of advantage to his crown and the general interest of this country.

The event of your present negociation will bring on a farther consideration on this head.

Whitehall, Feby 28th 1766.

It was not without surprize that his Majesty, as well as his ministers, received a treaty signed by you, in which some articles differed from the instructions I was commanded, and did send to you by my letter of the 16th November, by Walker. It is impossible

but the alterations made in the 5th article must strike you as greatly wanting the force, which the correspondent article in the project approved of by his Majesty carried with it. I am, notwithstanding, to acquaint you that as this affair has gone such lengths his Majesty has not refused to ratify it, especially since there can arise no harm from any part, whatever real efficacy and importance the whole may want. I must add, however, that the King in taking this step, which appears inadequate, is induced to it merely by a desire of conciliating a good disposition with the court of Sweden, which the refusal of it might drive again into the hands of France.

If this treaty is all that Mons^r Osterman brags his court has done for the benefit of Great Britain, I am of opinion that it will be easily repaid. But when I find, by the whole of the correspondence, that what his Majesty has expended in Sweden has been at the instigation of the Czarina, and that you have repeatedly been instructed to intimate this to her Imperial Majesty's minister, I did not expect that you would admit a claim of obligation from thence on that account.

I have no grounds to think that his Majesty will ever come into a measure of giving a subsidy to Sweden, much less will I ever advise such a one, in time of peace, to be given at any rate to a power which I look upon as insufficient to answer the only great end that can justify that measure.

The nature of the Swedish government, as well as the weakness of it's marine, give no prospect that Great Britain can hope from thence such a certain reinforcement to its navy as to maintain that superiority, which the true policy of this country requires to be kept up at sea over the combined fleet of it's powerful neighbours.

You will observe, Sir, that the whole of this is thoroughly consistent with that scheme which Mons^r Osterman opened to you by Mons^r Panin's order, and by which Russia was to take Sweden upon herself. Whatever stop the difficulties upon the treaty of commerce with Russia has occasioned in that plan, they have not, however, been such as to make his Majesty lose sight of settling, some time or other, the basis of a negotiation, which promises so powerful an alliance. In the mean time his Majesty would have you assist Mr^r Osterman in his endeavours to ally the courts of Russia and Sweden, and you may be assured that any facility and advantage that you can obtain for the British trade will always recommend you the most to his Majesty's favor.

As to what you mention in your letter of the 5th, by Walker,

that you knew it to be the president [Löwenhielm]’s wish that Great Britain would accede to the defensive treaty of alliance, which Sweden is likely to renew with Denmark, I can give you no instructions upon it until I can receive his Majesty’s commands, for which purpose I should be glad that you would transmit me a copy of it by the earliest opportunity.

Secret.

Whitehall, April 11th 1766.

. . . . In your conversations with M. Osterman you will take care to shew him that his Majesty continues in a disposition to cultivate the same good harmony that has been established between our two courts, that he must recollect that M. Panin, in opening his plan to Sir George Macartney, as also to you through him, proposed that Sweden was to be secured by the means of Russia.

Tho’ this great affair has for some time remained in suspense, yet I can not conceive that so promising a plan, and one which seemed equally the wish of the two powers which were to form the basis of it, should be totally laid aside; much less do I imagine that Russia, if she earnestly desires it to be compleated, should now neglect an opportunity of securing Sweden, which perhaps no future moment may effect. I am not without hopes that some expedient may be found out to make the treaty of commerce admissible here, to which his Majesty would not have raised difficulties, if they had not been essential for the interest of his kingdoms and the power of Great Britain. This affair once concluded would allow a freer ground to enter on the other negociation.

Whitehall, 15th April 1766.

Your several letters relating to the presents to be given to the Swedish plenipotentiaries employed in the late treaty having been submitted to the consideration of his Majesty and his ministers, I am to acquaint you that the King is most graciously pleased to allow you to draw for a sum not exceeding four thousand pounds for that purpose; but as his Majesty has extended his bounty thus far in order to leave no room for dissatisfaction with any of the persons interested in it, if that end can be attained for a less sum you will not fail to be as economical as the case will properly admit of. The particular distribution of it is trusted to your judgement, which your knowledge of the practice on similar occasions, as well as of the dispositions and expectations of those you have to treat

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with, will be the best direction to, and it is not doubted but you will use this confidence that is placed in you so as shall conduce most to the good of his Majesty's service.

You will draw in the usual form upon Sir George Amyand for the amount of the presents, and you will take care to transmit to me a particular account of the manner in which you shall have distributed them.

LIEUT.-GENERAL HENRY SEYMOUR CONWAY, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 109 to 113.*)

St James's, June 13th 1766.

The proposition in yours of April 15th relative to a loan of £400,000 to be made here has been taken into consideration, and if things are in such a situation, as that the effecting of such a loan will really establish the system, which has cost so much trouble and expence in the formation, you are at liberty to give assurances that we shall have no objection to their pursuing their plan of borrowing the £400,000 upon the terms they propose.

You will see by the dispatch of the 5th October that there never was an idea here of permitting this loan, 'till such time as things should be so ripe that the pursuing of this measure should insure the completion of our plan, and this sentiment you will keep constantly in your eye, your situation enables you to form the best judgement, and if you find the times are ripe for it, and that it is necessary for the credit of our friends, and the real good of Sweden, to make the loan, you may assure them that no assistance hère, which is consistent with the dignity of this crown and the good of this country, will be wanting.

It was certainly very agreeable news to hear that Mor [Karl] Rudenschiold was expelled the senate, not only as we got rid of a troublesome, and perhaps dangerous enemy, but as the example may teach others to be more cautious in their conduct. Notwithstanding the resentment which the nobles seem to express it is understood here that this senator is actually and irrecoverably expelled; if this is really the case it is thought that the success in this measure may be imperfect, and only temporary, if that senator's place is not filled by one who may be relied upon, and whose entire concurrence may enable our friends to compleat their plan of expelling the other

two obnoxious senators [Baron Hiarne and Count von Liewen]. I have it therefore in command from his Majesty to inform you that if you can positively effect the two points of filling the vacant seat in the senate with a friend, and insure the expulsion of the two other delinquent senators, you may expect a remittance of £4000. But if you can expect only to insure the election of a friend, without the hopes of expelling the other two senators, it is thought that £1000 should suffice, or at most that you should not exceed £2000, for that particular object and for putting the affairs of our party on a good footing at the close of the diet. And on this plan I have his Majesty's orders to say you may, if you see an absolute necessity for it, draw as usual for the sums, and with the restrictions above respectively specified. His Majesty hopes this new advance will convince Mr^r Osterman of the zeal and sincerity of this court in prosecuting the interests of our common cause in Sweden, and that it is expected, whatever expence you are now at, he will bear his full share in.

I could wish that the hopes you express in your letter of the 23^d May, that the prudence of the chiefs of all parties will prevent things from going to extremities ; but if an headstrong violence aims at once to overturn our system, and the constitution of the country, I have it in command from his Majesty to inform you that you are to join with Mr^r Osterman in any declaration that may be thought conducive to the preservation of the constitution and the present form of government.

St James's, June 28th 1766.

I have this instant received an intelligence of that consequence as induces me to forward it to you by a messenger immediately ; you may conclude from the dispatch, with which I send it, that you can rely upon it for authentick.

The French ministry have adopted an entirely new system in regard to their connection with Sweden. They think it no longer their interest to depend upon any party or faction there, which is liable to be continually overthrown itself and consequently, as the French reason, can give no permanent security to the cause they adopt, and are therefore not to be depended upon ; for which reason they have determined to make an absolute change in the form of government and to reestablish the prerogative royal in Sweden. The French are aware that the crown, when their power is established, may not prove at all times favorable to the views

of France, but this possible and future evil is preferred to the futility of their system of depending on a party.

St James's, July 15th 1766.

I have nothing new in command from his Majesty, and write at present with little further intention than to acknowledge your letters of the 20th and 27th past.

I cannot, however, help taking this opportunity of a kind of interval in the greater operations to recal your attention to the commercial advantages looked for by us in our connexions with Sweden ; I need not affect to inform you what they are, your letters previous to the treaty sufficiently manifest your knowledge on this subject. You seemed at one time to have good hopes of establishing a new tariff, and indeed of putting the whole British commerce upon a better footing than it had been with Sweden ; nor could there be an object more worthy of your attention, as it is probably the most, perhaps the only solid benefit we can propose to recompence the trouble and expence we have been at. Yet of late I am sorry to find the hopes you have formerly and repeatedly given on this important subject seem less in our view than before, at a time, too, when the growing strength of our party in Sweden should daily improve our means and prospect of success in it. As your political operations in the senate seem, however, to be near at an end, you will have more leisure to attend to the matter ; and as it has not been possible to carry all your wishes in the senate there will remain in your hands a considerable part of the money his Majesty permitted you last to draw for ; which cannot be better employed than in facilitating the accomplishment of this very useful work.

St. James's, 9th September 1766.

. Notwithstanding Mr Osterman's opinion I must beg you will apply your utmost diligence to the affairs of our commercial interest, and not desist from your endeavours for a new regulation of the tariff. If that, however, cannot at present be effected it will undoubtedly be something to accomplish the expectation you seem, by your letter of the 8th August, to entertain of taking off some of the most prejudicial prohibitions.

Your last of August 19th mentions that the affair of the constitution was then upon the carpet. As this is a point the court

of St Petersbourg has much at heart, I take it for granted Count Osterman will be enabled to go great lengths to carry it, in which you will naturally concur, still keeping your eye to our commercial advantages. You will give him all the assistance in your power, as certainly our success in that point promises to be the most effectual impediment to the views entertained of overturning all that has been done by the future interposition of royal authority.

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St James's, September 30th 1766.

I am very glad to find that the affair of the constitution is not only likely to pass, but to pass so satisfactorily and creditably, as to have the sanction of the four orders without a division.

It appears, I think, by the advances that have been made to you that there exists a real inclination to change their system and form a connection with Great Britain. The reception, however, which you gave those advances, relative to a defensive alliance, was very prudent. Should the ministerial overture, which you seem to expect, be made to you, you will receive it with great cordiality and not fail to express the strong desire his Majesty has to unite with the crown of Sweden in closer connection upon any proper and admissible grounds, in which the article of a subsidy must be understood as absolutely excepted. You will at the same time remind them of the larger view his Majesty entertains of forming such a system in the north as may ensure the preservation of the general tranquillity; and as it is his intention to act in the most perfect concert with Russia in that great work you will inform the Swedish ministers of the necessity there is of communicating with Mr Osterman, so as no uneasiness may arise from that quarter, for you well know how apt the jealousy and imperious disposition of that court may be to take offence at the appearance of any negociation, which is concealed from them. You will endeavour therefore to learn from Mr Osterman what are the particular views of his court relative to Sweden and what are the advantages to the common cause, which they propose from the success that has fortunately followed the joint exertions of this crown and Russia. The great difficulty will be to struggle with the desire that court has long shewn, that we should take the burthen of a subsidy to Sweden on ourselves, to ease them of the same obligation, so that the more positively he is acquainted with

our settled resolution not to give way on that head, the less he may be inclined to oppose such a connexion of our's with Sweden as may make their return to the system of France, our joint rival, hopeless and impracticable ; for some tolerable prospect of which I think we are much obliged to the imprudence and intemperance of Mons^r de Choiseul and his friend at Stockholm, in their late conduct. And I believe there is little reason to doubt that the French ministry, from Mons^r de Breteul's representations, look upon the connexion with Sweden as in a manner broke for the present, so that the opening is fair, and it is to be hoped Russia, who has a joint interest with us in improving it, will not let either her jealousy, or any false expectation of bringing us to the terms of a Swedish subsidy, prevail to make it slip.

If these obstacles do not prevent you may turn in your thoughts, and even talk with the ministers of the state on such terms as may be agreeable to our present system, rather hearing than proposing them and not doing any thing that may engage to particular articles without farther instruction. . . .

St. James's, October 17th 1766.

I am to inform you that his Majesty has been pleased to order that your draft for £300 should be paid, but I must at the same time say that the King is not well satisfied that you should have drawn at all, without having obtained his permission for so doing, the rather as you are very well aware that in the whole of this business it was not without reluctance that your court has engaged in the expence it has occasioned. You know, too, that the last sum that you were permitted to draw for was granted only upon certain conditions, and under restrictions, but at the same time fully expected that would prove the last expence. In case the diet should continue beyond the expected time you are on no account to draw for a single penny more without his Majesty's leave obtained, and you are not to expect any bill so drawn will be accepted.

I hope the foundation is already laid for such a revision of the tarif as may prove beneficial to this country without farther expence ; I much fear, otherwise, that the considerable sums already laid out in Sweden will turn little to our advantage.

Tho' I cannot at the same time but much commend the activity and diligence you have shewn in the conduct of these affairs, my doubts arise from my fix'd opinion of the venality of that country,

and the danger from thence of their falling back to France, who will pay them.

St James's, October 24th 1766.

By my last you will find that the King was not at all pleased at your having ventured to draw for money before a declaration of his Majesty's pleasure had authorized you thereto, yet I had no sooner writ it than I found by your's of the 7th you had again run into the same fault, and that again, without consulting your court, you have agreed to pay half of the 4,000 crowns which Count Osterman had advanced. Your manner of mentioning this step, too, is almost as of a thing of course, without a single circumstance of apology or appearance of real necessity from the exigency of affairs, that might have excused you to his Majesty.

I cannot help reminding you, Sir, of the substance of my letters, which from time to time have declared to you his Majesty's pleasure on this head. On the 13th of June, his Majesty having resolved to expend as far as £4,000, upon certain conditions, I informed you that you might draw accordingly for that sum as usual, with the restrictions specified, and to draw for different portions of it in proportion to the service that was to be performed. In my letter of the 15th of July I tell you his Majesty expected that as so much of that large sum remained in your hands, from the non-accomplishment of some of the conditions it was granted upon, he hoped you would be enabled thereby to forward the commercial interests of his people. In my letter of July 4th the sum there allowed was distinct and granted upon *another principle*; for upon your representations of not being restrained at the conclusion of the diet I had his Majesty's commands, on the 1st of August, to inform you that, provided you found it conducive to our interest, you might draw *for the remainder* of the sum his Majesty had granted by my letter of the 13th June.

You will see by this, Sir, that when his Majesty had vouchsafed to allow all that sum to be expended in the common cause, beyond the largest estimate of these expences, he had reason to conclude that it would have been the last; much less could he imagine that you should first draw for a sum without consulting your court and then immediately write you had agreed to incur a still further expence.

It is with great reluctance I am obliged to say your conduct on

this occasion is by no means conformable to the instructions I have transmitted to you ; and I must hope your more punctual execution of his Majesty's orders hereafter will prevent my ever being again under the same disagreeable necessity of blaming, where I wish to commend.

St. James's, Novber 14th 1766.

I congratulate you upon having brought the diet to a conclusion so satisfactory to his Majesty, and it is with great pleasure that I inform you that his Majesty approves your diligence and activity during that interesting and perplext scene of business.

As the affair of a defensive treaty with the court where you reside has in a manner lain dormant for a while, I cannot blame your caution in applying to your court for fresh instructions upon that head, when you found that it was again coming upon the carpet. But as his Majesty, as you know, has all along wished to form a nearer and more intimate connection with Sweden than at present subsists, provided all idea of subsidy was excluded, and he continues in the same sentiment, so that I can have little more to do in answer to your letter of October 17th than to refer you to my former letters on this subject. I would particularly call your attention to mine of the 30th Sept^{ber}, where you are directed to receive with cordiality any ministerial overture towards a defensive alliance on proper and admissible grounds. His Majesty's sentiments at present are so entirely conformable to what they were at that time, both in regard to the immediate connection with Sweden and in regard to the relation that connection might bear to another great court, that I can not give a fuller intimation of his Majesty's intentions relative to that object than is expressed in the letter I mention, and to which, I perswade myself, you will give your utmost attention

St James's, 26th Decem^r 1766.

I have wrote to you very lately, and much at large ; but as the king of Sweden's late conduct in the senate cannot but justly alarm you, and may perhaps open a new scene in Sweden, it calls on me to give you all the light I possibly can relative to the present designs of our adversaries ; and I may, I think, venture upon good authority to tell you that the French, despairing of success in any other way, and affecting to despise the weakness and insignificancy

of the Swedish alliance in her present state, have undoubtedly fixed upon the plan of a change in the constitution there, as the only effectual one, and are resolved on some violent means for the execution of it, if there is energy and spirit enough among their friends there for such an undertaking. But they have expressed such doubts on that head, and particularly, as I am told, from the character of the king of Sweden, little suited as they imagine to the execution of any great or bold undertaking, that had it not been for his late behaviour in the senate I should scarcely have hesitated to conclude that, however fixed their opinion may be, their designs were not yet ripe for execution, tho' it is, I believe, many months ago that I informed you, as I recollect, from my Paris intelligence that such a scheme was then laid, and tho' every step in the conduct of the French ministers and their party from that time clearly evince it. The strong and rough language of Mons^r de Choiseul to the Swedish minister at Paris [Count Gustaf Filip Creutz]; that of Mons^r de Breteuil at Stockholm; their quarrel on the slight pretence of our late insignificant treaty; their disavowal of almost any connexion with Sweden; and their refusal of the subsidiary arrears; these joined to their professed despair of success by any of the ordinary means, and the strong declarations of their adherents on the conduct of the diet and the depression of the regal authority, all confirmed the notion of a settled plan for a change in the constitution, even before this last violent measure of the king; which, with your other intelligence relative to the scheme of a temporary abdication &c., seems only to indicate, I think, that it is probably nearer its execution than was imagined.

These are the reflexions that occur to me from such lights as I have been able to procure; your own, together with your diligent observation of what passes on the spot and the information of your friends, will enable you to form a more mature and perfect judgment of the true state of things, and of the event that may probably ensue.

I have heard so strong an assurance lately of Mons^r de Schack's favor with Bernsdorff, and even with the French ministers, that I can't help giving you this hint for your future observation.

I have related to you very sincerely as well my information as my opinion in this peculiar crisis. You will make your own use of them, but sure our friends are now called upon, if ever, to

act with firmness, and even with expedition, in the part they are to take, if they think their liberties worth preserving.

St. James's, Jan^{ry} 9th 1767.

I cannot but suspect with you that Breteuil has something in view to obstruct our measures. As to his idle boast of leaving the country, if our treaty should be perfected without the grant of a subsidy, he can have no such intention, for I think I may say he has not yet had any instruction of that sort from his court; so that he had probably some motive for his inquisitiveness, which he did not think proper to avow but hoped to conceal under that affected menace. As you think it may be useful to know what the exact pensions are, that France pays in Sweden, I may, I believe, venture to assure you that Mo^r Tessin receives 12,000 livres a year, with the half of it to his wife, in case of his death. Mo^r Scheffer receives 10,000 livres, and Baron Hermanson 8,000; the Barons Levenhopt and Sparre, the under governors of the prince, have 2,000 each. Hopken was thought to have some scruples at times and not to have gone thro' their work, for which reason they would not allow him a settled pension, but as he had done some service it was determined to give him a sum once for all. As to Lowenhielm, the French court have determined never to give him a farthing more. This is all I can at present say with any certainty, and being upon this subject I cannot but take some notice of what you say in No. 14, relative to my road of intelligence. The means that were supposed by Osterman are too wild to deserve much consideration, but still I should not wish that his mind was left to rest itself upon any one opinion whatever; I could rather wish that his and others' sentiments on that head were vague and undetermined, for it is not to be explained how even an opinion, ill grounded in itself, may lead to a discovery of the fact, or at least to such inquiries as may in other respects have some evil tendency; which from every reason, both of publick utility and the personal safety of those who are of such infinite service, I would wish should for ever be an impenetrable secret; tho' to say the truth the means of our intelligence are of such a nature that with all the confidence in which I write to you I cannot with any degree of propriety give the least intimation of the channel it comes through. It is a French one, and such as you may rely upon it, that if things do not happen agreeable to the information I send you that arises from a change

in the French councils and not from misintelligence. I wou'd by all means recommend it to you to take proper and cautious means of removing any whatever fixt opinion Osterman may have form'd on this head.

St James's, Feby 20th 1767.

Your first three letters of the New Year arrived together on the 7th inst^t, and I am glad to find you have at least broke ground in your new negotiation. I agree with you that your first endeavour should be to induce the Swedish ministers to come into direct negotiation on the plan or project of a treaty to be transmitted hither for his Majesty's approbation. In what they may first propose it will perhaps be impossible for you to prevent their making demands for a subsidy, and it may probably be necessary for their own safety they should do so, but it is equally necessary that you should, agreeably to the uniform tenor of your instructions, assure them of the absolute inadmissibility of any such proposal, and by any influence you can acquire, or reasons you can urge, endeavour to have the project framed as near as possible conformable to the heads or general plan, which by his Majesty's orders I sent to you in my letter by Arduin. Mons^r Nolcken has not spoke to me since on the subject, which, if he had the instructions you mention, I am surprized at; when he does you may be sure my discourse shall be such as to afford our friends a very full witness in him of the impracticability of obtaining a subsidy from this country.

After all that has passed I can scarce imagine that either their inserting the demand of a subsidy in the project, if they should persist in it, or their instructing Mo^r Nolcken to treat with me on that footing, are either of them calculated on any other principle than those of obtaining that evidence. As to the full powers, the moment you can transmit such a project as promises the least hope of success, they will immediately be sent, and I could wish all other difficulties were as easily to be removed; it is clear that France will omit nothing in her power to distract and disturb you. The pretence they now put up of the arrears having been lodged at a bankers, ready to be paid when Sweden shall change her sentiments, is so flat a contradiction to all the professions of the French minister in Sweden, and particularly to his declaration of breaking all connections à *jaignais*, that I have little faith in it,

notwithstanding the assurance of the Swedish minister [at Paris, Count Creutz] on that head. Their deceiving him in that point is quite within the bounds of French artifice. I am afraid, however, our friends were not over prudent in leaving a man at the court of France so ready to second and guaranty every the most contradictory assertion of a French minister.

I shall be curious to see the representation of the College of Commerce ; it may possibly appear, upon examination, that the Swedish privileges in France are not of that consequence they have been persuaded to believe them. I cannot, however, but augur ill to our revision of the tariff, if it is to be made by the very board who are preparing this representation in favor of a French system. I will not take upon me to say any thing at present decisively, but when this representation shall appear it will be worth consideration, whether Sweden may not possibly find as great commercial advantages and conveniences in a connection with Great Britain as with France. Our ports are open to the Swedish ships, and most of the commodities for the Turkish trade are to be had here as well as in France, if they chuse to stop here in their passage to the Mediterranean, or they may follow another method with advantage ; the Swedish large ships, which now return home empty, may find a back-freight in our cloths and other commodities for the Turkish market. Minorca too, as you mention, is open to them as a port, for I do not apprehend that our trade laws in any sort preclude foreign ships from thence, nor am I at all clear that if a closer union should be formed between the two countries Minorca might not become a depot of mutual benefit to us and to Sweden. At all events the alarm of their being excluded from Marseilles must be ill founded, for France is not so wanton in her wrath as through resentment to others to hurt her own export trade. And if she were unadvisedly to shut the Swedes out of Marseilles I still see no great cause of uneasiness to Sweden, for Leghorn, a free port, is still open, where every kind of goods for the Turkish market is furnished as well as in any port in Europe ; and when all the boasted advantages that France holds out to lure and deceive the Swedes are examined, I scarce doubt that we should find little else than her own advantages covered by the name of indulgence to her ally. As it is, however, on the ground of commercial concerns, and the loss of the subsidy from France, that the partisans of that power will raise their clamour, those considerations will deserve

your utmost attention. I am glad to see Count Osterman in the temper of co-operating with you, and I rather hope his conduct will be approved of by his own court. Sir George Macartney's of the 22^d Dec^r/2 Jan^{ry} 1766, of which he has sent me a copy, seems to imply that Mo^r Panin is at last well inclined towards our treaty. The object in this treaty, as in the last, is principally to establish the new system in the north and to overthrow and root out the French interest and influence, and to make room for that system, which the Czarina has so justly made the object of all her endeavours. I should therefore hope that Russia would cordially co-operate with us in a measure of at least as much consequence to herself as to us.

I wish I could immediately furnish you with the names desired in your letter No. 3, but I shall make the proper enquiries and endeavour to be informed on that head; at present I have no direct intelligence to guide me. As to the king of Sweden's first paper, I do not think it was formed in concert with the court of Versailles, nor even meets their approbation, but was merely the effect of temper in the queen and prince [Gustavus], who have since repented of their violence and will probably, for the future, be more under controul.

Your draught for £480 will be duly paid, and his Majesty is satisfied to bear the exchange, if you think the leaving it on others may essentially tend to disgust and disincline the parties to his service, but there has been so much spent in Sweden, and the benefits in return are so uncertain, that it must be your aim, and is certainly your duty, as much as possible, to restrain every kind of expence.

As to your question in regard to the present of 3,000 ducats to Mo^r Lowenhielm, his Majesty consents to your assuring him of it, and also to your going as far as 2 or £3,000 farther in such shape, and with such persons, as you may judge most advisable, but on the condition of and to be paid on the *actual ratification* only. It is hoped at the same time that after all his Majesty has expended since the commencement of this diet that you do your utmost to save him this expence.

St. James's, May 5th 1767.

By our last intelligence from Paris we learn that a considerable sum was lately remitted to Stockholm, in order to pay the king of Sweden's debts and to fix him in the interests of France. This

information, which we think we can depend on, coincides with the account which you formerly transmitted to us, but which at that time we were inclined to think a little doubtful. I have also reason to know that the schemes formerly in agitation for a change in the Swedish government are by no means laid aside, tho' not yet in such forwardness as to threaten any immediate innovation.

His Majesty is well pleased to see the treaty with Sweden in such forwardness, so far as it may tend to fortify the bands of amity between the two nations, but is sorry to find that it is still to be clogged with an article of subsidies, a demand which, they have been repeatedly told, can never be complied with. This unreasonable expectation on the part of Sweden it is feared will prevent the execution of the proposed alliance; but I can assure you that nothing else will be wanting on the part of England to cement an union between the crowns.

St. James's, May 22^d 1767.

The project of an alliance, which you have transmitted me by Ardouin the messenger, shall be laid before his Majesty and his servants. Mean while it is almost needless to inform you of the determination to be expected, since I have so often mentioned his Majesty's firm resolution, not to agree to any subsidy, that you will foresee the impossibility of our ever complying with the Swedish demands.

Perhaps the very receiving their project, with such a clause in it, was giving them too much encouragement to expect success, and by inspiring false hopes could only turn their view from those conditions, on which a solid union between the nations could be founded. If there be any real interests that unite England and Sweden, as I am persuaded there are, they may remain durable, and will ensure the performance of articles agreed on. But a pecuniary confederacy will readily, when the exigence occurs, be overcome by superior offers of the same kind, and all past payments be found so much money uselessly lavished. I am glad to find you still entertain hopes that an alliance with Sweden may be made on a more reasonable footing, and should willingly be informed on what grounds you esteem this object feasible.

It were much to be wished that the king of Sweden and the French party were not so obstinate in their project of changing the constitution of Sweden, and of encroaching on the liberties of the

people. Such schemes are often attended with fatal consequences to the authors, and never fail to beget confusion in the government and to disable the state, in which they are conducted, from making any vigorous efforts for its own greatness or security. I have, however, no doubt that such designs are actually on foot, tho' I think not yet ripened into any form, and wanting perhaps the vigour of some able hand to put them into execution.

Your account of the money remitted for payment of the king's debts corresponds exactly with my intelligence. As to the affair of the ships, tho' my information is positive and in a channel I thought not to be suspected, yet as well from your information as to the subsequent silence of my correspondent on that head I am much inclined to think it groundless from other circumstances, and see no great probability of it's reality.

The French minister had certainly previous notice of the terms of the project, but whether from Mons^r de Lowenhielm I cannot say.

St. James's, 2^d October 1767.

. What you propose in regard to the plan of concert with Russia and Denmark well deserves consideration. If the stability of one of those courts, I mean it's administration, and the immediate disposition of both were exactly what we wish I should have great hopes from it, both as the likeliest means to forward our treaty and to build on that the future establishment of the right system in Sweden. I am sorry to find that the high expectations of Mons^r Panin, in respect to our pecuniary assistance there, and his great attachment to his own particular plans make our success in such a scheme very doubtful; nor is the consideration of future expence at all an indifferent one.

St. James's, 27th October 1767.

. The hint you gave of endeavouring to engage the courts of Russia and Denmark to promote our treaty, on promise of giving a joint support to the administration in the next diet &c.^a, seems by no means to be neglected; tho' just in the present state and temper of those courts I think the matter is better to be sifted than directly proposed. I have written to Mr Gunning on the subject, who may be able to discover the sentiments of the ministers there, in case he finds the idea at all encouraged by Mr de Saldern, who, whatever prejudices he may discover, is, I believe, a friend

to the system. This, however, I have directed him to do not as a proposition from hence, but in the most cautious manner, and as a private idea only. You will do right to communicate with him on it, and had better do it before you mention the affair to Count Osterman, for fear a double communication should discover from whence it comes ; it may afterwards be judged how far the measure should be pursued. I thought a hint in that manner would have less the air of—instruction, than by coming from you to Count Osterman.

It is unlucky that in this interval, and absence of our minister [Sir George Macartney] from Russia, the moment is not favourable for making any serious proposition there ; soon, if we see room for it, I should hope we may.

WILLIAM HENRY ZUYLESTEIN, EARL OF ROCHFORD, SECRETARY
OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 113 to 117.*)

Whitehall, 2^d Dec^r 1768.

I have received all your letters to No. 40 and have laid them before the King ; they all met with his Majesty's approbation, but particularly the last of the 8th past ; your conduct in managing the three delicate points you mention was extremely judicious, and in pursuing the same method I should hope you will be able to convince our friends there that it is not upon a principle of despising Sweden, that we refuse entering into a subsidiary treaty with them. There are times for all things, and it is not so much from a principle of economy that his Majesty does not chuse to enter into the views of Sweden with regard to the article of a subsidy, but upon a great and wise political principle taken up from the experience of the inutility of them. In establishing this doctrine, with proper precaution not to offend those who heartily wish an alliance with Great Britain, you will continue to pursue the tenor of those instructions formerly given you by Mr Conway, as I have read them over with care and do not see they want any addition or alteration. I need not recommend to you to be very attentive to every step Mons^r de Modene takes. I know the man personally well, he has a turn for business, and will be glad to cut out work for himself to make a figure in. He is full as enterprising

as ever any French minister was, I have been witness to many of his indiscretions and shall be much surprised if he does not get into some scrape.

(*Secret.*)

Whitehall, 13th Jan^v 1769.

Your letters to No. 49, the last received, as well as the whole state of affairs in Sweden, have undergone a full consideration by the King's servants, whose unanimous opinion thereupon his Majesty has been pleased to approve.

I am in consequence to acquaint you that although the account given by you of the general consternation of our friends in the late bold step of the king of Sweden, and the reasons to suspect the fidelity of some of them, does not afford a very flattering prospect of what they may hereafter be able to perform, his Majesty thinks it of importance to keep up a party attached to the interests of Great Britain and to endeavor to obtain such a majority in the ensuing diet as may defeat the attempts of France to make use of Sweden as an instrument to her ambition in disturbing the tranquillity of the north, and consequentially of all Europe. With this view his Majesty permits you to assure our friends of a pecuniary support, and to draw in the usual manner at different times, as you shall have occasion, for a sum not exceeding five thousand pounds, to be distributed among those whom it may be necessary to keep steady, and to acquire such others as may be useful to us; and his Majesty expects that this money should be laid out with the greatest discretion and that you give an exact and faithful account of it. I flatter myself to have ground to assure you at the same time that you will not meet in this respect with so powerful an opposition from France as you may be led to imagine by the gasconnades of M^r de Modene, for although we are not acquainted with the precise sum he has had remitted to him we are well informed that it is not large and that in the bad situation of their finances the French ministry do not think they can afford to spend much at present in their negotiations in Sweden, but hope to dazzle the royal party and to induce them to run all lengths by the promise of future support from France, which it will always be in her power to withhold when they shall have engaged themselves too deep to retreat. Another circumstance, which it will be of great advantage to you to know, is that notwithstanding the confidence with which the French minister

speaks of the open support that will be given by France to her party we are well acquainted that the court of Versailles is so diffident of the success of its projects as to have instructed M. de Modene not to commit them by letting them appear to take an open part in what may be done. I may add that the meeting of the States is not the means by which France has hitherto hoped to carry her schemes into execution, or on which she has now great dependance. You will in consequence endeavor as much as possible to take this terror off the minds of our friends. His Majesty wishes to go hand in hand with the empress of Russia in maintaining such an influence in Sweden as may bring about their common end of preserving the tranquillity of the north, by hindering that crown from entering into any engagements contrary to it, and is still farther desirous of inducing it to enter into such a treaty as he can admit, consistent with sound maxims of policy, that may effectually secure the publick peace. His Majesty therefore approves of your cooperating with Count Osterman in the most confidential manner in the means of attaching such persons to the common interest as may maintain a superiority in the government. But with regard to the joint declaration, which that minister wishes to be made by the two courts, as appears by the inclosed extract of a letter from him communicated to me by Count Czernicheff, I am to acquaint you that his Majesty doth by no means approve of that measure, as it is the object of Great Britain to gain Sweden but not to pledge herself to oppose at all events what may be determined there contrary to her wishes. But though the King cannot agree to such a *formal declaration* yet if the throwing out hints amongst our friends of the part England might probably take, should an attempt be made to alter the constitution of Sweden, be judged by you likely to produce a good effect, you are at liberty to do so with the proper prudence and caution, not to commit his Majesty in any shape.

With regard to the subsidy treaty I need say but little to you as you seem yourself satisfied that this is not a time to enter into any negociation of that sort. You will therefore easily be able to keep our friends off that subject, as a thing at a distance, and endeavor to turn their thoughts entirely to the immediate point of gaining such a strength in the diet as may hereafter perhaps make the conclusion of an honorable alliance with Great Britain a matter of no great difficulty.

*Most Secret.*Whitehall, 31 Jan^{ry} 1769.

Having lately obtained the following important informations (which you may absolutely depend upon) in an extraordinary manner from the City, I communicate them to you in the greatest confidence and must recommend to you to make use of them with the utmost prudence and caution, that they may not be suspected to have transpired.

The French plan was always to make the king of Sweden absolute by a sudden stroke, without waiting for the convocation of the States, as the means of bringing about a revolution. The establishment of the commission of enquiry by the senate, from which they expected some principal persons of their party to fall under heavy punishments, hastened their determinations. They flattered themselves that the senate would have persisted in their refusal to assemble a diet, in which case every thing was concerted for a coup de main under the direction of Count Fersen, who took the whole management on himself. The senate was to have been arrested, troops drawn up round Stockholm, the command of the fleet seized, and a diet called to meet in fifteen days. This plan was entirely disconcerted by the compliance of the senate. It had been in agitation to make this attempt without waiting for the final determination of the senate, but on sounding the publick they found them not disposed to approve it. They now flatter themselves that the diet will be favorable to their views, but are much afraid of the efforts of the English and Russian ministers and their money, of which the French party is in great want. Mons^r de Modene has four hundred thousand livres allowed for this years expences in Sweden, but presses to have it double, which we know it will be impossible for him to obtain in the present distressed state of the French finances. He had at the end of last month taken up one hundred thousand livres of Messrs Grill, to be reimbursed by Mr Magon de la Balue at Paris. Mons^r de Modene is at the same time said to be very uneasy at the orders he has lately received from the duke of Choiseul, not to let France appear openly in the operations in Sweden.

It is hoped, in case my letter No. 2 should not have arrived in time, that the decision of the senate to assemble an extraordinary diet will have prevented you making the declaration recommended to you by Lord Cathcart, which would have engaged his Majesty in a direct avowed opposition to the proceedings of the king of

Sweden. My letter will have sufficiently explained to you that it is not thought a prudent step at this time, though circumstances may hereafter induce his Majesty to take stronger measures. In the mean time it is his Majesty's intention to cooperate heartily with the empress of Russia in supporting a joint party in Sweden and to contribute a pecuniary assistance for that purpose, and it will be expected of you to explain clearly the points you apprehend necessary to be gained, and the precise sums requisite, that his Majesty may judge of the real value of the object.

Secret.

Whitehall, [7th] Feby 1769.

. His Majesty was glad to find that the court of Petersbourg have given Count Osterman such a discretionary credit, as must be very serviceable to counteract Mons^r de Modene's having got the start in his instructions with regard to money. You will have seen by my last that though the King cannot consider himself so deeply engaged in interest as the empress of Russia, nor consequently be willing to involve himself in so great an expence, his Majesty has however not determined to refuse contributing what may be reasonable, the value of the object always considered.

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Whitehall, 7th March 1769.

. With regard to the expences you are likely to be put to by the assembling of the diet I am at liberty to assure you that your situation will be made easy to you, and I hope very shortly to acquaint you with the allowance his Majesty thinks proper to make you for that purpose. You will have received the draught of a declaration in my letter No. 5, such as his Majesty approved of your making in consequence of your letter No. 2, and I shall in my next inform you whether his Majesty permits you to extend it in the manner you have expressed yourself in the draught you have now inclosed. My former letters will have given you to understand that his Majesty did not mean to restrain you to the five thousand pounds already allowed you, where proper occasions called for a further expence, but as it may prevent your uneasiness on the uncertainty of such further draughts, as you might propose, being approved of by the King, and may be a means of saving time where the objects may demand a quick determination, I have his Majesty's permission to acquaint

you that you may draw at different times as occasions shall require on Messrs Amyand and Siebel for the further sum of seven thousand pounds, making in all twelve thousand pounds.

Whitehall, 24 March 1769.

Your letter No. 13 appeared of so great importance that his Majesty was pleased to refer it to the consideration of those servants, whom he trusts in his most secret affairs, and I am to acquaint you that after the most mature deliberation the reasons given for the conclusion of a treaty of subsidy were not thought sufficient to induce them to advize his Majesty to depart from a maxim so well grounded on past experience, as that of giving no subsidies in time of peace. You must be sensible from what has been already said to you by my predecessor in office and myself that this resolution is not to be attributed to a spirit of parsimony, which would be unworthy of this kingdom when great and proper occasions present themselves, but to the inutility of former alliances of this kind and the dissatisfaction raised by them in the whole nation, who have felt themselves charged with an annual burthen in time of peace without reaping proportional benefits from it when a war has come on. At the same time the declaration, which my last letter empowered you to make, will have shewn our friends in Sweden the light in which his Majesty, as well as the courts of Petersbourg Copenhagen and Berlin, look upon any attempt to alter the constitution of Sweden or disturb the tranquillity of the north, which the promised assistance of France might tempt the court to make, and will I do not doubt give them courage to exert their utmost efforts in opposition to such designs.

Secret.

Whitehall, 7th April 1769.

Your letters Nos. 17 and 18 have been received and laid before the King.

I think it necessary to communicate to you, under charge of the greatest secrecy, the following intelligence received from Paris of the intentions of the court party in Sweden, from whence it should seem that it is not at present the French plan to prevent the assembling of the diet at Norkioping by any act of violence, of which you express your suspicion, although you cannot be too much on your guard against any sudden resolution of that kind, which may be the effect of their not thinking themselves quite

secure or of the queen's violence of temper. When the secret committee is once composed to their mind the senate will be deposed. They will then proceed to the reformation of the government, and as soon as the decisive vote is given to the king they will give the charge of compiling the new code to the secret committee, which will set out to Stockholm and the States follow them, unless it should be thought that staying a few weeks longer at Norkioping may finish the business ; which the French ambassador advizes as the safest way and most likely to shorten the diet, as is their great point to do as much as possible. They propose to attach Prince Charles to them (whom they are sensible they have too much neglected) by giving him the command of ten ships proposed to be opposed to the Danes. The French ambassador and Mr Scheffer have paid particular attention to him and flatter themselves to have got into his favour.

Whitehall, 9th May 1769.

Your letters N^o 28 and 29 have been received and laid before his Majesty.

The contents of them seem to shew what has been all along to be feared, that the French party are likely to carry every point they wish in the present diet. Indeed the very great expence they have gone to, and far beyond what any of the King's ministers could have been justified in advising his Majesty to engage in for the object of an alliance with Sweden, and the tempting bait France has had in her hands by the offer of the payment of the arrears of subsidy, make it highly probable that if his Majesty had found reason to depart from the maxim of giving no subsidies in time of peace ^{the} prevailing party, backt with so strong a support of money, would have rendered any proposal abortive and have only subjected Great Britain to the disgrace of having courted an inconsiderable power and been baffled in it. The events which have happened appear, as you seemed in your letter No. 12 to foresee, to make any further expences useless, except for the support of our particular friends, who may happen to be threaten'd or distressed, for which purpose his Majesty permits you to draw in the usual manner for five thousand pounds ; in the mean time I am anxious to hear from you what further steps have been taken, and what plan the court party are likely to pursue in consequence of this first success, as well as what plan you think it would be prudent or advisable

for us to adopt in the present situation of affairs at the court [where] you reside, as likewise whether you 'and the ministers of the three other courts have thought it a proper time to present the declarations you are instructed to make, which it is to be hoped will have the effect of checking any violent proceedings which might be meditated against our friends, as well as the intended subversion of the constitution. At the same time, notwithstanding the haughty language which the duke of Choiseul has affected to talk to the Danish minister at Paris [Baron Gleichen], we have very good reason to believe that the court of Versailles, in the present well known state of their finances, does not think seriously of embarking in a war, which the declarations must give her reason to imagine may be the consequence of her taking extraordinary measures to promote her project of establishing an arbitrary power in Sweden, or attacking either Russia or Denmark.

Whitehall, 6th June, 1769.

Your letters to N^o 41 have been received and laid before his Majesty.

I am sorry not to be able to furnish you, from the correspondent who some times supplies me with useful intelligence, with the information whether any difficulty is at present made by the court of France of paying up the arrears of the subsidy due to Sweden. Your last letter seems to make the sincerity of Count Fersen's professions extremely doubtful, and therefore things may consequently be much altered before this reaches you, but if you should still think there is room, at least from outward appearances, to pay him a compliment in the King's name on his moderation, and that it may be of service to the cause, his Majesty leaves you at liberty to do it. Since my last letter to you the Danish minister [Baron Diede von Fürstenstein], in consequence of instructions from home, expressed to me, in a long conversation, the desire of his master that the four courts should use their efforts to support the remains of our party in the diet, and profit of the disunion of our adversaries to preserve as much as possible the present constitution, and particularly to make a stand for the preservation of the regulation of 1756, which the French party cannot with good grace oppose, as being their own work. I acquainted him that you had orders to act entirely in concert with the ministers of the three other powers for the support of our friends and to prevent as much

as possible a change of the constitution, and that you would have such assistance of money for that purpose, as was reasonable. I must on this occasion observe to you that Count Czernichew has all along mistaken the assurance, that what should appear necessary would not be refused, for that of an unlimited credit being given you, which his Majesty does not think in any case proper.

Whitehall, 28 July 1769.

Your several letters down to No. 52 have been received and laid before the King.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that the judgment you have formed of the immediate union of the four courts in an alliance, to which Sweden should be invited to accede, being the only effectual and proper measure to prevent Sweden from entering into a dangerous connection with France, has met with the highest approbation of his Majesty and his ministers, who have all along considered such a plan as the most consistent with his Majesty's dignity, and best calculated to shew all Europe that a solid system is established in the north, which must be a strong barrier to the ambition of the house of Bourbon. His Majesty has in consequence repeatedly proposed this step to the court of Petersbourg, but I am sorry to say that hitherto it has not been seen there in the light that it deserves, nor has that court shewn the disposition, that could be wished, to meet the King upon equal and honorable terms, since instead of embracing so fair and becoming a proposal they have expressed doubts of his Majesty's system, which has been so often explained, and have, without shewing (the necessity of which you very properly point out) what efforts Russia and the other two courts are ready to make in Sweden, required a very large supply from Great Britain as a preliminary to Russia's concluding the alliance with us, which, if complied with, must make his Majesty appear as purchasing that alliance, a light in which, it has been constantly inculcated to them, he can never suffer himself to stand.

The present circumstances of Sweden (when a declaration of war against Russia is clearly out of the question, and it does not appear that the prevailing party are likely to propose, or at least to carry through any considerable alteration of the constitution) do not justify his Majesty's servants in advizing so great an expence as fifty thousand pounds, which has been suggested as the least that could be expected. At the same time it is thought proper

not to deny a reasonable support to our friends, and to enable you to pursue the plan you have already begun with so good a prospect of success to disunite our adversaries, which as you judiciously observe seems at this moment more likely to be done by giving play to their natural jealousies, and encouraging a defection from motives of interest and pique, than by intimidating measures, which might have the effect of uniting them. For this purpose you are at liberty to draw in the usual manner for the farther sum of five thousand pounds, and you will continue the same communication of sentiments with the Russian and Danish ministers [Ivan Osterman and Gregers Juel] as to the most useful way of employing it.

I wish it were in my power at present to give you the information you desire on some points.

Secret.

Whitehall, 18th August 1769.

The King's servants being at this season almost all in the country I have not yet had an opportunity of collecting their sentiments on the extensive plans of operation proposed by Colonel Pecklin, but you may depend upon hearing more fully from me in a few days. In the mean time I have some doubt how far it may be thought expedient to engage so deep, as it does not appear likely that the French influence will prevail on the reigning party to push matters so far at this time as to be a real subject of alarm to us. At all events it will be necessary to know what part the courts of Russia and Denmark are willing to bear. The intelligence in my last letter may perhaps have explained to you the reason of Colonel Pecklin's professing so peremptorily for your determination, but I can at present only furnish you with hints, and must leave it to your judgement upon the spot how far his sincerity is to be depended on. . . .

Whitehall, 25 August 1769.

Your letters No^s 56 and 57 having been taken into consideration at a meeting of the King's principal servants, I am to acquaint you that Colonel Pecklin's third proposal in No. 56 is thought to extend as far as it seems natural to expect in the present situation of Sweden, and to answer his Majesty's great end of hindering that kingdom from disturbing the tranquillity of the north, by preventing a change of constitution which possibly might be a preparatory step for such a design. His Majesty in consequence is

willing to cooperate with the courts of Russia and Denmark for the carrying this point, if upon a full examination of the means proposed for the execution of this plan you should find reason to be satisfied of Colonel Pecklin's sincerity, and of the probability of its success ; but it must at the same time be understood that the King expects that those powers, who are certainly more immediately interested, should contribute at least their full quota for this purpose. I am therefore to signify to you his Majesty's permission to draw at different times for the third part of the sum proposed of thirty thousand pounds, but you will take care not to pay any part of it out of your hands without seeing that proportionable advances are made by the other two ministers. The proposals themselves, on the face of them, suggest the greatest caution to be necessary in the proceeding upon them, as the variety offer'd at once, and the precision pretended to in each of them, give them too much the air of the schemes of a projector. It must, however, as I have before said to you, be left ultimately to you to judge of the expediency of venturing upon them. I must only recommend to you to issue the money entrusted to you as gradually as possible, that the success of those parts of the plan, which are to be first tried, may be a measure of the confidence you are to place in the event of the following attempts, before you put out of your own power the supplies required of you for the execution of them.

I am sorry that I am not yet able to communicate to you the particular intelligence you wish with regard to the French subsidies.

Whitehall, 27 October 1769.

I took the earliest opportunity of receiving the King's pleasure on your request for a further allowance for the monthly expences of the diet. His Majesty, from the greatness of the sum last granted and the effects which were promised from the execution of the proposed plan, considered it at that time as sufficient in itself to bring the diet to a favorable end. The King does not think proper to engage himself in a constant expence to an uncertain period, when it must depend on future circumstances to judge whether it is adviseable to continue it, but in order not to check your present operations, whilst they are carrying on with a prospect of success, is pleased to permit you to contribute, till farther orders, to the monthly expences you mention and to draw for the amount in consequence, not exceeding the sum specified by you of £1,800.

I am sorry not to have received any thing from my correspondent worth mentioning to you.

Whitehall, 24 Nov^r 1769.

I have deferred answering your letter of the 27 last, No. 81, till I could have a meeting of such of his Majesty's servants, whom he principally consults on affairs of importance, and I need not tell you that the purport of your letter was of a nature to require the maturest consideration; for it is very natural for the King's servants to weigh well, whether the object proposed is attainable, and also whether it is worth the great sum of money that has been expended to attain it.

With regard to the object itself there can be no doubt but the oversetting the schemes of the French party in Sweden and preventing a total subversion of the form of government, which has been the plan of the three courts from the very beginning, must, if it succeeds, be productive of the best of consequences. In order to carry this point it is believed here (notwithstanding what the Russian and Danish ministry may think) that we have been full as liberal as the interest we have in the success of the measure ought to have induced us to be.

In order to set your present demand for more money in its true light I must refer you to your letter No. 56, in which you offered three plans, and we then understood that as soon as one of those plans was adopted, and the sum demanded in consequence granted, that there would have come no fresh demands of a pecuniary kind. Since then £1,800 a month has been allowed during the continuance of the diet, which was supposed would be finished before Christmas. After this fair representation of our concerns in the diet you must not be surprized to find his Majesty's servants greatly alarmed at a fresh demand of £6,000, especially as we have now reason to believe from your letters that the principal point is in a great measure attained, and from other intelligence we receive we know that as soon as Mons^r de Modene sees no possibility of carrying his point as to a subversion of the constitution he will cease laying out any farther sums, and of course the French interest will entirely drop.

You, who are upon the spot, are certainly the best judge how far it may be prudent or necessary to expend the farther sum of six thousand pounds for clinching the whole, and if you see a fair prospect of succeeding in so capital a point as replacing the deposed

senators, or advantages equal to it, in that case you may draw, as usual, for that sum ; but at the same time I must inform you that this is the last that will be granted, and it is expected from your ability and discretion that the best and most prudent use will be made of it.

With regard to that part of your letter, in which you mention what you have written to Lord Cathcart, I must observe to you that the negociation of the treatys being now entirely at a stand it will be a matter of future consideration for his Majesty's ministers in what manner it may be adviseable to renew it.

Whitehall, 15 Dec^r 1769.

Your letters down to No. 86 have been received and laid before the King.

The news of the constitution of Sweden being effectually preserved, which has been all along the object of the three courts, gave, as you may imagine, great satisfaction to his Majesty and his ministers. You will have understood by my last that this point being carried, by which the designs of France have been entirely frustrated, and a further sum having been already granted for the purpose of reinstating our friends in the senate, it is not thought adviseable to engage deeper in a plan of never ending expences on the bare speculation of what may be farther attempted.

I have great pleasure in conveying to you his Majesty's highest approbation of your zeal diligence and activity in carrying through this important affair.

With regard to Colonel Pecklin, the King entirely approves of your giving him the vacant pension, and will not be averse to bearing a part with the other courts of such farther recompence for his services, as shall be concerted between them.

I learn from my correspondent that the French party looked upon the deposition of the present senate as inevitable, if they miscarried in the affair of the constitution, and I have good grounds to assure you that they have no farther assistance of money to expect from the court of France.

Whitehall, 5 Jan^ry 1770.

. . . . You judged very prudently in the present disposition of minds in not offering in form a renewal of the negociation for a defensive treaty with Great Britain, and indeed, as I have before

intimated and you appear to understand, it is not consider'd here as so desirable an object in itself, but as a proper accessory to a treaty with Russia and Denmark, by which the pacifick system of the north would be consolidated, since if France should ever succeed in the attempt, which it is probable she will be continually making, to detach Denmark from the interest of Great Britain the alliance of Sweden might prove rather a burthen than an advantage to us.

My letter No 31 will have enabled you to give Colonel Pecklin satisfaction, with regard to his Majesty's sense of his services and his willingness to concur with the other courts in rewarding them.

The manner in which I am well assured Mons^r de Modene has explained the points of the French plan for altering the constitution agrees perfectly with what you have already understood on that subject.

Whitehall, 30 Jan^{ry} 1770.

I have at present only to acquaint you that we are informed by my old correspondent that it is at present the idea of the court party in Sweden to strike some stroke by force, when they find the opportunity; that they complain of Mons^r de Fersen's timidity, and do not mean to communicate the plan to him till the last extremity. It may be proper for you to warn our friends, but with a great deal of caution, not to discover the quarter from whence you receive the intelligence.

Whitehall, 27 Feb. 1770.

Your letters down to No. 6 have been received and laid before the King. The successes mentioned in your last are important and were unexpected here, as since the affair of the constitution the French party appeared rather to have gained ground. I have great pleasure, at the fortunate close of the diet of Sweden, in assuring you of his Majesty's approbation of your conduct in the management of his interests during so critical a period.

Private.

Whitehall, 19th October 1770.

. Before you left England I gave you the fullest instructions with regard to your future conduct, and at the same time informed you of his Majesty's approbation of the plan for the three courts, previous to a dyet; but I think before you embark in this undertaking it would be prudent to see what turn affairs take in Denmark, for that may change the whole system. I shall therefore

expect to hear from you before you engage in the plan proposed for the three courts, unless you shall find the minister of Denmark [Gregers Juel] still abiding by the first project of a concert between the three courts for the purpose of making a strong party in the ensuing dyet.

Whitehall, 4 Dec^r 1770.

Your letter N^o 51 of 13th November, and your private one of the same date, have been received and laid before his Majesty.

Your answer to Count Osterman was very proper, that there was no change in his Majesty's desire to act in concert with the court of Russia but that it might naturally be supposed a matter of consideration at St Petersburgh, as well as here, whether in case the concurrence of Denmark should fail the same kind of plan were to be pursued. At the same time the affair did not seem to press so much, as your meeting with Count Osterman in November was considered as the projected beginning of the operations, whilst the plan of our adversaries must necessarily remain in suspense 'till they know the success of the prince royal's negotiations at Paris.

His Majesty is now pleased to permit you to make use of your credit, not exceeding, however, the settled quota of Great Britain, and indeed, if the court of St Petersburgh are desirous that his Majesty should take upon himself a greater share of the expences in Sweden, and support the system of Russia in the north in conjunction with her alone, exclusive of Denmark, it becomes them to shew themselves more determined than they have yet done to give his Majesty a cordial and effectual support with regard to other parts of the system of Europe, in which the two courts have all along agreed in theory.

GEORGE MONTAGU DUNK, EARL OF HALIFAX, SECRETARY
OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 118.*)

Whitehall, Feby 12th 1771.

. By letters lately received from Lord Cathcart I see that you look upon it as certain that Denmark has deserted the plan of joint expence in Sweden, and that you have communicated to his Excellency your doubts, whether you shall now be authorized to furnish half the sum necessary, in conjunction with Count Oster-

man, or whether you shall still be restrained to the third part originally agreed to be given. I therefore take this opportunity of giving you, for your own satisfaction, my opinion that if the court of Denmark was absolutely to decline her part in that concerted measure his Majesty would probably be willing to contribute one half of the estimated expence, rather than by the want of a sum, which makes no very considerable difference, the execution of the plan should be disappointed and the attainment of the object in view, as well as the expence already made, be totally lost. But I am glad to acquaint you that at present we have no reason to suppose such a defection on the part of Denmark, and should be much concerned at such a proof of that court's abandoning the system she had adopted; on the contrary Baron Diede assures me that he does not understand it to be the intention of his court to decline the share she agreed to bear in this business, and Mr Gunning's late letters inform me that Mo^r d'Osten, whose influence seems to be increasing and whose dispositions appear to be very favorable to the views of Russia and the system of union, has at his instance promised to take the first opportunity of laying the affairs of Sweden before the king his master. If, notwithstanding these grounds of expectation, you should find it evident and certain that Denmark will not contribute her third, you will no doubt immediately inform me of it, and in that case I shall lose no time in receiving and transmitting to you his Majesty's pleasure upon the enlargement of your present credit.

Whitehall, March 1st 1771.

Your dispatches No. 4 and 6 by express to the Hague, and from thence by an extraordinary packet, were received here last Wednesday late at night and as soon as possible laid before the King, who saw with equal surprize and concern your account of the sudden death of the king of Sweden.

The immediate assembling of a dyet, which you represent to be the necessary consequence of this unexpected event, is a very disagreeable consideration here, as it may bring on a new and heavy expence so much before the time which could give any expectation of it. If, on the one hand, the King cannot but regret this unforeseen occasion of expence, at a time when it can so ill be afforded, and in addition to the large sums already bestowed on the affairs of Sweden, his Majesty, on the other hand, cannot but be unwilling

that those sums, and the objects they were meant to attain, should be lost by the want of a farther supply. But as no judgement can be formed here of the expence of carrying the points, which you mention, his Majesty finds it impossible at present to fix the sum which he may think proper to bestow on the ensuing dyet. I have it therefore in command to desire that you will as soon as possible transmit to me the most accurate estimate you can form of the probable amount of the whole expence that may be necessary on the part of this court (supposing the whole to be divided in three) in the course of the approaching dyet, and upon the receipt of such estimate I shall signify to you his Majesty's farther pleasure. In the mean while, that no detriment may happen to the joint cause by the want of money, the King is pleased to authorize and allow you to draw for such sums as may enable you to go on *pari passu* with the Russian and Danish ministers; or, if Denmark should decline or neglect to furnish her quota, with Count Osterman only. You will lose no time in communicating the purport of these orders to Lord Cathcart.

You will observe that you are directed to cooperate step by step with the Danish minister as well as the Russian, and to divide the estimate of the whole expence in thirds, because it is still hoped, and expected, that the court of Denmark will adhere to her system and not hesitate to contribute her share on an occasion of so much importance; and you will see by the inclosed copy of the letter, which I write by this conveyance to Mr Gunning, that he is directed to press the Danish ministry upon this point and to acquaint you with the answer which shall be made to his instances. There are other circumstances also which seem to warrant a degree of hope that a few and extraordinary expence may be the less necessary; such as the possibility that the present king of Sweden may not adopt the politicks of the late reign, or that the court of France may be unable or unwilling to bestow large sums in the support of an opposition which in the last trial succeeded so ill; and I have the pleasure to acquaint you that according to the late advices of our old correspondent the Swedish ministers seem to despair of the effectual assistance of France since the disgrace of the duc de Choiseul, whose favorite plan is known to have been to push the French interest in Sweden as far as he could drive it. The court party is said to be full of distrust and disunion and will not engage in any undertaking, till they get a satisfactory answer to their former demands; and

the queen (now dowager) persists in her prejudices against Monsieur de Fersen, and in her opinion that they can and ought to do without him in the execution of the plan they proposed in the last dyet. But be this as it may, whether the King's share of the sums to be employed on the ensuing occasion be more or less extensive, his Majesty relies on your prudence and attention that you will make no expence which is not necessary, and in that which may be absolutely so that you will be as frugal as possible.

Whitehall, April 2^d 1771.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that it is now certain, as his Majesty's ambassador at Paris [Earl Harcourt] assures us, that his Most Christian Majesty has declined renewing the subsidiary treaty with Sweden ; and it is said the reason he gave for so doing was the disordered state of his finances. His Excellency adds that it does not appear that the king of Sweden has received any considerable sum of money at Paris, but on his return to Stockholm he is to have 750,000 livres out of the 1,500,000 livres which are deposited in the hands of a banker for the purpose of supporting the French interest in that country. His Swedish Majesty left Paris on the 25th past in the morning.

I am very glad to see that the suspicion respecting Count Osterman's conduct, which was occasioned by the intelligence communicated to you in Lord Rochford's dispatch of the 29th past, is refuted by your letter N^o 10, which shews that instead of expecting you to take the burthen of the necessary expence, and being backward to contribute his quota of it, that minister had even gone much farther in advance ; and I observe that he will since have been well enabled to continue to do so, if it should be necessary, as Count Panin assured Lord Cathcart on the 1st of March that he should the next day remit 100,000 roubles to Count Osterman.

WILLIAM HENRY ZUYLESTEIN, EARL OF ROCHFORD, SECRETARY
OF STATE, TO SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(Record Office, Sweden 118.)

St James's, May 7 1771.

Your letter N^o 17 having been maturely consider'd by the King's confidential servants, and his Majesty having been pleased to approve their opinion and advice upon the contents of it, I dispatch

Slaughter the messenger with this letter which (Lord Halifax being in the country, recovering from a dangerous illness) I write to inform you of his Majesty's final resolution as to the sum which he thinks proper to bestow on occasion of this year's dyet.

In a matter of expence so likely to be enormous, tho' so uncertain in it's extent, the half of it's probable amount would be such a burthen as the King never entertain'd a thought of undertaking ; nor can his Majesty in the present circumstances of his revenues by any means think even of bearing so heavy a part of it on the present occasion, as he did on that of 1769. The state of his Majesty's finances makes it absolutely necessary to confine his share of the expence within some certain and reasonable bounds, and his Majesty has thought proper to fix those bounds at £25,000 for every expence whatsoever, as well before as during the dyet. It is therefore his Majesty's intention that the several sums which you have already drawn since the death of the late king of Sweden should be consider'd as part of that £25,000, and that you should draw for the remainder not at once but at different periods, as the nature of the service, managed with the greatest economy, may require And it is hoped, when all circumstances are consider'd, that this allowance, which you are not to exceed upon any account whatever, will be deem'd not only a liberal and handsome support to the interests of Russia in Sweden but a sufficient contribution on his Majesty's part, especially as the inability of France to give very large sums for the support of her party is indubitably certain, as we have not heard of the court of Versailles having even promis'd any money in present, except the 750,000 livres mention'd in Lord Halifax's No. 10, and as we have lately (through the channel of our old correspondent) some reason to believe that that court, in engaging to pay Sweden the arrears of subsidy according to the arrangement already communicated to you, declared at the same time, and very positively, that France would contribute nothing further to the support of the present system in Sweden. But besides the abovementioned reasons for limiting the expence of the ensuing dyet to the sum of £25,000 his Majesty permits me to add, in confidential secrecy and for your own satisfaction, that the conduct of the court of Petersburgh, particularly with regard to the long depending treaty of alliance, has not been such as claims any extraordinary exertions on our part for the support of her interests. Having after a long delay absolutely rejected the terms

proposed by his Majesty that court has for some time been amusing us with the promise of a new project of a treaty, and there seems at present as little likelihood as ever of the alliance being concluded. Till that is done Sweden is principally, if not entirely, the object of Russia, and there is no reasonable motive for this country being at a vast expence for the attainment of it.

In your answer to this letter you will not fail to mention the amount of the bills which you shall at that time have drawn, in part of the £25,000, and afterwards you will take care to give notice in your official letters from time to time of the bills you shall have drawn for the remainder of it; it having been found inconvenient to have no advice of your draughts, till Messrs. Amyand and Co. apply for the payment of them.

St James's, 7 June 1771.

I write this only to acquaint you that altho' you are authoriz'd to draw to the amount of £25,000 for all expences whatsoever on account of the approaching dyet and during the course of it, yet, as it is now certain that the court of France will not go such lengths as were expected in her expence upon that occasion, and as a less powerfull opposition on the part of your antagonists ought necessarily to diminish the cost, as well as the difficulty of your operations, it is hoped that a less sum than £25,000 may now be sufficient. Whatever saving you can make from that sum will be look'd upon as very prudential and meritorious in you, considering the present state of the King's Civil List, and for that particular reason I am expressly directed to recommend to you the strictest œconomy.

HENRY HOWARD, EARL OF SUFFOLK, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
SIR JOHN GOODRICKE.

(*Record Office, Sweden 118 to 123.*)

St James's, June 14th 1771.

Your letter № 25 received by Slaughter has been laid before the King.

I have it in command to inform you that his Majesty sees no reason to make any alteration in those instructions, which were sent you upon the maturest deliberation, and the united opinion of his Majesty's most confidential servants, contained in the earl of Rochford's letter № 15. I saw Mons^r Pouschkin [Count Musin-

Pushkin] yesterday, who (notwithstanding in a late conversation with the earl of Rochford he seemed perfectly satisfied and pleased with the extent of expence this court had determined to go to, even on an apprehension that it was not to exceed £20,000) represented to me the disappointment which Count Osterman had express'd upon the limitation of expence which we had agreed upon, as he was pleased to express himself, at so critical a moment, when there was an opportunity not only to carry our points in the dyet but to demolish the French interest for ever in Sweden. As it will confirm you in your former instructions, and tend to shew his Majesty's final resolution on this subject, I will just repeat to you that I observed to him how impossible it was to recommend it to his Majesty to depart from what had been so maturely resolved upon in a matter of expence which knew no bounds, and where he must give me leave to remark the interests of Russia were principally concerned, and at a time when we had met with nothing but disappointments respecting the treaty of alliance so much to be wished not only for the interests of both courts but for the general tranquility of Europe. I added that we had the greatest reason to believe that the court of Versailles, as you have already been informed, will contribute nothing further to the support of it's system in Sweden, and of course that little is to be apprehended from the efforts of France.

I have only to add that you are not to exceed, upon any account, the allowance of £25,000, which cannot be considered otherwise than as a very liberal and ample allowance, in the management and distribution of which you will proceed with all proper economy.

St. James's, October 25th 1771.

..... The manner in which you have treated the insinuations mentioned in your letter N^o 60 is much approved of by his Majesty. The assertion that any assistance formerly granted to the Russian fleet had lately been refused is utterly groundless, and the surmize of any jealousy entertained here of the progress of their arms can (as you very properly observe) be believed only by those who are ignorant of the interests of this country and of his Majesty's disposition. Such reports are spread for particular purposes; you have done well in discrediting them, and you may now contradict them peremptorily.

My correspondent at Paris informs me that an agreement has been made between Mons^r Vergennes and some of the clergy, who are members of the secret committee. Their price is 925^m dahlers, of which 200^m down and the rest in monthly payments, in consideration of which they undertake to protect the present senate, to continue the system adopted in 1769 for the defence of the kingdom, and to break up the dyet in six months. Their treachery is the more dangerous, as they will still pretend to adhere in some instances to the principles of the Cap party, but the information I send you is as certain as it is confidential.

P.S. Since writing the above your letter N^o 62 is arrived. It is needless to observe that the treaty with Spain would be disagreeable here.

S^t James's, Novem^r 15th 1771.

Your letters to N^o 67 inclusive, and your private letter of the 11th October, have been received and laid before the King, but I have nothing particularly in command from his Majesty to send you in answer to them, and it is only in compliance with your request that I now write, lest you should impute the want of further instructions to any other cause than the inutility of them. I can now give you no others than those which have been given already, and can only repeat that his Majesty sees no reason for departing from the limitation he has fixed to his expences in Sweden. Pretences for extending them will, I know, never be wanting, in the present state of that country, and the only check upon unreasonable demands is a conviction, which you will take care to infuse into those who apply to you, that his Majesty will abide by his limitations with the same firmness as he will always perform his engagements.

You seem to have more confidence than I think you ought to repose in the conduct of Mons^r Fersen, who I have reason to believe is active, privately, in support of the French interest, whatever publick appearances he may occasionally assume. I do not mean that there are grounds for your marking any particular hostility against him, but certainly these are sufficient to put you upon your guard and to prevent your trusting to the ostensible part he sometimes takes with your friends. Let that have it's effect in publick; this caution is only for your private information.

I hear, but not with certainty, that the French party have
B.D.I. VOL. V. P

gained Count Pechlin. I should be glad to know whether the surmise has any foundation.

St James's, March 6th 1772.

. . . Your attention should principally be directed to the conduct of the king of Sweden. His design to extend his authority is unquestionable, and all his measures are adapted to that favourite idea. Projects continually occur for that purpose ; of those now in agitation one is to tempt the clergy by holding out the prospect of admission to their families into the order of nobles, and the restoration of some privileges taken away in 1766. Another is to allow some citizens and merchants of Stockholm to purchase the lands of the nobility, in order to engage them to support the kings views. You may know the persons by observing such of that class as have lately gone more to court, and been better received than usual. To break up the diet in confusion by raising a dispute between the clergy and the peasants about tythes, to prevent the re-assembling of the States for several years, and in the mean while to confine the controul of the senate over the king to cases in which they are unanimous, are other parts of the scheme now entertained, tho' perhaps they may not all be attempted. But it is necessary you should be apprized of them, that you may see at once the drift of every attempt which may be made for carrying any of them into execution. The knowledge of them must however be kept to yourself, at least so far as not to expose on any account the channel of your intelligence, even to a conjecture.

St. James's, May 1st 1772.

Your letters to N^o 14 have been receiv'd and laid before the King.

I may now congratulate with you on your success in the diet, which I understand is beyond your expectations. You will not, on this occasion, be misled by appearances of satisfaction in the French ambassador, as it can be attributed only to his dislike of Mr^r Scheffer, with whom he has long differed in the mode of proceeding, tho' they have always agreed in the object of extending the royal authority. He particularly condemn'd the misapplication of the public money, which I apprehend was Mr^r Scheffer's measure. You will perhaps now have an opportunity, if you think proper, to inquire more particularly into that transaction. . . .

TREATY PROPOSALS RENEWED

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St James's, May 7th 1772.

Your letters to N^o 15 have been received and laid before the King.

The defeat of the French party must be attributed principally to your abilities, but my correspondent at Paris also mentions dissensions among themselves, fomented, as he apprehends, by M^r Sinclair, in order to betray them. All the differences of opinion with M^r Scheffer are forgotten; he is a sufferer and a favorite, and all their animosity is now directed against Mons^r Sinclair.

Your conduct thro' the whole of this troublesome affair is honored with his Majesty's entire approbation, and your advice to your friends to proceed with moderation is very judicious. Their enemies, I understand, still entertain hopes from their extravagance, and your false friends pretend that they press'd the party to keep no measures in order to ruin them.

St. James's, May 22^d 1772.

I have received your letter N^o 18, and have laid it before the King.

The opportunity of negotiating a treaty with Sweden, as one means of forming a great northern alliance, is certainly favorable. I will write more at large on this subject by the next mail; at present it is sufficient to inform you that his Majesty, having laid your letter N^o 18 before his most confidential servants, orders me, in consequence of their unanimous opinion, to instruct you to negotiate a defensive alliance with Sweden on the principle of the projet transmitted by you in your letter N^o 20 of 1767. But I must explicitly acquaint you that no subsidiary article will be agreed to, nor any farther expence in Sweden acquiesced in for the continuance of the diet or any other purpose whatever. When the projet is finally settled and approved of by his Majesty you shall be furnished with full powers to sign the treaty, and you will not fail immediately to inform Count Osterman of the instructions you have received and concert your conduct, on this occasion, with him, who, I make no doubt, will be supplied with similar orders from his court. M^r Gunning sails for Petersbourg in a few days time, and on his arrival there will apprise the Russian ministers of the instructions sent to you, and of the continuance of his Majesty's dispositions towards the great system of northern alliance.

St. James's, May 29th 1772.

Since my letter N^o 7 the subject of a defensive alliance with Sweden has been again taken into consideration by his Majesty and his confidential servants, and I am instructed to convey to you in this letter their sentiments on the whole matter. The alliance of Sweden, as you must already be sensible, has been ever considered not so much as of real importance to Great Britain, in itself, as useful in strengthening our connection with Russia, and a step towards establishing the northern system and giving a total exclusion to France from raising disturbances in that part of Europe by a general coalition of the northern powers. You will be aware that the friendship of Sweden, without that of Russia, might prove rather a burthen to us, especially if we should ever be called upon, in virtue of a defensive alliance, to support her against the latter. The value of it therefore depends greatly on the concurrence and concert of the court of Petersburg, of which there is little reason to doubt, since that court cannot but look on our alliance as supporting her interest in Sweden, and indeed appeared so sensible of it during the course of our negotiation for the Russian treaty, as a prelude to the Grand Alliance proposed, that the Empress express'd her desire that his Majesty should guarantee the dominions of Sweden even against herself. The subsidy was then strongly urged by Russia, as conceiving the treaty with Sweden to be impossible to be concluded without it. If, as you seem to entertain some hopes (at least if France should refuse the payment of her arrears), it may now take place without that condition the conclusion of it will be an equal proof to Russia of his Majesty's inclination to support her influence at Stockholm and to form that comprehensive alliance, of the advantage of which the court of Petersburg is as much convinced as we are. You will therefore conduct yourself towards Count Osterman with the greatest openness and confidence, and let him thoroughly understand that the measure is considered to be altogether as useful, if not more so, to his court than to ours, and is meant as a fresh bond of union between us.

As to the particular stipulations of the projet, that of furnishing reciprocally 6000 land forces, in the case of an attack made on either of the contracting parties, does not appear, as it now stands, so well calculated as it might be for the convenience or probable wants of either. It would certainly be more easy and eligible for

Great Britain, whilst at peace herself, to furnish six sail of the line than 6000 troops, and probably it would be, at the same time, of more advantage to Sweden. On the other hand, in case England should be engaged in a war, the assistance of six Swedish ships of the line, or a proportionable number of frigates, might be of more value to us than their 6000 troops. It should seem as if it might also be more convenient to Sweden, and I may observe that it was always the idea of the court of Petersbourg, in the general plan of a confederacy, that Sweden should furnish ships and Denmark land forces. For this reason, as there is already an option given in the projet of commuting the succours, as shall be afterwards settled between the parties, it is thought more adviseable to name at once what shall be esteemed an equivalent in ships, or indeed to make that the first stipulation, as you will find done in the enclosed paper, in which the evaluation made in the projet offered by Russia for an alliance is nearly followed, except in not entering into a minute specification of the number of guns and men.

It is at the same time thought improper, as well as unusual, that the succours should be paid by the party requiring them ; such a stipulation seems to belong to a mere subsidiary, not to an auxiliary treaty ; and I believe there is no instance to be found where British ships or forces have been in foreign pay, or carried a foreign flag, as proposed in the projet. It is to be observed that in both the treaties of defensive alliance with Sweden of 1664 and 1720, which in other respects appear to be the model from which this projet is taken, the succours are to be paid by the party sending them ; it is so likewise in the projet offered us by Russia. You will find the article altered accordingly in the inclosed paper.

It is not thought proper to admit the article excepted to in general Conway's letter of the 18th of August 1767, for the reasons therein mentioned, unless Sweden would consent to the enumeration of the principal naval stores as contraband, which is, I am afraid, not likely to be obtained ; or at least it should be stopp'd at the end of the general words. As to that concerning the payment of a certain sum for the deficiency of the troops, stipulated on their return, it appears desireable to have the whole omitted, as unnecessary and quite unusual, but if you shall find it made a point of it should at least be restrained to those who should be proved, by proper certificates, to have been actually dead or disabled

in the service, as the allowing it in the latitude of making good deficiencies by deserters might be liable to great abuse.

You are already so well apprized of the determined resolution of his Majesty and his servants not to hearken to the proposal of a subsidy that it is needless for me to say any thing more to you on that subject, but you will have all along understood that the objection lies to paying a subsidy in time of peace for assistance in the event of a war, which past experience has shewn us to have generally failed when the case of it's being wanted has happened; but the same objection does not lie against our engaging to pay a tempting price for actual succours. If therefore you should find that besides the disappointment of not receiving a present subsidy the argument, which may probably suggest itself, of the greater likelihood of Great Britain's being engaged in a war than Sweden, and consequently the inequality of the latter subjecting herself to the risk of such a burthen as the stipulated succours to England on equal terms; if, I say, you should find that argument so strongly dwelt upon as to be a serious impediment to the accomplishment of the alliance, and that the enabling our friends to assure the nation of the certainty of their never being distressed by that stipulation, and to hold out to them a clear advantage whenever they shall assist Great Britain, may bring the treaty to a conclusion, you are permitted, as the last resort, to offer the article in the inclosed paper, by which a subsidy is ensured to Sweden whenever her forces are employed in the service of Great Britain. Whilst his Majesty engages to give his gratuitous protection to her, whenever the treaty shall entitle her to call upon him, the amount of that subsidy is left in blank for you to negotiate the best terms you are able to bring them to, but you will not by any means encourage them to expect [that] any greater sum than £100,000 will be acquiesced in, nor give assurances that any particular sum within that limitation will be acquiesced in 'till you have apprized us of the amount of it and you receive his Majesty's final determination.

St. James's, June 16th 1772.

Your letters down to No 22 have been received and laid before the King.

The manner in which the court of Russia considers the present opportunity in Sweden is exactly such as we expected. What

Count Panin wishes us to do upon it corresponds entirely with what you are already directed to negotiate. That minister promises the accession of his sovereign to a defensive alliance founded upon the principles of the projet I have transmitted to you. You are so fully instructed upon this subject that I have only to add the satisfaction I feel that our ideas so completely coincide with those of Russia upon it. The zeal and ability with which every business committed to your care is conducted makes me sanguine in the expectation that this will have a successful issue.

St. James's, July 24th 1772.

In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday with Mr Pouschkin he observed to me that the treaty between Russia and Sweden being now expired it was rather the wish of his court that the alliance between Great Britain and Sweden might precede the renewal of that treaty. He desired therefore that you might be directed to co-operate with Count Osterman to obtain instructions from the diet to the senate to conclude the treaty with Great Britain. I seize the first opportunity to communicate this desire to you, and hope that it will arrive before the breaking up of the diet, tho' I am confident that nothing will escape your vigilance which may cultivate the favorable dispositions of the senate towards us.

I have received no farther intelligence relative to the king of Sweden's designs (of which you are so fully apprized) except a confirmation, unattended by any circumstances, that the French minister is sanguine in his hopes of it's success.

St James's, July 28th 1772.

Your letter N° 27 has been received and laid before the King.

The objections made to our projet by senator Duben will have had your discussion long before you can receive my sentiments upon them; and indeed 'till I have heard at large from you on the subject by one of the messengers now at Stockholm, and am apprized how far you have gone in the discretionary proposals you were authorized to make, I can only observe that a comparison between the projet sent to you by Needham, and that which you transmitted to General Conway in 1769, will supply you with the fullest answer to the cavils of Mons^r Duben. The very favorable alterations with respect to Sweden, which are stated to you in my

dispatch N^o 8, were adopted to preclude the very objections which that minister has raised. That Great Britain is more exposed to war than Sweden is undoubtedly true, and therefore the projet now under consideration stipulates his Majesty's guaranty of the king of Sweden's dominions, promises gratuitous succours when called upon, and a payment for such as shall be at any time demanded from Sweden. So far is the inequality of the situation between the two kingdoms, either with regard to their powers or the critical circumstances which may attend them, from not having been considered, and so far is the proposed alliance from tending to destroy the pacific plan which Sweden wishes to pursue. Under such a treaty she must be more secure, because more respected, than at present, when protected by the naval power of this great kingdom, which is always actuated by the desire of preserving the ballance of power among her neighbours, not by that of aggrandizing herself.

As to the other parts of Mons^r Duben's remarks, drawn from reflections relative to France, I must repeat, what I believe I have more than once suggested, that the advantages which Sweden will reap from such an alliance with Great Britain as we are ready to conclude will amply compensate for whatever may be the consequences of the displeasure of France, whose views, in her connection with Sweden, are to annex to herself the dependance of that crown by pecuniary considerations (more frequently indeed stipulated than performed) as an instrument in her hands to raise disturbances in the north, perhaps to obviate any commercial proposal which may tend to the mutual benefit of Sweden and other nations. Her alliance with Great Britain will secure the tranquillity of the north and thereby establish the pacific situation of Sweden, which Mo^r Duben pretends to imagine it may hazard.

St James's, Aug^t 4th 1772.

. . . . It has been, as you justly observe, the constant desire of the court of Petersburgh that our alliance with Sweden should form the foundation of the system, and I think it is most eligible that it should do so. But as the King in the whole of this affair has been principally actuated by his views towards Russia, if the opportunity be more favourable for Russia than for us to conclude a treaty with Sweden his Majesty acquiesces in the reversal of the plan, but must be understood not to bind himself to accede to any-

thing he has not had a previous opportunity to consider. Your vigilance, I am sure, will provide one by transmitting the earliest accounts of whatever is transacted.

Secret.

St James's, August 4th 1772.

I am happy to collect from the date of your last letter, and from other circumstances which I am about to mention, that the intelligence transmitted to you from my office on the 3^d of July must certainly have arrived in sufficient time to enable you to counteract the design therein described and, I hope, to convert it to the preservation and firm establishment of our friends.

My last advices on this very important subject give me reason to believe that the king of Sweden's views are deeper, more desperate, and (if I may use the expression) more malevolent, both to the constitution and to individuals, than I at first conceived them to be. He appears to have worked up the passions of the French ambassador and his other confidential advisers to the same pitch of enthusiasm with his own, and they have mutually persuaded each other that the corruption and insolence of the States are such as to authorize any mode of reformation and correction, however fatal to the lives of the people, however repugnant to the constitution.

They have at length obtained a proper vessel to transport the troops from the fort, and exult extremely in the idea that the Caps have been chiefly instrumental in supplying them with it. It is reported to me to be one of those new ships which were built by General Ehrenschwerd for the protection of the coast of Finland.

It was the intention, according to the most recent information which I have been able to procure, to strike the blow on the 24th of last month. This delay has been occasioned by the difficulties which occurred in obtaining the vessel above-mentioned. His Swedish Majesty, in the mean time, has not been without many disquieting moments of distrust, and apprehension for the consequences, but he flatters himself that if any unforeseen obstacle should make the event unfortunate he may throw himself on the affections of his people, whom he believes to be much attached to his person and much discontented with the conduct of the Caps. His speculations, however, have turned chiefly on the idea of success, in which case he is now determined to prorogue the diet for some years and to assume both the legislative and executive power for

a certain time in his own person, pursuant to the advice of Count Charles, whose surname [Scheffer] is most probably known to you, but which my correspondent has inadvertently neglected to mention. He had at first some hesitation in adopting a conduct so inconsistent with a solemn oath so recently taken, but this was combated by the French ambassador, who is said to have paid to him a third part of the money remitted from France and whose arguments have convinced him that very vigorous measures will be necessary to sustain the revolution and that such measures will be impracticable if unsupported by any thing less than absolute authority. He is now resolved, therefore, to go straight to the end proposed, without any regard to consequences considerations or scruples ; but this eagerness is occasionally checked, partly by the dread of some attempt on his life (a discovery which slipt from him, I understand, inadvertently, and cannot help observing that such sensations are but bad ingredients for an enterprize of the nature his Swedish Majesty is engaged in), partly by the probability of a war with Russia, tho' the latter consideration is used to him as an argument for the assumption of unlimited power, as most likely to enable him to resist all hostilities.

Separate.

St. James's, August 4th 1772.

Needham the messenger arrived yesterday morning about one o'clock.

I perceive with great pleasure by his dispatches that the detection of his Swedish Majesty's designs reached you time enough at least to put our friends on their guard, I hope to preserve them. The measures already taken seem well calculated to impede the execution of the plan, but they may not be sufficient to defeat it. The security of Stockholm requires great attention, and the danger to which every thing valuable is exposed ought to inspire our friends with preventive invention and a disposition to profit by the risk they run, by looking for future safety and support in an honorable alliance with Great Britain. I wish I could supply you with any original paper, or proof, that could be produced. None such has fallen into my hands, unless the circumstance of the vessel, which I mention in my secret letter of to day, can be converted into a proof by leading into any thing that will amount to one upon enquiry ; and this anecdote, if fresh delays have not arisen, will come too late.

It is impossible to prescribe exact rules for your conduct on such an emergency, because it is impossible to foresee how people will be actuated and what turn affairs will take. Much must be left to your discretion, and your judgement, on which we can safely rely, will be directed by the event. Thus much, however, is clear, that the safety of our friends and the preservation of the constitution compose the first objects of your attention. You will therefore lend yourself to these points in any shape by which the King's honor and dignity will not be affected. It is to be wished you may be able to do this without interfering too ostensibly, tho' the main object must not be lost by adhering too rigidly to this restriction; but every purpose I conceive will be as essentially promoted by private managements, and whatever personal hazards the king of Sweden's desperate behaviour may, in the upshot of things, possibly expose him to, I am sure it will never appear that they have been increased by your means. You will do extremely right to act in concert with Count Osterman, as far as the bounds of prudence will allow, and I see no reason to imagine that that minister will be desirous to pass them.

I reserve the consideration of that part of your dispatches, which concerns the treaty, to another opportunity.

P.S. The measure of changing or removing the foreign garrison in the fortress of Schweaborgen [Sweaborg], which is to perform so principal a part in the intended revolution, is so obvious, that I conclude from your not mentioning it's having taken place there are difficulties in it which are not perceptible at this distance. Since writing the above I have happened to discover that your suspicions of Colonel Sprengport are well founded.

Separate and most Secret.

St. James's, August 18th 1772.

I have this moment received from my Paris correspondent certain intelligence that the king of Sweden's proposal to visit the Empress was previously concerted with the French ambassador and (as you suspected) merely illusory. They were alarmed at the precautions which have lately been taken by our friends, but attributed them entirely to some general suspicions, which the preparations for this journey are intended to dissipate. In the mean time the design to attempt a revolution, tho' suspended, is in

no degree laid aside. The preventive measures taken by the Caps are considered as insufficient to defeat it. The appointment of Col. Sprengporten, which is assigned to it's true cause, is intended to be made subservient to the scheme, and he is to set fire to the mine which he is said to have prepared and charged. It is expected to take effect in the course of the present month, and is to be assisted at the same instant by that which is dug in the southern part of the kingdom, and of which Prince Charles is to have the principal direction. For this purpose he is to remove himself to the proper spot under the pretence of a visit to his mother, and is there to meet his two regiments and to join them with some other troops, which are to be put in motion at the same time. The French ambassador, at the instant of this crisis, is to produce a very large sum of money, which was carried to him some time ago by a Mons^r de la Houze, brother to the French minister at Hambourg. In the mean time the ambassador is fully confident of success and has no apprehensions of any possible failure, except from the indiscretion of the king of Sweden and his brother.

I have stated the particulars of this intelligence to you as nearly as possible in the words in which it was transmitted to me, and I think it unnecessary either to trouble you with observations upon it, or to remind you of the very strict discretion which you will observe in making use of it.

Secret.

St James's, August 21st 1772

In writing to you my separate dispatch of the 18th inst I forgot to observe that the late appointment of Coll^l Sprengporten is considered by the king of Sweden and his confidential friends as the measure of all others best calculated to promote their design. It was essential to the whole enterprize, of which that gentleman is the author, that he should go, without delay, into Finland, and he was under the greatest embarrassment to find some colourable pretext for this departure from Stockholm.

It was certainly an eligible measure, to remove a man of such disposition and abilities from the person of the king of Sweden, but I was sorry from the first to see it accomplished by placing him in a situation of great military influence and authority.

I find that there is a good deal of jealousy both as to the probity and discretion of some of those who are most in his Swedish Majesty's confidence ; you may perhaps be able to improve this hint so as to

increase their mutual diffidence, and also to stifle all suspicions as to the true channel of your intelligence.

St. James's, Sep^r 1st 1772.

[*Unsigned.*]

I received by the last mail accounts of very extraordinary occurrences in Sweden. The particulars of them must now be well known to you, though your last letter mentions nothing about them. It is even insinuated that Prince Charles is far from wishing to compose the insurgents, and that the king of Sweden himself is embarked in this dangerous enterprize. A business which must so deeply interest the most considerable powers in Europe must be most hazardous in itself and exposed to the most serious consequences. It is therefore much to be wished that these insinuations are ill-founded, and indeed, when I recollect the obligations which the king of Sweden is under, of the most sacred nature, to preserve the liberties and constitution of his country, I cannot but conclude they must be so. I wait anxiously to receive authentic information upon this important subject from you, and you need not doubt that I shall have his Majesty's commands to convey precise instructions to you, when sufficient lights are thrown upon this critical transaction.

'Till we hear from you in what situation things actually are, what resistance the conspiracy meets with, what firmness and resolution there is in the States, and how the senate acts, no resolution can be taken with strict propriety. But if there is spirit enough in the States to reject the yoke that is prepared for their country his Majesty will not scruple a pecuniary assistance to preserve the constitution of Sweden. In this case as far as £15,000 you may draw in the usual manner, if the occasion should absolutely require it and that sum should be likely to answer the purpose. It is indeed premature to send you these powers, 'till we have heard particulars from you, but I have the King's commands to do it from a consideration that any delay may be fatal and a persuasion that you will not use them unless the States shew themselves worthy of the King's support and have been unable to take the necessary precautions, which I think their timely intelligence of what was going on enabled them to do, and unless the money can be applied with effect You will not fail to communicate confidentially with Count Osterman..to represent to him the neces-

sity of the court of Petersbourg's contributing amply to the expence, if this mode of interference is adopted. His Majesty, who assents to it principally from attention to the empress of Russia, who is much more immediately concerned, cannot be expected to bear an equal proportion. There is little reliance to be had upon the Swedish posts in the present state of that country, and for that and other considerations you may expect a messenger with a duplicate of the material part of this dispatch as soon as we have heard from you.

St. James's, Sep^r 8th 1772.

The messenger Booth arrived on Saturday and brought the first authentic accounts of the great change in the constitution of Sweden. His Majesty, who felt extremely anxious to preserve the free government, was in hopes that the States were in a condition of defence and enabled to maintain the liberties and independence of their country. Previous to the event, which has happened, the King was much disposed to co-operate with the northern powers in measures likely to have defeated the revolution. You have done extremely right not to engage in any conduct which may commit the King, or hazard the public interest. His Majesty, in this moment, can be by no means inclined that you should join with the Russian minister in all that he may be directed to do, without previously knowing what it is, and to authorize you in the dark to give his sanction to proceedings which may be founded upon principles widely different from his own and spring from considerations in which this country is no ways concerned. You are too enlightened to infer from hence that his Majesty does not see the consequences of what has happened in their full extent, and how much the present revolution in Sweden obstructs the favourite object of a northern system, and those alliances which the King is sincere in wishing to form; but by these it is his royal wish to strengthen, not to disturb the tranquillity of Europe, and therefore he will be cautious how he adopts plans of peace, that are to arise out of confusion, and how he risks the present for the future security of his people, especially while those connections, which are intended to provide for it, are still so remote and uncertain. The instructions therefore that I have it in command to give you are no more than what your own wisdom of itself seems to have adopted in your dispatch No. 41, and the very judicious reasoning

contained in the paper annexed to it. You will do well to continue great confidence and good understanding and the most friendly communication with Count Osterman, but not to concur with him without fresh or particular directions from hence in any declaration or other measure, which may be likely to produce hostilities and involve this country in war. His Majesty does not mean that you should by your conduct express his approbation of the change, or even his determination to acquiesce in it ; but it is conceived that the English minister, accredited as he is to the king of Sweden, may reside and transact business at the court of Stockholm without marking the one or the other in the first hours of the revolution. Till, then, we know more, both with regard to the manner in which the Swedish nation in general receives what has happened, how firmly the new government is likely to be established, and how the empress of Russia means to act, I cannot speak more positively. Much also may depend upon some collateral circumstances. When the necessary lights are obtained his Majesty will refer the whole consideration to his most confidential servants, the result of whose deliberations I shall report to you, with what farther commands the King shall please to have for you on the occasion.

St. James's, October 30th 1772.

The messenger Ogg returned on Sunday night. From him I received your dispatches No. 55, 56 and 57, which, with your several letters by the ordinary mails to № 54 inclusive, have been regularly laid before the King. You are perfectly well informed of the views of France, which certainly are to form an alliance betwixt Sweden Russia and Denmark, and to accede to it ; but I cannot persuade myself that these ideas will meet with a favorable disposition, either from inclination or necessity, at the court of Petersbourg. They are very sanguine in Russia for a fortunate issue to the resumed negotiations for peace [with Turkey], which I believe they depend much upon, and if it should take place I cannot but think the empress of Russia will turn her attention towards Sweden. The king of Prussia, tempted perhaps by Swedish Pomerania, is ready to take, when called upon, a decisive part against his nephew. And the Russian force in Finland will augment, while Denmark will have her fleet ready and perhaps advance a large body of Norwegians to the frontiers of Sweden, and also may have a number of men in Seeland to be employed on a descent on Schonen. I am

not certain that this plan is actually determined on, but I believe something of the kind may be in agitation. You will not fail to watch the dispositions of the people and to learn how far they are reconciled to the change, or disgusted at it. A spirit of uneasiness, or a wish to shake off the yoke, would greatly promote the success of any attempts to restore the free government. M^r Scheffer, in speculating on the probable continuance of peace for the ensuing year, is reported to have said, *Nous en avons grand besoin pour rétablir un édifice tout en lambeaux.* It is well worthy your attention to penetrate into the real sentiments of the king of Sweden's partizans, and to find out if there are any among them, who are well informed, who think the new establishment precarious. I am told Mons^r Vergennes wishes to negotiate an offensive alliance between Sweden and the Porte, but thinks it premature to let the Swedish ministers into his idea. Nothing can more effectually refute his representation of the revolution in Sweden than the very able answer which you have prepared to it.

St. James's, Nov^r 17th 1772.

Secret and Confidential.

In my letter No. — I alluded to measures which were in agitation against Sweden. They did not then appear to me sufficiently settled and ascertained to rely much upon their being put into execution, and what I have since heard does not induce me to alter my opinion. The king of Prussia holds a language by no means symptomatic of a readiness and inclination to adopt the plan, and the court of Denmark has explicitly declared that they will engage in no measures which have not the King's concurrence. The zeal and ability, with which you have always conducted the business of your mission, forbids reserve. I shall therefore not only acquaint you with his Majesty's decision but also explain the motives of it, and to do this clearly it may be necessary to revert to the dispatches you received by the messenger Ogg immediately after the revolution. From these you collected that his Majesty, tho' his sentiments with regard to the importance of that event were not changed by its taking place, thought the situation of things afterwards very different from what they were before; that he was ready to have concurred with the court of Petersbourg in almost any measures of prevention, but that those which might be proposed for restoring the antient system would require much consideration; and you

was given to understand that his Majesty's future resolutions might be greatly influenced by the conduct which Russia should adopt in so critical a conjuncture. You need not be told that it has been one of the constant objects of his Majesty's reign to form an alliance with Russia, and in conjunction with that power a system in the north strong enough to secure the tranquillity of Europe against the combinations of the south, or to protect their respective possessions. Upon this principle, you know, all our proceedings in Sweden have been founded. Sweden, taken by itself, would never have been considered; as a bond of union with Russia it became of great importance. But in proportion as the probability of a speedy alliance with Russia diminished this importance was lessened. The constitution of Sweden has been changed, and the court of Petersbourg has not, since that period, deviated from her indifference; she has made no advances, nor shewn any symptoms of growing more seriously disposed to our alliance. The King, therefore, entirely consistent throughout this whole affair does not in his wisdom think fit to engage in offensive measures against Sweden. It is difficult to suppose that the empress of Russia, thus left alone, as she probably may be, will adopt them, tho' my expectations are that the king of Prussia's counsels, whatever they prove, will determine her conduct more than any other considerations.

It is necessary I should acquaint you that Mr Gunning is directed to make the King's determination known at Petersbourg, in case he finds that court resolved to act offensively against Sweden, and neither reflection or advice diverts the Russian ministers from their enterprize. Whenever he is forced to come to this explanation he will use a language calculated, as much as possible, not to disoblige or create unfriendly sentiments in the empress of Russia, which his Majesty would hear of with concern. I foresee no occasion for your mentioning the King's determination, but I would not deferr communicating it to you in the most confidential manner.

St James's, Febr^y 26th 1773.

Your letters N^o 6 and 7 have been received and laid before the King

His Majesty has had such long and repeated experience of your zeal and dexterity in finding out and pursuing the best channels of usefull intercourse, that the progress which you have already made in the confidence of the Swedish ministers occasions no

surprise. The overtures of a defensive alliance, which they have made to you, were certainly proper to be received and transmitted to me, and you will do right to observe the same conduct with regard to what may be farther advanced on the subject. But the time is not yet arrived when the King can permit you to enter into any negociation, or to speak ministerially upon it. Many circumstances must be previously explained, and many contingencies take place, before that can happen. The extraordinary attachment with which his Swedish Majesty has devoted himself to the court of France renders all overtures suspicious. Those alluded to in your letter were certainly made with the knowledge of that court, and probably by it's advice, in conformity to it's system of losing no opportunity to create jealousies between foreign powers, more particularly between his Majesty and the empress of Russia, and perhaps with a view to intimidate Denmark into making herself a part of that connection, which they are so anxious to establish in the north. This last object engages their attention very much, and I am informed from good authority that there is a secret article in the late convention between France and Sweden, which obliges the latter to fit out a certain number of ships, expressly with a view of obliging Denmark to have recourse to their friendship. As you have no instructions to negotiate any alliance it does not seem necessary that you should communicate to Count Osterman any thing that has passed on this occasion.

LEWIS DE VISME. J. L. DOERFELD
1774-1778

LEWIS DE VISME was the third son of a Huguenot immigrant of distinguished descent (see Burke's "History of the Commoners," IV. 320). After highly commended service at Madrid he had been sent in May 1768 to take charge of affairs at Petersburg, pending the delayed arrival of Lord Cathcart, and two years later was accredited to Munich and Ratisbon. Arrived at Stockholm as envoy extraordinary in March 1774, he succumbed there to a sudden illness on 4 September 1776. Lord Weymouth in 1768 could not speak too highly of his merit, and Ulrik Scheffer, after his death, gave special expression to his sense of the severe loss. For the next two years charge of affairs at Stockholm was left in the hands of De Visme's secretary, J. L. Doerfeld.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEWIS DE VISME, A.M., AS ENVOY EXTRA-
ORDINARY TO GUSTAVUS III OF SWEDEN. 17 December 1773.

(*Record Office, Sweden 124.*)

[Besides the usual formal clauses.]

5. You will carefully observe the conduct and as far as you are able penetrate into those councils of the king of Sweden, which may have any influence on the affairs of Our kingdoms and on the public tranquillity. With this view you will be attentive to whatever may pass between the court of Stockholm and any other court, particularly as to any negotiation convention or agreement, relative either to the guaranty and support of the new constitution of Sweden, the new modelling thereof in any shape, either by rendering it more moderate or more absolute, or to the restoration and re-establishment of the old form of government.

6. You shall also endeavour to discover any overtures that may be made, or any steps that may be taken, for extending the duration or altering the terms of any treaty or other engagement now subsisting for renewing former alliances or for forming new connections between the court of Stockholm and any of the courts of Europe, and particularly with the Ottoman Porte.

7. You are likewise to inform yourself, as far as you are able, of the ordinary expences of the Swedish government, of the particulars of the amount and state of the revenue, of the resources and powers which his Swedish Majesty may have for levying any, and what, extraordinary supplies, and of the subsidies or other aids paid or promised by foreign princes.

8. And whereas it is conjectured that in consequence of the influence which the court of Versailles is at present supposed to possess over that of Stockholm considerable sums have been paid and are still paying by the former to his Swedish Majesty, with a view to enable him to strengthen the fortifications on his frontiers and to increase and improve his naval and military establishments, more especially the former, you will therefore use your best endeavours to obtain frequent and exact accounts of the number and condition of the Swedish forces by sea and land and the means of augmenting them, as also of the actual state of defence in which the kingdom of Sweden is.

9. You will also endeavour to learn the temper and inclinations of his Swedish Majesty and his opinions on the several publick points which may occasionally arise; nor will you fail to penetrate into the characters affections and degrees of credit of the several ministers employed by him. And whereas it is supposed that, a considerable part of the people of Sweden are by no means reconciled to the form of government introduced in September 1772, though from the circumstances of the moment they are led to acquiesce in it, you shall therefore vigilantly attend to the parties and divisions which may subsist and to every other circumstance relative to the interior of the kingdom, which you may judge capable of operating any change in the state and connections of Sweden or of affecting, in it's consequences, the general affairs of Europe; and upon all these points you shall transmit to Us, by Our principal Secretary of State, such information as you shall be able to obtain, and such remarks as shall occur to you thereon.

HENRY HOWARD, EARL OF SUFFOLK, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
LEWIS DE VISME.

(*Record Office, Sweden 124 to 126.*)

St James's, March 18th 1774.

As I conclude that you will have had leisure before you receive this letter to look into the papers of your predecessor for some time past, and to obtain a competent idea of the present state of Sweden and her collateral interests and views, I do not think it necessary to enter into any detail of particulars and shall only observe to you that the chief alterations since Sir John Goodricke's departure are the promotion of Count Hopken, the tendency and effects of which will deserve your best attention, and the final execution of the exchange of Holstein, against which the king of Sweden has submitted a protest to the Emperor, as conceiving it to affect the contingent rights of his family. But as this last step has not been taken without much previous management and explanation towards the court of Petersbourg, whose friendship his Swedish Majesty is extremely anxious to cultivate, partly on the speculation that she may soon be at leisure to consider the tendency of his new constitution, and partly with a view to engage her protection of Swedish Pomerania, his projected visit to the Czarina (which you will observe is not a new idea) proceeds upon the same train of reasoning and is not unlikely to take place, tho' I am well assured that both the French and Swedish ministers are endeavouring to dissuade him from it; the former from motives of jealousy, the latter both from the fear of giving umbrage to other courts and also to avoid the expence of such an expedition, which his Majesty's finances are very ill provided to support.

You will see in my correspondence with Sir John Goodricke some account of a secret convention, which is supposed to be concluded between the courts of Versailles and Stockholm. The particular articles of which it consists have not yet transpired with any certainty, but I have good reason to believe that it is engaged on the part of Sweden that a specified number of ships and troops should be ready at some certain time, and also that the French ministry is constantly attentive to completion of this stipulation. You will not be less so to this and every other circumstance that may be so important in it's consequences.

St James's, May 17th 1774.

The death of the French king will be known at Stockholm some time before you can receive this letter, and you will not fail to attend to the impression which it may make there. His Swedish Majesty has lost by this event both a personal and a political friend, and tho' it seems probable that he may find the latter in a new reign, yet the support to be expected is neither so great nor so certain as it was under a monarch who has been induced to consider the new constitution of Sweden as the work of his own hands, and professed to protect it upon every motive of pride friendship and political system. Besides, there is reason to believe that oeconomy will now be a leading principle in the French cabinet ; on this, however, as on other points I shall write more fully hereafter, and shall expect to be informed by you in a little time whether there is any appearance of a disposition to a change of system in Sweden, or whether the connection with France is as firmly adhered to now as it was before the death of the French king.

St. James's, Septem^r 2^d 1774.

Your letters to No 20 inclusive have been received and laid before the King, and are considered by his Majesty as very satisfactory proofs of your diligence and attention.

I hope soon to hear of M^r De Laval's arrival at Copenhagen, and you will do right to begin an official correspondence with him upon any matters which may tend to your mutual information. In the mean time my accounts from Denmark are very deficient, but I rather suspect that the Swedes entertain higher notions than their neighbours of the importance of their camp in Scania, as I can collect no reason from other quarters to believe that it gives that degree of uneasiness to Denmark, which you suppose. I am well assured however that the expence of it to his Swedish Majesty will be very considerable (about £25,000), and what his finances are at present very unable to support, tho' there is good reason to believe that immediately upon receiving the news of the conclusion of peace upon the Danube it was determined by the court of France to advance to that of Stockholm two millions of livres, being part of the arrears of the old subsidy, which were otherwise to have been discharged in annual payments of 500,000 livres each. If this intelligence is well founded it may be very material for you to observe it's effect, as there is no doubt that his

Swedish Majesty will be urged to apply the money in the strictest manner to increase the military and naval strength of his dominions. In the mean time, if I am rightly informed, he has every reason to believe that the interior of his government is not secure and that the inclination to abridge his power is entertained even by those to whom he has delegated parts of it. Under this description Count Hessenstein is particularly alluded to, and a connection of a dangerous kind is supposed to subsist between him and General Springporten; I need not tell you that this is an object of such magnitude as to deserve all the attention you can give it with proper caution and secrecy.

St James's, Novem^r 11th 1774.

Altho' by the third article of your instructions you are directed to live upon a footing of particular confidence with the minister of the empress of Russia at the court where you reside, yet his Majesty thinks proper to revoke that order in the case of Mons^r Simolin. This gentleman has conducted himself in some recent instances at Copenhagen in a very disagreeable manner; it is therefore the King's pleasure that in your publick and ministerial capacity you decline any particular communication and intercourse with Mons^r Simolin. Time will shew whether he is justly charged with the intrigues and restless disposition, which are attributed to him, but you will always remember that however his Majesty may dislike to see the kingdom of Sweden in the hands of France, and however possible it may be that the time will come when a restoration of the former constitution may be effected, this is not the moment for such an attempt. Therefore you will avoid shewing either predilection to the present system or desire to see it overturned.

St. James's, Feby 7th 1775.

I think it necessary to inform you that the commanders of his Majesty's ships and vessels sent and to be sent to the coast of North America are and will be instructed in their respective stations to intercept and to seize any British or foreign ships which may be found carrying on an illicit trade, and which may have on board prohibited goods and merchandize, or warlike stores, destined to his Majesty's colonies. You will take an opportunity of mentioning the substance and import of these orders to the Swedish minister; but it will be more material, in point of effect, to let it be under-

stood by the principal Swedish merchants, as the contraband trade between Sweden and our colonies is chiefly carried on thro' Holland and other indirect channels. . . .

St. James's, September 29th 1775.

I have received your letters N^o 36 and private 5th inst. and have laid them before the King.

Intelligence has been sent to my office from a very good quarter that a large vessel belonging to Ireland is at this time at Gottenburgh taking in gun powder and salt petre for his Majesty's rebellious subjects in North America, and that she has been consign'd to Arfurdon and Son of Gottenburgh. I therefore desire you will make immediate enquiry on this head and that you will give me the earliest notice you can obtain of any ships that may be loading at Gottenburgh or any other of the Swedish ports with gun powder or any other warlike stores, destined for any of his Majesty's colonies in North America or which may be suspected to be intended for them, though cleared out for any other port. The description of the vessels which may have any of these articles on board, the names of their captains, and any other particulars you may be able to obtain will be of great service at this time, and M^r Erskine, who wishes to recommend himself for the consulage, has an early opportunity of shewing his zeal by assisting you in these enquiries, at the same time that they plainly shew the necessity of a speedy nomination of a proper person for that employment, in case M^r Erskine should have any reasons for declining it.

St. James's, May 7th 1776.

I have had few occasions to address myself to you lately; your letters have all merited attention, but none have required any particular directions. I am happy, however, while I acknowledge the receipt of No. 14, to inform you that no appearances exist of an interruption of tranquillity in your part of the world. The alarm which was taken some time ago rather hastily is now quite removed, and it seems to be neither the inclination or the interest of neighbouring powers to give Sweden any serious cause of fresh uneasiness, while Europe enjoys the blessing of a general peace. I make no doubt the object of Prince Henry of Prussia's journey to Petersbourg excites much curiosity and speculation at the place of your residence. Whatever you collect upon this subject, worthy of being transmitted, I shall receive with satisfaction.

DISPATCHES TO J. L. DOERFELD.

(Record Office, Sweden 127.)

St James's, June 10th 1777.

[Signed 'Suffolk'.]

I am directed by the earl of Suffolk to acknowledge your letters to No 14 inclusive together with their several inclosures, and I have the pleasure to add that his Lordship appears satisfied with the proofs those papers contain of your diligence and attention.

Some reports have lately been received here of two American pirates said to be at Gottenburg; but if there were any such vessels it is impossible to suppose that they could escape Consul Erskine's observation. It is farther said that Marstrand is the chief deposit where the American rebels provide themselves with such commodities as they want from the Baltic. But this is also unconfirmed and is, at the same time, inconsistent with the very friendly manner in which his Swedish Majesty and his ministers have expressed themselves thro' the whole course of this business.

St James's, September 2^d 1777.

[Unsigned.]

I am directed by the earl of Suffolk to acknowledge your letter No 25, with it's inclosures, and I have the pleasure to inform you that your memorial presented to the Baron de Falckenberg respecting the American brig arrived at the port of Marstrand has his Lordship's approbation. I am also to add for your farther instruction on this subject that the answer given to you by order of his Swedish Majesty, tho' not in every respect so satisfactory as it might have been, will afford no just cause of complaint if the assurances conveyed in it are strictly enforced, that is, if no vessel is admitted in the Swedish ports but what is unarmed and "purely commercial," and if the purchase of arms and ammunition by the rebel agents continues to be prevented in his Swedish Majesty's ports, in the same liberal and friendly manner with which it has hitherto been done.

A report has been circulated that permission is given to the piratical vessels to carry their prizes into the Swedish harbours. This, if in any degree confirmed, must of course be remonstrated against in the strongest manner. In the mean time, however, it is so inconsistent with the proper language held by the court of Stockholm that it deserves no credit.

SIR THOMAS WROUGHTON, K.B.
CHARLES KEENE
1778-1789

THOMAS WROUGHTON, before his coming to Stockholm in September 1778, had served for sixteen years as minister at Warsaw, and before that as consul-general at Moscow. In November 1780 he was created a Knight of the Bath at the particular request of Catherine II, and next month received investiture of the order at the commissioned hands of Gustavus III. In March 1787, on his representation, when on leave in England, that he was now "the minister of the longest service abroad" but had been neglected, he was advanced to the rank of minister plenipotentiary. He did not enjoy the honour long, for arrived at Maestricht on his return journey on 21 August 1787, the next morning he was found dead in his bed.

During his frequent absences from Stockholm, and after his decease, charge of affairs there fell to his secretary, Charles Keene, a man whom, with strongest recommendation, he had described as "a gentleman of English extraction of very virtuous and respectable Saxon parents."

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THOMAS WROUGHTON Esqr, AS ENVOY
EXTRAORDINARY TO GUSTAVUS III OF SWEDEN. 19 June 1778.

(*Record Office, Sweden 128.*)

[Besides the usual formal clauses.]

5. You will carefully observe the conduct and as far as you are able penetrate into the councils of the king of Sweden, which may have any influence on the affairs of Our kingdoms and on the publick tranquillity. With this view you will be attentive to

whatever may pass between the court of Stockholm and any other court, particularly as to any negotiation conversation or agreement relative either to the guaranty and support of the new constitution of Sweden, the new modelling thereof in any shape, either by rendering it more moderate or more absolute, or to the restoration and re-establishment of the old form of government.

6. You shall also endeavour to discover any overtures that may be made, or any steps that may be taken for extending the duration or altering the terms of any treaty or other engagement now subsisting for renewing former alliances or for forming new connections between the court of Stockholm and any of the courts of Europe. And you will be particularly attentive to the part which the king of Sweden may take, or the engagements he may enter into, with regard to the dispute at present subsisting on account of the Bavarian succession.

7. You are likewise to inform yourself, as far as you are able, of the ordinary expences of the Swedish government, of the particulars of the amount and state of the revenue, of the resources and powers which his Swedish Majesty may have for levying any and what extraordinary supplies, and of the subsidies or other aids paid or promised by foreign powers.

8. And whereas it is conjectured that in consequence of the influence which the court of Versailles is at present supposed to possess over that of Stockholm considerable sums have been paid and are still paying by the former to his Swedish Majesty, with a view to enable him to strengthen the fortifications on his frontiers and to increase and improve his naval and military establishments, more especially the former, you will therefore use your best endeavours to obtain frequent and exact accounts of the number and condition of the Swedish forces by sea and land and the means of augmenting them, and also of the actual state of defence of the kingdom of Sweden.

9. You will also endeavour to learn the temper and inclinations of his Swedish Majesty and his opinions on the several publick points which may occasionally arise ; nor will you fail to penetrate into the characters and degrees of credit of the several ministers employed by him. You shall likewise vigilantly attend to the parties and divisions which may subsist and to every other circumstance relative to the interior of the kingdom, which you may judge capable of operating any change in the state and connections

of Sweden or of affecting in it's consequences the general affairs of Europe.

10. You are farther to procure an account of the population of the king of Sweden's dominions and of the extent and nature of the commerce and manufactures carried on in the different parts of them, and in so doing you are to pursue the method pointed out in the circular dispatch of Our principal Secretary of State, dated the 27th of April 1773, written by Our command for the purpose of obtaining regular accounts of the state of the commerce of Our subjects in foreign parts and of the increase and decrease of the same.

13. During the continuance of the unnatural rebellion which at present unhappily subsists in some of Our colonies in North America you will make it an object of your constant attention to discover whether any and what supplies, and from what ports in the king of Sweden's dominions, may be exported for the use of any of those colonies, either for the purpose of carrying on their military operations or for the purposes of trade; and you will give Us immediate notice of any discoveries you may make on this head through Our principal Secretary of State for the northern department:

HENRY HOWARD, EARL OF SUFFOLK, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
THOMAS WROUGHTON.

(Record Office, Sweden 128-9.)

St. James's, Nov^r 27th 1778.

[*Unsigned.*]

Your letters N^o 3 to N^o 9 have been received and laid before the King, and I have it in command to assure you that the expressions of friendship and regard made use of by the king of Sweden and the rest of the Swedish royal family towards his Majesty, as well as the gracious reception given to his minister in your person, afforded his Majesty the greatest satisfaction.

You very properly anticipated in your conversation with his Swedish Majesty expressions of the great pleasure which the news of the queen of Sweden's safe delivery of a prince [Gustavus Adolphus] gave to the King.

My letter of the 19th October will have furnished you with an answer to everything that may be said to you on the subject of the capture and detention of Swedish vessels, and will have proved

to the Swedish ministry the King's extreme attention to prevent, as far as circumstances could admit, any detriment or loss arising from our part to neutral ships. The decisions of the High Court of Admiralty will have corroborated this with the strongest evidence, and sufficiently pointed out to Swedish traders the limits to which their speculations may with security be extended during the present hostilities of Great Britain with France and with the rebellious colonies. The very proper and moderate conduct of Baron Nolcken with regard to these matters has not made it necessary to submit any of his representations on Swedish captures for the opinion of his Majesty's law servants, but it will not be an useless communication that I make to you of the inclosed report of his Majesty's Advocate General on the case of a Danish ship, as it shews the principles of equity and moderation which direct the decisions of the High Court of Admiralty and will enable you, whenever you may be spoken to on the subject, to demonstrate how much it is for the interest of neutral powers that every case wherein is concerned the security of their property stopt on what ground soever by English ships should be necessarily submitted to the determination of that court.

St James's, Jan^y 3rd 1779.

I have received your letters Nos. 13, 14 and 15 and have laid them before the King.

Notwithstanding the assurances which Monsieur de Scheffer lately gave you that his court was not arming a single boat and that if they did arm it would not be as enemies to Great Britain, I have received from undoubted authority intelligence that the king of Sweden intends to equip a number of men of war to convoy their ships to the ports of France with naval stores in the spring, and that overtures are actually made to the court of Denmark from that of Stockholm to enter into a convention for the mutual support of their commerce, which it is hoped will meet with the concurrence of Russia. This is so contradictory to what Monsieur de Scheffer declared to you that I would not lose any time in giving you information of it and in directing you to make it the object of your most serious attention. And you will not fail to give me the earliest information of the discoveries you may be able to make on a matter of so much importance as a resolution to support the commerce of Sweden with France in such articles as may enable her to carry on her war with his Majesty.

St. James's, Jan^{ry} 12th 1779.

Your letters N^o 17 and 18 have been received and laid before the King, as well as your separate and private dispatches of the 15th and 22^d December, the contents of which are of too interesting a nature not to deserve immediate acknowledgment. With regard to the latter, wherein you hint at symptoms of dissatisfaction in the court of Sweden with that of France and at a consequent probability of transferring her attachment to England under equal advantages of subsidy or protection to those which she may derive from her present connexion with or rather subserviency to France, I must observe to you that many reasons, both of a particular and general nature, exist to render any attempt or overture on our part of the tendency alluded to highly improper at this moment. You will therefore strictly confine yourself to the mere observation and reporting of any variation in the dispositions of the court where you reside, without taking any step or holding any language which may in any respect commit your own.

THOMAS THYNNE, VISCOUNT WEYMOUTH, SECRETARY OF STATE,
TO THOMAS WROUGHTON.

(*Record Office, Sweden 129, 130.*)

St. James's, Feby 19th 1779.

Your letters N^o have been received and laid before the King, and I am glad to be able to conclude from that of the freshest date that you are recovered from your indisposition..

Our conduct towards neutrals in the point of stopping naval stores going in their ships to the ports of France is at present an object of the greatest importance and most general attention, and you appear to have so well understood and executed your instructions on that head, in the language you have held upon it to the Swedish ministry, that I would by no means withhold from you any information of our sentiments or resolutions which may assist your perseverance in the same proper line of conduct.

The King has demonstrated in the present conjuncture so much friendship and attention to neutral states (of which you possess sufficient proofs in the letter of the 19th October and the decrees of the Court of Admiralty) that it would be inconsistent as well

as very far from his Majesty's wish to deny such farther éclaircissements as are amicably demanded by neutrals, and which it is in our power to give ; but you will readily conceive that the precise definition of naval stores is not of this number. The demand for particular articles of such stores is so fluctuating, the denomination of raw materials or finished implements so equivocal, and their utility so equal in many articles that it does not appear feasible, nor perhaps safe, to attempt to discriminate them, necessitated as we are to prevent as much as possible our enemy from receiving the essential assistance which they constitute. The only rule therefore which under these circumstances can be given is what has been the constant usage in former wars, from which it is impossible we can formally and precisely promise to depart, how much soever inclined his Majesty may be to consider that the articles in question, being so principally the natural productions of Sweden the trade of that country is essentially interested in their reaching with security a foreign market. But at the same time it may be observed that as the Act of Navigation does not forbid the direct importation of such natural products it might be the interest of Sweden, as well as perfectly compatible with the strict neutrality which she professes a wish to observe, if such articles of naval stores were shipp'd by her merchants directly for England, than which no better market can surely exist during a state of hostilities like the present.

You have hitherto very properly enforced the argument of self defence as the justification of our conduct on the point in question, which must remain sufficient and unanswerable ; yet I have not thought it useless to furnish you with the above hints on the subject of more particular specification of naval stores, to which you will conform your language when farther spoken to by the Swedish ministry thereupon.

You will very properly continue your best attention to the progress of the idea of a concert between the northern powers for the protection of their trade, as also to any armaments that may be undertaken with that or any other object.

St James's, March 26th 1779.

. The intended equipment at Carlskrona is very probably calculated to satisfy the court of France and to keep pace with their neighbours. I am persuaded, you will, however, be attentive

to the progress of it, as well as endeavour to discover what remittances may be made from France for compleating it, the steps that may be taken to procure a sufficient number of seamen, and whether there is a probability of it's being put into such a state as to be able to proceed farther than the Baltic. You are already apprized of the attempts which have been made by the court of France to indispose the northern maritime powers against us and to misrepresent the measures which his Majesty has been under the necessity of taking for his own security ; but the justice and equity of his Majesty's proceedings, the invariable observance of the laws of nations, and the attention which has been shewn to the interests of the subjects of neutral powers are so universally known that the endeavours of his Majesty's enemies are not likely to meet with success. But you will not, I am persuaded, lose sight of the favorite object the court of France has in view, the bringing about a convention between the courts of Petersbourg Copenhagen and Stockholm for the purpose of equipping fleets for the protection of their commerce.

St. James's, April 13th 1779.

I have received your letters N° 32, 33, 34 and 35 and have laid them before the King.

I have great satisfaction in assuring you that your zeal and attention meets with his Majesty's gracious approbation. The report of his Swedish Majesty's intention to visit this country, as you remark, does not appear to deserve much credit, but if it should be revived I am sure you will not be inattentive to it.

The description you have obtained of the state of the fleet fitting out at Carlskrona is very important, and I am persuaded you will keep me informed of the progress of it ; and it is very material for us to know how far the king of Sweden may have it in his power to comply with the wishes of France, as well as how far she may be inclined to assist her ally in the efforts she is now making. We have great reason to believe that the court of Denmark will not join in the convention, which France labours to bring about. His Majesty's desire to preserve the good understanding at present subsisting between this country and the northern maritime powers is invariable. At the same time the King finds it indispensably necessary to use every means in his power to prevent his enemies

from being supplied with those articles they are most in want of for the purpose of carrying on the war.

St James's, May 14th 1779.

Your letters N^o 37 and 38 have been received and laid before the King.

I have only to commend your zeal in his Majesty's service, and if you shall receive positive information of what was mentioned to you of an intention in the court of France to authorize Swedish merchants to fit out privateers to make reprizals I am persuaded you will give me the earliest intelligence of it, that his Majesty may give such directions as may appear to be necessary for the protection of his subjects. The King wishes to preserve the most perfect understanding with the court of Sweden, and what you said on this subject to the person from whom you received your information was extremely proper. You will continue to hold the same language and you will take every opportunity of assuring the Swedish ministers that his Majesty does not wish to interrupt the innocent trade of neutral subjects but that he cannot, consistent with his own security, permit his enemies to be supplied with such articles as they stand most in need of to carry on a war against his Majesty, commenced and prosecuted on the most unjust principles that ever existed.

The answer to the inflammatory letter on the subject of the Swedish ship carried into Falmouth may be of use, and it were to be wished that the postscript had not been omitted. There can be but one reply to complaints for this kind, which is that the Court of Admiralty is ever desirous to do the most ample justice to neutral subjects, whenever they appear to have been aggrieved; and there has not been an instance since the commencement of the war where, on regular proceeding, the party offending has not met with exemplary punishment.

St. James's, July 16th 1779.

I have received your letters N^o 48 and 49 and have laid them before the King.

The language which you held to Count Scheffer on the subject of the equipment and sailing of part of their fleet was extremely proper, and you will continue to give the strongest assurances of his Majesty's constant desire to preserve the good understanding

between the two courts. By a letter from Mr Fenwick at Elsinore, dated the 29th past, we learn that the Swedish squadron, consisting of six ships of the line four frigates and a small cutter, had put to sea the preceding day; that the duke of Sudermania intended to remain on board during a short cruise in the north sea, at the expiration of which his Royal Highness proposed to land at Gothenbourg, and the fleet was to proceed towards Cape Finisterre. From the account which you have given of the state of the Swedish ships, which is also repeated in Mr Fenwick's letter, it does not seem probable that the latter part of their destination should be put in execution; if they should determine to do so it can only be with an intent to convey naval stores to the ports of France, and you will take an opportunity of representing to Mons^r de Scheffer, in the most friendly terms, the consequences which most probably will result from it, as they can hardly fail of being met with by some part of his Majesty's fleet.

I do not perceive by your correspondence that Mons^r Scheffer has communicated to you the note, which Baron Nolcken was instructed to deliver to me some time ago; I therefore send you a copy of it, as also of the answer which his Majesty has ordered me to return to it. This you will take an early opportunity of communicating to Mons^r de Scheffer, for his Swedish Majesty's information. This answer is so full that it requires no explanation, and the instructions which his Majesty has from time to time ordered to be printed for the regulating the conduct of his own officers, as well as that of the commanders of letters of marque and privateers, have been drawn with every possible attention to the security of the subjects of neutral powers; and lest you should not be furnished with copies of them I send them inclosed.

As you will observe that towards the conclusion of Baron Nolcken's note there is a reference to the orders given by his Swedish Majesty to the governor of Gothenbourg with regard to his Majesty's ships of war or privateers that may have occasion to enter the ports of Sweden, I desired Baron Nolcken to furnish me with a copy of these orders, which he very obligingly did. I send you inclosed a copy of this paper, by which you will see that the exception of the port of Marstrand, as contrary to the treaty of 1661, recited in the answer to Baron Nolcken is contained in these orders; and it was therefore very necessary to make the observation upon it, which is contained in the inclosed answer.

St James's, August 31st 1779

I have received your letters N^o 55 and 56 and have laid them before the King.

I am very glad to find you have repeated the apprehensions you were instructed to express on the subject of Swedish convoys accompanying merchant ships laden with naval stores for the ports of France. His Majesty most earnestly desires to preserve the good understanding which at present subsists between the two crowns, and therefore would wish that every thing may be avoided that can in the least endanger it. If his Majesty's cruizers should meet with any merchant ships so laden, though under convoy, they will be under the necessity of bringing them in I mention this, as a report has prevailed lately at the Hague that orders have been given to the King's officers to respect the Swedish convoys, whilst we object to the Dutch; and it has been reported at Copenhagen that one of his Majesty's ships let a Swedish convoy pass without taking any notice of it. You will easily see the difficulties which this must occasion, and if it is in your power to enable Sir Joseph Yorke to contradict this second report you will do it as speedily as you can. At all events you will exert your utmost endeavours to prevent the disagreeable consequences which may be expected, if any part of the Swedish fleet is employed.

St. James's, October 22^d 1779.

Your several letters to N^o 61 have been laid before the King.

I have great satisfaction in assuring you that the King approves the zeal you have shewn for his Majesty's service in having deferred to avail yourself of the permission his Majesty was pleased to grant you to come to England.

You will, I do not doubt, have heard from Mr Eden of the very friendly conduct of the court of Denmark in having restored two transports in his Majesty's service, which had been brought into the port of Bergen by an American privateer. I am persuaded you will have made a proper use of this information in your conversation with the Swedish ministers, and the remark in the note to Baron Nolckin, dated the 7th of August last, with regard to the exception of the port of Marstrand (contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of 1661) contained in the instructions given to the governour of Gothenbourg, cannot fail to strike the Swedish ministers on this occasion. His Majesty is persuaded of the

friendly disposition of the king of Sweden, and it would be highly satisfactory to his Majesty, whenever the case may admit of it, if his Swedish Majesty would issue orders of the same friendly tendency with those lately given by the king of Denmark.

DAVID MURRAY, VISCOUNT STORMONT, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO
THOMAS WROUGHTON.

(*Record Office, Sweden 130.*)

St. James's, Jan^{ry} 25th 1780.

Your letters N^o 68 and 69 have been received and laid before the King.

I make no doubt that Baron Nolckin, with his usual fairness, will have made an exact report of the determination of the Court of Admiralty with regard to the Swedish ships. That determination shews that the Admiralty Court has fulfilled the assurances I gave you of it's administering speedy and impartial justice upon this as upon every other occasion.

It appears by information that has reached us from a variety of channels that there is a very general uneasiness and discontent in Sweden, which seems, according to these accounts, to increase every day. It is also reported that in order to lessen these discontents there is an intention of assembling a diet early in the spring. As you have not mentioned it in your dispatch no such resolution can have been openly taken, but you will please to endeavour to discover whether there is a secret intention, and if it does exist what are the motives and what the principal objects in view. It is likewise reported, and not without some appearance of probability, that Spain is endeavouring to purchase from Sweden a considerable number of ships of the line, for which, besides the purchase of them, she is to make some concession that will flatter the king of Sweden's ambition. The nature of that concession is not yet agreed upon. I do not give you this intelligence as certain, on the contrary I consider it as very doubtful, and mean it only as a ground of enquiry. If you should discover that there is any such project actually carrying on, and that Sweden does mean to furnish any naval force to France or Spain, in any shape whatever, you will not fail to make the strongest remonstrances against it as a direct and open violation of our treaty. It is essential to the King's service that you should be very attentive not only to this

object but also to every thing that passes in the ports of Sweden, and endeavour to transmit to me the fullest information of the actual state of the naval force of that country. What number of ships they could furnish immediately to France and Spain, upon being paid for them, what ships of war they could build for those powers in the course of this year, what fleet they could equip and put to sea this summer, if France was to give them a sufficient subsidy. Your last letter says that they will not be able to equip one, if unsupported by foreign aid and left to their own scanty resources.

St. James's, March 31st 1780.

. . . . There is good reason to believe that France expects in the course of the summer a large supply of naval stores from Sweden and that these stores are to be convoyed by Swedish ships of war. You will please to point your attention to this important object and transmit to me all the information you can collect with regard to it. Till the design is avowed, or at least publickly known, it might be improper to make any representation upon it, but it is essential to keep the object constantly in view.

St. James's, April 18th 1780.

I have no other commands from his Majesty on the subject of your last letters to me, N^o 9 and 10, than to express his approbation of your conduct and of your diligence and zeal in his service.

I wait with impatience to know what resolution your court has taken, or means to take, in consequence of the application made by the empress of Russia. Tho' her Imperial Majesty's armament was certainly occasioned by a just resentment of the unwarrantable conduct of Spain, and tho' her declaration points principally at that court, yet I have some reason to suspect that the court of France will use their endeavours to engage the king of Sweden to adopt the Empress's proposals, in hopes that out of such an unnatural junction something will arise to the prejudice of this country. You are so active in the discharge of your duty that I need not recommend to you to be particularly attentive to send me the fullest and speediest information of every resolution taken by the court of Sweden upon this interesting occasion. If there is any book of ordonances published in Sweden respecting

the condemnation of prizes, similar to the marine ordonances in France, I trust you would take the first opportunity that offers of sending it me by a safe conveyance.

P.S. I have just had a short conversation with Baron Nolcken, who came to mention to me a disagreeable accident that happened in the Mediterranean to one of his Swedish Majesty's frigates.

The vessel that attacked the frigate in the night was a cutter supposed to be English, but there is no proof of that, nor any one circumstance yet known that indicates whence the vessel came nor to what nation she belongs. Under these circumstances all I could possibly say to Baron Nolken, and all indeed that he expected or desired, was to express in general terms my concern for this disagreeable accident and to assure him that every inquiry should be made that could lead to discovery. The circumstance of the cutter haling the Swedish frigate in French makes it as probable that she does not belong to this country.

St. James's, May 5th 1780.

On Saturday last I had the favor of yours No 13, which has been laid before the King.

In addition to what I said in my last letter I think it proper to inform you that I have now very good reason to believe that France will use her utmost endeavours to engage the king of Sweden to adopt the proposal made by the empress of Russia, from an expectation that by the means of that secret intrigue, by which France endeavours to influence and misguide the court of Petersbourg, her Imperial Majesty may be induced to give such a turn to her present plan as will render it prejudicial to Great Britain. I have however the pleasure to inform you that the Empresses professions continue to be as friendly as ever, and there is no reason to doubt of their being perfectly sincere. In this situation of things you cannot speak with too much caution and circumspection of the Russian declaration, without seeming to take any alarm at it. You may easily find an opportunity of saying in general terms, either in your conversation with the Swedish ministers or with the king of Sweden himself, that the subsisting treaties are the true and natural bond of union between this country and Sweden and that you have no doubt they will be an invariable law to both

.....

St. James's, May 16th 1780.

I lose no time in acknowledging your letter of the 21st.

The language you held to his Swedish Majesty was extremely proper and meets with the King's entire approbation. Nothing can be more directly contrary to his Majesty's sentiments and to those principles of justice that regulate his conduct than to suffer any insult to the flag of a friendly neutral power to go unpunished. I send you a copy of a memorial received the other day from Baron Nolken, and of the answer I returned by his Majesty's command. In my conversation with Mons^r Nolken I made him sensible that the method he proposes at the end of his memorial is impossible. Private ships of war, though amenable to trial for every offence, do not, as you know, receive orders from the Admiralty; and we have no fleet in the Mediterranean to compel the Hector's immediate return. But the most effectual methods will be taken to sift the matter to the bottom, and if the guilt comes out such as it is stated to be it will meet with the punishment due to so flagrant a violation of the general law of nations and of the friendship that happily subsists between the two courts, and that is so agreeable to the interests and disposition of both.

What you say of the king of Sweden's intended journey is confirmed from various quarters. It seems to be generally believed that it is a journey of mere amusement, and that he means to go to Spa. If the object is to keep clear of any decided resolution with regard to the proposal from Russia I do not think it unwise.

St. James's, August 8th 1780.

Your letters No 24 and 25 have been received and laid before the King. His Majesty entirely approves the language you held to the Great Chancellor [Ulrik Scheffer] and the memorial you presented.

The right is so clear, and the stipulations of our treaty so full and explicit and so directly to the point in question, that it cannot be doubted from his Swedish Majesty's known justice and equity that he will immediately issue the necessary orders and direct a proper answer to be returned to you; but as the object is an important one you will take care not to lose sight of it, and in case of any delay you will renew your application in the most pressing but at the same time in the politest manner.

On Thursday last Baron Noleken delivered to me by order of his court a declaration of which the inclosed is a copy. I have it in command from the King to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that you take the first proper opportunity of presenting to the Swedish ministry the inclosed answer, informing them that you have received it from hence and present it by his Majesty's express command.

It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Swedish declaration, as upon the first perusal of it you will see how repugnant it is to the clearest stipulations of our treaties with Sweden. This is fully stated in the abovementioned answer, the main object of which is to state what our mutual engagements are with regard to the points so much agitated of late and to declare, in the precisest but at the same time the civilest and most friendly terms, his Majesty's fixed and invariable resolution to abide by and support and maintain those treaties and to suffer no deviation from the line they have drawn.

St James's, Augst 25th 1780.

I have already desired you to press in the strongest manner for a satisfactory answer to the memorial you have presented. Your demand is so clearly just and so agreeable to the clearest stipulations of treaty that it is impossible the court of Sweden can hesitate to comply with it, if their dispositions towards this country are as friendly as they have repeatedly professed them to be. I will not suppose them capable of giving you an evasive answer, but if that should be the case you will return to the charge and in the strongest but most friendly terms claim the performance of our treaty, the stipulations of which are so clear, and apply so directly to the case in question, that it is impossible to dispute them.

I have some reason to believe that France will use every endeavour to engage Sweden to resist our demand. This circumstance, I know, will add to your activity and quicken your zeal.

I observed in the account you gave me of a conversation you had with the Russian minister that he appeared to talk to you with great confidence. You may draw advantage from such conversations, provided you on your part are constantly on your guard and remember that whatever Mr Pouschkin may affect he is certainly very hostile at bottom and attached to that strange unnatural system that would connect Russia with France.

St James's, Sept^r 12 1780.

. . . . The demand so properly insisted upon in your memorial is so just, and the right our treaty gives us so indisputable, that I cannot but expect that his Swedish Majesty will order a satisfactory answer to be given you. There is however no doubt that the French are using every endeavour to engage the court of Sweden to give an equivocal evasive answer. I have repeatedly informed you that it is the King's pleasure that you continue to insist in the strongest but politest manner on the demand you have made, claiming the clear stipulations of treaty. There is reason to beleive that in the course of the ensuing winter France will use every endeavour to turn the northern league into something hostile to this country and from the close connexion with your court will expect his Swedish Majesty's concurrence in such a design. I need not say how important it is for you to be watchful and active to counteract such attempts. It is impossible to give more than general instructions upon such a subject, as it cannot yet be known in what shape these attempts will be made; every motive of justice and sound policy ought to prevent the king of Sweden's engaging in such measures, and I cannot but hope, from his general wisdom and from his repeated friendly professions to this country, that there is not much danger of his being caught in such a snare.

St. James's, Nov^r 14th 1780.

Your letters N^o 36 and 37 have been received and laid before the King. It gave his Majesty great pleasure to hear of the king of Sweden's return to his dominions in perfect health.

I have no doubt of your constant endeavours to cultivate the favourable disposition towards this country, which his Swedish Majesty has expressed upon various occasions of late, but more particularly in a long and confidential conversation with his Majesty's ambassador at the Hague [Sir Joseph Yorke]. The king of Sweden's own observation will have furnished him with many proofs of the malevolence of the French faction in Holland and of the scandalous partiality that marks the conduct of the Dutch in a war, in which the republick is bound by every tie to give the most effectual assistance to Great Britain. But the seizure of Mr Laurens's papers has opened a new scene of treachery, and furnished positive proofs of that clandestine correspondence with the rebels, of which we had many suspicions and indications. The account given in the

Dutch papers of this business is a very false one. The treaty, the project of which was signed by positive orders from the Pensionary and other magistrates of Amsterdam, is not conditional or eventual, but direct and absolute, and is a treaty of perpetual peace and indissoluble friendship between the republick of Holland and the United States of North America. If there is not a formal disavowal by the republick of such an infamous transaction, and an exemplary punishment of the perpetrators of such treachery, the most serious consequences must ensue. In such a quarrel it is not possible that the republic should receive any assistance or support from any power in friendship with Great Britain. The avowed object of the Northern Union is to support neutrality, not to abet the enemies of any of the belligerant powers. I am persuaded that his Swedish Majesty, from those principles of justice and that elevation of sentiment which distinguish him, will feel great indignation at this conduct of the Dutch and will never directly or indirectly do any thing that can tend to support so odious a cause.

As we do not yet know what the answer of the States General will be it would not be regular for you to say any thing official to the Swedish ministers upon the subject, but either in the audience you are to have of his Swedish Majesty, or on some other occasion, you may, I think, find an opportunity of speaking to him, and if such an opportunity offers I am sure you will seize it with address and improve it to the utmost. You see how important it is to give a right impression at first and to prevent all those misrepresentations which our enemies will make with their usual dexterity and with that contempt of truth, which is so habitual to them, and which indeed may be considered as the distinguishing characteristic of their policy.¹

THE SAME TO SIR THOMAS WROUGHTON, K.B.

(*Record Office, F.O. 73, 1, 2.*)

St. James's, Feby 27th 1781.

Your letters N^o 1 and 2 did not reach me till the 22^d inst. They were immediately laid before the King.

¹ Henry Laurens, arrested in London in October 1780, v - - - American "rebel," President of Congress in 1778 and one of those who signed the preliminary terms of peace at Paris on 30 November 1782. Lord Stormont sent the papers seized with him, including a draft for a treaty between the United States and the City of Amsterdam, to Sir Joseph Yorke at the Hague on 11 October 1780 (*Record Office, Holland 572*).

The language you held to the king of Sweden and his ministers was extremely proper and meets with his Majesty's entire approbation. It gives his Majesty great pleasure to find the king of Sweden so sincerely disposed to maintain the friendship that has so long subsisted between the two nations and that ought to be immutable as the common interests upon which it is founded. You will be particularly attentive to use every endeavour in your power to preserve this good disposition, which our enemies are so sollicitous to change. We know from various quarters that the courts of France and Prussia will assail his Swedish Majesty by every possible artifice and are not without hopes of giving a false direction to his politics. You will however be careful not to betray any suspicion of this kind, but at the same time you will exert all that vigilance which the present crisis requires. You judged very well in employing the Austrian chargé d'affaires, who, from the present very favourable disposition of his court to this country, must be inclined to give you every assistance in his power.

St. James's, 9th March 1781.

. . . . I understand that the States General have applied to the king of Sweden to purchase ten ships of the line, and there is intelligence, but I hope not to be credited, that his Swedish Majesty has given a favourable answer to this demand. I cannot persuade myself that he can think of taking such a step, which would be a direct and flagrant violation of our treaty. Nothing can be clearer nor more express than the stipulations upon this point. It will be necessary that you take the first opportunity of speaking to Mons^r de Scheffer upon the subject, but you will be carefull to do it not only in the politest but in the most friendly manner, mentioning the application made by Holland as an instance of the absurdity to propose to such a court as that of Sweden a direct violation of solemn engagements with Great Britain.

If, contrary to all expectations, either Monsieur de Scheffer's answer or any other circumstance should give you reason to apprehend that there is the least intention of falling in with the offer made by the States General you will make the strongest representations against it, as a clear breach of the abovementioned article and indeed an act of absolute hostility.

St. James's, April 10th 1781.

I send you enclosed an extract of a letter I received a few days ago from Sir James Harris. It is so much for the interest and dignity of all the three northern powers to secure the uninterrupted trade of the Baltic that I can have no doubt of the court of Sweden's agreeing perfectly in opinion with that of Petersburg upon this subject. You will however take the first opportunity of mentioning it to Mons^r Scheffer and assure him that nothing can be more agreeable to his Majesty's wishes than that the trade of the Baltic should continue to be secured in the manner it has hitherto been, and that no interruptions should be given to it by the Dutch war.

The language you held to Mons^r Scheffer was extremely proper. From the first impression it made upon him there seems but too good reason to believe that the extraordinary proposal made by the republick of Holland was not rejected in the manner it ought to have been, but it is sufficient for our purpose to know that the project will not be carried into execution, upon which point Mons^r Scheffer was so direct and explicit, his credit and sincerity are pledged for the truth of what he asserted.

St. James's, May 22^d 1781.

Yesterday Baron Nolcken came to me and by order of his court delivered to me a note, of which I inclose a copy. This note is verbatim the same with that which I have received from the Russian and Danish ministers [Ivan Simolin and Christopher Dreyer], but those ministers accompanied the communication they made with an express declaration in writing to the following effect; that as a rupture between Great Britain and Holland had arisen from causes in which their respective courts had no concern, and which were foreign to the object of the neutral league, they, the abovementioned courts, considered the States General as *Puissance Neuve* with respect to France and Spain, but as *Puissance Belligerante vis à vis de l'Angleterre*. These are the very words in which the distinction so properly made is expressed. I, of course, expected a similar declaration from Baron Nolcken, and finding that he remained silent, after delivering the inclosed note, I asked him if he had nothing further to say to me upon the subject of the communication he had made. When by his answer I found he had not, I acquainted him with the substance of the declaration made by the other two ministers, and added that as I was persuaded

that the sentiments of his court were equally pacific, and as Mons^r de Scheffer's language to you had been as friendly as possible, I attributed the difference of his orders to some accidental mistake. He answered that his orders were to *act in concert* with the other two ministers, and that he had not the least doubt that the intentions of his court were exactly similar to those of Russia and Denmark. I asked him if he thought himself authorized to make a similar declaration, and upon his answering in the negative I told him that he must be sensible that the communication of a convention entered into with a power actually at war with his Majesty was a very different thing, when it stood single, from what it was when accompanied with such a friendly declaration, and that consequently the answer must also be different; but that, as I wished to avoid such a difference, I thought that the properest mark of attention that could be given to his court, to which every attention was due, was to defer the answer 'till he could have time to receive further instructions. He seemed to be much pleased with this proposal. You will take the first opportunity of mentioning this business to Mo^r Scheffer, exactly as it is. I have no doubt that he will immediately send orders to Baron Nolcken to rectify what I am persuaded must be a mistake. You see, however, how important it is that a mistake of such a nature, and in a business of such moment, should be corrected.

St. James's, June 26th 1781.

I heard with concern of your indisposition, and wait with impatience for accounts of your perfect recovery.

After all the professions made to you by the Swedish ministers, after all the king of Sweden himself has repeatedly said to you with respect to the Dutch, it is matter of just surprize to find that his Swedish Majesty at once concurs in a proposal to join in a memorial of a very extraordinary nature, for such we know it to be, tho' as yet having no official communication of it, nor regular notice of such an intention, we must be entirely silent upon the subject. If such a paper is presented, the answer to be given to it his Majesty's wisdom will determine. In the mean time you will use your utmost endeavours to discover what are the real designs of your court, what steps they are prepared to take to press the acceptance of the offered mediation, and if such should be their intention in what shape they can carry it into execution,

what force they can put to sea, and how soon that force can be made to operate. I do not mean to insinuate that there is sufficient ground to believe that Sweden means hostility; and you will be very careful not to betray the least suspicion or apprehension of any such intention; but in doubtful times like these, when the true principles of policy, that ought to govern the conduct of courts, are so little attended to, and when we know that the king of Prussia wishes to involve the northern powers in a war with Great Britain, and eagerly pressed to be admitted into the northern league with that view, at such a time, I say, and under such circumstances we cannot be too attentive to guard against the possibility of a surprize.

St. James's, Feby 19th 1782

. . . I have repeated intelligence from various quarters that the French ministers, who know how much the king of Sweden's vanity was hurt by the non-acceptance of his offer of mediation, use every artifice to inflame his passions. As by addressing themselves to his vanity they attack his weakest part, there is too much reason to believe that the attack will not be unsuccessful. You know that the offer made by his Swedish Majesty was declined in the politest manner. It could not have been accepted without giving great umbrage to the empress of Russia, who had been the first to offer her good offices and who, upon that and every other account, was entitled to the preference given her. She was very anxious to obtain that preference, and if the king of Sweden does not know this to be the case all I will say is that he is ill acquainted with the real sentiments of her Imperial Majesty. It is not meant that you should enter into this subject, either with the king of Sweden himself or with any of his ministers, unless they lead you to it. But you will please to continue your attention to seize every proper opportunity of paying your court to his Swedish Majesty and endeavour to preserve and if possible increase the share you have in his Swedish Majesty's personal favour.

St. James's, March 22^d 1782.

Your letters down to N^o 6 have been received and laid before the King.

According to intelligence I have received from various quarters the Dutch expect a large supply of cannon from Sweden, and are in great want of such supply. It may not perhaps be possible to

prevent cannon being sold to them by individuals, in the way of trade, but it will be essential to keep this object constantly in view and to transmit to me the earliest information you can procure respecting the ships on board of which this cannon is sent and the probable time of their sailing. You cannot be too minute in your accounts, as such particular description will increase the chance of intercepting this supply.

I have been informed from pretty good authority, but cannot absolutely vouch for the truth of my information, that France has agreed to give a pretty large sum to his Swedish Majesty, in order to enable him to fit out a respectable fleet of observation this summer. The mode of granting the money is this, not by entering into any new subsidiary engagements but by discharging arrears of subsidy, which have been disputed, or at least the payment of them hitherto withheld. As it is of great importance to know whether such agreement has actually taken place you will secretly endeavour to come to the bottom of this business but will be very cautious in your mode of investigation

FRANCIS OSBORNE, MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, TO SIR THOMAS WROUGHTON.

(*Record Office, F.O. 73, 4, 5*)

St. James's, March 23, 1784.

I take the earliest opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letter No. 4, which arrived this day.

My reason for not troubling you on the subject of my dispatch of December 29 to Mr Elliot was my being thoroughly persuaded of the necessity of keeping clear of the smallest probability of the court of Stockholm having any, however remote a suspicion of their plan being discovered, previous to the court of Denmark's being apprized of the hostile designs of its neighbour.

The same information, by which I learned the intended project of Sweden, furnished me ample proof of the extraordinary secrecy with which the whole plan was meant to be conducted till fully ripe for execution, and I am by no means surprized that even you, Sir, received no intimation upon the subject, though residing upon the spot.

The whole plan probably is laid aside in consequence of the

accommodation which has taken place between Russia and the Porte; it will however be extremely worth your while to endeavour, even at a future period, to discover the real sentiments of the Swedish government in regard to Denmark at the close of the last and beginning of the present year, and you, Sir, I am sure, will neglect no opportunity of acquiring every degree of intelligence not only upon this but upon every other subject, which can in any essential point contribute to his Majesty's information.

St. James's, March 26 1784.

In consequence of intelligence received within these few days, and which may be depended upon, I find the Swedish plan with regard to Denmark is by no means relinquish'd; the preparations which have been made in Norway, in order to put that country in a state of defence, have, I find, occasioned no small degree of umbrage at Stockholm, as they naturally occasion a suspicion of their designs being discover'd, or at least a probability of their being attended with more difficulty in executing than was at first apprehended.

As I understand there have been many vague rumours upon this subject, even at Stockholm, I think it may not be amiss, in the course of your conversation with the Swedish ministers, if you, Sir, were for the present at least to affect totally to discredit them and treat them as undeserving the least degree of serious attention. I would still, however, wish you by no means to lead the Danish minister into an error on this business; the less intercourse between you, however, that can possibly take place at this period the better, as it might furnish suspicion to the Swedish ministers of their plan being discoverd, and at present a direct explanation on the subject might be premature.

You, Sir, from your knowledge of the Danish chargé d'affaires (for the minister, I think, is absent) will best know how far it may be prudent to trust him. I understand he has already been question'd on the subject of the extraordinary preparations making in Norway. I rely most fully, Sir, on your discretion and known zeal for his Majesty's service for every possible degree of information you can collect in regard to the progress of this business. The great degree of caution observed in the conducting of it renders the attainment of that information extremely difficult, but I am

well aware that you will not spare any pains which may tend to the discovery of so important an object.

St. James's, June 29 1784.

Your letters to N^o 19 inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

The account you have transmitted of what has passed between the Russian chargé d'affaires [Rückman] and the Comte de Creutz is very interesting in itself, and the more so as it marks so strongly the desire of the Swedish government to conceal as much as possible the real designs of wild and absurd ambition, which has so long and so absolutely engrossed the attention of the confidential ministers of that court. The very ample information which has from time to time been communicated to the courts of Petersburg and Copenhagen for these six months past has, I hope, fully answer'd the purpose of preventing the hostile projects of Sweden being carried into effect, and the Empress herself having interfer'd renders, I think, any very speedy renewal of such schemes extremely improbable.

On this account, therefore, I hope you will not fail to take advantage of his Majesty's most gracious permission, in order to the reestablishment of your health, by trying the effects of a milder climate, as soon as ever you may think it necessary to leave Sweden for that purpose.

St. James's, Nov. 29 1785.

. The death of M. de Creutz will, I apprehend, be sensibly felt by the king of Sweden, as the loss of so able and diligent a servant must appear almost irreparable to a sovereign, who has so fully and so repeatedly experienced the advantages to be desired from his abilities and zeal in promoting every measure of public utility and advantage.

I am anxious to know what effect the death of this minister is likely to produce, either in respect to the general system of Sweden or to the personal views of the king. Creutz was, I believe, a pensioner of France, but the wild and intemperate disposition of the king of Sweden, which I know has upon more than one occasion greatly perplexed the cool and cautious plans of the Comte Vergennes, may* probably have been tempered into something like prudence by the advice of his late minister. It therefore will

become an object worthy of your most assiduous attention to observe whether any alteration in the conduct of the court of Sweden is likely to take place in consequence of the death of that minister, and you will I am sure, Sir, omit no opportunity of discovering as far as possible the opinion as well as behaviour of M. Pons, in consequence of that event.

Whitehall, May 14 1786.

Your several letters to N^o — inclusive have been duly receiv'd and laid before the King, and I am happy to assure you, Sir, of your attention to every circumstance of sufficient consequence to be communicated to his Majesty having met with his royal approbation.

The king of Sweden's convocation of a diet, at so short a notice, is a circumstance naturally productive of speculation, and the more so, when the restless spirit which has for some time past prevailed in almost every step taken by the court of Stockholm comes to be considered. Should the present diet be convened merely for purposes of finance, and the supposed object of the kings wishes, respecting the Bank, be carried into execution, I think a short time will be sufficient to remove every possible apprehension entertained by those powers, who suspect the abilities of Sweden being at all adequate to carrying into effect any one of the wild projects of ambition the Swedish monarch is supposed to have formed. You will however, Sir, continue to give every possible degree of attention both to the public and private measures, as far as you can possibly discover them, of the Swedish monarch, at this period in particular.

M. de Pons, I have reason to believe, regrets the loss of M. Creutz, on account of the improper persons at present likely to possess the king of Sweden's confidence. He expresses himself as having been uneasy at the intimate footing on which you, Sir, apparently lived with M. Marcoff and the Danish minister [Juel] and was apprehensive that such a triumvirate might, by means of certain persons employed in secondary offices of the Swedish government, occasion a change of sentiment, and ultimately of conduct, in the king himself.

I own it was not without satisfaction I learnt this apprehension of the French ambassador, and although it is difficult to prevail upon Russia to cooperate in any thing which deserves the name

of a system, either at Stockholm or elsewhere, yet any thing which can counteract the views of France is, in my apprehension, too essential to the interests of this country not to be distinctly and repeatedly encouraged.

The line of conduct which both Russia and Denmark ought to observe with respect to the French influence in Sweden appears to me so perfectly similar to that which England should adopt, that your continuing to shew a desire of cultivating the friendship of those two ministers, and in fact living with them upon a confidential footing, as far as they are to be trusted, will certainly be adviseable.

To CHARLES KEENE.

(*Record Office, F.O. 73, 7, 8.*)

[*Unsigned.*]

Whitehall, August 29th 1788.

Your several letters to N° — inclusive have been received and laid before the King.

His Majesty observes with the deepest concern the rupture which has taken place between Sweden and Russia, and would with pleasure contribute his good offices and mediation with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, not only from principles of humanity but from motives of sincere friendship and regard to the king of Sweden, and an earnest desire to promote the tranquillity and welfare of that prince's dominions and to maintain the equilibre of the powers on the Baltic.

His Majesty having communicated his wishes upon this important subject to his good brother and ally the king of Prussia was happy to find that prince concur entirely in opinion with his Majesty and equally desirous of promoting the salutary ends of reconciliation between the two contending powers, and there is every reason to believe that the States General of the United Provinces will readily concur with his Majesty and the king of Prussia in offering their good offices and mediation towards the attainment of so desirable an object.

You will, Sir, upon the receipt of this dispatch immediately communicate to the Swedish ministers, for the information of the king their master, this his Majesty's most friendly offer, and as soon as you have received the king of Sweden's answer you will not fail to redispach the messenger to England with it.

Whitehall, March 13th, 1789.

[Signed "Carmarthen"]

I am to desire that you will procure and transmit to me for the information of the Lords of the Committee for Trade an account of the state and success of the Greenland whale fishery, carried on in Sweden in the course of the year 1788; and as from information received by the Committee there is reason to believe that this fishery has been generally unsuccessful, and that many ships have been lost in the prosecution of it in the last season, it is their Lordships' wish, if this information shall prove to be well founded, that the causes as well of the ill success of the fishery, as of the loss of the ships employed in it, may be particularly assigned, and as there is ground to suppose that there will be some proceeding in parliament in the course of this session, in the discussion of which the information now desired will be useful, it is necessary you should transmit the same with as little delay as possible.

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